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It is the primary aim of this dissertation to draw 
attention to Voegelin’s political philosophy and to place it 
at the center of the conduct of political inquiry, by 
criticizing positivistic political epistemology. Though 
scientism had become a dominant commitment, it does not 
provide an appropriate approach to political knowledge. 
Making reality dependent on methodology, it neglects 
important political existence, and fails to ask deeper 
questions about the truth-content political reality. 
However, there is an extra-spatio-temporal reality, that we 
can know, albeit imperfectly, and not discovered by the 
modern scientific methods.
By means of the restoration and "retheoretization" of 
the classical Platonic and Aristoteli. political
philosophy, Voegelin attempts to provide an answer to the 
discredited positivistic world view of man, politics and 
history. Voegelin’s political philosophy evaluates
critically both the methods and the subject matter of 
political science, explores the human nature and the reality 
of human existence in society and history, comprehends the 
relations between knowledge and reality, penetrates the 
sources of the disorder of society, probes the limits of
v i
instrumental rationality, and establishes an ontological 
basis for political epistemology.
The dissertation is divided into five chapters. 
Chapter One is a background study of the epistemological 
controversies of political inquiry. Chapter Two is an 
explication of Voegelin’s critique of positivism and his 
redevelopment of the true meanings of science, theory, and 
philosophy. The third chapter clarifies the main theories 
of Voegelinian philosophy: political reality. To recount
Voegelin’s speculation of political reality, the theories of 
consciousness, representation, and history are examined. 
Chapter Four reviews Voegelin’s account of modernity and 
gnosticism as a civilizational critique. Chapter Five gives 
some indication of Voegelin’s general position in 
contemporary political science by appreciating the scope of 
his "new science of politics" in both critical and 
constructive dimensions.
Voegelinian "philosophical science of politics" is a 
new, revolutionary way of political inquiry in that it 
proffers science in a new mode. It restores a radically new 
anthropology, i.e., theory of man as man. As a noetic 
science, it signals the abandonment of the sciences of the 
external world as the model of the science of man.
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is a critique of positivist- 
behavioral ist political theorizing in contemporary political 
science, since I find myself standing on the threshold of 
the critique that attacks the positivistic political inquiry 
and believing that political science is continuously shaped 
and nourished by t h e  philosophical traditions. By treating 
a "philosophical science of politics,"1 like that developed 
by Eric Voegelin, as the vigilant reflective enterprise that 
seeks to revolt against positivistic, scientistic, and 
empirical mainstream in political science, this work 
attempts to illumine and investigate Voegelin’s approach as 
an alternative to the contemporary theories of politics 
which have been dominated by positivistic epistemology.
In this very context, this study was conceived in an 
endeavor to understand the nature of political knowledge and 
reality. Many observers have commented that the
fundamentally political understanding of political inquiry
1 Ellis Sandoz refers to the approach of the restorers of the classical tradition of political theory 
as the "philosophical science of politics." See E. Sandoz, "The Philosophical Science of Politics 
Beyond Behavioralisna, " in George J. Grahaa, Jr., and George 0. Carey, eds., The Post-Behavioral Era 
(New York: David NcKay Co, 1972), pp,285-305. The tern "trad itionalisa," which aany refer to this 
approach, Bay be aisleading, for classical political philosophy in its own time was non-traditional 
and, aore iaportantly, it is now reappropriated not because of its antiquity but because in its 
aethod, substance, and direction it is a rationally coapelling way to approach the study of politics.
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is entirely absent in contemporary political science.2 So 
much so is this the case that only a few of today’s 
practicing political inquirers could give a coherent account 
of what Aristotle meant when he called man a "political 
animal" ( z o o n  p o l i t i k o n ). The reason for this inability 
does not lie in mere forgetfulness or historical 
inattentiveness; it lies in the theory of knowledge and view 
of reality which informs political science. The source of 
this interest is, therefore, engendered by a concern over 
the appropriate epistemological roots of political theory 
and the philosophical status of epistemology in political 
inquiry.
It is the primary aim of this dissertation, therefore, 
by criticizing positivistic epistemology, to draw attention 
to Voegelin’s political philosophy, which focuses more 
attention on ontology than on epistemology, as a permanent 
revolution in political thinking and to place his political 
philosophy at the center of the conduct of political 
inquiry. In order to do this, it attempts to trace and 
examine the themes of Voegelin’s political philosophy, and 
apply the philosophical insights of Voegelin to the 
epistemological conduct of political inquiry. In short, in 
an attempt to understand the nature of political knowledge 
and reality, this work presents a review of the Voegelinian 
response to the crisis of political inquiry today. It is
2 See, for exanple, Richard Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory (New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976 ), pp.xxi-xxii.
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with a sense of loyalty to the Voegelinian philosophical 
science of politics that this dissertation is conceived and 
formulated--"loyalty, when enlightened, being a person’s 
willing and thoroughgoing devotion to a cause which should 
not be confused with fanaticism that dogmatism engenders."3
Eric Voegelin is the preeminent political philosopher 
of the twentieth century whose political writings need to be 
critically analyzed. The Voegelinian political philosophy 
occupies a unique place in contemporary political science.
His interest in the study of politics developed as a 
response to certain critical developments of Western 
political society in the twentieth century which can 
specifically be identified with totalitarianism in both 
Soviet Marxism and German Nazism. As expressions of 
civilizational crisis, such political movements could only, 
according to Voegelin, be understood through an analysis of 
specific forms of human consciousness. For "the problems of 
human order in society and history arise from the order of 
the consciousness. The philosophy of consciousness is for 
that reason the centerpiece of a philosophy of politics."4 
Voegelin sees the political philosopher's primary task as 
one of developing a theory of human consciousness that could 
account for the character of our modern age. He is very
3 Josiah Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty (Hew York: Hacnillan, 1920), pp.16-7. Cited in Hwa Yol 
Jung, The Crisis of Political Understanding: k Phenoaenological Perspective in the Conduct of 
Political Inquiry (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1979 ), p.3.
4 E. Voegelin, knaanesis: Zur Theorie der Geschichte und Politik (Huenchen: R. Piper & Co., 1966), 
p.7.
critical of the modern age or of modernity. He sees the 
tradition of political theory from Plato onward as the 
decline of the tradition. He also sees that behavioralism 
has its origins in the positivistic and scientistic 
tradition and that positivism and scientism are the 
culmination of modernity’s degeneration. Thus, positivism 
is somehow equated with modern thought generally.
Voegelin’s aim is to regain a truth of political order
that has been lost through the process of modernization.
The task is one of "restoration" and "retheoretization." In
developing the theme of "retheoretization," he distinguishes
between classical political philosophy as represented in the
works of Plato and Aristotle on the one hand and the modern
understanding as conceived by positivism on the other.
Retheoretization, he insists, would "return political
science to the kind of enterprise founded by Plato and
Aristotle and overcome the effects of positivism with its
emphasis on emulating the methods of natural science and
establishing a value-free mode of inquiry."5 Human
existence in society and history is the theme of Voegelin’s
political philosophy. Three dimensions of human realm of
being--man, society, and history--are fields of inquiry
which taken together constitute what Voegelin calls
political reality. Voegelin defines political science as
the "noetic interpretation" of political reality
substantially like that given by Plato and Aristotle.
5 John Gunnell, Political Theory: Tradition and Interpretation (Caabridge, HA: Winthrop Publishers, 
1979), p.41.
Political science in the Voegelinian sense is concerned with 
"the elaboration of symbols which assist men in gaining a 
more differentiated and self-critical understanding of 
political reality."6
The Voegelinian definition of political science, which 
may therefore be called "political philosophy" or "the 
philosophy of order," is definitely different from that of 
the positivistic mainstream of contemporary political 
discourse. The Voegelini&h. approach "precludes the
understanding of political science in terms of a 
propositional science of phenomena which operates with 
axioms, strives to be systematic, and models itself through 
methodological rigor on the natural and mathematizing 
sciences of the external world."7 The noetic interpretation 
of reality, on the contrary, originates from the tension in 
political existence which forms between the historically 
grown self-understanding of a society and the reflective, 
self-conscious individual thinker’s experience of 
existential order. The "tension" in political reality, 
therefore, is not "an external object of experience"; rather 
it is "an inner experience or tension" of the concrete 
consciousness of specific individual persons who know 
themselves to be at odds with society with respect to 
fundamental issues of existence. Thus, the experience of
s E. Voegelin, Anaanesis (in Geraan), p.7.
7 E. Sandoz, "The Foundations of Voegelin's Political Theory," Political Science Reviever, 1 (1971), 
p. 52.
existential tension, or the experience of man’s 
participation in the ground of being, or, in a word, human 
consciousness, becomes the starting point of Voegelin’s 
thought.
Any assessment of Voegelin as a political theorist, in 
effect, is also an assessment of the state of political 
science itself. Testing and seeing the full implications of 
"philosophical science of politics" as a new way of 
political theorizing requires, I think, a general 
redevelopment of political theory based on the Voegelinian 
political philosophy. It is my primary contention of this 
dissertation that a philosophical science of politics is 
able to show why scientism has become a sorcery for 
contemporary political science and how it might be cured. 
As an upholding statement, Stanislav Andreski regards 
"social sciences as sorcery." He writes: "much of what
passes as scientific study of human behavior boils down to 
an equivalent of sorcery." He continues: "More than that of 
his colleagues in the natural sciences, the position of an 
’expert’ in the study of human behavior resembles that of a 
sorcerer who can make the crops come up or the rain fall by 
uttering an incantation."8 Voegelin’s unique and
extraordinary endeavor to explore the human condition in all 
its dimensions, and his great creative synthesis supply the 
foundation for "the new science of politics," so that his 
work is called "revolutionary."
* Stanislav Andreski, Social Sciences as Sorcery (New York: St. Kartin’s, 1972), p.10 and 24.
7
In its volume and scope many commentators have compared 
Voegelin’s work to Toynbee’s, while the depth of his 
philosophical insight has reminded others of Hegel. Despite 
the preeminence of his philosophical insight, however, 
Voegelin is "not nearly so famous as, say, Herbert Marcuse 
or Angela Davis, nor even so well known as those with whom 
he is most frequently compared: Spengler, Toynbee, Sorokin,
or perhaps Collingwood."9 And Voegelin has even been 
misunderstood, because his work refuses to be labelled in 
any one fixed denomination whatsoever that may imply 
dogmatic or ideological swindle. For example, Voegelin once 
catalogued some of the pandemoniac ways his work has been 
classif ied:
On my religious position, I have been classified as 
a Protestant, a Catholic, as anti-semitic and as a 
typical Jew; politically as a Liberal, a Fascist, 
a National Socialist and a Conservative; and on 
my theoretical position, as a Platonist, a neo- 
Augustinian, a Thomist, a disciple of Hegel, an 
existentialist, a historical relativist and an 
empirical sceptic; in recent years the suspicion 
has frequently been voiced that I am a Christian.10
Indeed, it is not easy to find a label for him and his 
work, since "he is (in varying degrees) at odds with all 
schools of thought. He does not fit any of the convenient 
intellectual pigeon-holes."11 According to a commentator,
9 E. Sandoz, The Voegelinian Revolution (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1981), p. 10.
19 B. Voegelin, "On Readiness to Rational Discussion," in Albert Hunold, ed., Freedoa and Serfdon 
(Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1961), p.269-84.
11 B. Sandoz, fie Voegelinian Revolution, p.11.
"he was a scholar of antiquity, a Hellenist and a Latinist, 
an expert on pre-Christian Near Eastern cultures, a 
medievalist, a thinker with knowledge of the whole body of 
modern philosophy, a historian of political philosophy, as 
well as a philosopher of history and of political 
thought."I2
No matter what the causes of the neglect and 
misunderstanding may be,13 however, proper understanding of 
Voegelin’s philosophical enterprise is quintessential to the 
examination of the nature of political science in its full 
sense. What is primarily intended here is to provide a 
critical appraisal as it relates to political reality and 
knowledge. It is not intended to inquire into all the 
relevant aspects of Voegelin’s views on politics. An 
attempt, however, is made to discuss some of his views on 
politics so far as they might allude to the epistemological 
and ontological foundation of his political philosophy. To 
this end, we shall focus our discussion on Voegelin’s 
seminal work on the study of politics, T h e  N e w  S c i e n c e  o f  
P o l i t i c s . And other major works, including O r d e r  a n d  
H i s t o r y ; A n a m n e s i s ;  S c i e n c e , P o l i t i c s  a n d  G n o s t i c i s m ; and 
F r o m  E n l i g h t e n m e n t  t o  R e v o l u t i o n  will also be scanned. In 
appreciating Voegelin’s thought, it will be presented in a 
manner which seeks to adhere as much as possible to a single
12 Helaut Hagner, Alfred Schutz: An Intellectual Biography, p.185.
1S On the uisunderstanding and neglect of Voegelin, see E. Sandos, The Voegelinian Revolution, pp.9- 
18.
language of interpretation and exegesis. By doing so, 
Voegelin’s work will be made to be both familiar and 
comprehensible to general readers.
The dissertation will be divided into five chapters. 
Chapter One is a background study of the epistemological 
controversies of political inquiry. It seeks the answers to 
questions, such as: "How does epistemological concern become 
the predominant domain of the theoretical enterprise of 
political inquiry, while the philosophical ontology of man 
is relegated to obscurity?" "Why is the positivistic 
epistemology unsatisfactory in political inquiry?" In this 
chapter, an attempt is made to review the nature and 
philosophical roots of the epistemological development of 
scientism by offering a general outline of its origins, 
inspirations, and central arguments, and by reconstructing 
the complex evolution of scientistic tradition.
The second chapter will be an explication of Voegelin’s 
critique of positivism in which he sees positivism as the 
perversion of science. The true meanings of science, 
theory, and philosophy, redeveloped by Voegelin as they were 
used in ancient times, will be reviewed. Voegelin’s 
radically unique critique of positivism, I believe, does 
offer helpful leads for our reconsideration of the nature of 
political theory. It is his criticism that makes way for an 
alternative orientation to the tradition of positivistic 
epistemology in political inquiry. Moreover, through an 
appreciation of his critique of positivism, we can examine
scrupulously what I believe are the most important and 
unique twentieth-century philosophical insights embodying an 
ontological orientation capable of offering a "new," 
"revolutionary," but, at the same time, "restoring," 
understanding of the nature of political inquiry: the
Voegelinian philosophical science of politics.
The remaining three chapters are, thus, to clarify some 
of the theories and conceptualizations used by Voegelin in 
his analysis of the modern disorder of Western political 
forms, and his attempt to recapture the classical insights 
for use in creating a political philosophy that will have 
relevance for modern times. Our journey through this 
"philosophical"--in Voegelinian terms--orientation for 
political inquiry should shed some light on the classical 
topics of political theory: the questions of human nature,
political order and history. The main theories or concepts 
of Voegelinian philosophy will be clarified in chapters 
Three to Five respectively: (1) reality and political
reality (Chapter Three); (2) modernity and "gnosticism" 
(Chapter Four); and (3) a scope of the "new science" 
(Chapter Five). These chapters will show how these have 
coalesced into the traditional form of Western political 
order, and how the knowledge of the origins of Western form 
can be used to find an answer to modern "scientism" and 
Marxism.
The last part will draw some conclusions with regard to 
the Voegelin’s contribution to the restoration of
philosophical science of politics which, I believe, is the 
most important twentieth-century philosophical achievement 




This chapter is an introduction to the questions as to 
"how epistemological concern becomes the predominant domain 
of the theoretical enterprise of political inquiry" and "why 
positivistic political epistemology is unsatisfactory." The 
chapter begins with a section that reviews, through an 
account of the distinct features of two approaches to 
epistemology, the relationships of epistemology to political 
inquiry. It is followed by a section that reviews the 
philosophical roots and nature of the epistemological 
development of scientism which gave shape to the 
positivistic orientation for political inquiry. The origins 
and development of scientism in the Western intellectual 
tradition--in the forms ,of the Copernican, Galilean, and 
Newtonian cosmological revolutions, the Cartesian and 
Lockean epistemology, the Enlightenment movement, and the 
nineteenth-century positivism--will be examined briefly. I 
then trace the nature of scientism by defining the term and 
illustrating its basic tenets. Since this dissertation 
concerns the work of Eric Voegelin, this chapter may appear 
as a long digression; however, to indicate some contours of 
the nature and rise of scientism in the history of
12
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philosophy will help us to understand the general 
epistemological directions of the movement of positivist 
political science.
1. C U R R E N T  P OL I TI C A L  SCIENCE
The contemporary scene finds "the science of politics" 
preoccupied with and entangled in a labyrinth of heated 
controversies over epistemological and methodological 
problems. The voluminous literature concerning the study of 
politics emphasizes the "scientism" and the "scientificness" 
which characterize the modern Z e i t g e i s t . Such a pre­
occupation would lead to a methodological solipsism, hence 
to the poverty of creative, constructive political 
philosophy upon which rest not only the foundation of a 
political society, but also the guidance and direction of 
the science of politics. But such an inclination is the 
inescapable consequence of the nature of ill-defined 
subject-matter of political inquiry. Exactly what should be 
the central domain of political inquiry has been sharply 
debated since Aristotle. At issue is an essential
disagreement over what is the proper nature of political 
discipline and what should be studied by political 
scientists. For instance, there has been the barrenness of 
theorizing that tries to maintain the alleged hiatus between 
empirical and normative theory. In this century
positivistic behavioralism, an offspring of empirical 
theory, has produced a certain orthodoxy in political 
science but has found itself under fire from an older 
tradition of political theory. The conceptual structure of 
contemporary political science is shaky and confused. At 
best, the fundamental concepts and methods that dominate 
contemporary thought and research are unsatisfactory; at 
worst, the situation could be called a crisis.
The two polarities among antagonists of the recent 
debate over the proper nature of political science are 
occupied by the positivists of the behavioral movement and 
the revivalists of the classical tradition of political 
theory.1 Their debates reveal an ongoing concern over what 
should be, and how we are to understand the nature of 
political knowledge and reality. It is thus required that 
political science continue to address itself to questions 
concerning the appropriate domain of its interest and at the 
same time its proper epistemological orientation.
The tradition of political theory has seemed to be in
"decline" or "dead," "killed by the endeavors of the
political behavioralists."2 Indeed, many forms of
1 Soae coaaentators eaphasise that there is a third voice which is called as "post-behavioralisa." It 
is the indication of a aoveaent that arose in opposition to behavioralisa in the 1960s on the 
iaaediate grounds of political policy, but aore profoundly on grounds of the proper scope and 
direction of political Bcience. It adopts a principle of dialectic as an alternative to behavioralisa 
and traditionalisa. See Scott Warren, The Eaergence of Dialectical Theory: Philosophy and Political 
Inquiry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); Douglas Stura, "Politics and Divinity: Three 
Approaches in Aaerican Political Science," Thought, 52:207 (December 1977), pp.333-365; Hwa Yol Jung, 
"Phenoaenology as a Critique of Politics," HuBan Studies, 5 (1982), pp.161-181; and, Hichael E. Kirn, 
"Bahavioralisa, Post-Behavioralisn, and the Philosophy of Science: Two Houses, One Plague," Review of 
Politics, 39:1 (January 1977), pp.82-102. However, this aoveaent has not yet attained a solid status 
as a doainant tradition of political inquiry.
positivist political science had undermined the assurance of 
traditional political theorists and thus eroded and 
parochialized the scope of the political discipline. The 
predominance of positive behavioral ism in the twentieth- 
century political science has seemed to be the victory of 
the "calculative thinking" of scientism. Inasmuch as 
"calculative thinking" has been the W e l t a n s c h a u u n g  of modern 
man and his world, political behavioral ism is merely one 
aspect of its manifestation. The advocates of the
behavioral movement, or of the idea of a "science" of 
politics, did not believe that the classical tradition of 
Western political theory had yet accomplished much in the 
way of a systematic and universally applicable causal 
empirical theory that is coincident with the W e l t a n s c h a u u n g  
o f  modern age. They charged all previous traditional 
political theories from Plato and Aristotle onward with 
being hopelessly metaphysical, scientifically imprecise, 
invalid, unfounded, and confused. Some of them also doubt 
that political theory ought to be described as a separate 
field of political science at all. They exhort political 
science to abandon the "older, theologically-oriented, and 
’traditional’" system of thought in favor of the "modern, 
scientific, empirical, logical, and anti-metaphysical" 
system of thought.3 It is only in this fashion, for the
2 Charles Taylor, "Neutrality in Political Science," in Peter Laslett and W.G. ilunciaan, eds., 
Philosophy, Politics and Society (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967 ), p.25,
3 Eugene Meehan, The Theory and Method of Political Analysis (Hoaewood, IL: Dorsey PresB, 1965), 
p.237.
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behavioralists, that political science can cure and 
transcend its "malaise and disenchantment" with the 
classical tradition of political theory. And for them it is 
only in this fashion that political science can get over its 
"inferiority complex" in the face not only of the natural 
sciences, but of the other social sciences as well. John S. 
Dryzek and Stephen T. Leonard state in a recent essay:
[P]clitical scientists have often treated the 
discipline’s past as if it were a history of 
"prescience" or "ideologies" or "philosophy," with the 
present (or imminent future) bearing witness to the 
emergence of a real science. It is not only twentieth 
-century practitioners who have tendered this line. 
Since Hobbes (at least) it has been widely argued that 
social and political science is a possibility if not a 
reality. At the root of these arguments one finds a 
common belief that science proceeds by following a 
particular method. Hobbes’ method was one of thinking 
of "men as if but even now sprung out of the earth, and 
suddenly, like mushrooms, come to full maturity without 
all kinds of engagement to each other"... Most modern 
practitioners place their faith in the methodology of 
the natural sciences. If these methodological 
aspirations could be realized, they would clearly 
vindicate those political scientists who read the 
history of the discipline in terms of modern break from 
a prescientific past. On this account, the standards 
against which the materials generated by the historian 
[of political science] are to be judged would be 
provided by the scientist. Moreover, the identity of 
the discipline would be independent of its past, a 
methodological not a historical matter. The history 
(or better, prehistory) of political science would have 
interest only as a source of examples of attempts to 
articulate a scientifically grounded knowledge of 
politics.4
The positivist mood and its attack on the tradition of 
political theory came to be seen by many concerned political
4 John S. Dryzek and Stephen T. Leonard, "History and Discipline in Political Science," dnerican 
Political Science Reviev, 82:4 (Deceaber 1988), p.1248,
theorists as a threat to the existence of critical thought 
and to the validity of the classical type of inquiry. In 
response to the gaining momentum of behavioral movement and 
to behavioralists' critique of the tradition of political 
theory, advocates of the revival of political theory who 
were dissatisfied with the "inadequacies" of the behavioral 
persuasion criticized both its theoretical assumptions and 
the spirit of its research. Instead they increasingly 
emphasized the reality of the classical tradition as a 
distinct and worthwhile object of political inquiry. The 
"great transformation" that took place in the 1950s in the 
study of politics--fundamentally in the works of Eric 
Voegelin and Leo Strauss— was an attempt to reverse the 
character attributed to the theoretical enterprise of 
political inquiry. The transformation involved an attempt 
to return to and revive the great tradition of political 
theory from Plato onward. Since Plato, political theory has 
usually understood itself as a noetic enterprise, guided 
first and foremost by the faculty of reflective reason 
rather than by empirical sensation and observation. A 
certain allegiance to the epistemological primacy of 
reflective reason, based upon the primacy of ontology over 
epistemology, clearly sets this tradition apart from the 
positivist tradition emphasizing epistemological rigor and 
exactitude.
But it is worth noting here that contemporary political 
theorists including Eric Voegelin, Leo Strauss, and numerous
others, also acknowledged the fact that traditional 
political inquiry was in a state of decline. They, however, 
in contrast with behavioralists, argued that the symptom of 
the decline of political theory broke out in modern politics 
and political ideas and particularly in the positivistic 
tendency of contemporary political science. For them a 
crisis in modern political philosophy is represented as 
resulting from certain contemporary attempts to replace the 
discipline of political philosophy with some non- 
philosophical or even anti-philosophical science of 
politics. Establishing a philosophical science of politics 
is thus Voegelin’s response to the crisis of political 
inquiry due largely to the failure of scientism to take into 
account the ontological experiential vectors of subjectivity 
in political inquiry.
The crisis of political inquiry is also a crisis in 
human existence.5 It is because every conception of 
politics or political theory presupposes manifestly or 
latently some conception or image of man or of human nature. 
In a word, epistemology presupposes ontology, because, as 
Hwa Yol Jung argues, "how to know human action must be based 
on what human action is."6 This means that a critique of 
political knowledge presupposes a philosophical ontology of
s Paul Ricoeur, Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenonenology, tranB. by E.G. Ballard & L.E. Enbree 
(Evanston, IL: northwestern University Press, 1967), p.162.
8 Hwa Yol Jung, The Crisis of Political Understanding (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1979), 
p.59.
man. To deny this results in "methodolatry," the worship of 
method to the exclusion of substance, i.e., in Hilary 
Putnam’s words, the "method fetishism."7 As John Wild puts 
it, therefore, "political philosophy must begin with some 
understanding of the being of man, for its many problems 
developed from an inclusive grasp of man as he is."8 Thus,
it can be said that the ontology of man or, as it is called
by Eric Voegelin, "philosophical anthropology," is the basis 
of epistemology. And, a critique of political knowledge 
must be understood in terms of the description of human 
action as the structure of meaning.
This was the case in the Platonic and Aristotelian
tradition. In that period, epistemological concerns have 
often been subordinated to ontological concerns, the quest 
after the nature of Being, leaving epistemological questions 
at a more implicit level of interest. The type of 
epistemology in that tradition was the transcendental, 
philosophical, ancient epistemology in which the connection 
between knowing rightly and doing well is very intimate. 
Eugene Miller characterizes it as "epistemology, rightly
approached."9 But our thoughts on such matters in these 
days have a basis which is different from that of the 
earlier times. The distinctive cast of the modern mind, in
1 Hilary Putnaa, Reason, Truth, and History (Caabridge: Caabridge University Press, 1981), p.188.
8 John Wild, "Foreword" to H.Y. Jung, ed., Existential Phenoaenology and Political Theory: A Reader
(Chicago; Henry Regnery, 1972), p.ix.
5 Eugene  Hill e r ,  " E p i s t e a o l o g y  and P o l i t i c a l  Inquiry; C o a a e n t  on Kress' 'Against Episteaology,
Journal of Politics, 42 (1980), p.1164.
spite of its vagaries, is scientific rather than
metaphysical, tending to base itself on observations with 
the senses. With the advent of the empirical, scientific, 
and positivistic movements in political inquiry, the 
questions concerning epistemological orientations became the 
foremost concerns of practitioners of political inquiry. 
"Ours is an epistemological century," as Paul Kress writes, 
for "we want first to know not what but how we know."10
Underlying the positivistic movement in the
contemporary political inquiry is above all a profound 
epistemological concern: the quest for "reliable knowledge"
of political behavior and events, guided by an empiricist- 
oriented theory of knowledge and aimed at formulation of 
nomological propositions about political reality. The 
positivists identified all truth with the epistemological
model of "objective knowledge" produced by scientific 
method. For them epistemology is important and predominant 
when narrowed to strictly logical and objective constructs. 
Epistemology is important in confirming empirical statements 
regarding matters of fact and in validating the logical and 
methodological precision of statements which may pertain 
only incidentally to matters of fact. The type of their 
epistemology is therefore the positivistic, empirical,
modern epistemology. It is characterized by Eugene Miller 
as "epistemology, wrongly approached."11 This sort of
18 Paul Kress, "Against Episteaology: Apostate Husings," Journal of Politics, 41 (1979), p.531.
11 E. Hiller, " E p i s t e a o l o g y  and P o l i t i c a l . . . , "  p . 1164.
epistemology has indeed been very influential in recent 
political theory, and it has stood in the way of a direct 
confrontation with the world of politics.
The goal of the positivistic epistemology is to 
augment, through use of the scientific method, "objective 
knowledge of an intersubjectively transmissible character in 
the social sciences."12 The proponents of positivistic 
political epistemology are concerned with objective 
description and generalization and thus emphasize the 
methodological ideal of rigor, scientific objectivity, 
operational exactitude, quantitative measurement, and 
finally prediction in order to build the citadel of an exact 
science after the model of the natural and mathematical 
sciences, especially physics. Moreover, positivistic
political inquiry, as is clear from its epistemology- 
oriented characteristics, points to its indifference to the 
historicality of science as a human project and the 
scientist as a human being. It should be noted here that 
the rise of modern science, or scientism, has been 
characterized by its reluctance to accept the personal and 
existential nature of human consciousness, that is, the 
ontological dimension of human cognition. Rather, it 
eventually produced a myth which sought to account for the 
experience of understanding in terms of a methodology of 
explanation. The refusal of modern science to accept the
11 Arnold Brecht, Political Theory: The Foundations of Twentieth-Century Political Thought (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1959), p.481.
existential nature of human cognition is most evident in the 
removal of those "life" elements of body, sensing, history, 
tradition, and emotion from the act of knowing.13
I contend, therefore, that the primary source of
intellectual mistakes in contemporary political inquiry is
the tendency to take the epistemological concern as the most
significant, concrete, and relevant arena of the discipline
and to regard positivistic epistemology as the only reliable
epistemology, while relegating the ontological to the empty,
unreal, and abstract. This study is thus intended
incidentally to be a contribution toward the needed
reintegration of epistemology and ontology in our
theoretical enterprise in the context of the Voegelinian
philosophical science of politics, while maintaining the
primacy of ontology. This reintegration cannot proceed
satisfactorily, however, unless the real depth of the
problem of political inquiry is appreciated and confronted.
The fundamental assumptions that have caused a crisis in the
contemporary political inquiry and political society have
both a long history and a pervasive theoretical background.
As Thomas Spragens writes, "[p]olitical science did not
manufacture the assumptions about epistemology and
permissible scientific concepts out of whole cloth but
rather adopted them from the more general intellectual
13 The concept of "life" elenents has occurred recently in two critiques of scientistic tradition.
See Harjorie Grene, The Knaver and the Knovn (London: Faber I Faber, 1966); and Hans Jonas, The 
Phenoaenon of Life: Tovard a Philosophical Biology (Hew York: Dell Publishing Co., 1966 ). In both 
cases it is used to refer to the inability of Bcientisa to explain the siaple fact of life--a 
phenoaenon whose telic, appetitive and selective character defies the aechanistic categories of a 
scientistic ontology.
climate of the time, specifically from philosophy and 
philosophy of science. As a consequence, unraveling our 
present dilemmas calls for consideration of the relevant 
inquiry in these areas."14
Superficial reunion of the two halves of the 
theoretical enterprise--ontology and epistemology--based 
upon sheer necessity rather than upon genuine understanding, 
will never ultimately prove viable or durable. To
reconsider the nature of political theory, therefore, above 
all, the long historical legacy and theoretical background 
which caused difficulty to contemporary political inquiry 
needs to be carefully considered.
2. E P I S T E M O L O G Y  AND POL I T I C S
Before it is possible to reconstruct the development of 
scientistic tradition in political inquiry in the following 
section, it is surely essential, first of all, to decide in 
what sense the terms e p i s t e m o l o g y  and s c i e n t i s m  are to be 
understood. Because the ambiguity which accompanies the 
characterization of the terms necessitates a preliminary 
clarification of the topics, "what is epistemology," and 
"what is scientism," I will consider in this and next
14 Thoiias Spragens, Jr., The Dileaaa of Conteaporary Political Theory: Tovard a Postbehavioral Science 
of Politics (New York: Dunellen, 1973), p.2.
sections the relationship of epistemology and political 
inquiry, and also examine the nature of scientism.
Contemporary political theorists have tended in recent 
decades to mire down in epistemological speculation and 
consequently have often failed to reach the subject matter 
and the questions that should be their primary concern. As 
I have mentioned earlier, a preoccupation with epistemology 
can distract political theory from its proper tasks and a 
concern with political discourse and substantive political 
problems. This contention is also pointed out by Paul Kress 
in his warning "against epistemology."15 Kress’ contention 
does not intend to go so far as to deny that political 
theory can benefit from epistemological studies. The 
pursuit of epistemology has had beneficial side effects, as 
Kress acknowledges. Epistemology, in this case onto- 
epistemology, understood broadly as the rational account of 
human knowledge, is indeed indispensable to political 
inquiry as well as beneficial to it. Epistemological 
reflections help us "to penetrate the special obscurity of 
political things, to understand political actions that 
involve knowing, to understand the place of the political 
sphere within the comprehensive whole, to defend prudence or 
practical wisdom, and to clarify the nature of political 
inquiry.1,1 6
15 P. Kress, "Against Episteaology," pp.526-542.
11 E. Hiller, " E p i s t e a o l o g y  and P o l i t i c a l . . . , "  p . 1167.
However, this is not to deny that epistemology also 
"may be particularly hostile to the subject matter of 
politics" and may contain an "element of self-indulgence," 
and that "there may be a danger... in the reification of 
epistemology."17 Political theorists, therefore, need to 
return from their current obsession with epistemology to the 
critical study of politics. Yet, to resolve this issue is 
not so simple because it is uncertain whether these 
difficulties arise from something intrinsic to epistemology 
or from a misapplication or misunderstanding of methodology. 
In order to reach some clarity about the relationship of 
epistemology and politics, or political inquiry, it is 
necessary to make clear what we mean by epistemology.
Epistemology, or the theory of knowledge, is a branch 
of philosophy which is concerned with the nature of 
knowledge, the character of the procedures we use to attain 
it, its presuppositions and basis, and the general validity 
and reliability of claims to knowledge. Although
epistemology is but one branch of philosophy, it is a 
particularly important branch because it plays a part in 
other branches of philosophy such as ontology (or, 
metaphysics), and axiology. It is an important aspect, 
also, of philosophy as applied to other subjects, the 
philosophy of science and the philosophy of history for 
example. To be sure, epistemology is an ever-present 
concern. Epistemological positions are explicitly stated or
IT P. Kress, "Against Epistenology," pp.533, 534, 542.
implicitly assumed in every attempt to understand the worlds 
of fact and value.
It was Plato who can be said to be the real originator 
of epistemology, for he attempted to deal with the basic 
questions: What is knowledge? Where is knowledge generally 
found, and how much of what we ordinarily think we know is 
really knowledge? Do the senses provide knowledge? Can 
reason supply knowledge? What is the relation between 
knowledge and true belief? Plato develops the distinction 
between genuine knowledge and opinion in the R e p u b l i c . Only 
the confidence that knowledge differs deeply from opinion 
makes possible the courageous and persistent pursuit of 
truth and right. For Plato it was possible to know what is 
morally right or wrong, good or evil, in personal, social, 
political, and other realms. Plato took the main purpose of 
philosophy to be to encourage right conduct, and this was to 
be achieved by convincing men that they should be good, and 
also by showing them the way to be good. He did not regard 
knowledge as separate from ethics, for he held that everyone 
wanted to be good and that any failure in virtue must, 
fundamentally, be due to ignorance. The wise understands 
that his best interest is served by acting virtuously. In 
short, "one cannot be virtuous without being knowledgeable, 
and therefore, as Herbert Marcuse has said, for classical 
Greek philosophy ’epistemology is in itself ethics, and 
ethics is epistemology.’"18
18 T. Spragens, The Irony of Liberal Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago PresB, 1981), p.10.
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In Plato’s R e p u b l i c ,  which stands as "a virtual 
monument to the nexus between epistemological and political 
ideas," thus "essentially epistemological theories are 
developed in the course of asking fundamental political 
questions."19 Therefore, it can be said that epistemology 
in a broad sense, or, more accurately, onto-epistemology, 
was an integral part of classical political philosophy. 
With regard to the classical approach to epistemology (onto- 
epistemology), Eugene Miller presents an account of two 
features of it:
First, its inquiry about politics begins not from 
epistemology but from the data of political life 
itself— from political things or opinions about them. 
Epistemological reflections enter as a way of shedding 
light on these things and on the relationship of 
philosophical inquiry to political life. Second, the 
starting point for the epistemology of the classics-- 
its given, so to speak--is the fact of the mind’s 
encounter with being. The mind, having come to know 
something of things as they exist in the world, turns 
back critically upon itself to reflect on its own 
operations--on what we do when we sense and remember 
and opine and reason. Still, our primary awareness of 
things is taken to be more certain and more reliable 
than any account we can give of how things are known 
or how the mind operates, and the ways of knowing are 
distinguished in terms of the kinds of things to be 
known.2 0
Yet, in the modern period, a fundamentally different, 
that is, characteristically modern approach to epistemology 
emerged. As Spragens states, revolutions within the 
tradition of political theory are intimately related to new
18 Ibid., p.11.
28 B. Hill e r ,  " B p i s t e a o l o g y  and P o l i t i c a l , "  p p . 1160-1162.
departures in epistemology.21 The onto-epistemological 
assumptions of political inquiry prevailing in the ancient 
and medieval period were attacked by the radically 
innovative theorists and were consequently superseded by the 
radically revolutionary epistemology.
Machiavelli (1469-1527), for example, "styled his 
political essays as a pathbreaking departure from the 
established mode of conceptualizing political life,"22 by 
bringing to the field of political inquiry the scientific 
spirit of detachment. As for his theoretical writings, 
particularly T h e  P r i n c e  and the D i s c o u r s e s , Machiavelli 
employed the scientific method. For him, the study of the 
political phenomenon must be scientific. It must find its 
inner laws, and free itself from methodological dependence 
on theology, metaphysics and moral philosophy. In this 
sense, he secularized the methodology of political inquiry 
just as his compatriot--Gal ileo--secularized that of the 
physical sciences. Machiavelli’s fundamental axiom is 
simple: human nature is the same always and everywhere.
Therefore history, more precisely, the history of particular 
states or political communities, is also the same.23 
States--like men, the sky, the sun, the elements— never 
change their motion, order, and power.24 Because of this
21 T. Spragens, The Irony of..., p.11.
22 Ibid.
23 Nicolo Machiavelli, The Prince and the Discourses, ed. Max Lerner, Discourses, I, ch.39.
24 Machiavelli, Discourses, I, preface.
uniformity it is possible to make comparative analyses, draw 
valid generalizations, and apply the lessons of the past to 
the present and the future. Moreover, for Machiavelli, the 
scientific study of politics is possible only if its 
principles are derived from fact rather than from 
speculation. His contention is that "the tradition of 
political philosophy had been misled by a faulty conception 
of the relationship between Idea and Reality, between truth 
and imagination."25 Therefore such study should focus on 
"how men live rather than how they ought to live"; on 
"republics and principalities" that actually exist rather 
than on those "that have never been seen or known to exist"; 
in brief, it should produce "the truth of the matter as 
facts show it rather than the imagination of it."26 Whereas 
Plato believed that the well-ordered soul of the man who had 
seen truth should become the paradigm for ordering the 
state, Machiavelli felt that the order or disorder within 
its citizen’s soul is immaterial as power becomes an 
ordering principle in its own right.
One hundred years after Machiavelli the revolution in 
political epistemology begun by him was provided a much more 
systematic foundation through the work of the British 
political philosopher, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). In a 
number of places, Hobbes stated that the mathematical and 
scientific model is the best foundation for accomplishing
25 T. Spragens, The Irons' of..., p.11.
2t Hachiavelli, The Prince, ch.15.
the tasks of formulating a "solid philosophy" and a "sound 
commonwealth." The "new science" in the sense of the 
seventeenth-century scientists, was the mode] for his 
science of "politique bodies," and the political insights he 
felt could be gained through a new manner of knowing might 
enable men to extricate themselves from the political 
miseries of their "natural condition,"27 or, as he called, 
the "state of nature." Hobbes’ ambition, as Ernst Cassirer 
points out, was "to create a theory of the body politic 
equal to the Galilean theory of physical bodies--equal in 
clarity, in scientific method, and in certainty."28 After 
Galileo and Descartes, Hobbes emulated the ideal of 
mathematics as the universal science ( m a t h e s i s  u n i v e r s a l i s ). 
Above all else, Hobbes attempted to orient political 
philosophy according to the principles of mathematics. He 
founded the "mathematics of politics." In the theory of 
politics, he constructed the political system where the 
human body (and consequently the body politic) is treated 
merely as a physical mechanism (i.e., mechanistic 
psychology). What really mattered for Hobbes was that we 
should determine commonwealths and norms according to the 
mathematical procedure of reasoning. Therefore the task was 
to apply men’s actions so that a consistency or pattern
11 T. Spragens, The Irony of..., p.12.
21 Ernst Cassirer, The Hyth of the State (Hew Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1946 ), p.165.
could be reached according to preestablished rules governing 
commonwealths.2 9
In short, although epistemology continued to be an 
integral part of political philosophy in the modern era, the 
modern approach, as formulated by such leading philosophers 
(whatever their differences) as Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes, 
Locke, Hume, and Kant, departed radically from the classical 
approach. Epistemology began to move on "the cusp between 
science and rival doctrines in theology and metaphysics." 
And, as John Gunnell writes, it became "a means of advancing 
one position and undercutting contending ones."30 The 
eventual demarcation of philosophy from science, and, in 
other words, elimination of ontological foundation from 
onto-epistemology was thus made possible by the notion that 
phil osophy’s core was epistemology, a theory distinct from 
the sciences because it was their foundation. Without this 
idea of an epistemology, it is hard to imagine what 
"philosophy" could have been in the age of modern science. 
Metaphysics had been displaced by physics. Philosophy gave 
up some of its domain to science. Philosophy, at one time 
thought to comprise all fields of knowledge and called "the 
most general science," was regarded as a critique of the 
foundations of knowledge in an attempt to establish its 
authority. It took up what science no longer pursued: the
33 Thoaas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Michael Oakeshott, p.110.
33 John G. Gunnell, "In Search of the Political Object: Beyond Methodology and Transcendentalisn," in 
John S. Nelson, ed., Hhat Should Political Theory Be Hot? (Albany, NT: SUNY Press, 1983), p.32.
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search for a methodological legitimating authority. The 
modern minds wished to establish epistemology as the 
foundation of the sciences, including moral or political 
science. In a word, "the foundations of knowledge became 
the philosophical problem of epistemology, and methodology 
became part of the philosophy of science."31
Consequently, modern epistemology became increasingly 
divorced from substantive claims of knowledge, which is 
essential in onto-epistemological enterprise. Rather, it 
became instrumental arguments. And it legitimated certain 
concrete empirical claims so that it was called an empirical 
epistemology and meaningless when divorced from those 
claims. Therefore, in the age of modern science, the 
characteristically modern assumption that epistemology must 
be taken up before ontology was widely recognized. As the 
Scottish philosopher James Frederick Ferrier (1808-1864), 
who seemed to introduce the term "epistemology" itself for 
the first time,32 puts it:
the ontological question, "What is?" is the ultimate 
question of philosophy and also the first to make its 
appearance, but it must be postponed until the problem 
of knowledge has been solved. The question of being 
or existence "...cannot be approached, or even looked 
at," until we have "exhausted all the details of a 
thorough and systematic epistemology."33
31 Ibid., p.33.
32 B. Hiller, "Episteaology and Political...," p.ll61n.
33 Janes Frederick Ferrier, Philosophical Vorks, vol.I: Institutes of Metaphysics, 3rd ed., (London: 
Williaa Blackwood and Sons, 1875), pp.48-49. Quoted froa E. Hiller, "Episteaology and Political...," 
p.liein.
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In the view of the modern mind, scientific inquiry 
cannot properly begin either from opinion or from natural 
cognition, for as Francis Bacon explains, "Idols and false 
notions are now in possession of the human understanding, 
and have taken deep root therein."34 There are impediments 
of knowing which may prevent a man from knowing clearly. 
These are especially noticeable when emotion, personal 
interests, or outside pressures are present to lead our 
philosophy to be biased, but they are especially likely to 
influence and to distort our fund of common-sense opinions. 
This is the starting point by which the classical 
distinction between knowledge and opinion was blurred as 
axiomatic, demonstrative certainty ceased to be the 
criterion of scientific knowledge.
It is worthwhile to briefly note here Francis Bacon’s 
presentation of a classical statement of "the errors of 
knowing" in his famous "Idols of the mind."35 There are, 
first, the Idols of the tribe. Men are prone to recognize 
evidence and incidents which are favorable to their own side 
or group (tribe or nation). That is, there is a tendency to 
accept what has been hallowed by tradition or to let the 
passions interfere with the acquisition of rational 
knowledge. The second Idols, those of the cave, are those 
which arise from the particular viewpoint of the individual
34 Francis Bacon, The Hen Organon and Related Vritings, ed, Pulton H. Anderson, Nev Organon, I. p.38.
35 P. Bacon, The Great Instauration, Part II.
which often precludes a more general perspective. Because 
of the Idols of the cave, we tend to see ourselves as the 
center of the world and to stress our own limited outlook. 
Third, the Idols of the market-place are linguistic, the 
market place being the symbol for social interaction which 
is often at variance with reality and thus, again, an 
obstruction to rational understanding. In other words, the 
Idols of the market-place cause us to be influenced by the 
words and names with which we are familiar in everyday 
discourse. We are led astray by emotionally toned words--in 
our society such words as communist or radical. Finally, 
the Idols of the theater are the dogmatic conceptions of 
former times which, given the absence of any empirical 
foundation, are no better than dramatic fictions. They 
arise from our attachment to parties, creeds, and cults. 
These fads, fashions, and school of thought are like stage 
plays in the sense that they lead us into imaginary worlds; 
ultimately, the Idols of the theater lead us to biased 
conclusions.
For Bacon, the understanding is obstructed not only by 
received dogmas and by the defects of ordinary language, but 
also by forces in the individual man or in human nature 
itself that cause the understanding to distort and discolor 
the nature of things. Inquiry in the sciences, therefore, 
must have a method that will purge the mind of doubtful 
opinions and guard it from error, and this method is to be 
supplied by a philosophical analysis of the mind itself.
Statements about the efficacy of experimental, inductive 
method, which became intimately associated with the 
definition of natural science, was appealed to formulate 
distinctions between scientific and non-scientific 
knowledge. Due to the absence of a proper method, Bacon 
thinks, the science and philosophy in the past was 
unsuccessful. Therefore, not only must the mind be freed 
and cleared of such idols and approach the task of knowledge 
pure and unadulterated, but also a new way of reaching 
knowledge, a new instrument or organ for the mind, or, a new 
logic, a n o v u m  o r g a n u m  has to be devised, because the 
traditional syllogistic logic is thought to be useless for 
scientific discovery. The traditional logic only assists in 
confirming and rendering inveterate the errors founded on 
vulgar notions rather than in seeking after truth.
Assumptions about scientific method that scientific 
method was represented as accessible, single and 
transferable36 or "method fetishism" as Hilary Putnam 
phrases37 derived, to a large extent, from a Baconian 
framework. Bacon attempted to outline an approach to the 
study of society based on observation. Hitherto, human 
understanding obscured by what he called idols, had been
38 These three characterisations of scientific aethod respectively claia that the aethod of science 
could be understood and practised by a large nuaber of people; that there was a single aethod coaaon 
to all branches of science; and that this aethod could be extrapolated froa natural Bcience to other 
subjects. See, Richard R. Yeo, "Scientific Method and the Rhetoric of Science in Britain, 1830-1917," 
in John A. Schuster and Richard R. Yeo, eds., The Politics and Rhetoric of Scientific Hethod:
Historical Studies (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1986), p.262.
33 H. Putnaa, Reason, Truth and History, p.188.
mistaken, irrational conceptions. In this sense, Bacon can 
be acknowledged as the individual who for the first time 
clearly comprehended the new modern scientific spirit and 
successfully advertised its salient features. And the 
influence of Bacon’s work was the starting point for later 
development of the philosophy of science.38 In other words, 
after Bacon’s references to methodological issues, 
discourses on methodology became an important aspect of the 
modern scientific tradition. The Baconian theory of idols 
lies at the origin of modern social science. It strongly 
influenced both the English empirical tradition in Hobbes 
and Locke and the French Enlightenment which eventually 
produced the concept of ideology. And, at the same time, 
discussion of scientific methodology has been closely 
associated with the general epistemological concerns of 
modern scientistic tradition. "Epistemology thus comes to 
be understood as the precondition ■for scientific inquiry and 
as the final arbiter of claims to knowledge in the 
sciences."3 9
This modern approach to epistemology not only redefines 
the relationship of epistemology to the sciences; it also 
leads to a transformation in the procedure of epistemology 
itself. As a distinct field, epistemology in the modern 
period, which radically deviated from onto-epistemology, 
began as "sloughed off elements of scientific discourse:
33 R.R. Yeo, "Scientific Hethod and...," p.263.
33 B. H i l l e r ,  " E p i s t e a o l o g y  and P o l i t i c a l . , . , "  p . 1162.
arguments without function, substance, or concrete 
context."40 Modern epistemology also comes to focus "not on 
the mind’s uncertain knowledge of things but on the 
operations of the mind and on its contents— its ’ideas’ and 
’impressions’ and ’concepts’--taken in abstraction from 
things external to the mind."41 Starting from what we can 
know clearly and distinctly of the mind and its contents, 
modern epistemology attempts to prove that we can know 
external things, to show how we can know them, and to 
establish with finality the limits of our knowledge.
3. AN E P I S T E M O L O G I C A L  FALL:
M O D E R N  SC I E N C E  AND MODERN P H I L O S O P H Y
The positivistic orientations for political inquiry 
have been influenced by the epistemological transformation 
accompanying the rise of modern science and modern 
philosophy. In order to understand the general
epistemological directions of the movement of positivist 
political science, therefore, some contours of the rise of 
modern science and scientism in the history of philosophy 
need to be examined. Thus, this section briefly
reconstructs the complex evolution of scientistic tradition
40 J. Gunnell, "In Search of the Political Object...," p.33.
in the modern period which gave shape to the positivistic 
political inquiry.
The P...e e.e e.f .,M,.e..de..,:T...n E.p...:t.e...t.e.mQ,,X,,Qiia..y
The crisis in contemporary political discipline is a 
chronic crisis which manifests itself in long standing 
internal dissensions which can be traced back to the very 
beginnings of modern science and beyond. In other words, a 
crisis in modern political theory is implicated in a crisis 
of modernity which has been in course of development for 
several centuries. The attempt to resolve the modern crisis 
cannot proceed satisfactorily, therefore, unless we refer to 
the intellectual history of that crisis. Positivism is 
commonly supposed to have originated in the nineteenth 
century with Auguste Comte. Yet, it is misleading because 
"the positive philosophy" and "the positive method", if not 
the very word "positivism", have origins in the Middle 
Ages42 and historically they are generally associated with 
the rise of modern science. They also owe much to the 
empiricist philosophers, especially, to David Hume, and to 
the Enlightenment p h i l o s o p h i e s . The positivist doctrines 
were, then, after a number of other modifications, 
eventually labelled "logical positivism" in the twentieth 
century Austria and Britain.
Viewed in this way, positivism, more generally,
scientism, does not begin with Comte, but has a long history
42 John Wellauth, S.J., The Nature and Origins of Scientism (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 
1944),
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in Western philosophy.43 Positivism is equated here with 
modern thought generally. Thus the emergence of political 
behavioral ism as a dominant movement or mood in contemporary 
political science can be seen as a culmination not only of 
the positivist spirit of the late nineteenth century but 
also even of the general movement toward a scientistic 
culture in the West since the Renaissance. In other words, 
the epistemological roots of scientism are discernable in 
the rise of modern science and modern philosophy which can 
be traced back to the very beginnings of modern mathematics 
and physics as early as in the second half of the sixteenth 
century. The scientific revolution of the late sixteenth 
and the seventeenth centuries is the most significant point 
of division between the medieval and the modern minds. The 
eminent historian, Herbert Butterfield, gives this 
assessment of the scientific revolution:
It outshines everything since the rise of Christianity 
and reduces the Renaissance and Reformation to the rank
With regard to the use of the tera "positivisn," I distinguish two aain ways in which it Bay be 
taken, one quite specific, the other ouch aore general. In the aore restrictive sense, the tera aay 
be taken to apply to the writings of those who have actively called theaselves positivists. The 
positivisa in a restrictive sense has been doainated by the works of the author who coined the tera 
"positive philosophy", Auguste Coate, and of the "logical positivists" of the Vienna Circle. But the
positivisa in a aore broad and diffuse sense, which I rely on here, refers to the thought of 
philosophers who have adopted aost or all of a series of connected perspectives: for exaaple, basic
tenets of scientism which is reviewed in the next section. Positivistic strains are auch aore widely
represented in the history of philosophy, overlapping with eapiricisa, than would be suggested if 
attention were confined to self-proclaimed "positivisa". Richard Bernstein acknowledges that, 
strictly speaking, Anglo-Saxon social scientists are not positivists, if we define positivisa in the 
strict sense of either Coate or the Vienna Circle. He says, however, that they have a 'positivist 
teaper" which has had a profound influence upon then. "Basically, the positivist teaper recognises 
only two models for legitiaate knowledge: the empirical or natural sciences, and the foraal
disciplines such as logic and aatheaatics." See, R. Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social Political
Theory, p.5. To evade the aabiguity, the self-proclaimed positivisa is identified here as "aodern 
positivisa" or "logical positivisa."
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of mere episodes, mere internal displacements, within 
the system of medieval Christendom. Since it changed 
the character of men’s habitual operations even in the 
conduct of the nonmaterial sciences, while transforming 
the whole diagram of the physical universe and the very 
texture of human life itself, it looms so large as the 
real origin both of the modern world and of the modern 
mentality that our customary periodisation of European 
history has become an anachronism and an encumbrance.44
An epistemological shift that occurred at the beginning 
of the modern age and laid the foundation on which the 
edifice of modern science was reared is of particular 
significance for us because it paved the way for a change of 
the modern minds in theory, in world-view, in metaphysical 
outlook, in conception and method of knowledge, and even in 
ways of living. To understand this event historically, 
therefore, we need to turn our attention back to the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These centuries are, 
according to Hans Jonas’ description, "a time not only 
pregnant with change but also conscious of it, with a will 
for it, and with the polemical animus that turns against the 
old in the name of the new and hails the break with the 
past."4 5
However, in order to take account of the rise of modern 
science, it seems necessary, to a certain degree, to extend 
our attention beyond the modern age, because medieval
44 Herbert Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science: 1300-1800, rev. ed. (New York: Free Press,
1957), pp.5-7.
45 Hans Jonas, "The Scientific and Technological Revolutions," Philosophy Today, 15:2 (Sunner 1971), 
p.77.
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thought is said to have given birth to and given expression 
to the fundamental ideas of scientism. As is well known, 
throughout the Middle Ages all the branches of knowledge, 
metaphysics, logic, ethics, politics and economics were held 
together in one coherent whole through the mediation of the 
Christian religion or theology. Consequently, in the early 
modern period the epistemological concerns of the Western 
mind were ultimately related with religious criticism. The 
new developments in the natural sciences in this period, 
typified especially by the works of Copernicus, Galileo, and 
Newton, gave powerful impetus to the medieval dominance of 
Christianity. But the medieval Church did not clearly 
perceive the inherent separateness of science and faith and 
proceeded instead to war against modern science for several 
centuries in an ultimately losing battle. However, it 
should be noted here that the medieval era was not 
absolutely unresponsive to the inevitable distinction 
between science and faith. With regard to this point, it is 
worth noting Harold J. Berman’s arguments:
in Western civilization, where science has flourished 
more than in any other culture (indeed, some would 
say it has flourished t o o  much), the objectivity, 
skepticism, openness, and general spirit of rationalism 
that characterize scientific inquiry have stemmed from 
a complex relationship between the sacred and the 
profane. On the one hand, a belief in the sacredness, 
or potential sacredness, of all things, such as existed 
among the Germanic peoples and also in Eastern 
Christianity, inhibits objective, skeptical, open, 
rational investigation. Thus it was no accident that 
the first Western sciences emerged at the time when 
there was a separation between ecclesiastical and
42
secular politics.46
According to Berman, the "de-divinization of the world," to 
use Eric Voegelin’s phrase,47 fostered by the emphatic 
separation of ecclesiastical and secular politics, gave rise 
to the first Western sciences. He states that the tradition 
of scientific inquiry first emerged precisely in the 
ecclesiastical sphere--in canon law and in theology itself-- 
not the secular. That is, Berman argues that the first 
Western sciences— not the modern sciences in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, but that which is called the 
progenitors of the modern sciences— arose in the 
ecclesiastical sphere in the work of such Western 
theologians of the late eleventh and twelfth centuries as 
Anselm, Abelard, and others. They subjected the evidence of 
divine mysteries to systematic, rational, and even skeptical 
examination.48 In other words, "what gave rise to
scientific values was not the carving out of a sphere of 
life--the secular, the temporal, the material--which could 
be investigated without risk to religious beliefs, but
41 Harold J. Berman, Lav and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, HA: 
Harvard University Press, 1983), p.158.
47 E. Voegelin, The Rev Science of Politics: An Introduction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1952), p.107. Hereafter abbreviated as NSP. See, E. Sandos, "Book Review: Lav and Revolution," 
Louisiana Lav Reviev, 45 ( 1985), p.1119. On the Voegelinian sense of "de-divinization" will be 
considered later, in Chapter Four.
41 For example, "Anselm sought to prove 'by reason alone,1 without the aid of faith or revelation, not 
only the existence of God but also the necessity of his incarnation in Christ. Abelard exposed the 
self-contradictions in sacred writings--a first step toward scientific Biblical criticism." H.J.
Berman, Lav and Revolution, p.158.
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rather a new attitude toward the sacred itself. The Church, 
though still understood to be the ’mystical body of Christ,’ 
was viewed as also having a visible, legal, corporate 
identity and an earthly mission to reform the world."49 
Berman continues:
The emphasis shifted from sacredness in the sense of 
otherworldliness to the incarnation of the sacred, 
which meant its manifestation in the political, 
economic, and social life of the times. That, in 
turn, made it necessary to examine the sacred, the 
spiritual, with scientific value premises. Only when 
the effort was made to study God objectively, and 
God’s laws, did it become possible to attempt to study 
secular life, and secular laws, objectively--and 
eventually nature and nature’s laws.50
Diogenes Allen also writes that "it is part of the
world of the Middle Ages, not part of the world of the
Renaissance or the Reformation, which is usually regarded as 
the beginning of the transition from the medieval to the
modern world."51 Another commentator, examining the origins 
of scientism, supports this contention by saying that the
movement called scientism was:
the natural outcome of a trend of thought which began 
in the early Middle Ages, which was strongly opposed by 
St. Thomas during his lifetime, and which ultimately 
led to the breakdown of medieval philosophy before the 
end of the fourteenth century, at a time when the 
traditional fathers of modern science had still about
«» Ibid., p.158.
51 Ibid.
51 Diogenes Allen, Philosophy for Understanding Theology (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1985), p.151.
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two centuries to wait before being born.52
Thus, before the end of the fourteenth century, though 
the positive sciences were only beginning to develop, 
we have the essential features of the modern scientific 
method with its emphasis on probability as the ideal of 
scientific knowledge, and the essential characteristic 
of scientism at least in this negative sense, that the 
whole field of human knowledge, apart from revealed 
truth and theology, was to be explored by other than 
philosophic means because philosophy had failed.53
What is to be noted, however, is that "an obvious 
tension between the sacred and the profane in the theology 
of the church and in the canon law" also existed in other 
branches of learning, and "inevitably imposed severe 
restrictions on scientific value premises." It should be 
added that "it is hardly necessary to recall the repressive 
measures taken against scientists who departed from official 
dogma. The original thinker, the innovator, ran severe 
risks of condemnation; the heretic might be executed. It is 
of little comfort, yet it is important, to know that the 
very tension that caused such repression also made possible 
the first growth of science in the West."54 Consequently, 
questions concerning the validity of theological claims were 
given a new seriousness with the dissolution of the formally 
unified dominant Christianity in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. The intellectual and creative talent
52 J. Wellsuth, The Nature and Origins of Scientist! (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1944 ), 
p.19.
53 Ibid., p.47-8.
54 H.J. Beman, Law and Revolution, p.159.
that for almost a millennium had served the interest of God 
and the Church thus began to redirect toward the secular, 
terrestrial things of this world, that is, nature and man. 
These developments provided not only inspiration for further 
speculation on the validity of theological interpretations 
of man and the world, but also a new model of understanding 
and investigation.
And this new model became a source of understanding 
what is the basis for a claim of knowledge, if not at times 
a formal standard for knowledge claims altogether. The 
triumphal success of the natural scientific understanding of 
nature secured thereafter the dominance of its mode of 
understanding as an epistemological model for understanding 
as such. Its understanding of knowledge was carried over 
and applied abstractly in politics, theology, and other 
fields of investigation. In all important realms of modern 
thought, therefore, one finds that epistemological and 
methodological considerations do not play a mere secondary 
role. Rather, these concerns are bound up immediately with 
substantive concerns and in fact seek to give direction to 
the substantive branches of thought.
Through the rise of modern science the conception of 
knowledge as "completely impersonal, explicit and 
permanent"--"the ideal of total objectivity"--powerfully 
impressed upon Western minds.55 In terms of the ideal of 
total objectivity, as Polanyi has put it, we suppose that if
55 H. Grene, The Knever and the Snown, p.17.
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we had an infinite blackboard we could write down one after 
another in final and precise form all the knowledge there is 
to be known.56 The optimism of the seventeenth century and 
the Enlightenment have contributed mainly to the form of 
this ideal, which has dominated philosophical thought in the 
last few centuries. In characterizing the epistemological 
foundations of scientism, three chief versions of the ideal 
of knowledge, as were discerned by Marjorie Grene, need to 
be identified: i.e., in the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle 
and Descartes. Even though for all three knowledge is final 
and certain, the criteria for certainty are radically 
different from each other.
[W]hat makes Platonic certainty possible is the 
eternity, the superior, intrinsic reality, of its 
transcendent object, itself by itself, apart from 
relativity, contradiction, or decay. This is 
certainty beyond, even against, the world. What 
makes Aristotelian certainty possible is the secure 
natures of kinds of things within the real world 
itself, and ultimately the eternity of the world 
itself; it is certainty within the world. Cartesian 
certainty, finally, relies neither on a really real 
beyond the world, nor on rootedness in the structure 
of the world itself. It is the pure, intrinsic 
certainty of the knowing intellect itself, needing 
no support beyond the luminous self-evidence of 
its own act of knowing.57
The modern scientific tradition, of which epistemology 
is represented by Cartesian certainty, is characteristically 
said to originate in what Whitehead called the "century of
5t Michael Polanyi, "Coaaitaent to Science," Lecture delivered at Duke University, Feb. 24, 1964, p.2. 
Quoted froa H. Grene, The Enower and the Knot/n, p.17.
5T Ibid.
genius." Francis Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Newton, 
and Galileo were all part of that remarkable seventeenth 
century intellectual revolution which shaped the contours of 
our reigning scientific tradition. These giants
accomplished the destruction of the desiccated and 
increasingly sterile medieval world view and simultaneously 
replaced it with their "bright new world," translucent to 
the mathematizing mind.
Indeed, modern science started mainly with the reform 
of cosmology. The new cosmology replaced the geocentric 
system by a heliocentric one through the hypothesis of a 
double, axial and orbital, movement of the earth, with the 
resultant simplification of theory compared to the 
cumbersome Aristotelian scheme.58 Several weak points in 
the Aristotelian cosmology, for example, the faulty notion 
of change and causality, to be sure, led to persistent 
dissatisfaction in many quarters from as early as the 
fourteenth century. Despite this recurrent dissatisfaction, 
however, no new model had been developed that was itself 
adequate enough to commend widespread acceptance as a 
substitute. Since, to borrow Thomas Kuhn’s words, "the
58 In Aristotelian cosaology, the concept of heavenly spheres was closely connected with the axioa 
that all cosaic action is circular. This idea had gained the quality of a netaphysical principle and 
becoae wedded to ideas of perfection which were associated with the geoaetrical properties of the 
circle. The two a priori requireaents, therefore, which every cosaic aotion had to satisfy were 
circularity of path and uniforaity of speed. Therefore, in Aristotelian physics, aotion was subsuaed 
under the ontological category of change. The Aristotelian cosaology was thus not only the basis for 
scientific thought, but also for philosophical speculation and even for poetic iaagination, See, T. 
Spragens, The Dileaua of Conteaporary Political Theory, pp.23-28; H. Jonas, "The Scientific and 
Technological Revolutions," p.86; and, Jennifer Trusted, An Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Knowledge (London: Hacaillan, 1981), pp.48-65.
decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the 
decision to accept another,"59 the situation remained 
unresolved.
It was not until the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries that the authority of Aristotelian cosmology was 
replaced by a new method and a new view of the universe. An 
illustrious group of scientists, including Copernicus, 
Galileo, and Newton, finally produced the conceptual 
breakthrough by producing a new paradigm by which to 
understand physical motion. They established scientific 
observation and experimentation on a firm foundation. Thus 
the scientific changes are often spoken of as the Copernican 
revolution, Galilean revolution, or Newtonian revolution. 
Copernicus pointed out that the sun is the center of our 
solar system and that the earth is one of the planets. 
Galileo accepted the atomic theory and established the 
science of mechanics on an experimental and mathematical 
basis. Newton’s astronomy and mechanics brought the newer 
developments together in one grand synthesis. Their
achievements were monumental; however, they contained 
weaknesses that became evident only later, overshadowed as 
they were by the early brilliant successes of the tradition. 
Ironically, the late sixteenth and seventeenth-century 
developments both provided the impetus and tools for the 
unparalleled achievements of modern natural science and in
55 Thonas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed., (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1970), p.77.
the process began, again in Whitehead’s words, the "ruin" of 
modern philosophy,60 or the crisis of modern philosophy.
The import of the intellectual turn in the seventeenth 
century is so profound and so fraught with consequences that 
it calls for some elaboration. Since considering the 
validity of the epistemological foundations of modern 
science requires an account of this intellectual 
transformation, its progress and principal implications 
warrant a review. Therefore, in examining the new outlooks 
of the first trail blazers of the scientific revolutions in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth century--men like Copernicus, 
Kepler, Galileo, Newton, and others--the direct conceptual 
content of the theoretical revolution in Copernican and 
Galilean physical cosmology and Newtonian dynamics will be 
analytically summarized.
Tii.e  K..e_..y_Q...Lu..t..i..Q..n  17 th C entury
Since in the Middle Ages all the branches of knowledge 
were held together under the authority of the Church in one 
coherent whole, Copernicus’ new theory that the sun, not the 
earth, is at the center of the universe, is not a mere
I
scientific hypothesis. It is socially revolutionary and 
threatens the entire Aristotelian-Christian rationale for 
the social and moral order. The epistemological change 
underlying the reform of cosmology therefore merits the name 
of a scientific "revolution" in its own right. Copernicus,
68 Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern Horld (New York: Mentor Books, 1948 ). p.56.
Galileo and others, as Hans Jonas maintains, didn’t 
undertake their experiments with practical intent: instead,
’’their intent was to gain knowledge," even though "the 
method of knowledge itself, by the active intercourse with 
its object, anticipated utilization for practical ends."61 
However, it should be noted that, even if certain 
implications of the new theory were not at all on its 
inventor’s mind, it inevitably led to a new revolutionary 
physical cosmology far beyond any merely mathematical 
reinterpretation of astronomical data. Therefore, as Thomas 
Spragens points out, "the revolution in cosmology suggested 
the need for a radically refashioned epistemology."62
Nicolas Copernicus (1473-1543) placed the sun at the 
center of the universe. The best way to get a clear grasp 
of the apparent movements of the planets in the heavens was 
by regarding them as movements around the sun conceived as 
stationary. However, it was not a claim about the actual 
position of the sun in relation to the planets. His aim was 
only the ease of making mathematical calculations.63 In 
advocating a new theory of the universe, therefore, Johannes 
Kepler (1571-1630) was far more radical. He not only viewed 
the sun as the actual center of the universe but also 
abandoned the Aristotelian conception of uniform circular 
motion for the planets. This was truly daring, for it meant
81 H. Jonas, "The Scientific and Technological...," p.76.
82 T. Spragens, The Irony of..., p.25.
83 D. Allen, Philosophy for Understanding., p.161.
that the heavens did not move because of their natural 
circular motion (in imitation of an unmoved mover).
For him it was apparent from observations of the sun 
that the apparent path of the sun against the background of 
the fixed stars differed in speed at different times of the
year, but that the angular velocity of this movement was
always the same at the same point in the astronomical year,
and therefore that the speed of rotation of the straight 
line earth-sun was always the same when it pointed to the 
same region of the fixed stars. It was thus legitimate to 
suppose that the earth’s orbit was a self-enclosed one, 
described by the earth in the same way every year--which was 
by no means obvious a priori. For Kepler, an advocate of 
the Copernican system, it was thus as good as certain that 
this must also apply to the orbits of the rest of the 
planets.
In a word, the heavens moved in elliptical orbits, and
accelerated and decelerated along the path. This implied 
that some physical explanation had to be found for their 
motion: a physical explanation outside of those possible in 
Aristotelian physics. Kepler was also led to his view of 
the planetary orbits by the most meticulous concern for 
mathematical accuracy. "The exactness or rigour with which 
the causal harmony must be verified in phenomena is the new 
and important feature in Kepler."64 The one thing clear to
Edwin Arthur Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science: A Historical and 
Critical Essay, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967, originally published in 1924), p.53.
all from the emergence of the radically refashioned 
cosmology was that Aristotelian physics no longer applied to 
the altered scheme of things. Movements were no longer 
explained by forms of order; instead, the form of movement 
had to be explained by the action of forces. Copernicus’ 
and Kepler’s endeavours led to Galileo’s work which broke 
the hold of the Aristotelian hierarchical world view.65
Galilei Galileo’s (1564-1641) achievement in completing 
a new paradigm won virtually universal acclaim among the 
intellectual luminaries of his day and gained for him such 
encomiums as Hobbes’ designation of him as "the first that 
opened to us the gate of natural philosophy universal."66 
As an instance, by addressing himself to the motion of 
projectiles and falling bodies, Galileo developed a 
radically new conception of motion which broke with the 
Aristotelian conception of motion (as a change from potency 
to act).67 The new illumination provided by Galileo’s 
explanation "relegated the classic potential-actual model of 
Aristotle with its profound ramifications to the status of 
obscurantist nonsense."68 Galileo treated quantitative 
relations as more important than qualitative ones, which had 
primacy in Aristotle. Galileo gave a mathematical relation
85 D. Allen, Philosophy for Understanding..,, p.162.
68 T. Hobbes, English Works, Killian Holesworth, ed. (London: John Bohn, 1839), I, p.viii.
81 Galileo postulated inertial notion (in a circle) and a speed of free fall which was independent of 
the weight of the falling object.
88 T. Spragens, The Uileaaa of..., p.25.
for bodies in motion. The crucial revolutionary element was 
to treat time as an abstract parameter of motion. That is, 
time is freed of all associations with the mind and all 
associations with growth (a passage from potency to act). 
Time is treated simply in relation to velocity and distance. 
It is simply a mathematical term in relation to velocity and 
distance. With this shift Galileo could give a precise and
general mathematical statement of a law applicable to all
falling bodies. In other words, with him mathematical 
relationships were reduced to mere expressions of mechanical 
laws. Indeed, Galileo performed his great intellectual feat 
by abstracting from the sense manifestations of motion to 
its mathematically manipulatable components. He considered 
only the mathematical properties of bodies as essential and 
objectively present in bodies. All other properties of
bodies as they appear to our senses, such as color, texture, 
smell, taste, are the result of the size, shape, and motion 
of matter on our sense organs.
For Galileo nature was seen as a simple, orderly 
system, whose every proceeding is thoroughly regular and
inexorably necessary. According to him, the conclusions of 
natural science are absolutely true and necessary, not at 
all dependent on human judgment. Further, he believed that 
the rigorous necessity in nature results from its 
fundamentally mathematical character: that is, nature is the 
domain of mathematics. Galileo’s idea of mathematical
54
supremacy is illustrated in the following statement:
Philosophy is written in that great book which ever
lies before our eyes I mean the universe but
we cannot understand it if we do not first learn 
the language and grasp the symbols, in which it is 
written. This book is written in the mathematical 
language, and the symbols are triangles, circles, 
and other geometrical figures, without whose help 
it is impossible to comprehend a single word of it; 
without which one wanders in vain through a dark 
labyrinth.6 9
The geometricization of movement, with its remarkable 
success, had the most far reaching and profound consequences 
for Western philosophy, both in its procedural and in its 
substantive implications.70 Cosmologically, this conceptual 
transformation resulted, quite literally, in draining the 
world of its substance, for the whole notion of substance in 
the Aristotelian and scholastic world view was inextricably 
connected with the understanding of motion as finite change 
to a specified end, completion, and rest. A particular 
substance was seen as composed of the defining boundaries of 
a particular motion.
With the infinitizing of motion on the Galilean 
model,71 however, the function of substances disappeared and
63 Opere Complete di Galileo Galilei, Firenze, 1842, vol.IV, p.171. Quoted in E. A. Burtt, The 
Hetaphysical Foundations of Hodern Physical Science, p.64.
T0 H. Butterfield, The Origins of Hodern Science, p.15.
T1 More accurately speaking, the world was seen by nost seventeenth-century thinkers as "indefinite"
or "indeteminate," rather than as strictly "infinite." They saw the universe, even if not infinite,
had to be nuch bigger than had been supposed. See, Alexandre Eoyre, From the Closed Ilorld to the
Infinite Universe (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1958). However, this distinction is irrelevant to our 
present concern.
the modern world had no need of that hypothesis. Thus, the 
domain of sciences of substance was encroached by the 
propositions of sciences of phenomena. Galileo was the 
forerunner who formulated "the phenomenalist program for 
knowledge as opposed to the traditional interpretation of 
the world in terms of substantial forms."72 Having
dissolved the configurations of substance,73 the infinite, 
mathematicized view of motion served as the indicator of the 
proper replacement for the whatnesses, quiddities, and 
entities that had composed the premodern cosmos."74 
Infinite, mathematicized, and abstract motions clearly 
belonged in an infinite, mathematicized, and abstract world. 
Despite a radical reversal in content, formally this 
inference from the nature of motion to the nature of the 
world directly paralleled the reasoning within the 
supplanted world view.
The conceptual revolution incited by the intellectual 
talents of the late sixteenth and seventeenth century 
effected a full-fledged mechanics of nature: the Newtonian
physics. Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727), who joined heaven 
and earth under one rubric, succeeded in showing that the 
same mathematical formulae can be applied to all bodies in
72 Leszek Kolakowski, The Alienation of Season: k History of Positivist Thought, trans. by Norbert 
Guteraan (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1968), p.18.
73 With regard to the dissolution of the configurations of substance in aodern science, Voegelin 
characterises the scientisa as "the atteapt to treat substance (including aan in society and history) 
as if it were phenoaenon." E. Voegelin, "The Origins of Scientisa," Social Research, 15:4 (1948), 
pp.463-464.
74 T. Spragens, The Dileaaa of..., p.25.
the same fashion, whether they are cannon balls or planets 
in the solar system. It was not until Newton’s P r i n c i p i a  
M a t h e m a t i c a  (1687) that the fruitfulness of mathematical 
accuracy proclaimed by his predecessors was thoroughly 
vindicated. As such, Newton might be said to complete, but 
not alter, the basic character of Galileo’s treatment of an 
object’s motion in time. To use abridged labels, it means 
completing the Galilean revolution with the Newtonian
record. In short, Newton reached his epoch-making
discoveries of dynamics; and thus this epoch has been
presided over by the concepts of Newtonian cosmology and 
Newtonian method.
Epistemologically, Newtonian science of nature 
represented the union of a priori with a posteriori 
elements: while space, time and motion i n  a b s t r a c t o  present 
a pure mathematical manifold for a priori construction, 
inertia and gravity, the dynamical ingredients of mass--and 
the same goes for the electromagnetic forces discovered 
later--fall as to their existence and their actual values in 
the realm of irreducible empirical fact; in short, the 
gravitational constant is a purely empirical magnitude. But 
since those empirical constants operate in the mathematical 
continuum, their values are expressible in its terms. And 
so physics could be mathematized with these rationally 
recalcitrant facts. The discoveries in physics made by
Newton had received lofty acclaim and had given rise to a
reigning world view. According to the Newtonian cosmology,
the real character of the universe was material bodies 
moving in space and controlled by rudimentary mathematical 
laws, such as the law of gravity.
Assuming that nature was nothing but matter-in-motion, 
Newton believed that the science of mechanics (a 
fundamentally mathematical discipline) provided the model 
for all scientific reasoning. Consequently, the task of the 
natural scientists was to reduce all physical phenomena to 
their engendering mathematical laws. "Yet Newton was not 
interested in mathematically pure speculation for its own 
sake."75 Unlike Galileo, Kepler, or Descartes, Newton did 
not believe in a priori certain truth. Therefore, all 
mathematical explanations of nature had to be verified and 
guided by experiment. For Newton ideas could claim
scientific legitimacy only if they were deductions from 
sensible phenomena and thus capable of being verified within 
experience. As a result he refused to use rationalistic 
hypotheses in his scientific work, and this refusal, in 
turn, placed a strict limit upon the range of phenomena 
which could be investigated legitimately. For example, 
although Newton could specify the mathematical 
characteristics of gravitational forces, he refused to 
speculate about gravity’s ultimate nature or the reason for 
its existence.
75 J.L. Wiser, Political Philosophy: A History of the Search for Order (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, 1983), p.232.
Hans Jonas’ summary of three important developments, 
promoted by the new conceptualization that the first 
trailers such as Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo and Newton 
blazed, is worth being noted here.76 The first is the 
geometrizing of nature and consequently the mathematization 
of physical cosmology. Pioneers of modern scientific 
tradition were equally convinced that geometry is the true 
language of nature and must therefore be the method of its 
investigation, which is to decode its sensuous message. 
This growing conviction was raised by Descartes to the 
dignity of a metaphysical principle when he split reality 
into the two, mutually exclusive, realms of the r e s  c o g i t a n s  
and the r e s  e x t e n s a --the world of mind and the world of 
matter (or, body). The latter is in its essence nothing but 
extension; therefore, nothing but determinations of 
extension, i.e., geometry, are required for a scientific 
knowledge of the external world. The contribution of 
Cartesian philosophy to the development of the scientific 
tradition will be further reviewed in the next section.
The second impact of the revolutionary conceptual 
scheme is the necessity of a new mathematics raised by the 
program of an analysis of motions. Galileo’s and Descartes’ 
analytical geometry was only the first step of new 
mathematics. The reduction of a complex motion to simple 
motions involves breaking it down to infinitesimal portions. 
The answer to the mathematical task thereby posed was the
Tt H. Jonas, "The S c i e n t i f i c  and T e c h n o l o g i c a l . . . , "  p p . 88-9.
infinitesimal calculus, invented simultaneously by Leibniz 
and Newton.
Thirdly, the conceptual analysis of motions permitted 
an actual dissociation of its component parts in suitably 
set up experiments: it thus inspired an entirely new method
of discovery and verification, the experimental method. "It 
must be realized that the controlled experiment, in which an 
artificially simplified nature is set to work so as to 
display the action of single factors, is t o t o  c o e l o  
different from the observation, however, attentive, of 
’natural’ nature in its unprocessed complexity, and also 
from any non-analytical trying-out of its responses to our 
probing interventions. It essentially differs, in one word, 
from experience as such. What the experiment aims at--the 
isolation of factors and their quantification--and is 
designed to secure by the selective arrangement of 
conditions, presupposes the theoretical analytic..."77
In sum, new developments in the natural sciences, 
typified especially by the works of Copernicus, Kepler, 
Galileo, and Newton, gave powerful impetus to the validity 
of Aristotelian epistemological claims. Because the
scientific revolutions in the seventeenth-century suggested 
the need for a radically refashioned theory of knowledge, 
modern philosophers began to be primarily concerned with 
establishing epistemology as the foundation of the sciences,
»  Ibid.
including moral or political sciences. What characterizes 
the higher intellectual life of the period following the 
Middle Ages, and more specifically, after the scientific 
revolution in the seventeenth-century, is "an abiding faith 
in the power of human reason, an intense interest in natural 
things, a lively yearning for civilization and progress."78 
Reason becomes the authority in science and modern 
philosophy. The notion begins to prevail that truth is not 
something to be handed down by authority or decreed by papal 
bulls, but something to be acquired, something to be 
achieved by free and impartial inquiry. The gaze is thus 
turned from the contemplation of supernatural things to the 
examination of natural things, from celestial things to 
terrestrial things, from heaven to earth--therefore, 
theology yields her crown to science and modern philosophy. 
The physical and the mental world, society, human 
institutions, and religion itself are explained by natural 
causes. Knowledge is esteemed and desired not only for its 
own sake, but also for its utility, for its practical value: 
"knowledge is power."
Prank Thilly, A History of Philosophy, 3rd ed., revised by Ledger Hood (New York: Holt, Rinehart 4 
Winston, 1957), p.281,
T h e  Eme r g e n c e  o f L i b e r a l  R a t io n a l i s m :
fhe. C a r t e s i a n  and L o c k e a n  E p is t e m o l o e v
Nearly all the great leaders of modern thought, from 
Francis Bacon onward, are interested in the practical 
applications of the results of scientific investigation, and 
look forward with an enthusiastic optimism to a coming era 
of achievement in the mechanical arts, technology, medicine, 
as well as in the field of political and social reform. 
Modern philosophy, in its beginnings, breathes the spirit of 
the modern times which is described as "a spirit of revolt 
against medieval society, its institutions and conceptions, 
and as the self-assertion of human reason in the field of 
thought and action."79 It is independent in its search for 
truth, resembling ancient Greek thought in this respect. It 
is rationalistic in the sense that it makes human reason the 
highest authority in the pursuit of knowledge. It is 
naturalistic in that it seeks to explain inner and outer 
nature without supernatural presuppositions. It is,
therefore, scientific, keeping in touch with the new 
sciences, new cosmologies, particularly with the sciences of 
external nature.
However, the various seventeenth-century intellectual 
luminaries who set about developing the cosmological 
implications of the infinitizing of motion80 were not in 
agreement on all counts. For example, some thinkers 
accepted reason ( r a t i o )  as the source and norm of knowledge,
™ F. Thilly, A History of Philosophy, p.400.
See, fn. 71 on p.54.
whereas others found this in sensory experience. Descartes 
and rationalists took the former view and Locke and 
empiricists, the latter. Some, preeminently Descartes, saw 
a radical dualism between thinking and extended substance, 
mind and body. Others, like Hobbes, followed a consistently 
monistic path, seeking to integrate the workings of mind 
into the material motions which they saw as exhausting the 
furniture of the cosmos.
With Descartes standing in stark opposition to Locke,
we discover the first truly clear-cut polarization of the
rational and empirical modes of knowing. In the seventeenth 
century, we can find the philosophical rumblings which gave 
birth to modern philosophy in the debate between 
"Continental rationalism" and "British empiricism." We may, 
therefore, characterize modern philosophers as rationalists 
and empiricists, according to the answers they give to the 
question of the origin, source and norm of knowledge. 
Descartes, Spinoza, Malebranche, and Leibniz are classified 
as rationalists; Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume,
as empiricists. Closely connected with the question of the
origin and source is the question of the certainty or 
validity of knowledge.
Rationalists declare that only rational or a priori 
truths, clearly and distinctly perceived truths, are 
certain; genuine knowledge cannot come from sense perception 
or experience, but must have its foundation in thought or 
reason: certain truths are natural or native to reason;
innate or inborn or a priori truths. Truths which have 
their origin in the mind itself are valid truths. On the 
other hand, empiricists generally deny that there are such a 
priori truths, and hold that clearly and distinctly 
perceived truths are not necessarily certain; there are no 
inborn truths: all knowledge springs from sense perception
or experience, and hence so-called necessary presuppositions 
are not necessary or absolutely certain at all , but yield 
only probable knowledge. In a word, for Locke, apodictic 
knowledge of the empirical world is replaced by 
probabilistic knowledge of the empirical world.
Stated briefly, for rationalism, reason can go beyond 
sense experience and acquire a priori knowledge, whereas for 
empiricism reason can claim as positive knowledge only that 
which is based, directly or indirectly, on sense experience. 
As we have witnessed, the differences between Cartesian 
rationalism and Lockean empiricism are significant in some 
contexts and should not be lost sight of. However, the 
differences are essentially secondary disagreements within a 
more important consensus about the nature of the external 
world. On this question, it quickly becomes taken as a 
virtual presupposition that external, objective reality is 
composed of mathematically comprehensible entities. "This 
conviction served as the basis for the optimistic faith in 
the limitless possibilities of the mathematical mind to 
comprehend the world, a faith reflected undimmed in the much
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later writings of the Enlightenment philosophers such as 
Laplace and Condorcet."81
The crucial point for present purposes is to note the 
assimilability of key Lockean and Cartesian ideas about the 
nature and extent of human cognition. Despite their 
differences, the overlap between Lockean empiricism and 
Cartesian rationalism in some of their central beliefs is 
profound, extensive, and vitally significant. Indeed it 
becomes difficult to determine which of them contributed the 
most to the Enlightenment conception of reason. Locke’s 
critique of the Cartesian belief in innate ideas can be seen 
as "essentially an internecine battle within a school, not 
warfare between fundamentally opposed camps," as Spragens 
indicates. He continues:
The undeniable differences between the empiricist 
and the rationalist orientations, therefore, should 
not divert us from the even larger areas of agreement 
between them in their basic view of the nature and 
capacities of human understanding. Accounts of the 
history of modern philosophy tend to focus on the 
persistent antinomies of the tradition: materialism/ 
idealism, dualism/monism, empiricism/rationalism.
But undergirding these debates, indeed generating 
them, is a common core of ideas that constitutes the 
fundamental paradigm or disciplinary matrix of the 
critical tradition in philosophy, and it is this 
fundamental paradigm that we have in mind when we 
refer to "liberal reason."82
11 T. Spragens, The Dileaaa of..., p.26.
8Z T. Spragens, The Irony of..., p.22. "Liberal reason" is Spragens' rather loose "faaily" tera for
an array of labels, including Bnlightenaent reason, scientific reason, positive reason, and critical
reason. See ibid., p.14.
In a broad sense, both rationalist and empiricist 
points of view are "rationalistic,"83 since they are both 
committed to the use of reason. If by "rationalism" in a 
broader sense we mean the attitude which makes reason 
instead of revelation or authority the standard of 
knowledge, all modern systems of philosophy are 
"rationalistic"; indeed, it is this characteristic which 
enables us to classify them as modern. Even though the 
structures of "scientific method" of the rationalist and the 
empiricist differ from each other, they are consistent in an 
aspect that the modern scientific method appears to 
accurately describe the principles of reason itself.
On the other hand, we may mean by "rationalism" the 
view that genuine knowledge consists of universal and 
necessary judgments, that the goal of thought is a "system" 
of truths in which the different propositions are logically 
related to one another. This is the mathematical conception 
of knowledge, which is accepted by nearly all modern 
thinkers as the ideal; whether they believe in the 
possibility of realizing it or not, they consider genuine 
only such knowledge as conforms to the mathematical model. 
This widespread acceptance of the mathematical conception of 
knowledge as the appropriate formal norm for all areas of 
knowledge had several significant corollaries:
First, it generated a quest for a universal language,
or at least for language that would approach the
13 See, F. Thilly, A History of Philosophy, pp.282-283.
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transparency and precision of numbers. Second, the 
idea of an allegedly universally applicable model of 
inquiry led to the idea of a unified science. Third, 
the acceptance of the mathematical norm began to bring 
into disrepute any discipline that seemed clearly 
incapable of approximating the geometric ideal.84
It followed from the mathematical conception of 
knowledge that the stuff from which the universe is composed 
is quite homogeneous, both in its composition and its 
operations. There was no longer a vast but definite number 
of heterogeneous entities in the world but really only a 
single uniform substance (or, as in the case of Descartes, 
two substances, one of which has no detectable location, or, 
as in the case of Spinoza, two virtually coterminous 
substances which are really the same thing viewed under 
different aspects). Everything is composed of simple 
natures which can be clearly and distinctly conceived, and 
anything more complex than these simple natures possesses 
only a secondary kind of reality. This uniform, empty 
spatial homogeneity characterized the Cartesian notion of 
r e s  e x t e n s a , the Hobbesian notion of body, and the Lockean 
concept of primary qualities. By taking basic ideas of 
Cartesian rationalism and Lockean empiricism together, 
Spragens lists the principal tenets that compose the 
fundamental paradigm of "liberal reason," or "liberal 
rationalism":
14 T, S pr a g e n s ,  The Dileaaa of..., p . 31.
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1. The assumptions and methods of the previously 
dominant Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition are 
mistaken and must be fundamentally revised or 
supplanted before genuine "natural philosophy" 
can be possible.
2. The human understanding, guided by the "natural 
right" of reason, can be and should be autonomous. 
Moreover, it constitutes the norm and the means 
by reference to which all else is to be measured.
3. It is possible and necessary to begin the search 
for knowledge with a clean slate.
4. It is possible and necessary to base knowledge 
claim on a clear and distinct, indubitable, 
self-evident foundation.
5. This foundation is to be composed of simple, 
unambiguous ideas or perception.
6. The appropriate formal standards for all human 
knowledge are those of the mathematical modes of 
inquiry.
7. The key to the progress of human knowledge is the 
development and pursuit of explicit rules of method.
8. The entire body of valid human knowledge is a unity, 
both in method and in substance.
9. Therefore, human knowledge may be made almost 
wholly accessible to all men, provided only that 
they not be abnormally defective in their basic 
faculties.
10. Genuine knowledge is in some sense certain, 
"verifiable," and capable of being made wholly 
explicit.
11. Knowledge is power, and the increase of knowledge 
therefore holds the key to human progress.85
The core of the modern spirit is, as I have already 
mentioned, a spirit of change from or revolt against 
medieval society, its institutions and conceptions. The 
philosophical systems of Continental rationalism and English 
empiricism, with their various offshoots, added fuel to the 
flame of the change, change of world-views. Indeed, the 
spirit of independent inquiry and rationalistic scientific
15 T. Spragens, The Irony of..,, pp.22-23.
method, which was produced by the change, slowly but surely 
transformed the view of life. But the new ideas had to be 
popularized and disseminated over larger areas, and this 
task was performed during the eighteenth century, which has 
been called the century of the Enlightenment.
The Enlightenment carried over and popularized the 
ideas of Bacon and Descartes, of Bayle and Spinoza, and,
above all, of Locke and Newton. It carried over the
philosophy of laws of nature and natural right. Never was 
there an age so skeptical toward tradition, so confident in 
the powers of human reason and of science, so firmly
convinced of the regularity and harmony of nature, and so 
deeply imbued with the sense of civilization’s advance and 
progress. In other words, the Enlightenment movement
represents the culmination of the entire modern intellectual 
movement which sought the demise of scholasticism, 
metaphysics, ontology, and a priori reasoning in general. 
Only after such attacks, it was believed, could the 
radically new style of reason come to reign as a guide to 
all action: only by procedures of observing facts and
following the dictates of the senses could one find hope to 
enter the highest stage of intellectual progress.
It is an age in possession of principles and world- 
views--or, in other word, ideologies. It is "an age of 
philosophical dogmas, an age that has the courage to write 
books like [Christian] Wolff’s R e a s o n a b l e  T h o u g h t s  o n  G o d ,  
t h e  W o r l d ,  a n d  t h e  S o u l  o f  M a n ,  a l s o  o n  A l l  T h i n g s  i n
G e n e r a l . " 86 Eager to make their point, the Enlightenment 
p h i l o s o p h e s  or i d e o l o g u e s  promoted their ideas in a zealous 
effort as if promoting religious faith.87 They felt that 
the spread of their philosophy would usher in a completely 
new age. Full of confidence in the power of the human mind 
to solve its problem, it seeks to understand and to render 
intelligible human life--the state, religion, morality, 
language--and the universe at large.
Philosophy in the eighteenth century not only mirrored 
the strivings of the times, but influenced people’s action. 
It came out of the closet of the scholars, and mingled with 
the crowd in the market-place; it no longer spoke a special 
language of its own— the language of scholars--but expressed 
itself in the speech of the people and in terms intelligible 
to men of average intelligence. Thus, men and women who 
considered themselves p h i l o s o p h e s , or close to the 
p h i l o s o p h e s  in spirit, were found all over Europe. Owing to 
social, political, and ecclesiastical oppression, in France, 
the true home of it, the Enlightenment found its most 
radical utterance, and here its influence was greatest: the
French Revolution was the result of the propagation of the 
new enlightened ideas.
The Enlightenment glorified knowledge, the sciences and 
the arts, civilization and progress, and boasted of the 
achievements of the human race. The progenitors of the
86 P. Thilly, A History of Philosophy, p.400.
!T See Jay W, Stein, "The Beginnings of Ideology," South Atlantic Quarterly, 56 (April 1956), p.166.
Enlightenment set out to effect the disenchantment of the 
world, to replace myth, or superstition by solidly founded 
knowledge, and by the application of that knowledge in moral 
and political sciences as well as in technology. In so 
doing they prepared the way for the domination of modern 
culture by technical rationality. In the name of freedom 
from the domination of myth and superstition, the 
Enlightenment created a new form of domination: domination
by instrumental rationality.
That is, for the Enlightenment, "truth was conceived as 
something straightforward and ’factual,’ something to be 
rescued from the grasp of metaphysical and religious 
superstition by the noble, inexorable, and clarifying power 
of philosophy and rational thought."88 This spirit of the 
Enlightenment fueled the later development of positivism, 
which today still dominates the pursuit of political 
inquiry. As an example of the application of instrumental 
rationality in political science, James Wiser summarizes 
their thought as follows:
If humanity could learn to follow the laws of critical 
inquiry rather than the dictates of prejudice, custom, 
or authority, there appeared to be every reason to 
believe that the moral and political sciences would 
soon imitate the progressive development of the natural 
sciences... Thus assuming that the natural order was the 
basis for the political order, it seemed apparent that 
a rationally justified pattern of uniform political 
order could be discovered and implemented.89
88 S. Warren, The Esergence of Dialectical..,, p.177.
88 J. Wiser, Political Philosophy, p . 229,
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It may not be neglected that what the modern
enlightened spirit had been demanding in especially politics
was in part achieved: liberty of conscience and worship,
equal opportunity and economic freedom, representative
government and equality of all individuals before the law. 
The respect for human reason and human rights which 
characterized nearly all the important modern philosophical 
doctrines, became universal in the eighteenth century, and 
the words humanity, good-will, natural rights, liberty, and 
equality were on every tongue. Therefore, we need here to 
refer to the fact that the liberal faith in reason was the 
driving force of the Enlightenment rebellion against
traditionalism. As Spragens illustrates, liberalism, or 
liberal rationalism, can be equated with the 
Enlightenment.90 Liberal political philosophy have placed 
particular importance on "the rational and cognitive 
dimension of politics and have thus taken as the ideal model 
of political activity the interaction of rational, if self- 
interested, men."91 And the liberal commitment to
rationalism, which was formulated by Locke and Descartes,
96 Of course, the origin and essence of liberalisa has been and can be interpreted in a variety of 
ways. It is generally accepted that "liberalisa has been, in the last four centuries, the outstanding 
doctrine of Western Civilization." See Harold J. Laski, The Rise of European Liberalisa (New York: 
Unwin Books, 1962, originally published in 1936), p.11. Horeover, the rise of liberal theory is 
coeval with the agenda of probleas of aodern episteaology. However, as Spragens deaonstrates in The 
Irony of Liberal Reason, liberal political theory is specifically connected to the Bnlightenaent. And 
the period after the Bnlightenaent, i.e, the nineteenth century, can be called the liberal century, 
for the century aarked the high tide of liberalisa as a political creed in the West.
91 T. Spragens, The Irony of..., p. 13.
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was expressed in the Enlightenment thought as a desire to 
get rid of the philosophy of superstition and mysticism.
But it should also be noted that a major paradox, or 
"irony" emerges concerning liberal political theory. 
Liberalism has flourished "in a philosophical context in 
which most supra-individual supports for knowledge and 
belief have been knocked out, and where most cultural 
products from the spheres of philosophy, science and art to 
politics and religion are ultimately validated out of the 
empirically certifiable resources and needs of 
individuals."92 Thus, when the basic concepts in the 
liberal political vocabulary--e.g ., liberty, human rights, 
representation and consent— have historically been 
persuasive in Europe and America, it has been persuasive 
precisely because "the negative arguments concerning the 
denial of supra-individual supports for knowledge and belief 
were regarded as true."93 Indeed, liberal political ideas 
appear convincing if and only if the claims of relativism, 
reductionism and skepticism upon which liberalism is 
predicated94 are regarded as true. Yet inherent in the 
notions of reductionism and skepticism is "the incoherence 
attached to formulating their tenets as independent
33 Aryeh Botwinick, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, and Political Participation: An Essay in the 
Epistemology of Democratic Theory (New York: University Press of Auerica, 1985), p.l,
83 Ibid.
94 On the predication of liberalism on skeptistic and reductionistic tradition, see T. Spragens, The 
Irony of..., pp.3-127.
philosophical theses."95 Therefore, as Hilary Putnam states 
it, extreme skepticism, reductionism and relativism cannot 
possibly be true because they are in a certain way self- 
refuting: "A self-refuting supposition is one whose truth
implies its own falsity."96 In a word, the "self­
destructive" liberal faith in reason undermined liberalism 
itself and depraved the contemporary politics to be 
illiberal and inhumane.
T.Ix.sl. -EL.r.c.n..c..h.  .a..n.,d  ,G.x..r...c.,.I..o
The origin of modern positivism, which has come to be 
associated with the very idea of a social or political 
"science", is conditioned by the development of the 
reductionist intellectual movement. The reductionist
intellectual movement has gained increasing strength with 
the rise of the authority of science, and, more especially, 
with the enormous progress within the spheres of chemistry 
and physiology. As we have examined, all spheres of nature 
were being gradually brought under the scientific principles 
and methods which Kepler, Galileo and Newton had 
established. It is not surprising therefore that, as we 
have witnessed in thoughts of Descartes, Locke, and the 
Enlightenment, the work which the founders of modern natural 
science had performed within the spheres of astronomy and 
physics began to influence the conception of life and of the
95 A. Botwinick, Wittgenstein, Skepticisn..., p. 1.
96 H. Putnaa, Reason, Truth and History, p.158; Cited in A. Botwinick, Wittgenstein, Skepticiss..
pp.1-2.
world. Since they had gained a knowledge or comprehension 
of nature by explaining its phenomena according to the laws 
discovered in experience, modern scientists and philosophers 
attempted to base faith, manner of life and conduct on an 
entirely new foundation. That is, the time has come for men 
to choose such ideas only as "positive" science can 
acknowledge and confirm when constructing their conceptions 
of life and of the world. The task which they had to take 
upon themselves was to make mental science a positive 
science, and to give a systematic presentation of the main 
facts, laws and methods of all the positive sciences.
Various groups of scholars of the nineteenth and 
twentieth century carried on and supported this reductionist 
tradition. They are the French positivists of the
nineteenth century, the logical positivists of the Vienna 
Circle, the English schools of Analytical Philosophy, and 
the various schools of behaviorism in psychology. These 
groups support or reinforce each other even when they have 
not actually come together. In order to comment on the type 
of positivist thinking in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries as a whole, I shall begin by discussing the French 
positivism of the nineteenth century led by the work of 
Comte and the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle of the 
twentieth century.
In France the Enlightenment, which rested on a 
naturalistic philosophy, led to the great Revolution with 
its disturbing social and political changes. After the
Revolution, the sensationalistic and materialistic theories 
of Condillac, the Encyclopedists, and d ’Holbach, which had 
been so popular during the last half of the eighteenth 
century, lost their vogue, and new philosophies came to the 
front. It was not surprising that an excess of criticism 
and liberalism should have aroused a conservative reaction, 
and that the demand for free thought should have been 
opposed by a school of thinkers who emphasized the principle 
of authority and offered a supernaturalistic philosophy as a 
remedy to the troubled age. But not one of the movements 
opposed to sensationalism and materialism possessed 
sufficient vigor to satisfy the needs of an age that still 
felt an interest in the ideas of liberty, equality, and 
progress.
The reform of human society remained the dream of many 
French thinkers, and practical questions appealed to them 
strongly. The political revolution had not brought
universal happiness; the ignorance and misery of the lower 
classes had not been removed by the proclamation of 
universal human rights. But it was now held that the goal 
could be reached by social evolution, through the gradual 
reform of society by education and enlightenment. The 
French tradition of positivism is mainly composed of the 
works of Saint-Simon, Comte and Durkheim. Even though 
Saint-Simon, Comte and Durkheim do not subscribe to every 
one of the same tenets with equal vigor, there are 
sufficient continuities in the work of them to justify talk
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of a French tradition of positivism. Bryant articulates 
twelve tenets which "are stated in a form which is closest 
to Comte’s position, with references back to Saint-Simon and 
forward to Durkheim where appropriate."97 The twelve tenets 
together make up the French positivism and constitute a 
coherent theory which all three theorists basically 
accepted:
1. There is but one world, and it has an objective 
existence.
2. The constituents of the world, and the laws which 
govern their movements, are discoverable through 
science alone, science being the only form of 
knowledge. Therefore that which cannot be known 
scientifically, cannot be known.
3. Science depends upon reason and observation duly 
combined.
4. Science cannot discover all the constituents of 
the world, and all the laws which govern them, 
because human powers of reason and observation 
are limited. Scientific knowledge will remain 
for ever relative to the level of intellectual 
development attained and to progress in the 
social organization of science.
5. What man seeks to discover about the world is 
normally suggested by his practical interests 
and his situation.
6. There are laws of historical development whose 
discovery will enable the past to be explained, 
the present understood and the future predicted.
7. There are social laws which govern the inter­
connections between different institutional and 
cultural forms.
8. Society is a reality sui g e n e r i s .
9. Social order is the natural condition of society.
10. Moral and political choice should be established 
exclusively on a scientific basis.
11. The subjection of man before the natural laws of 
history and society precludes evaluation of 
institutional and cultural forms in any terms 
other than those of conformity with these laws.
12. The positive, the constructive, supersedes the 
negative, the critical. The positive, the
,7 Christopher G. A. Bryant, Positivisa in Social Theory and Research (New York: St. Kart in, 1985 ),
p.12.
relative, also supersedes the theological and 
the metaphysical, the absolute.98
According to this school of thought--French positivism- 
-knowledge is valuable only because it helps people modify 
the conditions amidst which they live in the material world 
and in society. For this purpose men need to know only 
phenomena and the laws under which things operate. In place 
of supernatural religion or any metaphysical unity, Comte 
sets humanity and social progress. The negative attitude of 
positivism toward any reality beyond the experienced order 
has influenced various modern schools of thought, including 
pragmatism,99 scientific naturalism, instrumentalism, and 
behaviorism.
One of the most influential movements in recent 
positive philosophy is logical positivism, which originated 
in the "Vienna Circle" in the early twenties. Due largely 
to the influence of Moritz Schlick (1882-1936), the central 
figure of the school at its inception, the Vienna Circle 
positivists made its influence felt not only in Austria and 
Germany but also eventually throughout the West. The 
original members of this group, especially active during the 
twenties and thirties, were for the most part specialists in 
fields other than philosophy: physicists, mathematicians, or 
men who had done their main professional work in the fields
58 C.G.A. Bryant, Positivisa in Social Theory..., pp.12-13.
89 Coate is discussed as a forerunner of pragaatisa because
of his rejection of reality as substance. He was not satisfied with the atteapts to explain all 
things in teras of substance.
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of symbolic logic and scientific methodology. Whereas the 
earlier positivism was founded on nineteenth-century 
science, the new developments are based on more recent 
logical and scientific concepts.100
Logical positivism has, in the course of its brief 
development, undergone many radical transformations. There 
is a great diversity among the different representations of 
the movement, as the movement has been variously designated 
logical positivism, the Vienna Circle, logical empiricism, 
scientific empiricism, and the Unity of Science Movement. 
Yet the main outlines of the positivistic position stand out 
clearly. Joergen Joergensen, an historian of the logical 
positivist movement, identifies the logical positivists as 
follows:
The forerunners of logical empiricism are, in the 
opinion of the members of the movement themselves, 
all those philosophers and scientists who show a clear 
antimetaphysical or antispeculative, realistic or
materialistic, critical or skeptical, tendency as
well as everyone who has contributed essentially to 
the development of their most important methodological 
instrument: symbolic logic.101
1C0 The logical positivists acknowledged that aany earlier thinkers influenced their work. Those 
nentioned included aost of the European thinkers in the eapiricist tradition, anyone who Bade a 
contribution to syabolic logic or axioaatics, and finally, any thinker who showed anti-aetaphysical or 
anti-speculative tendencies in his work. See Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath, and Rudolf Carnap, 
"Wissenschaftlische Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis" (1929), in Otto Neurath, Eapiricisa and 
Sociology, trans. by Paul Foulkes and Marie Neurath, edited by Marie Neurath and Robert S. Cohen 
(Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1973 ), p. 304 . However, three conteiporary thinkers 
stand out as having had a truly significant influence on the developaent of logical positivisa: Ernst 
Mach, Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. On these three thinkers’ influence, see Bruce J. 
Caldwell, Beyond Positivism Econoaic Methodology in the Twentieth Century (London: George Allen A 
Unwin, 1982), pp.11-12.
101 Joergen Joergensen, The DevelopBent of Logical Eapiricisa, International Encyclopedia of Unified 
Science, Vol. II, No.9 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p.6.
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The members of the Vienna Circle were especially 
interested in working out a secure intellectual foundation 
for all science. They felt that the sciences, though not 
now unified, belong to one coherent system. The problem was 
to find an inclusive system of terms and concepts which are 
common to all the sciences and not limited to one or to only 
a few of them. This aim led to a study of the language of 
science and an analysis of language in the hope of finding a 
universal language of science which, for them, is the task 
of philosophy. In other words, the true task of philosophy, 
that they thought they had discovered, was to analyze 
knowledge statements with the aim of making such 
propositions clear and unambiguous. As Schlick stated, 
"...philosophy is that activity through which the meaning of 
statements is revealed or determined."102
Compared with conventional arguments of philosophy, the 
logical positivist approach represents a definite shift in 
method and tactics. Instead of attacking the arguments of 
the conventional philosophers, they have turned to a 
criticism of language in an attempt to bypass the older 
issues as meaningless, since for them the task of philosophy 
is the analysis of language, especially the language of 
science. Thus in their writings the differentiation of what 
is scientific and what is not became convergent with what is
1,2 Moritz Schlick, "The Turning Point in Philosophy," trans. by David Rynin in A.J. Ayer, ed., 
Logical Positivist (New York: Hacaillan, 1959 ), p.56,
meaningful and what is meaningless. In short, logical 
positivism asserted that only meaningful statements were to 
be permitted scientific consideration and accorded the 
status of knowledge claims.
The employment of verifiability as the criterion of 
meaning is the core of logical positivism: Verification thus 
requires the reducibility of statements to direct records of 
experience. By this criterion, metaphysical statements are 
neither analytic nor subject to empirical test, so must be 
deemed meaningless, expressing emotional stances or "general 
attitude towards life."103 That there is knowledge only 
from experience was at the heart of the logical positivists’ 
relentless attack upon metaphysics and speculative 
philosophy. Attacks on metaphysics were, of course, hardly 
new but "the logical positivists went much further than 
Comte in that they demanded something he opposed, the 
identification of positivism with empiricism.1,104 But, as I 
have mentioned above, the positivist attack on metaphysics 
does not mean that the propositions and arguments of the 
latter are merely false, as Schlick emphasizes:
The denial of the existence of a transcendent external 
world would be just as much a metaphysical statement 
as its affirmation. Hence the consistent empiricist
1,3 R, Carnap, "The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language," trans. by Arthur 
Pap, in A.J. Ayer, ed., Logical Positivisa, p.78.
184 C.G.A. Bryant, Positivisa in Social Theory..,, p.112. Logical positivisi differs froa earlier 
forns of positivisa--for exaaple, the French positivisa— in its use of "logical analysis" for the 
clarification of problems and assertions. This difference is the aajor reason why Rudolf Carnap 
preferred the label "logical eapiricisa" to ' logical positivisa." According to his notion, the ain 
of philosophy is logical analysis; and its subject natter is the empirical or positive sciences.
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does not deny the transcendent world, but shows that 
both its denial and affirmation are meaningless. This 
last distinction is of the greatest importance. I am 
convinced that the chief opposition to our view derives 
from the fact that the distinction between the falsity 
and the meaninglessness of a proposition is not 
observed. The proposition ’Discourse concerning a 
metaphysical external world is meaningless’ does not 
say: ’There is no external world,’ but something
altogether different. The empiricist does not say 
to the metaphysician ’what you say is false,’ but 
’what you say asserts nothing at all!’ He does not 
contradict him, but says ’I don’t understand you.’105
Rather, the major point of the positivist attack is that 
propositions of metaphysics cannot be accorded the status of 
knowledge claims. As A. J. Ayer, a leading contemporary 
positivist, succinctly puts it: "Metaphysical utterances
were condemned not for being emotive, which could hardly be 
considered as objectionable in itself, but for pretending to 
be cognitive, for masquerading as something that they were 
not."106 He continues: "[t]he originality of the logical
positivists lay in their making the impossibility of 
metaphysics depend not upon the nature of what could be 
known but upon the nature of what could be said."107
105 Horitz Schlick, "Positivisa and Realisa," trans, by David Rynin, in A.J. Ayer, ed., Logical 
Positivisa, p.78.
1M A.J. Ayer, ed., Logical Positivisa, pp.10-11.
m  Ibid., p.11.
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4. THE N A T U R E  OF S C I E N T I S M  
U^fiX...Pt.t.ng..
The predominant trends in contemporary political 
science, which attacked the philosophical tradition of 
political theory and intended to establish the autonomy of 
the discipline as an empirical science, modeled after the 
methodology of the natural sciences, are generally called 
behaviorism or behavioralism. The dedication to scientific 
research also ordinarily justifies calling these trends in 
such other ways as positivism, empiricism, scientism, 
objectivism, and relativism. Either singly or in
combination, and either interchangeably or distinctively, 
these terms are those constantly present in the attempt to 
characterize the distinctiveness of the positivistic trends 
in political inquiry.
Yet the meanings of these very words which are offered 
for the sake of clarification are themselves highly 
evanescent at best. Each of the terms stands for a rather 
vague and diffuse consensus which contains broad areas of 
disagreement and uncertainty.108 There is, indeed, by no 
means an accord on either the definitions of the terms, or 
the extent to which the various designations should be 
incorporated into a single organic whole. The relationships 
between the terms are, for some commentators, one of 
overlap, not of identity. Each has its own distinctive 
1 0 8 On disagreeaent and uncertainty of each of the teras, see T. Spragens, Jr., The Dileaaa of.,.,
pp.18-22.
ideas and concerns which distinguish it from the others. In 
spite of the thematic variations of these terms, however, at 
least some of the fundamental assumptions of the scientistic 
tradition are operative in each case. There exist family 
relationships between these diverse characterizations. And, 
there is a single concern that unifies them in their 
activities against the classical tradition of political 
theory--a concern for producing scientific knowledge about 
politics which is objectively descriptive, precise and 
generalized. The positivist paradigm which lies behind the 
various tenets of scientism is, thus, characterized by an 
theoretical/conceptual homogeneity.
Although much confusion has resulted from the fact that 
the definition of what is understood by "science" and 
"scientism" has varied significantly at different times and 
places, the behavioral, positive, or empirical approach can, 
therefore, be in general equated with "the" scientific 
method. In other words, it can be said that political 
behavioral ism, positivism, and empiricism are forms of 
scientism which, as an epistemology, emulates the model of 
the natural sciences. And, I think the term "scientism" is 
the most general and pervasive designation of all the terms, 
and also capable of both depicting the dominant form of 
contemporary inquiry and incorporating the notions of 
behavioral ism, positivism, and empiricism within its 
penumbra.109 Scientism has thus come to be associated with
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the very idea of a political "science" and the quest to make 
the discipline "scientific." Furthermore, according to 
Voegelin, "[s]cientism...is a decisive ingredient in modern 
intellectual movements like positivism and neopositivism, 
and, in particular, in modern political mass movements like 
communism and national socialism."110 On the basis of this 
belief, I want here to reconstruct the definition about and 
the nature of what we mean by scientism in a total sense, as 
an all-inclusive, all-pervasive term.111 As an example of 
the broad definition of scientism, Voegelin defines the term 
"scientism" as having three principal dogmas:
(1) the assumption that the mathematized science 
of natural phenomena is a model science to which all 
other sciences ought to conform; (2) that all realms 
of being are accessible to the methods of the sciences 
of phenomena; and (3) that all reality which is not 
accessible to sciences of phenomena is either 
irrelevant or, in the more radical form of dogma, 
illusionary.112
Indeed scientism has come to be associated with 
methodological endeavor which make sensory experience the 
foundation of all knowledge, and also with their 
complementary phenomena which propose a division between
169 "Penumbra" is a term used by some linguistic analysts to designate the connotations and family 
terms that cluster around a particular word,
110 See E. Voegelin, "The Origins of Scientism," pp.463-464.
111 It should be noted here that using the term "scientism," of course, might misleadingly suggest
contrasts which are not intended or present. In fact, the terms positivism, behavioralism, 
empiricism, scientism and others are in large part conceptual alter egos, struggling together over 
insoluble dilemmas which are the function of mutually shared beliefs.
112 E. Voege l i n ,  "The Orig i n s  of S c i e n t i s m , "  p .462 .
objects which are accessible to observation (about which 
knowledge is therefore possible) and objects which are not 
(and about which there can therefore be no knowledge). In 
short, scientism is frequently understood as a cognitional 
venture in that "in meeting the conceptual and 
methodological requirements of the physical sciences, it 
determines the order of human reality in terms of physical 
reality."x13
_
Because the term scientism has been so widely applied 
and appropriated, it might be helpful to specify the family 
of ideas long associated with scientism. Leszek Kolakowski 
presents the most systematically developed of general 
definitions, or formulations, of positivism. According to 
him, there are four fundamental elements which, taken 
together, can be said to constitute positivism.114 General 
formulations such as this are of value in that they point up 
certain central issues for examining scientism in a broad 
sense. Furthermore, we must recognize that there are other 
elements associated with scientism which are not easily 
reducible to any one of these four and not obviously
113 H.Y. Jung, The Crisis of Political Understanding, p.62.
114 In foraulating the basic tenets of scientisn, I an deeply indebted to Kolakowski, especially for
the first four eleaents presented here. In his "overall view," Kolakowski presents positivisa as "a 
collection of rules and evaluative criteria for refering to huaan knowledge," and as "a noraative 
attitude, regulating how we use such teras as ’knowledge,' ’science,’ 'cognition' and ’inforaation’”. 
See L. Kolakowski, The Alienation of Reason, ch.l.
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inferred from them.115 The fifth element is presented as an 
example of them. There are several corollaries of these 
basic tenets and various degrees and versions of each of 
them, but together they form the critical group of 
assumptions operative in the context of theory formation 
which are derived from scientism. They are, furthermore, 
ideas that are related both logically and historically, 
sharing a common basis in the same general world-view and 
sharing a common origin.116 They all have grown from the 
root model of a unidimensional world.
The first element of family ideas of scientism, i.e., 
emphasis of science and scientific method, is the view that 
"the unity of science stems from a single fundamental law 
from which all other laws are ultimately derived...or from 
certain evolutionary processes common to nature and 
society..."117 The word "scientism", in its original sense, 
is to be understood as meaning the belief that science, in 
the modern sense of that term, and scientific method, as 
described by modern scientists, afford the only reliable
115 This value is strictly United in that they are also insensitive to much of what the debate about 
positivism and scientism has been about in different intellectual and cultural contexts. To correctly 
identify terminology, complementary analysis of the debate about the different characterizations are 
needed. However, it is not the present purpose to focus on the reflection of the debate in detail.
For the other elements, see Percy S, Cohen, "Is Positivism Dead?" Sociological Review, 28:1 (1980), 
p.142.
116 Perhaps it is misleading, strictly speaking, to talk of a common origin, since each of the
features of scientism mentioned had its precursors. For example, seventeenth-century nominalism 
clearly had a forerunner in the theological nominalism of Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. As a 
group, possessed of a clear familial relationship and articulated as a gestalt, however, these ideas 
did arise together,
1I? C.G.A. Bryant, Positivisa in Social..., p . 6.
natural means of acquiring knowledge about whatever is real. 
Science is a clearly definable form of inquiry which can be 
extended to examine any area of experience. Scientific 
method claims to have universal application, and its great 
success in analyzing and interpreting physical phenomena has 
helped to maintain a persistent faith in the method itself. 
Some scientists have argued, therefore, that science is the 
only avenue to human knowledge, that is the "sole authentic 
mode of revelation," and to know is to measure, to count, or 
to state things in quantitative terms. They also have come 
to claim that there is nothing else worthy of consideration. 
Scientific method, according to them, has no limitations 
whatever.
As Juergen Habermas puts it, scientism "means science’s 
belief in itself: that is, the conviction that we can no
longer understand science as one form of possible knowledge, 
but rather must identify knowledge with science."118 It is 
important to note that scientism involves not merely a 
distinction between science and non-science, but the 
relegation of the latter to an inferior status, even to 
cognitive meaninglessness or nonsense. So the question "Can 
science save us?" is even answered in the affirmative119 by 
some addicts of "the superstition of science." In a word, 
scientism claims to be the absolute paradigm for all 
knowledge, including political knowledge. Eugene Meehan,
118 Juergen Haberaas, Knovledge and Hunan Interest, p.214.
119 George A. Lundberg, Can Science Save Hs? (New York: Longaans, Green A Co., Inc., 194?)
one of the eminent figures of the behavioral persuasion, 
argues that scientism is "the only epistemic base for human 
knowledge . 111 2 0
In another account of the tenets of scientism, Anthony 
Giddens, a sociologist, discusses the particular problems of 
"positivism in sociology," as distinct from the general 
problems of "positivism in philosophy," in connection with 
"the assertion that the concepts and methods employed in the 
natural sciences can be applied to form a ’science of man,’ 
or a natural science of sociology."121 His account of 
"positivism in sociology" is thus most directly related to 
this first element, although it also has connections with 
the other ones. According to him, "the ’positivist
attitude’ in sociology may be said to comprise three 
connected suppositions": (1) the methodological supposition
that the procedures of natural science may be directly 
adapted to sociology; (2) the analytical supposition that 
the end-result of sociological investigations can be 
formulated as "laws" or "law-like" generalizations of the 
same kind as those established by natural scientists; (3) 
the practical assumption that sociology has a technical 
character.12 2
125 E. Meehan, The Theory and Method..., p. 12.
121 "Positivisn in philosophy" is the contention that "the notions and stateaents of science 
constitute a fraaework by reference to which the nature of any fora of knowledge aay be deterained." 
Anthony Giddens, ed., Positivisa and Sociology (London: Heineaann, 1974), p.3.
122 Ibid., pp.3-4; and C.G.A. Bryant, Positivisa in Social..., pp.7-9.
The second rule of scientism, i.e., phenomenalism, is 
opposed to that long and powerful philosophical tradition of 
distinguishing between the essences of things and their 
observable manifestations. It either banishes essences from 
all rational discussion or insists that all, so-called 
essences, must be reduced to phenomena. This rule, the one 
most often attributed to scientism, states that "[w]e are 
entitled to record only that which is actually manifested in 
[sense] experience."123 That "man can acquire information 
about the environment only through the sensory apparatus"124 
is one of the prime assumptions of scientism. It admits 
phenomena to knowledge but not noumena, existence but not 
essence. Kolakowski stresses that while "positivists do not 
object to inquiry into the immediately invisible causes of 
any observed phenomenon, they object to any accounting for 
it in terms of occult entities that are by definition 
inaccessible to human knowledge."125 Scientism, then, 
leaves no place for metaphysics by asserting the claims of 
sense experience as the ultimate foundation of human 
knowledge and denying the possibility of meaningful 
discourse concerning supersensible objects.
The third rule, i.e., nominalism, follows from the 
second rule and is often merged with it. It asserts that
113 L. Kolakowski, The Alienation of Reason, p,3,
134 E. Heehan, Value Judgsent and Social Science: Structures and Processes (Honewood, IL: Dorsey 
Press, 1969), p.12.
135 E. Heehan, Value Judgaent,.,, p.4.
general terms refer only to particular instances of things 
and not to some general properties, as such. "We may not 
assume that any insight formulated in general terms can have 
any real references other than individual facts." 
"According to nominalism," Kolakowski continues, "every 
abstract science is a method of abridging the recording of 
experience and gives us no extra, independent knowledge in 
the sense that, via its abstractions, it opens access to 
empirically inaccessible domains of reality." Thus the 
general entities of metaphysics are dismissed as fictions 
"for they illegitimately ascribed existence to things that
have no existence save as names or words."126
The fourth rule, i.e., dichotomy of facts and norms, 
states that facts and values are distinct conceptual 
categories, and that they ought to be separated in the 
scientific investigations of political phenomena. It
refuses to call value judgments and normative statements 
knowledge and insists that normative statements and their 
terms must, if they are to have meaning, be reducible to 
descriptions, explanations or technical prescriptions. 
According to the rule of phenomenalism, "we are obliged to
reject the assumption of values as characteristics of the
world for they are not discoverable in the same way as the 
only kind of knowledge worthy of the name." In addition, 
the rule of nominalism renders untenable "the assumption 
that beyond the visible world there exists a domain of
12t Ibid., p p . 5-7.
values ’in themselves’, with which our evaluations are
correlated in some mysterious way."127
Scientism maintains the dualism of fact and value in 
the name of scientific judiciousness. The scientific method 
works well only when applied to things that have tangible 
existence, that is, to facts. Furthermore, the logic of 
science, scientism argues, entails no moral commitment: 
science does not and cannot create values. Instead of 
confusing the two realms, they must be kept apart and 
considered to be "logically heterogeneous."128 This
hallmark of value neutrality, which juxtaposes fact and
value, is "the most acute manifestation of the behavioralist 
bifurcation of knowledge, science, methodology, and 
objectivity on the one hand and action, philosophy,
ontology, and subjectivity on the other." This sharp 
separation between facts and norms "epitomizes this 
bifurcation whose leitmotifs are rigor and objectivity."129
The last element of scientism, i.e., objectivism, or 
the objective ideal of knowledge, claims the image of true 
knowledge as utterly objective, in the sense of fully 
specifiable, unambiguous, and wholly unstructured by the
agent of the knowledge. The objective ideal of knowledge
127 Ibid., p.8.
128 The view that fact and value are logically heterogeneous is stated uost clearly in David Easton, 
The Political Systen: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1953), pp.219-32 and A Fraaevork of Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965),
pp.1-22.
12S H.Y. Jung, The Crisis of Political Understanding, p p . 102-103.
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claims that reality is objective in the sense that it is 
separable or ought to be separated from the realm of 
subjectivity. No reality is subjective. This doctrine is 
well captured in the following passage from John Nelson’s 
W h a t  S h o u l d  P o l i t i c a l  T h e o r y  B e  N o w ? :
Objectivism is the doctrine of the positivist (or 
passivist) epistemologist. It contends that there 
is a single, exhaustive, and ineradicable separation 
between subject and object. Often, this is associated 
with an ontology of atomism, such that the world is 
claimed to consist of elemental particles 4 objects) 
individuated prior to and apart from any intervention 
by subjects. At any rate, the objectivist is convinced 
that the world (of objects) is simply there(somewhere), 
utterly independent of his activities in investigation 
of it. The issue of objectivity then becomes the 
problem of keeping subjectivity out of inquiry; in 
other words, of saving the appearances while also 
saving the sanctity of beings (objects).130
Scientism in this sense denies the qualitative 
differences between what is human--human because it is 
subjective--and what is merely natural--objective. So 
methodologically speaking, the scientist claims that 
political science is amenable to the same procedures as the 
natural sciences in the name of causal explanation and 
prediction. Even though twentieth-century political
behavioral ism maintains the difference between the 
behavioral and the natural, it treats political behavior as 
if it were a physical object and therefore amenable to the 
same techniques of the physical sciences. Insofar as
1311 J.S. Uelson, "Political Theory as Political Rhetoric," in J.S, Nelson, ed., Wiat Should 
Political..., p.197,
political behavioral ism succumbs in this way to the "canons 
of scientific method" as defined in the model of the natural 
sciences, it is committed to scientism.
.S., c . i .    X...
The presuppositions of positivistic epistemology, as 
formulated by Descartes, Locke and their successors, and 
underlying the intellectual premises of Western liberalism, 
have fostered a mechanistic world view in which personal or 
primary qualities could be brought under control by Galilean 
and Newtonian mechanics from which impersonal or secondary 
qualities could be derived. Thus, with the development of 
the paradigm of rationalistic scientism from Descartes and 
Locke through the Enlightenment p h i l o s o p h e s  to the modern 
positivists, the radically refashioned epistemology became 
rigorously impersonal and unambiguously precise. Neither 
ambiguity nor personality intrude to obscure the clarity of 
pure res e x t e n s a ,  which is the proper object of knowledge. 
Knowledge, like the reality it was to know, was in the 
Cartesian view, seen as homogeneous, clear, and distinct. 
This model of epistemology is clearly appropriate to a 
modern mind which sees the world itself as both impersonal 
and precise.
The central premises of positivistic epistemology or 
world view, for example precision and impersonality, implied 
a whole series of dichotomies which were soon to become 
entrenched in the most basic presuppositions of modern
philosophy.131 First was the standard split between
subjective and objective. The problem was that the location 
of the knower and his relationship with the known were quite 
unaccountable. The subjective-objective model of knowledge 
remained unresolved in the objective conception of reality, 
and has plagued Western philosophy ever since. Second was a 
bifurcation of reason and emotion. Since reason took its 
structure from the reality, to know was its task; and, since 
the reality as seen by the new Copernican and Galilean 
cosmology had no legitimate objects of emotion, the realm of 
emotion was obviously distinct from the proper object of 
reason. Emotions were, by definition, irrational, as the 
language used to describe them from Spinoza to Freud clearly 
indicated. And finally, there evolved the alleged dichotomy 
of facts and values, with only the former having reference 
to the real world and hence a valid place in science. Facts 
refer to reality and can be verified in reference to it; 
values or moral aspects are emotions and desires. 
Therefore, facts can be true or false, while values are 
meaningless in terms of truth or falsity.
The parallelism of these three dichotomies is not 
merely formal, for they are substantively intertwined as 
well. The concepts of objective, reason, and fact all are 
expressive of the reality depicted by the seventeenth- 
century cosmology. Their opposites--subjective, emotional, 
and values--in each case "represent the receptacles for
1 3 1 T. S p r a g e n s ,  The Dileaaa of..., p p . 30-31.
those leftover phenomena which could not fit into the world 
as it was defined but which could apparently not be 
abolished either."132 The elements of the three dichotomies 
share a close family relationship.133 The formal
parallelism and substantive overlap of these dichotomies is 
of course no accident, since they are all the offspring of 
the same seventeenth-century outlook. Thus, to be objective 
is to be factual, and being rational means to be objective. 
And on the other side, taking a subjective approach means to 
let one’s emotions and values become involved.
The objectivist world view with its numerous 
interrelated dichotomies provides the background of the 
contemporary bifurcation of political theory into the 
empirical and the normative, and the implications of the 
quest for a value-free political science. Even today the 
centrality of the fact-value dichotomy to the pursuit of the
scientific study of man is discovered in many works of
modern mind baptized with scientific epistemology. It is 
generally believed by the behavioralist and positivist- 
inspired political inquirers that, without a logical 
separation of facts from values, of objective reality from 
subjective preferences about reality, a true science of 
politics would be impossible.134 Rather, from this natural,
132 Ibid., p.31.
133 The relationship anong the three terns has been eaphasized by the frequent use of one of the terns
on one side of the ontological split to define its brothers.
134 It is worth citing here Easton's conment on the inplications of the fact-value dichotony, which 
operates as a silent working hypothesis in auch of political inquiry: "values can ultiaately be
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physical, factual, or mathematical bias, we are told, would 
flow the foundation for infallible and universal moral and 
political sciences. In other words, in emulating the legacy 
of the Galilean mathematization of nature into the m a t h e s i s  
u n i v e r s a l i s  and Descartes’ "mechanicomorphic philosophy of
nature,"135 contemporary political positivists, as disciples 
of Hobbesian scientism, have endeavoured "to create a theory 
of the body politic equal to the Galilean theory of physical 
bodies--equal in clarity, in scientific method, and in
certainty.ni3 6
This rationalistic understanding of science has had the 
effect of challenging the very legitimacy of political 
philosophy itself. Scientism entails denials of "the 
dignity of science to the quest for substance in nature, in 
man and society, as well as in transcendental reality; and 
in the more radical form, it denies the reality of 
substance."137 As a consequence, the contemporary political 
philosophy lost much of its previous force and credibility.
As James Wiser indicates, "as an attempt to reconstruct
reduced to emotional responses conditioned by the individual's total life-experiences. In this 
interpretation, although in practice no one proposition need express either a pure fact or a pure 
value, facts and values are logically heterogeneous. The factual aspect of a proposition refers to a 
part of reality; hence it can be tested by reference to the facts. In this way we check its truth.
The moral aspect of a proposition, however, expresses only the emotional response of an individual to 
a state of real or presumed facts." D. Easton, The Political System, p.221.
135 James Collins, Descartes’ Philosophy of Nature, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1971).
136 E. Cassirer, The Nyth of the State, p. 165. For a discussion on the implications of Hobbes' 
scientism on the study of politics, see T, Spragens, The Politics of Notion: The No rid of Thottas 
Hobbes, (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1973).
137 E. Voegelin, "The Origins of Scientism," pp.462-463.
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human and social order, political philosophy, necessarily 
involves an act of creative imagination, and by its very 
nature the meaning of such an act is of the type that in 
part must be accepted rather than simply observed."138 This 
decision to accept certain arguments or to accredit certain 
experiences is necessarily a matter of personal judgment. 
Indeed classical political philosophy is based upon an 
acknowledgement of this fact.139 Yet in the "climate of 
opinion" emanating from the scientific rationalism the
personal involvement of the knower within the act of
cognition came to be seen as the root of subjectivity. The
objective character of modern science was associated with
its impersonal quality and such a quality, in turn, was to 
be secured through a rigorous application of the "scientific 
method." In a critique of the impact of positivistic 
epistemology upon contemporary culture and its modes of 
thought, thus Theodore Roszak manifests the prevalence of 
ill-fated scientism:
Science...has become a total culture dominating the 
lives of millions for whom discussions of the theory 
of knowledge are so much foreign language. Yet 
objectivity, whatever its epistemological status, 
has become the commanding life style of our society.. 
Objectivity as a state of being fills the very air 
we breathe in a scientific culture; it grips us 
subliminally in all we say, feel, and do. The
138 J. Wiser, "Knowledge and Order," Political Science Reviewer, 7 ( 1 977 ), p.91.
135 For example, Aristotle states that "Scientific knowledge is judgment about things that are
universal and necessary, and the conclusions of demonstration, and all scientific knowledge follow 
from first principles (for scientific knowledge involves apprehension of a rational ground)." 
Aristotle, Viconachean Ethics, Bk.VI, Ch.6. 1140b. Also, see J. Wiser, "Political Theory, Personal
Knowledge, and Public Truth," Journal of Politics, 36:3 (August 1974), pp.661-674.
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mentality of the ideal scientist becomes the very 
soul of the society.140
Roszak says that the stuff of this soul is objectivity and 
that the belief in objectivity becomes myth. That is, he 
characterizes the modern rationalistic ideal of scientific 
knowledge as "the myth of objective consciousness." Again 
to quote Roszak:
There is but one way of gaining access to reality-- 
so the myth holds--and this is to cultivate a state of 
consciousness cleansed of all subjective distortion, 
all personal involvement. What flows from this state 
of consciousness qualifies as knowledge, and nothing 
else does.141
Accordingly, there developed a growing reluctance to 
accept the scientific claims of those traditions of inquiry 
especially where such an application was inappropriate, 
e.g., theology, ethics and political philosophy. 
Furthermore, there have emerged intellectual endeavours 
which have launched attack on the scientistic tradition. In 
the next chapter I will investigate Voegelin’s radically 
unique critique of scientistic tradition and relate it to 
some of these new developments.
140 Theodore Roszak, The Making of a Counter Culture: Reflections on the Technocratic Society and 
Its Touthful Opposition, (Garden City, NY: Douhleday & Co., 1969), p.216.
141 Ibid., p.208.
CHAPTER II
ERIC VOEGELIN’S CRITIQUE 
OF I P O S  I T IV I  STIC RATIONALISM
In recent years, in fact, interest in the Voegelinian 
philosophical science of politics has enjoyed a revival of 
sorts. Voegelin’s philosophical science of politics has 
come to the attention of the political theorists who attempt 
to revive and return to the great tradition of political
theory. The critique Voegelin brings to bear on the 
positivist self-understanding of political inquiry is, I 
believe, largely representative of the restored tradition of 
political philosophy in general.1 The restoration of
political science in Voegelin’s sense is essentially the
restoration of the classical concept of science and a return 
to the pre-positivist conception of political inquiry. As
such, it primarily marks a return to the classical Platonic- 
Aristotelian conception of political science. And, this 
restoration involves a response to a major development in 
the recent history of political inquiry. That is, it is a
1 As a leading exponent of the revived tradition of political theory, nany coaaentators prefer 
referring to Leo Strauss to Eric Voegelin. However, as Janes H. Rhodes states in his recent essay 
coaparing Strauss and Voegelin, and clarifying how their work points beyond positivisa toward a 
knowable political ethics, "Voegelin's theories are truer to the historical origins of philosophy and 
revelation than Strauss’s.’ See J. H. Rhodes, "Philosophy, Revelation, and Political Theory: Leo 
Strauss and Eric Voegelin," Journal of Politics, 49:4 (Nov. 1987), pp.1036-1060. Also see Chapter 
Four of this dissertation, pp.390-400.
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response to the intrusion of positivist theoretical dogma 
into the tradition of political theory involving debates 
over the meaning of "science," "theory," and "philosophy" in 
political science and the notion of value freedom in 
research. Thus, the restoration has also produced
reflections on the roots and claims of positivist political 
science in the face of what for over two thousand years has 
been called "political theory."
The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to examine 
Voegelin’s endeavor concerning the proper self-understanding 
of political inquiry by exploring Voegelin’s notion of some 
key terms such as "science," "theory" and "philosophy," and 
his radically unique anti-positivist, anti-gnostic critique. 
His protest movement against the chaos spawned by the 
positivistic tradition that has dominated political science 
since the latter part of the nineteenth century is one of 
Voegelin’s major contributions to political philosophy. In 
this chapter, I will review Voegelin’s critical enterprises: 
first of all, on the restoration of the onto-epistemic 
meaning of science, theory, and philosophy, secondly, on the 
positivistic perversion of science brought about by the 
overruling of methodological consideration over theoretical 
relevance, thirdly, on Max Weber’s contribution for 
consolidation of objectivistic value-free social sciences in 
the positivistic tradition. And, finally, special attention 
is devoted to the relations of Voegelin to those individuals
1 0 1
who have contributed most creatively to the reconstruction 
of anti-positivistic humanity.
1. O N T O - E P I S T E M I C  D E F I N I T I O N  OF
SCIENCE, T H E O R Y  AND P H I L O S O P H Y
All of us, we moderns, suppose we know roughly what
science is. But, what we know is the word science in its
narrower, reductionist sense. It is used today to denote a
knowledge of nature that is quantitative and objective as we
have witnessed in the preceding chapter. However, the
conventional and reductionist notion of science, or
"scientific knowledge" which Voegelin identifies as a
"scientistic creed"2 is proper not to political inquiry but,
if anywhere, to natural or physical sciences. Viewed on the
basis of a recognition that there is a fundamental,
ontological difference between human reality and physical
reality, the ontological difference itself determines or
dictates the choice of method in different sciences. There
is, therefore, a fundamental methodological difference
between what is political scientific and what is natural
scientific. However, the dictum, "after the method of the
natural sciences," is undoubtedly the key to what many
positivists of political science believed to be the right
2 According to Voegelin, the "scientistic creed" inplies two great denials: "it denies the dignity of 
science to the quest for substance in nature, in nan and society, as well as in transcendental 
reality; and, in the aore radical fora, it denies the reality of substance." E. Voegelin, "The 
Origins of Scientism," Social Research, 15:4 (1948), p.462.
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objective for the discipline. In fact, what is understood 
to be science by political positivists is the conceptions
and techniques of the physical or natural sciences. But we 
shall misconceive political reality if we confine political 
inquiry within this strait-jacket. The method of the 
natural sciences is not the only way to conceive of the 
nature of knowing in general, nor a proper way to conceive 
the political knowledge in particular. There are other
kinds of understanding of science, that is, other ways to 
knowledge of reality. For example, revivalists of political 
theory manifest that the most immediate and particular 
relevance to political inquiry is the philosophical,
philosophical knowledge or philosophical science.
Indeed, it is a curious and distinctive feature of
contemporary political inquiry that we use the term
"science" and "theory" to encompass understanding in both
the scientific and philosophical senses. The possibility of
confusion comes from the fact that the terms are used in
both ways, more accurately, in both "doxic or hypothetical
and epistemic or existential senses."3 Lest the differences
between these two ways be misunderstood, it should be
3 For the distinction between the two aodes of knowledge, Eugene Webb expounds: "Shat is 
characteristic of knowing in the hypothetical or doxic node is that it speculates regarding the 
external existence, apart froa the knower, as a reality sketched out in an hypothesis or speculative 
aodel (doxa). For exaaple, one catches a gliapse of a strange object, then develops a concept or 
speculative scheaa (doxa) that Bay fit it, and finally confiras the fit by closer observation.
Episteaic or existential knowledge, on the other hand, which for Voegelin is the proper sphere of 
philosophy, is the knowledge in which the tension of existence, the love of the divine ground, becoaes 
conscious to itself and coaaits itself to live in fidelity to its love; for this kind of knowledge is 
not a aatter of aere observation of fact but of clarifying, opening up, and rendering conscious a
nd available the possibilities iaplicit in existence in its fullness." Eugene Webb, Eric Voegelin: 
Philosopher of history (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981), pp.105-13.
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acknowledged that, like behavioralism, traditionalism (or 
philosophical science of politics) claims to be a form of 
political s c i e n c e ,  indeed both of them have at one time or 
another been called a "new political science." Both of them 
also claim to be empirically oriented. They claim to be 
realistic; they are seeking knowledge about the realities of 
the political world as experienced. However, an unfortunate 
consequence of this ambiguity and confusion is, I believe, 
that we sometimes imagine that we are understanding the 
political reality itself when we are actually pursuing 
hypothetical or doxic knowledge about it. At this point, it 
is essential to decide in what sense the political reality 
is to be understood. The next chapter examines the 
ontological, noble meaning of political reality as developed 
by Voegelin. The scientistic, or hypothetical understanding 
of political reality is "the blind transference of the 
methodolatry to the study of political reality."4 With 
regard to this point, Sandoz explicates:
The most comprehensive knowledge of political reality 
is attained primarily through a p h i l o s o p h i c a l  
investigation, not through one narrowly modeled on 
the supposed "methodology" of the natural sciences. 
This means that in contradistinction to the prevailing 
paradigm of American political science, there need 
be no preoccupation with phenomena, no naturalistic 
reduction, no restriction of "reason" to inferential 
reasoning, no juxtaposing of "traditional" and 
"behavioral" schools, no dogmatic postulation of 
assumptions or doctrine, no specious fact-value
4 Hwa Yol Jung, The Crisis of Political Understanding (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1979), 
p.65.
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dichotomy, and no systems of political thought.5
As a response to the intrusion of positivist doxical 
dogma into the tradition of political theory, Voegelin 
redefines the meaning of "science" and "theory" in political 
science in accordance with the traditional and prepositivist 
conception of theory and political inquiry. Much of 
Voegelin’s treatment of the basic issues of political 
inquiry is to be found in his historical studies of the use 
of these terms. He has mastered "a technical philosophical 
vocabulary developed by the Greeks of antiquity, one 
employed with persistence down to the present." And he 
"uses it as the indispensable instrument for elucidating in 
a precisely meaningful way the phenomena of political 
existence to which he addresses himself."6 In Voegelin’s 
meaning, thus, the restoration of political theory is 
essentially the revival of the traditional concept of 
science and theory and a return to the classical Platonic- 
Aristotelian conception of political science.
From the perspective of this approach, an adequate 
understanding of politics, or political reality requires 
tracing phenomena back to their ontic roots. Hence, 
whenever Voegelin makes "theory" and "science" as such an
5 E. Sandoz, "The Philosophical Science of Politics Beyond Behavioralisa," in George J. Graham, Jr., & 
George W. Carey, eds., The Post-Behavioral Era: Perspectives on Political Science (New York: David 
HcKay Co., 1972), p.296,
* E. Sandos, "The Foundations of Voegelin’s Political Theory," Political Science Reviewer, 1 (Fall 
1971), p.34.
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explicit theme for discussion, he is concerned with the
epistemic or existential sense. This becomes clear by
Voegelin’s insistence on a generic understanding of science
as e p i s t e m e . The term science comes from the medieval Latin
s c i e n t i a  which is derived from s c i r e ,  "to know." S c i e n t i a
itself is a translation of the Greek e p i s t e m e ,  knowledge.
In the classical setting the two fundamentally different
ways of knowledge--knowledge of existence from within and
knowledge of existence from without--were designated by the
distinctions of e p i s t e m e  and d o x a .  E p i s t e m e  is a term for
the experientially rooted mode of knowing of n o u s ,  which
enables man, as an existent, to participate consciously in
transcendent reality. That is, what can truly lay claim to
the title of e p i s t e m e  is only the knowledge of being "in
itself"; the knowledge of being in the manifold of things is
d o x a . 1 In the onto-epistemic notion of science, e p i s t e m e ,
or that which brings man into a conscious contact with
reality, was seen as distinct from d o x a .  The question of
the distinctions and relations between e p i s t e m e  and d o x a  is
of central importance for Voegelin. E p i s t e m e  has been one
of central terms in his own analysis of philosophical
knowing as an existential process, because epistemic
knowledge implies existential knowledge. Thus, to be truly
science, any science must be philosophically, or, more
T The object of knowledge (episteme) is identified by the Parmenidian term "being." But, the object 
of opining cannot be "net-being," for of the Parmenidian "not-being" we have no knowledge at all.
Hence, Doxa is a faculty of the soul in between knowledge and ignorance, while its object 
correspondingly must be a realm "between" (netaxy) "being" and "not-being." E. Voegelin, Order and 
History, vol.3, Plato and Aristotle, p.66. Hereafter abbreviated as OH, III.
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accurately, ontologically oriented, insofar as it concerns 
itself with conceiving of human reality.
The Voegelinian notion of science is not demanding that 
there must be two separate orders in the logic of scientific 
inquiry, one for the political inquiry and the other for 
natural sciences. Rather, it maintains that the respective 
"objects" they investigate are qualitatively different. 
Unlike physical nature which does not experience itself, 
only man experiences himself as well as other people in
society and other things in nature. As Alfred Schutz 
contends,
The world of nature, as explored by the natural 
scientist, does not "mean" anything to molecules, 
atoms, and electrons. But the observational field 
of the social scientist--social reality--has a 
specific meaning and relevance structure for the 
human beings living, acting, and thinking within it.8
Here we encounter a new notion of experience radically
different from the conventional one that forms the empirical 
basis of political science. Experience--more specifically, 
existential experience--embraces man’s participation in 
multiple dimensions of reality; it includes confrontations 
and relations that extend far beyond the limits of sensory 
perception and reflections on phenomenal regularities.
It is not man the animal, nor much less man the
sentient integer, but man the political living being
in the fullness of his h u m a n i t y  that science seeks to
* Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers, vol.l: The Probless of Social Reality, Haurice Natanson, ed. (The 
Hague: Hartinus Nijhoff, 1962), p.59.
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know and to assist toward a well-ordered and happy 
existence...[I]n the new science of politics the 
entire range and all the modes of man’s experience 
become resources from which may be drawn by way 
of rational inquiry the knowledge of reality and its 
order...The existential foundation of the science 
of politics, and the very source of scientific 
o b j e c t i v i t y , is man’s prescientific participation in 
all of the realms of being from the somatic and simply 
sentient to moral, aesthetic and mystical levels of 
experience. This existential participation is the 
means whereby man attunes himself with reality and 
gains the primordial grip on the whole of being which 
is the foundation of all knowledge.9
To put it in Voegelin’s own words,
Science starts from the prescientific existence of 
man, from his participation in the world with his 
body, soul, intellect, and spirit, from his primary 
grip on all the realms of being that is assured to 
him because his own nature is their epitome.10
Man’s very humanity is established by the presence of 
the unique faculty of n o u s .  It is this noetic experience 
which sets the parameters and establishes the 
characteristics proper to the Greek notion of science. "The 
enterprise of science is guided, not by a methodology, but 
rather by the knower’s sense of theoretical relevance. As 
such, science was seen essentially as an attempt to 
consciously elucidate reality--an open reality understood as 
a horizon into which man is drawn by a multiplicity of
* E. Sandoz, "The Philosophical Science...," pp.296, 298.
10 E. Voegelin, The New Science of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952 ), p.4. 
Hereafter NSP.
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promised meanings."11 It is this particular conception of 
science which is retained in the statement of Voegelin: 
"Science is a search for truth concerning the nature of the 
various realms of being."12 Voegelin’s use of the term 
political science is, therefore, consistent with the 
Aristotelian concept of an e p i s t e m e  p o l i t i k e  and not with 
corrupted contemporary usages by behavioralists and 
others.13 In the conventional sense, Voegelin’s "new 
science of politics," or onto-epistemic conception of 
science is "neither science nor new."14 As William Havard 
states, "[i]t is far easier to make dogmatic assertions 
about the meaning of science and to relegate Voegelin to the 
status of a ’metaphysician,’ or ’worse,’ than to come to 
grips with his work."15 For example, Robert Dahl, a leading 
proponent of political behavioral ism, reproaches that 
Voegelin "has not only ’un-defined’ science; he has ’un- 
scienced’ it."16 However, "all Voegelin has done is to 
’unscience’ positivism"1 7 ; that is, to break through the
11 Jaaes Kiser, "Political Theory, Personal Knowledge, and Public Truth," Journal of Politics, 36:3 
(1974|, p.663.
12 RSP, p.4.
13 See Dante Gernino, Beyond Ideology: The Revival of Political Theory, pp.167ff, and "Eric Voegelin’s 
Anaanesis," Southern Review, 7 (1971), p.69.
14 Gregor Sebba, "Prelude and Variations on the These of Eric Voegelin," in E. Sandoz, ed., Eric 
Voegelin’s Thought: A Critical Appraisal (Durhan, NC: Duke University Press, 1982), p.20.
15 Killian Havard, Jr., "Notes on Voegelin's Contributions to Political Theory," E. Sandoz, ed., Eric 
Voegelin's Thought, p.89.
14 Robert Dahl, "The Science of Politics: Old and New," Iforld Politics, 7 ( 1955 ), p.489.
17 E. Sandoz, "Introduction," in Sandoz, ed., Eric Voegelin’s Thought, p.X.
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parochial narrowness of positivist political studies, and to 
restore the true and literal conception of e p i s t e m e  
p o l i t i k e .  He does not ignore the importance of positivistic 
and technical knowledge nor the impact it has had upon 
political inquiry. The major purpose of Voegelin’s
criticism of scientistic tradition is not to suppose
the behavioral approach and the techniques of 
quantification to be simply u s e l e s s  to political 
science. The point rather is that the science q u a  
science must not itself be defined with methodology 
as the controlling criterion. This is of crucial 
importance since the key issues of political science 
cannot be studied with the methodology of the 
mathematizing sciences but require the employment 
of other methods. In short, the study of political 
behavior is a part (not the whole) of political 
science, nor is it the most important part.18
However, Voegelin has been decisive in thinking since his 
twenties that the state of contemporary political science 
has been mired by its immersion in the behavioral ism ’ s 
ancestors such as neo-Kantian epistemology, value-related 
methodology, historicism, descriptive institutionalism and 
ideological historical speculations, could be overcome only 
by with the restoration of a "new science of politics."19 
Voegelin’s "new science" alludes to the tradition of 
Giambattista Vico’s S c i e n z a  N u o v a , N e w  S c i e n c e .  Defying the 
restrictive claims of the scientific ideal of the 
E. Sandoz, "The Science and Deaonology of Politics," Intercollegiate fieview, 5:2 (Winter 1968-69),
p.121.
IS E. Voegelin, Anamnesis (German), p.7. Cited in Dante Gernino, "Eric Voegelin’s Anamnesis," pp.69-
70; and, E. Voegelin, "Consciousness and Order: Forward to Anamnesis," in Fred Lawrence, ed., The
Beginning and the Beyond (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1984), p.35.
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seventeenth century, Vico founded a conception of N e w  
S c i e n c e  which expresses the revolt against the unhistorical 
Cartesian notion of science that dominated European 
scholarship at the time.20 However, unlike Vico, Voegelin 
does not mean that he himself "[has] founded a new science, 
but rather [has] pulled together the widely scattered 
results of a ’process of re-theoretization’ that had been 
going on in different sciences for the last half century."21
To Voegelin, as Dante Germino writes, "political 
’science’ and political ’theory’ are inseparably bound 
together."22 With regard to Voegelin’s analogical usage of 
e p i s t e m e  (science, or knowledge) and t h e o r i a  (theory), 
Eugene Webb expounds:
E p i s t e m e  and t h e o r i a  were the terms used by certain 
classical philosophers, as discussed by Voegelin, 
for the reflective illumination of this experienced 
movement of transcendence. Since the former term has 
disappeared and its Latin equivalent, s c i e n t i a ,  has 
been preempted in modern usage to describe the natural 
sciences, it is the word "theory," as Voegelin uses 
it at least, that carries the classical meaning 
forward. It does so, that is, as best it can under 
the circumstances, since "theory," too, has largely 
been preempted in the doxically oriented modern setting 
to serve as a term for speculative hypotheses.23
2(1 For a discussion of Vico's foundation of new science, see Helaut Viechtbauer, "Giambattista Vico 
and the Foundation of Science," in Peter J, Opitz 4 Gregor Sebba, eds., The Philosophy of Order: 
Essays on History, Consciousness and Politics (Stuttgart, V. Gernany: Ernst Klett, 1981), pp.406-415.
21 Gerhart Nieneyer, "Eric Voegelin’s Achievenent," Hodern Age, 9:2 (Spring 1965), p.133,
22 D. Gernino, Beyond Ideology, P.163.
23 E. Webb, Eric Voegelin, p . 108.
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In the accustomed, modern usage, theory, like science, 
"bears the unmistakable imprimatur of the Cartesian 
framework."24 That is, a theory consists of explanatory 
devices; and, it is also a generalization or set of 
generalizations which explain general statements or 
propositions or other theories by relating them one to 
another in a larger conceptual scheme in which the 
generalizations find a place and are thereby explained. In 
other words, "choices about research topics, methods, 
materials, evidence, conclusions, explanations, and
expositions revolve around conceptions of theory."25 And,
political positivists "push a conception of theory which 
makes it synonymous with scientific endeavor as a whole. 
Thereby they imply that all properly scientific studies of 
politics (and nothing else) constitutes political theory."26 
From this viewpoint, political theory is a methodologically 
conditioned body, whose task is to serve as the handmaiden 
of research into behavioral regularities on the phenomenal 
level by producing ideal types, models and the like.
In the scientistic and parochial account of the term,
theory should be intelligible to any investigator who uses
properly objective scientific methodology; the demands are
not on the observer but only on the method, and the observer
28 Patricia Lewis Poteat, Valker Percy and the Old Hodein Age: Reflections on Language, hrguaent, and 
the Telling of Stories (Baton Rouge: LSI) Press, 1985 ), p.14.
25 John S. Nelson, "Natures and Futures for Political Theory," in J.S. Nelson, ed., I/hat Should
Political Theory Be Now? (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1983), p.5.
28 Ibid., p . 5.
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i s  s u p p o s e d  t o  b e  p e r s o n a l l y  d i s e n g a g e d  f r o m  t h e  s u b j e c t  
m a t t e r  u n d e r  s t u d y . 2 7  N o t  o n l y  h a s  s c i e n t i s m  c l e a r l y  
e m p h a s i z e d  o b j e c t i v e  k n o w l e d g e  o r  o b j e c t s  b u t  h a s  b e s i d e s  
s o u g h t  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  k n o w i n g  s u b j e c t  f r o m  h a v i n g  a n
i n f l u e n c e  o n  w h a t  i s  k n o w n .  T h e  d u b i o u s  r e m e d y  p r o f f e r e d  b y  
s c i e n t i s t i c  t r a d i t i o n  i s  t o  o v e r c o m e  s u b j e c t i v i t y  e n t i r e l y  
b y  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  a n d  a b s t r a c t i o n .  I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  t h e  
o b j e c t  k n o w n  m u s t  b e  k n o w n  o r  k n o w a b l e  i n  e x a c t l y  t h e  s a m e  
w a y  t o  o t h e r s .  T h i s  i s  g u a r a n t e e d  b y  m e t h o d o l o g y ;  i n d e e d ,  
s o  i n t i m a t e  i s  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  s c i e n c e  ( i n  t h e  
m o d e r n  s e n s e )  a n d  s c i e n t i f i c  m e t h o d s  t h a t  w e  t e n d  t o
i d e n t i f y  s c i e n c e  w i t h  s c i e n t i f i c  m e t h o d o l o g y .  E v e r y o n e  w h o  
u s e s  t h e  s a m e  m e t h o d  o r  t o o l  i n  i n v e s t i g a t i n g  a n  o b j e c t  
s h o u l d  b e  a b l e  t o  d e r i v e  t h e  s a m e  a n s w e r  o r  " u n d e r s t a n d i n g "  
a b o u t  t h e  o b j e c t ,  t h e  s a m e  c o n c l u s i o n .  " F r o m  t h i s  p o i n t  o f  
v i e w ,  a n y  t w o  i n v e s t i g a t o r s  s h o u l d  a r r i v e  a t  m u t u a l l y  
c o n f i r m i n g  o b s e r v a t i o n s  p r o v i d e d  t h e i r  m e t h o d o l o g y  a n d  t h e  
t h e o r y  i t s e l f " - - i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  t h e o r y  i n  [ t h e ]  s c i e n t i s t i c
s e n s e ,  o r  i n  [ t h e ]  f o r m  o f  doxa--" i s  s o u n d . " 2 8  T h e  f i n a l
t e s t  o f  t h e o r y  b e c o m e s  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  w h i c h  o b s e r v a t i o n  h a s
22 A twentieth-century heraeneutician, Hans-Georg Gadaner also discusses the role of personal 
existential involvement in theoretical understanding. "Perhaps we nay renind the reader of the idea 
of sacral coanunion which lies behind the original Greek idea of theoria...In the sane way, Greek 
metaphysics still conceives the nature of theoria and of nous as pure presence to what is truly equal, 
and also the capacity to be able to act theoretically is defined for us by the fact that in attending 
to sonething it is possible to forget one’s own purposes. But theoria is not to be conceived 
priaarily as an attitude of subjectivity, as a self-determination of the subjective 
consciousness, but in terns of what it is contenplating. Theoria is a true sharing, not soaething 
active, but sonething passive (pathos), nanely being totally involved in and carried away by what one 
sees." H.-G. Gadaner, Truth and Method (New York: Crossroad, 1975), p.111.
28 E. Webb, Eric Voegelin, p . 112.
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been accurate and the methodology has been careful and 
unprejudiced. This is measured not by a qualitative 
standard but by a quantitative one: the more people who make 
observations and, using carefully-followed methodology, come 
up with the same conclusion, the more valid that conclusion 
is. Therefore, the methodological rigor is the necessary 
coefficient for the formation of a judgment on which they 
claim universal validity.
This methodolatrous scientistic tradition, or "method 
fetishism" in Hilary Putnam’s terms,29 has drowned the true 
and literal sense of theory. For example, the majority of 
contemporary political scientists who judge all political 
theory in terms of methodological rigor and the fact-value 
dichotomy, have easily labelled the thinker who conceives of 
political theory as the experiential science of order, based 
on the total experience of the existing human person, a 
doctrinaire or metaphysician. And the thinker’s claims to 
scientific status have been dismissed with contempt. The 
thinker seems to be scarcely noticed by the majority unless 
his influence becomes a causative ideational factor in the 
struggle of the political market-place or unless his thought 
becomes a significant source for a new dominant paradigm.
Indeed, Voegelin’s work which represents such thought 
is incapable of being understood by most political 
positivists on its own terms. However, the academic 
enterprise searching for reality is not necessarily a sphere
2S Hilary Putnaa, Reason, Truth and History (Caabridge: Caabridge University Press, 1981), p.188.
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where majority rule works. Even though Voegelin’s work is 
hardly understood by the majority of modern intellectuals, 
he must be approached on his own terms because, otherwise, 
one cannot proceed very far in appreciating his thought. 
The "revolutionary quality of Voegelin’s political science" 
may remain a mere scholarly curiosity, if one employs "the 
language of a political science establishment dedicated to 
scientism and dogmatically committed to quantification of 
the subject matter of politics in the positivistic mode--and 
equally committed to the neglect of those sectors of 
political reality which do not lend themselves to treatment 
by this method."30
Theory, as Voegelin primarily uses the term, refers to 
knowledge (e p i s t e m e ) that is the conscious expression of 
immediate experience and that has become explicit through 
adequate symbolization. Therefore, in his sense of the term 
it is essential that theoretical understanding makes 
existential demands of the inquirer. Theory, he defines,
is not just any opining about human existence in 
society; it rather is an attempt at formulating the 
meaning of existence by explicating the content of a 
definite class of experiences. Its argument is not 
arbitrary but derives its validity from the aggregate 
of experiences to which it must permanently refer for 
empirical control.31
31 E. Sandoz, "The Sciene and Denonology.. . p.121. 
3> AfSP, p.64.
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As a science it is that e p i s t e m e  t h e o r e t i k e  which Plato and 
Aristotle called p h i l o s o p h i a  which Voegelin defines as "a 
truthful account of structure of reality," not new but 
renewed by taking into account what has become known since 
the Greeks.32 According to Voegelin, the substance of 
reality is "the luminous tension of existence," and the 
luminosity of this tension is what constitutes e p i s t e m e  or 
t h e o r i  a.33 What is to be added here is that theory is a 
"type of noetic construction and communication between 
mature human beings,"34 and, therefore, "theorist" must be 
what Aristotle called a s p o u d a i o s  or mature man, one whose 
character has been formed by the aggregate of experiences 
which theory inquires into.
The s p o u d a i o s  is the man who has maximally actualized 
the potentialities of human nature, who has formed his 
character into habitual actualization of the dianoetic 
and ethical virtues, the man who at the fullest of his 
development is capable of the b i o s  t h e o r e t i k o s .35
Theory seems not so much a technical term describing 
meaningful communication between human beings as opposed to 
mere d o x a . 36 It exemplifies simultaneously the highest form
32 G, Sebba, "Prelude and Variations...", p.20.
35 Hore details on what Voegelin teras the "tension of existence" is presented in the next chapter.
33 John Williaa Corrington, "Order and Consciousness/ Consciousness and History: The New Progran of
Voegelin," in Stephen A. HcKnight, ed., Eric Voegelin’s Search for Order in History (Baton Rouge: LSU 
Press, 1978), p.166.
33 HSP, p.64.
36 J.W. Corrington, "Order and Consciousness,..," p.166.
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of communicative consciousness, grounded in the b i o s  
t h e o r e t i k o s ,  the life of reason and contemplation. "Unless 
a theoretical exposition activates the corresponding 
experiences at least to a degree, it will create the 
impression of empty talk or will perhaps be rejected as an 
irrelevant expression of subjective opinions. A theoretical 
debate can be conducted only among s p o u d a i o i  in the 
Aristotelian sense; theory has no argument against a man who 
feels, or pretends to feel, unable to re-enact the 
experience. Historically, as a consequence, the discovery 
of theoretical truth may not at all find acceptance in the 
surrounding society."37
In this context, Voegelin emphasizes the aristocratic 
nature of the discovery of theoretical truth. According to 
him, again following classical thought, empirically all men 
are not of equal quality, and hence all men do not have an 
equal access to the most important truths. In other words, 
all or most of the individuals in a society cannot become a 
s p o u d a i o s  or philosopher-king. This could never happen 
because the multitude is not philosophical, or theoretical. 
Nor is the multitude "theorist" in its classical sense. 
Only a few or even only one person can be really theoretical 
or philosophical. Voegelin writes:
[T]heory cannot be developed under all conditions 
by everybody. The theorist need perhaps not be a 
paragon of virtue himself, but he must, at least, be 
capable of imaginative re-enactment of the experiences
P̂P.M-65.
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of which theory is an explication...[T]heory as an 
explication of certain experiences is intelligible only 
to those in whom the explication will stir up parallel 
experiences as the empirical basis for testing the 
truth of theory.38
However, it should be noted that, unlike the modern
methodological solipsism, for the classical political 
theory, its authority and universality is grounded in the 
ontological substance of an independent reality. A claim to 
universality is not rooted in the possibility of proof or in 
the hope of eventual agreement but rather in the theorist’s 
commitment to the universal quality of n o u s  itself. This
claim of universal validity appears to be paradoxical 
because the discovery and elucidation of truth is 
characterized by the aristocratic, personal and historical 
conditions of its emergence. However, although emerging
from within a personal or existential achievement, truth is 
understood to be discovered by the "rational" or noetic
element in man, the very faculty which, by definition, is 
common to all men. Given this understanding, "the noetic
achievement of truth is a representative act, and its 
appearance carries with it the implications of a universal 
validity."3 9
In the work of Michael Polanyi, we can find a clear 
contemporary expression of the association of the personal
and the universal as contained within the noetic experience.
     .
35 J. Wise r ,  " P o l i t i c a l  Theory, P e r s o n a l  Knowl e d g e ,  and Pub l i c  Trut h , "  p p . 663-664.
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i?
According to him, personal knowledge can and does claim a 
universal validity. By regarding all knowledge as personal, 
Polanyi maintains that personal involvement assumes a form 
of involvement which does not imply subjectivity. That is 
to say, grounding knowledge in personal commitment does not 
lead to subjectivism. Although Polanyi emphasizes the 
personal commitment in scientific inquiry, his concept of 
the p e r s o n a l  is not a defense of a radical subjectivity: for 
he clearly distinguishes between the p e r s o n a l  in us that 
actually enters into commitments and the s u b j e c t i v e  states 
in which we merely endure feelings. The concept of personal 
transcends the distinction between subjective and objective, 
and, thus, claims to universality. Polanyi denotes that:
Such is the p e r s o n a l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of the knower in 
all acts of understanding. But this does not make 
our understanding s u b j e c t i v e .  Comprehension is 
neither an arbitrary act nor a passive experience, 
but a responsible act claiming universal validity. 
Such knowing is indeed o b j e c t i v e  in the sense of 
establishing contact with a hidden reality; a contact 
that is defined as the condition for anticipating an 
indeterminate range of yet unknown (and perhaps yet 
inconceivable) true implications.40
An attempt must also be made to understand what is 
meant by "philosophy" in the Voegelinian posture, an 
important task because the term is sometimes used 
ambiguously, and not only by "philosophers." Voegelin does 
not present a standard philosophical argument of the sort
411 Hichael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1958), pp.vii-viii.
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that leads the reader from premises to a conclusion through 
the force of formal logic. This might "make it sound as if 
he is a dogmatic thinker; but that would be to return to the 
supposition that a philosopher’s aim must be to present and 
win assent for a doctrine."41 Voegelin, however, has a 
quite different conception of philosophy which is difficult 
to grasp for any person accustomed to the more common type 
of philosophical exposition. Most of the accustomed
definition of philosophy implies that philosophy deals with 
the systematic body of general principles and assumptions 
underlying a particular field of experience. Thus, it is 
supposed that there are philosophies of science, education, 
art, music, history, law, mathematics, and of religion. In 
addition, for the modern mind, philosophical discourse is 
also understood as what tends to maintain both a 
dispassionate attitude and a clear distinction between the 
language of philosophy and that of theology, or between 
reason and faith. However, Voegelin uses the terms science, 
theory and philosophy interchangeably, and somewhat 
analogically. Indeed, in the classical notion, political 
science, political theory and political philosophy are 
essentially one and the same.
Like the terms science and theory, "philosophy" has 
lost its original meaning and has come to be used to refer 
to what Plato called "philodoxy," the love of opinions. 
Voegelin denotes that through gnostic derailment in the
41 E. Webb, Eric Voegelin, p.5.
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modern history the term "philodoxy" eventually dropped out 
of use as its meaning was absorbed into "philosophy."42
[W]e have an abundance of philodoxers in reality; and 
since the Platonic term for their designation is lost, 
we refer to them as philosophers. In modern usage, 
thus, we call philosophers precisely the persons to 
whom Plato as a philosopher was in opposition...[W]e 
think of philodoxers when we speak of philosophers.
The Platonic conception of a philosopher-king, 
furthermore, is so utterly strange to us because our 
imagination substitutes a philodoxer for the 
philosopher intended by Plato.43
This echoes Karl Jaspers’ statement:
It seemed to me that the philosophy of the academicians 
was not really philosophy; instead, with its claims to 
be a science, it seemed to be entirely a discussion of 
things which are not essential for the basic questions 
of our existence. In my own consciousness I myself 
was not originally a philosopher. But when the 
intellectual world is empty of philosophy, it becomes 
the task at least to bear witness to philosophy, to 
direct the attention to the great philosophers, to try 
to stop confusion, and to encourage in our youth the 
interest in real philosophy.44
In short, Voegelin radicalizes the definition of philosophy 
by replacing a static, modernist notion with a dynamic, 
classical meaning of it. For him, philosophical thought 
cannot take the customary form of a logical argument, 
because philosophy involves a process in which the
12 With regard to this point, Voegelin reaarks that "the history of philosophy is in the largest part 
the history of its derailaent." OH, III, p.82, 277.
43 Ibid., pp.65-66.
44 Karl Jaspers, "Philosophical Autobiography," in Paul Arthur Schlipp, ed., The Philosophy of hr 1 
Jaspers (New York: Tudor, 1957), p.34.
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philosopher unfolds and clarifies his own formative 
experiences. "For philosophy as a symbolic form is
distinguished from myth and history by its reflective self- 
consciousness. What philosophy is, need not be ascertained 
by talking a b o u t  philosophy discursively; it can, and must, 
be determined by entering i n t o  the speculative process in 
which the thinker explicates his experience of order."45 
Hence, Voegelin defines philosophy in a true and deeper, but 
somewhat different and strange way to the modern ear:
Philosophy is the love of being through love of divine 
Being as the source of its order. The Logos of being 
is the object proper of philosophical inquiry; and the 
search for truth concerning the order of being cannot 
be conducted without diagnosing the modes of existence 
in untruth. The truth of order has to be gained and 
regained in the perpetual struggle against the fall 
from it; and the movement toward truth starts from a 
man’s awareness of his existence in untruth. The 
diagnostic and therapeutic functions are inseparable 
in philosophy as a form of existence.46
Philosophy is not simply an academic subject matter, 
but an active struggle for truth, moral, spiritual, and 
intellectual; it is a process that takes place in a field of 
tension between justice and injustice, between e p i s t e m e  and 
d o x a ,  and between existential truth and untruth.47 As 
Voegelin states regarding Plato’s conception of philosophy, 
the "philosopher does not exist in a social vacuum, but in
44 E. Voegelin, Order and History, vol.II, The tforld of the Polis, hereafter, OH, II, p. 170.
44 E. Voegelin, Order and History, vol.I, Israel and Revelation, hereafter, OH, I, p.xiv,
47 OH, III, p p . 63-68.
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opposition to the sophist."48 Based on this perspective, 
Voegelin employs the word philosophy in generic, literal 
sense, and in what he takes to be its Platonic sense, 
p h i l o s o p h i a .  Literally, it is the love (p h i l i a ) of wisdom 
(s o p h i a ) ,  which is "not a disengagement but an ordering 
event of p h i l i a . " Philosophy is not commensurate with the 
systematic possession of knowledge, because "love is not 
possession but longing, and all the knowledge love gives is 
the knowledge of what it is one loves."49
But, the philodoxer seeks the security of possession
that will put an end to longing; the tension of longing may 
feel too painful; thus, he may resist it, or prefer an
illusion of certainty to the challenge of epistemic
existence in truth. Voegelin uses the term s c o t o s i s
(darkening), which is used by Bernard Lonergan, for the 
voluntary closure against reality, and interprets it as a 
major source of philodoxic thinking.50 On the contrary, the 
philosopher has only the continuing pain and insecurity that 
are the essential correlates of love. The philodoxer also 
suspects that the love of the lover is "merely subjective."
He seeks to disguise the love by reducing it to 
subjectivity. On the contrary, to the philosopher the love 
is experienced as objectively real. The philosopher does 
........
49 E. Webb, Eric Voegelin, p.117.
50 Voegelin uses the tera scotosis in "What Is Political Reality," dnaanesis (Geraan), p.201, citing 
Lonergan’s Insight, pp.191-203.
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not make it up arbitrarily, but suffers it as a passion. It 
is the pull (h e l k e i n ) which initiates his own philosophical 
inquiry, or philosophical seeking (z e t e s i s ).51
In Voegelin’s sense, the philosopher does not produce 
systems or philosophies, he only "philosophizes."52 
Voegelin’s conception of philosophizing situates philosophy 
firmly within the historical world and within the concrete 
existence of the philosopher. He emphasizes that the 
enterprise of philosophy stems from the experiential 
perspective. In his terms, the experience of existential 
tension, with its "ordering truth," stands in the center of 
philosophy. The philosopher is one who dwells consciously 
and freely in what Voegelin has come to call the "tension of 
existence" and this means that he must experience the 
tension and be willing to acknowledge it and the demands it 
makes on his existence. Philosophy, therefore, as Voegelin 
conceives it, and unlike the doxical interpretation of it, 
is not a subject matter, or a collection of propositions, 
opinions, and arguments, but an existential event, in which 
the principle of order in the experiential tension is raised 
into consciousness and freely affirmed.53 "In historical 
reality," says Voegelin, "a philosopher’s truth is the 
exegesis of his experience."54 Truth lies at the level of 
31 E. Webb, Eric Voegelin, p.118.
52 G. Sebba, "Prelude and Variations...," p.5.
53 E. Voegelin, Anaanesis (English version), trans. t ed. by Gerhart Nieaeyer (Notre Dane, IN: 
University of Notre Dane, 1978) p.136; Geraan edition, p.276,
54 E. Voegelin, "On Hegel:: A Study in Sorcery," Studiun Generale, 24 (1971), p.344.
124
experience, not at the level of the ideational construct or 
the propositions and symbolisms which articulate its 
content, the experience.55 That is, philosophy in
Voegelin’s sense, or in its essential reality, is not a 
system construction, nor a set of ideas or opinions but a 
phase of an existential process in which one experiences and 
freely yields oneself to the tension of existence. In other 
words, the tension of existence is the deep longing of the 
soul for truth and for fullness of life, the pull at the 
core of the philosopher’s being toward a goal.
Also, philosophy is a process in which the philosopher 
seeks to enter into more adequate and comprehensive 
participation in the possibilities that existence holds open 
to him--to enact, in other words, the love of being.56 But, 
in the case of man, this participation takes, in addition to 
its bodily form, the form of consciousness. Participation 
(Plato’s m e t h e x i s , Aristotle’s m e t a l e p s i s )  forms the human 
consciousness (p s y c h e ) itself, the essence of man’s nature 
and humanity. "Consciousness," defines Voegelin, "is the 
experience of participation, participation of man in his 
ground of being."57 The "existential participation is the 
means whereby man attunes himself with reality and gains the 
primordial grip on the whole of being which is the
55 E. Sandoz, "The Philosophical Science...," pp.297, 298.
58 E. Webb, Eric Voegelin, p.90.
57 E. V o e g e l i n ,  Anaanesis (English), p . 175.
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foundation of all knowledge.”58 In this sense, by seeking 
consciousness, the philosopher seeks knowledge--not just any 
knowledge, but the knowledge that is self-reflective clarity 
of consciousness itself. As Sandoz states, therefore, on 
the existential side, philosophy denotes "an erotic tension 
to the Ground of reality (being, o u s i a ), a passion of mind 
(nous) which mediates the distance between the seeking 
knower ( z e t e i n )  and the reality sought and known.” However, 
what is sought and appropriated as ’known’ is "only a 
fragment of the truth that Is; the insights gained are 
partial and provisional, but they are within these limits 
nonetheless validated to the exhaustion of rationality and 
evidence."5 9
It should be noted that, for Voegelin, as for Plato, 
philosophy has a "diagnostic and therapeutic" function. The 
opposing pairs of concepts developed by Plato--justice and 
injustice, episteme and doxa, truth and untruth--"must be 
understood in their aggregate as the expression of a man’s 
resistance to a social corruption which goes so deep that it 
affects the truth of existence under God. Philosophy, thus, 
has its origin in the resistance of the soul to its 
destruction by society. Philosophy...[is] an act of
resistance illuminated by conceptual understanding."60 
"Philosophy in antiquity, that is to say, philosophy par 
88~ E. Sandoz, "The Philosophical Science...," p. 298.
58 Ibid., pp.296-297.
10 OH, III, p.68.
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excellence, is existential in the sense of being a life 
lived in resistance to untruth out of a love of wisdom 
experienced as divine, for only God is wise."61 Philosophy, 
as the "love of being through the love of divine Being as 
the source of its order," illuminates for us the "modes of 
existence in untruth." And the substance of history will be 
discovered to consist "in the experiences in which man gains 
the understanding of his humanity and together with it the 
understanding of its limits."62 These experiences cannot be 
ignored by the political inquirer, but must be empirically 
examined and critically evaluated for the light which they 
shed upon his own search for the truth about order in human 
society.
From this vantage point, it is evident that for 
Voegelin political science is a form of philosophy itself. 
Thus, political knowledge presupposes the ability of man to 
maintain the form of philosophical existence-in-tension. 
Voegelin’s basic stance on the philosophical investigation 
of politics or reality is well manifested in the following 
statement:
The decisive event in the establishment of p o l i t i k e  
e p i s t e m e  was the specifically philosophical realization 
that the levels of being discernible within the world 
are surmounted by a transcendent source of being and 
its order. And this insight was itself rooted in the 
real movements of the human spiritual soul toward 
divine being experienced as transcendent. In the 
experience of love for the world-transcendent origin
81 E. Sandoz, The Voegelinian Revolution (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1981), p.24.
82 NSP, p . 78.
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of being, in p h i l i a  toward the s o p h o n  (the wise), in 
e r o s  toward the a g a t h o n  (the good) and the k a l o n  (the 
beautiful), man became philosopher. From these 
experiences arose the image of the order of being. At 
the opening of the soul... the order of being becomes 
visible even to its ground and origin in the beyond, 
in the Platonic e p e k e i n a  in which the soul participates 
as it suffers and achieves its opening.63
In short, from the Voegelinian perspective, the aim of 
philosophy, more accurately, of philosophical science of 
politics is to move beyond opinion to knowledge, beyond 
appearance to reality, beyond surface manifestation to 
essential structure. The effort to transcend the realm of 
opinion and acquire knowledge is at the same time an effort 
to open one’s soul to the dimension of reality which is 
beyond the purely immanent. And the opening of the soul, or 
tension towards openness is what Voegelin means by 
philosophy.
t3 E. Voegelin, Science, Politics, and Gnosticisa (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1968 ), p.18. Hereafter 
SPG.
2. P O S ITIVISM: THE P E R V E R S I O N  OF SCIENCE
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Based on a delving of the proper meaning of science, 
theory, and philosophy in political inquiry, Voegelin 
examines, in T h e  N e w  S c i e n c e  o f  P o l i t i c s , the foundation of 
positivistic tradition. By positivism Voegelin meant an 
historical phenomenon that endeavored to apply the methods 
of post-Galilean physics to the nonphysical as well. For 
the positivist criterion of science is a methodological one 
and the methods in question are those of the mathematizing 
natural sciences and physics in particular. That is to say, 
the essence of positivism is to make method--specifically, 
the method of the physical sciences— the criterion for 
judging whether the cognition of an object is scientific, 
and, therefore, objective or merely subjective opinion.
This transposition of methods implies the denial of the 
qualitative differences between what is human and what is 
merely natural. That is, political positivism treats 
political behavior as if it is a physical object. The 
object in political positivism is to apply the methods 
already proved in the natural sciences and only when this is 
done can we claim to have a "scientific" understanding of 
politics and society. Methodologically speaking, thus, the 
political positivism claims that political or human sciences 
are amenable to the same treatments or technique of the 
natural sciences in the name of causal explanation and
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prediction. Even though it maintains, to a certain degree, 
the difference between the behavioral and the natural, it 
succumbs nonetheless to the "canons of scientific method." 
Leaving aside the question of how correctly the positivist 
have pictured the procedures of natural science, one problem 
with this position lies in the unexamined assumption that 
the areas of natural and social sciences are sufficiently 
similar to justify the application of the same investigatory 
methods.
But it should be noted that human beings transcend the 
physical realm as physical science conceives it: they are
persons acting in a multiplicity of dimensions of being that 
transcend the quantitative, physical, biological and 
psychological dimension of reality. Even though "there is a 
necessary connection between natural and social reality," 
and "each real society is in fact a particular human 
solution to a number of natural needs traceable to the 
nature of man and his place in the universe," as David Levy 
argues, "this is not in itself sufficient warrant for the 
positivist programme."64 There is no one model of "science" 
universally applicable to all reality, as people have 
sometimes taken theoretical physics to be, for there is no 
one type of object that the various branches of knowledge 
study. "The criterion for scientific status is not
conformity to model ’X ’ of what a science should be like,
M  David J. Levy, "What is Social Reality?" Philosophy Today, 24:4 (Winter 1980), pp.326-327. 
Reprinted in D.J. Levy, Realise: An Essay in Interpretation and Social Reality (Manchester: Carcanet 
New Press, 1981), pp.4-5.
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but adequacy of range and method to the object studied. The 
range and method of the inquirer should be rationally 
defensible and the grounds for his procedure should be 
publically available."65 It is mistaken, therefore, to 
think that methods suited to the study of nature can really 
give us insight into the non-natural, specifically human 
characteristics of behavior in the political realm. 
Voegelin says,
Different objects require different methods. A 
political scientist who tries to understand the meaning 
of Plato’s R e p u b l i c  will not have much use for 
mathematics; a biologist who studies a cell structure 
will not have much use for methods of classical 
philology and principles of hermeneutics.66
Let us examine Voegelin’s contrast between the methods 
appropriate to the study of cell structure and those
suitable to the understanding of Plato’s R e p u b l i c . 61 It may 
be asked, "why are the methods of the mathematizing natural 
sciences suitable to the study of cell structure but not to 
the understanding of Plato’s R e p u b l i c ? " In both cases the
inquirer finds himself in the presence of data having 
existence in the external natural world. In both cases the
inquirer wishes to understand that data. Both the
biological cell and Plato’s R e p u b l i c  can be shown to possess
D. Levy, "What is Social...," p.327; Realisn, p.4.
RSP, p .5.
67 Examining the contrast between the methods, I an indebted to Levy's account. See, D. Levy, "What 
is Social...," pp.327-38; Realisn, pp.4-5.
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an inherent structure and an adequate understanding of each 
can be seen to involve proper identification of structure. 
Nevertheless, the structures in question exist on different 
levels. In the case of the biological cell, one is said to 
have understood when he has described as fully as he can the 
physical relationships that exist between the component 
molecules that make it up. These molecules are, in
principle, directly observable and the relationships that 
exist between them can be ideally expressed in the precise 
language of mathematics. In the case of biological cell, a 
brief formula or physical model will tell us more about its 
structure than a lengthy verbal description which takes 
account, among other things, of the way such a cell
originates.
In the case of Plato’s R e p u b l i c , mere description of 
the observable components will hardly yield the same
results. Here the observable data are words, and though it 
is possible to identify a linguistic structure, that of
ancient Greek, in some sense equivalent to the structural 
form found to exist between the component molecules of a 
cell, the understanding of the R e p u b l i c  obviously involves 
something more than the descriptive formulation of that 
structure. "To understand a text involves, something more 
than understanding the syntax and vocabulary of the language 
in which it is written. We have knowledge of a biological 
cell at the point at which we have identified its physical 
structure but to know a text involves the understanding of
its meaning and the term ’meaning’ signifies more than the 
grammatical sense of the sentences. Interpretation of texts 
presupposes knowledge of the relevant syntax and vocabulary, 
but such knowledge is only the necessary first stage in the 
attempt to understand meaning, Plato’s R e p u b l i c  is not a 
succession of words so much as an inherently meaningful
argument whose meaning is known by reference to the 
intentions of its author and the circumstances of its 
composition."6 8
What is true of a particular text is found on
examination to be true of every sphere of reality in which 
man is creatively involved. The field of human physical 
existence is the world of nature, but the object of
political knowledge is the world of political existence and 
the characteristic of the political world is that it is a 
world of meaning in which the items of experience have 
already been organized in accordance with subjectively 
meaningful categories of the inhabitant.69 According to
Alfred Schutz, this means that the sciences dealing with 
human reality have to develop particular devices foreign to 
the natural sciences, interpretative or hermeneutic 
techniques and procedures adequate to the understanding of a 
realm of reality already structured by human consciousness. 
There is, as Schutz argues,
88 D. Levy, "What is Social...," p.328 ; Realism, pp.4-5.
88 D. Levy, "What is S o c i a l . . . , "  p. 328; Realism, p . 5.
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an essential difference in the structure of the thought 
objects or mental constructs formed by the social 
sciences and those formed by the natural sciences.
It is up to the natural scientist and to him alone to 
define, in accordance with the procedural rules of his 
science, his observational field, and to determine the 
facts, data and events within it which are relevant for 
his problem or scientific purpose at hand. Neither are 
those facts and events preselected, nor is the 
observational field pre-interpreted. The world of 
nature, as explored by the natural scientist, does not 
’mean’ anything to molecules, atoms and electrons. But 
the observational field of the social scientist--social 
reality— has a specific meaning and relevant structure 
for the human beings living, acting and thinking within 
it. By a series of commonsense constructs they have 
preselected and preinterpreted this world which they 
experience as the reality of their daily lives.70
To adopt the terminology of Max Scheler, political 
positivism, which assumes that methods suited to the study 
of natural sciences are amenable to the political inquiry, 
is, thus, ontologically an illusion and epistemologically an 
error.71 In a word, the positivistic science of man may be 
an illusion and/or an error. From this point of view, 
Voegelin argues that to make method the criterion of science 
destroys the true constitution of science, because method 
cannot be a criterion of science. However, by subordinating 
theoretical relevance to method, positivism perverts the 
meaning of science. In principle, thus, positivism is the 
destruction or perversion of science.
79 A. Schutz, Collected Papers, vol.l, pp.58-59.
71 Max Scheler uses the terns illusion and error solely in deternining two types of falsehood in 
cognition: illusion always has its proper sphere in innediate cognition; error, in indirect or 
nediated cognition, especially in inferences. See Hax Scheler, Selected Philosophical Essays 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), trans. by David R. Lachternan, p.12.
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According to Voegelin, positivism incurs "the 
destruction of science" by making two fundamental 
assumptions. First, the success of the natural sciences 
gave rise to the belief "that the methods used in the 
mathematizing sciences of the external world were possessed 
of some inherent virtue and that all other sciences would 
achieve comparable success if they followed the example and 
accepted these methods as their model. This belief by 
itself was a harmless idiosyncrasy that would have died out 
when the enthusiastic admirers of the model method set to 
work in their own science and it did not achieve the 
expected successes. It became dangerous because it combined 
with the second assumption that methods of the natural 
sciences were a criterion for theoretical relevance in 
general."72 The effect of the second assumption is to 
reverse the proper relationship of method and scientific 
relevance.
The "mathematical sedimentation of science"73 since 
Galileo is "cast upon the life-world so as to conceal it to 
the point of being substituted for it. What in truth is a 
method and the result of that method comes to be taken for 
reality."74 It is worth noting here Jacob Klein’s
contention: Klein discovers the difference between the
72 USP, p.4.
73 H.Y. Jung, fiie Crisis of Political Understanding, p.64.
74 Aron Gurwitsch, "Coaaent on the Paper by H. Harcuse," in Boston Studies in the Philosophy of 
Science, vol.2, ed, by Robert S. Cohen and Harx V. Wartofsky (New York: Huaanities Press, 1965 ), 
p,300.
ancient and the modern conception of mathematics. He 
contends that the ancients intended to solve the problem of 
(mathematical) method on the basis of an ontology of 
(mathematical) objects. On the contrary, however, the 
moderns since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries turned 
their attention first and last to method as such. Klein 
argues that in modern science the "generality of the method" 
(methodology) replaced the "generality of the object" 
(ontology): modern mathematics determines its objects by
reflecting on the way in which mathematical objects become 
accessible only through a general method.75
Voegelin observes that "the subordination of 
theoretical relevance to method perverts the meaning of 
science on principle."76 Attempting the "restoration of 
political science" through "retheoretization" at "the point 
where the principles of politics meet with the principles of 
philosophy of history," Voegelin protests the positivistic 
subjection of theoretical relevance to method. Because 
science is a search for truth concerning the nature of the 
various realms of being, for Voegelin "relevant in science 
is whatever contributes to the success of the search. Facts 
are relevant insofar as their knowledge contributes to the 
study of essence, while methods are adequate insofar as they 
can be effectively used as a means for this end." Voegelin
75 Jacob Klein, Gre e k  M a t h e m a t i c a l  T h o u g h t  a n d  the Orig i n  o f  Algebra, trans. by Eva Brann (Cambridge,
HA: HIT Press, 1968), p.123.
78 MSP, p . 6.
continues, "if the adequacy of a method is not measured by 
its usefulness to the purpose of science, if on the contrary 
the use of a method is made the criterion of science, then 
the meaning of science as a truthful account of the 
structure of reality, as the theoretical orientation of man 
in his world, and as the great instrument for man’s 
understanding of his own position in the universe is 
lost.."77 In correctly fathoming what Voegelin exactly 
implies with theoretical relevance, it is worthwhile to 
bring up Schutz’s theory of relevance. Schutz, Voegelin’s 
friend with whom he spoke of a life-long dialogue, worked on 
the foundations for a sociological theory of relevance. 
Among other points, Schutz explained to Voegelin his triple 
scheme of subjective relevance:
(1) anything which is found problematic and becomes a
theme of deliberate attention within an "unstructurized
field of unproblematic familiarity," gains t o p i c a l
r e l e v a n c e .  It may be imposed from the outside or it
may be intrinsic to a person’s intentions. (2) If the
topically "experienced segment of the world" is given
a meaning according to a person’s pre-established
knowledge, it gains i n t e r p r e t a t i v e  r e l e v a n c e .  (3) If
established topical and interpretational relevances
lead to action, they become m o t i v a t i o n a l  r e l e v a n c e s .
A decision on "how to act" depends first of all on the
interpretation of the "object" of topical relevance.
However, for action to occur, the interpretation must
be combined with a more or less definite idea as to
what is to be achieved; "that which has to be done is
motivated by that for which it is to be done." This
is "in-order-to motivation." It is different from
"the motivation for the establishment of the...project
itself": Why is the objective of the action important
to me? This is the "because of motive." According to
the initial topical relevance, the motives for acting
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are imposed or intrinsic.78
It seems clear from this explication of relevance that the 
problem of relevance is breaking up into two problems 
grounded in different levels of reasoning: theory taken in a 
narrower technical sense of social-scientific investigation 
and interpretation, and theory in the philosophical sense. 
Theoretical relevance in a narrower technical sense contains 
the conceptual and analytical tools dealing with a concrete 
subject-matter. Schutz’s triple scheme falls in this 
category. But, as Schutz indicates, "since the scheme 
affects other segments of the investigation, the problem 
becomes a problem complex and gains a theoretical function 
of its own: it serves as a larger framework within which the
interpretation of concrete findings occurs, not merely as 
facts-in-larger-context but as facts interpreted by the 
meaning embodied in the theoretical framework."79 In a 
word, conceptual tools for the analysis of relevance in 
concrete cases are subordinated to a broader frame of
relevance. Schutz only wanted to develop a "universal
theory of relevance which can be applied to all different
concrete relevance systems," including all ethical
78 Richard H. Zaner, Alfred Schutz: Reflections on the Problea of Relevance (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1970), pp,26-28, 36-37, 46-17, 50-51. Cited in Helmut Wagner, "Agreement in 
Discord: Alfred Schutz and Eric Voegelin," P.J. Opitz and G. Sebba, The Philosophy of Order: Essays on 
History, Consciousness and Politics, pp.81-82.
73 H. Wagner, " A g r e e m e n t  in D i s c o r d , "  p . 84.
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systems.80 Confirming this, Schutz listed further themes of 
his relevance theory, "the problem of so-called preferential 
action" and a "general theory of the motivation of human 
action": "the fully executed theory of relevance is nothing
else but a phenomenology of motivation."81
Voegelin understands and accepts Schutz’s general 
theory of relevance. However, he does not dwell on the 
first and second categories but deals extensively with the 
third, motivational relevance.82 Schutz’s motivational 
relevance, for Voegelin, means answering the question, 
"through what kind of experiences will men be motivated to 
ask "theoretical questions?" In answering this question, 
Voegelin aimed at separating the technical-social scientific 
discussion of relevances from the philosophical problem of 
relevance. Voegelin’s usage of the term "theory" is, in the 
Greek sense— "explication of experiences of the transcendent 
in language symbols, illustrated by Heraclitus’ triad of 
Love, Hope, and Belief, and Plato’s Eros, Thanatos, and 
Dike"83--implants exactly what Voegelin means with 
"theoretical relevance." He aimed at separating the 
technical-social scientific discussion of relevances from 
the philosophical problem of relevance. As we have already
88 Schutz’s letter to Voegelin on Oct. 19, 1952. Cited in H, Wagner, A l f r e d  Schutz: An Intel l e c t u a l
B i o g r a p h y (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 983 ), p.196.
81 Schutz's letter to Voegelin on November 1952. Cited in H. Wagner, A l f r e d  Schutz, p. 196.
82 H. Wagner, "Agreement in Discord," p.82.
83 Ibid.
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seen, theory in the Voegelinian sense is an attempt to 
formulate the knowledge of the essence of man in words with 
constant reference to the transcendental experiences. A 
science of man and society exists insofar as this theory has 
been developed. Theoretically relevant is, therefore, what 
can be related to a theory of the essence of man in this 
sense. Voegelin aimed at such "a theory which would be tied 
to a philosophical anthropology which, in turn, would 
express ultimate metaphysical orientations," while Schutz 
aimed at "a theory of relevance which, in the end, would be 
identical with a phenomenology of motivation."84 In this 
sense, while Schutz, a sociologist, is said to build up his 
explorations of the problem of relevance from the level of 
substantive investigations, Voegelin, a philosopher of 
history, started on the philosophical level.85
Because positivism is the perversion of science, true 
science is ruined when inquirers who engaged in the study of 
man, society and history addict to positivism. The
procedures and immanent logic of a science ought to be a 
function of the nature of the reality which it studies. And 
a defective, or a perverted conception of political reality 
gives rise to a defective or perverted political science. 
Positivism does not provide political inquiry with an 
adequate notion of reality. "Without the intellectual tools




expose the unfounded claims of pseudo-science whether they 
are the claims of positivism, Nazis or Marxists."86 
Voegelin considers the ostensible victory of positivism in 
the contemporary social sciences "a Pyrrhic victory."87 
Pointing up the negative aspects of a purely positivistic 
approach, he declares:
if positivism should be construed in a strict sense 
as meaning the development of social science through 
the use of mathematizing methods, one might arrive at 
the conclusion that positivism has never existed; if, 
however, it is understood as the intention of making 
the social sciences "scientific" through the use of 
methods which as closely as possible resemble the 
methods employed in sciences of the external world, 
then the results of this intention (though not 
intended) will be rather variegated.88
Because positivism is not true science, Voegelin 
argues, it is full of internal contradictions. Its
inconsistencies are inherent in its very nature as an 
historical phenomenon. Consequently, when the nature of 
positivism is understood critically as the principled 
perversion of science, the historical manifestations of 
positivism can be seen to unfold with a necessary 
dialectical movement toward the end of positivism, which is 
at once a new beginning for true science.
** Mary Ann Pauken Diebel, "On Eagle’s Wings: Eric Voegelin's Onto-Theological Conception of History 
in ’The New Science of Politics'," (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1986 ), p.78.
8? Hans Auf 
Politics
richt, "A Restateoent of Political Theory: A Note on Voegelin’s The New Science of 
," in S. HcKnight, ed., Eric Poegeiin’s Search for O r d e r  in History, p.58.
“  NSP, p p . 7-8.
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Voegelin phenomenologically presents the dialectical 
movement of positivism that is historically necessitated by 
its very nature. With regard to the historical emergence of 
positivism, he identifies three manifestations:89 (1) 
Science has been destroyed by the first manifestation of 
positivism which accumulates theoretically undigested, and 
perhaps undigestible, facts, that is, irrelevant facts. (2) 
Science has been perverted by the second manifestation of 
positivism, that is, by the operation on relevant materials 
under defective theoretical principles. (3) Positivism’s 
third manifestation is the development of methodology, 
especially in the half-century from 1870 to 1920. That is, 
the historical manifestations of positivism "range from the 
factfinders to the relativists to the methodologists."90 As 
moments of analysis, these historical manifestations are not 
simply accidental temporal points in the historical process 
called positivism. Rather the historical manifestations are 
essential moments of Voegelin’s phenomenological analysis of 
positivism because they unfold necessarily and universally 
from the nature of positivism as the principled perversion 
of science.91 Because of its internal contradictions, 
positivism created a whole host of problems for the 
historical and social sciences.
89 Ibid., pp.8-10.
50 H.A.P. Diebel, "On Bagle’s Mings...," p.78.
91 Ibid., p.79.
Through his challenge of the logical and methodological 
assumptions of positivism, Voegelin forces its adherents and 
advocates to re-evaluate the premises of their doctrine. He 
presents a criticism of positivism focusing on the 
epistemological milieu in which positivist theoretical dogma 
operates. More precisely, assessing the validity of the 
fact-value dichotomy, and the notion of value freedom in 
research, he boldly declares that the value-free social 
theory is valueless. Voegelin discusses the legacy of Max 
Weber, for the fact-value dichotomy is closely related to 
the work of Max Weber. The manifestations of positivistic 
destructiveness, and the fundamental controversiality one 
finds among the political positivists is a consequence of a 
much larger problem in contemporary political science, 
namely, the separation of facts and values. That is, 
positivism historically has spawned the widely accepted 
fact-value dichotomy, and the dichotomy is structurally 
important to a complete understanding of the positivistic 
conceptualizations of political reality. Consequently, 
political science tends to move in either of two directions. 
Either positivism collects and studies so-called 
"subjective" values held by the populace and influencing it; 
or it becomes a kind of quantitative methodology, a means of 
research which might assist other fields by supplying 
behavioral regularities, ideal types, models, etc. My 
argument in this section, following the framework of 
Voegelin, suggests that the problems of positivistic
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conceptualization are heavily dependent on the theme of 
value freedom and that it is informative to look more 
closely at the Weberian notion of science underlying these 
problems.
In political science of the twentieth century, the 
fact-value dichotomy or value freedom gained ascendancy.
The positivistic paradigm in political science clearly 
partakes of this strict division between facts and values: 
the fact-value dichotomy is a central facet of positivist 
political inquiry. Political positivists have developed 
their thoughts in a so-called "value-neutral" fashion. The 
so-called scientific basis of positivistic epistemology 
which I have outlined in the former chapter allows its 
adherents to view the facts with a so-called objective and 
ethically neutral attitude. In many ways, the contemporary 
situation in which behavioral political inquiry finds itself 
is a product of the positivistic separation of objective 
facts from subjective values. Propositions about facts are 
related to the phenomena of the world, while propositions 
about values are discussed in normative argument about 
preferences. Facts are henceforth scientific and values
increasingly reduced to personal preferences beyond
verification. For positivism, a fact is something observed
with the senses, whereas a value is something intrinsically 
desirable, good, worthy, or estimable by the internal, 
subjective, moral, ethical, or aesthetic standards of the 
person doing the valuing. Consensus is achievable in the
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realm of facts, but much more difficult, if not impossible 
to ever achieve in the world of values. Positivists firmly 
believe that the scientific study of politics is possible by 
virtue of the researcher’s ability to manage and subordinate 
human emotions and values in the interest of an objective 
assessment of behavior. But, obviously the political 
inquirer has many personal values. If these ever conflict 
with his science, he ought first to try to abandon his 
research altogether. But, positivism does not think the 
latter likely. Instead, "value-free inquiry" is assumed 
possible in most circumstances. Personal preferences, 
interests, and bias can, in other words, be held in 
abeyance.
I am not concerned at this point with the history of 
contemporary positivistic political science, but it is 
noteworthy that the loss of meaning and order is apparent in 
the labeling of all values as subjective, not experientially 
verifiable, as not scientific, etc. Eventually positivistic 
epistemology has consequently lost the ontological dimension 
of "science" which is, in its fullest sense, an onto- 
epistemic endeavor. Voegelin writes:
Only when ontology as a science was lost, and when 
consequently ethics and politics could no longer be 
understood as sciences of the order in which human 
nature reaches its maximal actualization, was it 
possible to become suspect as a field of subjective, 
uncritical opinion.92
,2 NSP, p . 12.
1 4 5
The very making of the claim that science p e r  s e , that 
is onto-epistemic science or general ontology, is 
illegitimate and unwarranted, and that it is merely the 
"field of subjective, uncritical opinion" shows the extent 
to which positivism is destroying science. By accepting the 
positivistic dogma in making this claim, the methodologists 
participate in that destruction. Voegelin goes on to say 
that
When the e p i s t e m e  is ruined, men do not stop talking 
about politics; but they now must express themselves 
in the mode of d o x a .  The so-called value-judgments 
could become a serious concern for methodologists 
because, in philosophical language, they were d o x a i , 
uncritical opinions concerning the problem of order.93
"Uncritical opinion, private or public (doxa in the Platonic 
sense), cannot substitute for theory in science."94 
Therefore, while political science, along with the physical 
sciences, is filled with and based upon value judgments, 
these invariably wear the mask of "reality." And political 
positivists throw themselves into innumerable mental 
gyrations in order to maintain the fiction that they are not 
making or pursuing value judgments. However, the more 
astute practitioners of the social sciences faced the 
problems of value-judgments squarely and attempted to 
overcome them. Consequently, even in the heyday of
positivism, there was implicit in it a "movement toward 
*3 Ibid.
54 Ibid., p . 10.
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retheoretization."95 The roots of the problem of value 
judgments are generally traced back to the influential work 
of Max Weber, since for Weber political science must be 
value-free in order for it to be science.
M..a.x w..e.be..r.j M l w e j j  t...h..<s. End. .and a N.a.w. B.a..g..l.a.n..ii>.g
Voegelin understood the greatness of those who devoted 
their lives to resisting what he later called "ideological 
swindles."96 Among these scholars was Max Weber. Indeed, 
"Weber was of great importance for consolidating Voegelin’s 
attitude toward science and sharpening his resistance to 
ideologies of all descriptions."97 Voegelin had taken a 
step from his education in neo-Kantian methodology to 
Husserl’s phenomenology, combining it with Weber’s insight 
into the fruitfulness of ideological interpretation of the 
social sciences. However, although Voegelin had been an 
early adherent of Weber’s theory of action, he later became 
critical of Weber’s derailment in advocating value-free 
science. Voegelin shows that the work of Max Weber is 
significant because he is "a thinker between the end and a 
new beginning."98 A brief look at Weber’s views makes clear 
in what sense Voegelin designates Weber as a thinker between
55 Ibid., p.3.
56 Barry Cooper, The Polit i c a l  T h e o r y  o f  Eric Voegelin (Lweiston, NY: Edwin Hellen Press, 1986), p.21.
97 E. Sandos, The V o e g e l i n i a n Revolution, p.38.
98 ESP, p.14.
147
the end and a new beginning, on the one hand, and identifies 
the Weberian derailment on the other.
It has been suggested that Weber had anticipated the 
end of ideology by having transcended Marxism, historicism, 
and utilitarianism.99 As one of the founding fathers of 
sociology, and as the inspirer of much later empirical 
investigation in the Anglo-Saxon world, Weber produced 
discussions about the genesis and validity of ideas which 
contributed substantially to subsequent treatments of 
ideology. Weber very rarely mentioned the word "ideology".
But his long and heavily qualified search for objectivity in 
politics places him uncertainly in the non-Marxist tradition 
moving from Destutt de Tracy to much current Anglo-Saxon 
political science.100 Weber’s thinking on social scientific 
concept formation is first elaborate in his criticism of 
meditation on philosophy of history.101 Especially, in his 
criticism of philosophical historical thought regarding 
reality, Weber had a lasting influence on Voegelin. For 
Weber, the fundamental problem with formulating a philosophy 
of history is its confusion of the historical process with 
thought about the process, i.e., its confusion of "reality"
35 David HcLellan, Ideology: Concepts in Social Thought (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1986), p.35,
130 Ibid.
101 In recounting Weber’s criticisa of philosophical historical thought, I an indebted to J.T, Bergner 
and Anthony Giddens. See, Bergner, The Origin of Foraalisn in Social Science (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1981), pp.99-100; and, A. Giddens, Studies in Social and Political Theory (New York: 
Basic Books, 1977), pp.189-207.
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and "thought about reality".102 Weber’s criticism is that 
the practice of second-rate historical work attempts to 
compel reality to confirm to its concepts or its mental 
constructs.103 Second-rate historians distort reality with 
their simplified concepts, and claim that they have not 
distorted reality. A far more thoughtful version of the 
confusion of thought and reality, or "ideological swindles" 
in Voegelin’s terms, is offered when these concepts are then 
taken as the "true content" of history. Hegel serves as an 
example of this for Weber. Weber argues that Hegel 
abstracts from historical life certain concepts, which he 
then regards as the r e a l  history of which historical life is 
only the superficial manifestation. For Weber, the
thoroughgoing Hegelian idealism represents a more 
thoughtful, but nevertheless mistaken, confusion of thought 
and reality. In this regard, Weber shares Marx’s view of 
Hegel’s philosophy.104
Yet Marx himself also commits the same mistake as Hegel 
in a slightly different form. Weber considered that Marx 
had made fundamental contributions to historical and 
sociological analysis. But, for Weber, "Marx merely
hypostatizes as ’real’ forces of historical change certain
1(12 See H, Weber, "Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy," in The M e t h o d o l o g y  of  the Social 
S c i e n c e s (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1949), trans. and ed. by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, p.94.
103 Ibid.
1114 See, Weber, "On Hegel’s 'Concrete Universal,’" trans, by Sidney Hook, in Hook, Fro a  Hegel to Harx 
(Ann Arbor: University of Hichigan Press, 1962), pp.312-315.
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concepts such as ’class.’"105 In other words, Marx
endeavors to free himself from the Hegelian idealism 
implicit in all philosophy of history, but he succeeds only 
partially. The concept of "class," for example, is a very 
useful concept with which to investigate social reality.
But it does not constitute a real component of real causal 
chain of any historical events. "Class" is a human idea, an 
abstraction which never corresponds at any stage of a 
historical event to the real and unique components of causal 
chain. All Marxian designations such as "the driving force 
of capitalism" are suitable only as abstractions with 
heuristic value, and do not constitute the real elements of 
an actual causal chain.106
To Weber, Marx’s theories could not be regarded as 
anything more than sources of insight, or at most as ideal- 
typical concepts, which could be applied to illuminate 
particular, specific sequences of historical development.
In Weber’s conception, Marx’s attribution of overall 
direction to movement of history was as illegitimate as the 
Hegelian philosophy of history which helped to give it 
birth.107 While Weber admitted, with strong reservations, 
the use of "developmental stages" as a "heuristic means" 
which could facilitate the explanatory interpretation of 
historical materials, he rejected totally the construction 
J. Bergner, The Origin of FomaJisa..., p.99.
1,6 H. Weber, "Critical Studies," in The Methodology of the.,., p.188.
1CT See Weber's remarks on Harx’s concepts in "Objectivity...," p.103 and pass in.
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of "deterministic schemes" based upon any sort of general 
theory of historical development.108 The necessary
corollary of this is the rejection of Marx’s materialism as 
a key to the explanation of historical change. Weber was 
well aware that the undermining potential of the Marxist 
concept of ideology could be turned against the Marxists 
themselves. "The materialist conception of history", Weber 
wrote, "is not to be compared to a cab that one can enter or 
alight from at will, for once they enter it, even the 
revolutionaries themselves are not free to leave it."109 
According to Weber, the thesis that economic factors in any 
sense finally explain the course of history as a scientific 
theorem is "utterly finished".110
Indeed, Weber went so far as to reject the idea of an 
"absolutely o b j e c t i v e  scientific analysis of s o c i a l  
p h e n o m e n a  independent of special and o n e - s i d e d  viewpoints 
according to which--expressly or tacitly, consciously or 
unconsciously— they are selected, analysed and organised for 
expository purposes."111 From Weber’s viewpoint reproaching 
Marx and Marxism, we can find that his overriding concern 
was to attack those who thought that political and ethical 
issues could be resolved by purely "scientific"--in this
168 See A. Giddens, S t u d i e s in Social..., p.192.
188 H, Weber, "Politics and Belief," ffesaanelte Politische Scliriften(Hunich), 1921, p.446. Cited in 
D. HcLellan, Ideology, p.36,
110 See A. Giddens, S t u d i e s  in Socia l . . . , p.193.
111 H. Weber, The g e t h o d o l o g y  of..., p.72.
case, more accurately, ideological, or to use Voegelin’s 
term, gnostic--means. He wished to reject the legitimacy of 
a "scientific politics", and to dispel what he regarded as 
the illusory authority given to political and ethical ideals 
propounded in the name of "science." Weber was concerned to 
reject a view that a society should be ideally organized 
upon scientific principles, and that all social and 
political problems are open to a rational solution through 
the application of scientific knowledge. Weber argued that, 
because it was not possible to justify normative claims by 
scientific evidence and argument alone, the very idea of a 
scientific politics was epistemologically misconceived.
In this way, Weber’s criticism of Marx and Marxism 
destroyed whatever pretension to science Marxists could 
conceivably claim. Weber’s "study of the S o c i o l o g y  o f  
R e l i g i o n  and E c o n o m i c s  a n d  S o c i e t y  buttressed his rejection 
of Marxism as scientifically untenable."112 His analysis 
showed that Marx’s writing was an untenable ideology. In 
Voegelin’s sense, it is an ideology that has held "a 
mortgage upon science--that is, upon systematic thought."113 
Weber showed that the ideologue does not think of himself as 
a simplifier or a sloganizer; the ideologue believes that he 
is objective and scientific, even dispassionate. Weber, in 
this sense, taught Voegelin a more radical criticism than 
the implicit rejection of Marxism that the study of
112 E. Sandoz, The V o e g e l i n i a n  R e volution, p.38.
113 Russell Kirk, E n e m i e s  of  the Permanent Things (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1969), p. 158.
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economics entailed.114 The act of overcoming ideological 
commitment became a central focus of Voegelin’s later 
analyses of ideological consciousness. The study of
economics was equivalent to common sense insofar as it 
showed why no responsible economist could be a Marxist. In 
addition, Weber indicated the sources of the refusal by 
Marxists of responsibility and of common sense. In S c i e n c e  
a n d  P o l i t i c s ,  Weber "clarified the point that the ideologies 
supply the values premised by action, but are not themselves 
scientific propositions. The matter became troublesome 
through Weber’s distinction between the ethics of intention 
and the ethics of responsibility, the problem of taking 
responsibility for one’s actions whatever one’s intentions 
in acting may be."115
The ideological commitment of Marxists eclipsed their 
common sense and their sense of responsibility. Weber’s 
distinction between the "ethics of intention" and the 
"ethics of responsibility" contained the genuine and 
permanent insight that the unforeseen consequences of 
moralistic action are the responsibility of the actor. This 
insight, which could be formulated in commonsensical terms 
as well, was important because it was developed in 
opposition to the ideological position that if one cherished 
certain values with great conviction, the sincerity with 
which they were held and the morally elevated intentions
114 B. Cooper, The Political Theory of Eric Voegelin, p.21.
115 B. Sandoz, The Voegelinian Revolution, p.38.
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that one made public would be sufficient to excuse any 
suffering that might be caused by trying to put them into 
action.
Weber’s distinction made it clear that the values that 
are assumed to be so morally elevating are scientifically 
invalid ideological inventions. He believed that a value- 
free social science was at least a legitimate aim. Whatever 
the particular values and prejudices of thinkers, their 
conclusions should be valid in terms which were in principle 
accessible to everyone. It was to protect his science from 
ideological infection that Weber developed his famous value- 
free method of inquiry devoted to the analysis of cause-and- 
effect relations in the process of society. Voegelin notes 
that Weber was
on the side of the ethics of responsibility... so that 
if you, for instance, establish a government that 
expropriates the expropriators, you are responsible for 
the misery which you cause for the people expropriated.
No excuse for the evil consequences of moralistic 
action could be found in the morality or nobility 
of your intentions. The moral end does not justify 
immorality of action... Ideologies are not science and 
ideals are no substitute for ethics.116
Voegelin firmly adopted these principles. He says that the
immanent logic of the methodology movement ends in the
person and work of Max Weber.117 "In the work of Max Weber
positivism had come to its end, and the lines on which the
116 E. Voegelin, "Autobiographical Memoir,n p.11. Cited in E. Sandoz, The V o e g e l i n ian Revolution, 
pp.38-9.
111 ATSP, p . 13.
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restoration of political science would have to move become 
visible. The correlation between a constituent ’value’ and 
a constituted ’value-free’ science had broken down; the 
’ value-judgment ’ were back in science in the form of the 
’legitimate beliefs’ which created units of social 
order."x18
However, Voegelin "later discovered the connection 
between Weber’s views and the teachings of the neo-Kantian 
methodology of the historical sciences developed by the so- 
called Southwest German School of Heinrich Rickert and 
Wilhelm Windelband."x 1 9 Indeed, Weber’s approach to social 
sciences arose in the context of neo-Kantianism, or what he 
called the "historical school" which clearly arises from and 
has affinities to modern positivism while nevertheless 
altering its postulates somewhat.120 Weber’s
118 Ibid., p.22.
119 E. Sandoz, The V o e g e l i n i a n devolution, p.39.
125 Weber accepted Rickert’s aethodological distinction between the social sciences, specifically 
history and the natural sciences. He agreed with Rickert that the nature of historical knowledge was 
very different froa the nature of natural scientific knowledge, but no less trustworthy because of 
that. Historical and huaanistic knowledge is not to be contrasted with natural scientific knowledge 
as an anti-rational and anti-scientific fora. To be sure, insofar as Weber argues for differences 
between the social and the natural sciences, he seeas to differ froa conteaporary tendencies in 
aainstreaa social science in a variety of ways related to his interpretative, or verstehende, 
sociology. However this Bay be, and however auch classificatory dispositions Bay be satisfied with 
such distinctions, the overriding fact reaains that the aainstreaa of aodern social scientific thought 
does not oppose, but elaborates upon, the fundaaental probleas established by Weber. It is doubtful 
that even today we could find a aore coaprehensive stateaent of the origin, the tendencies, and the 
liaits of aodern social science than is found in Weber's "Objectivity in Social Science and Social 
Policy." Furtheraore, Weber’s position is distinguished froa Rickert’s in the point that Weber 
efforts to reconcile the idealist tradition of sympathetic understanding of huaan action, verstehen, 
with the rigours of causal explanation on the mode 1 of the natural sciences. For Weber, therefore, 
historical knowledge is scientific knowledge even though it differs froa natural scientific knowledge 
insofar as it is arrived at, and states in teras of, verstehen, and even though it gives knowledge of 
the unique and the individual rather than of the universal and the lawful.
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epistemological thesis, which is made into a methodological 
premise, has been particularly important for political 
positivism, because his methodological writings represent 
one of the major expressions of the doctrine of value- 
freedom which constitutes a significant element of modern 
positivistic tradition. Hence, Weber has been regarded as 
"the greatest positivist" because the phenomenal process of 
positivism culminates in the work of Max Weber. Voegelin 
has penetrated to the core of the problem. As he writes:
The notion of a value-judgment ( W e r t u r t e i l ) is 
meaningless in itself; it gains its meaning from 
a situation in which it is opposed to judgments 
concerning facts ( T a t s a c h e n u r t e i l e ). And this 
situation was created through the positivistic conceit 
that only propositions concerning facts of the 
phenomenal world were "objective," while judgments 
concerning the right order of soul and society were 
"subjective." Only propositions of the first type 
could be considered "scientific," while propositions 
of the second type expressed personal preferences and 
decisions, incapable of critical verification and 
therefore devoid of objective validity. This 
classification made sense only if the positivistic 
dogma was accepted on principle; and it could be 
accepted only by thinkers who did not master the 
classic and Christian science of man.121
But Weber’s positivist position entailed "intellectual 
conflicts and contradictions."122 Even Weber sometimes 
sounds ambivalent about his approach to the principle of 
value-freedom. Weber’s conception of the place of values in 
social sciences involves several different claims, which are
122 Ibid., p . 15.
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partly independent of one another. This is often concealed 
by discussions which ascribe to him a single, general 
position of value freedom.
Let us turn to a brief explication of Weberian 
rationalism. To use the term coined by Weber, science is 
"wertfrei," value-free. In Weber’s sense, the principle of 
the W e r t f r e i h e i t , value-freedom (literally, freedom from 
value, value-freeness, abstention from value judgments, or 
freely translated as "ethical neutrality")123 of the social 
sciences means that a social scientist "brackets" his own 
evaluative preferences and sentiments when facing and 
analyzing his subject matter. Weber suggested as a general 
proposition that values are ultimately "demonic," not 
subject to rational determination. Therefore, facts are not 
determinative of values. In Voegelin’s words, he recognized 
"the ’values’...as ordering ideas for political action, but 
he accorded them the status of ’demonic’ decisions beyond 
rational argument. Science could grapple with the demonism 
of politics only by making politicians aware of the 
consequences of their actions and awakening in them the 
sense of responsibility."124 "Demonic" decisions are purely 
arbitrary ones, choices made without reason. Therefore, he 
insisted that social science in order to be taken seriously 
as a "scientific" discipline, stands and falls with this 
princ iple.
123 See Arnold Brecht, Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p.227.
12’ NSP, p p . 14-15.
This Weberian principle--if social science is to be 
science, then it must be value-free--in turn, "restricted 
social science to the exploration of causes and effects 
within social processes, leaving the underlying values out 
of account but for an acknowledgment of their use in 
selecting the materials. Value judgments were excluded from 
science, which meant that basic premises could not be 
critically examined, either in the realm of action or in the 
realm of science."125 He took methodology as a value-free 
science to mean "the exploration of causes and effects, the 
construction of ideal types that would permit distinguishing 
regularities of institutions as well as deviations from 
them, and especially the construction of typical causal 
relations."126 Thus, Weber was convinced that he had 
developed a purely empirical basis for discovery: his was a
methodology independent of value judgments. According to 
him, value judgment, which he defined as "practical 
evaluations of the unsatisfactory or satisfactory character 
of phenomena subject to our influence", cannot be logically 
derived from factual statements.127 Thus the social
sciences, which are concerned with factual descriptions and 
explanations, cannot establish the truth or falsity of any 
value-judgment. Weber’s claim that value judgments cannot 
be derived from the results of social sciences is based on a
125 E. Sandoz, The Voegelinian Revolution, p.39.
126 MSP, p.14.
127 K. Weber, The Methodology of,.., p.l.
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particular epistemological view of the logical status of 
such judgments.128
However, it should be noted that when Weber claims that 
the social scientist should not make value judgments, this 
is itself a value judgment, and it cannot be supported 
solely by his epistemological view about such judgments. 
Weber was well aware of this. Thus he does not argue 
against making value judgments on the grounds that this 
stance is, for social scientists, required by the logical 
status of their inquiry. And, "in assessing the likely 
consequences, Weber distinguishes between the effects of 
social scientist making value judgments in their writing, 
and in their teaching in universities."129 That is, besides 
keeping "unconditionally separate" the establishment of 
facts from the evaluation of them, the social scientist has 
to maintain a clear distinction between the academic life 
and the political life. It is with the latter that Weber is 
mainly concerned.
At this point we need to refer to the concept of value
relevance, and the relationship between selecting objects of
122 In adopting this view, Weber was strongly influenced by both Kant and Nietzsche, Weber holds that 
there is no way of rationally and objectively deciding between competing, substantive ethical 
doctrines. In particular, specific value judgments about concrete phenomena cannot be justified by 
reference to factual inquiries. From such inquiries, all that car. be discovered are the likely 
consequences of different courses of action, and thus the most effective means of achieving various 
ends. But the results of social scientific investigations do not enable one to make favourable or 
unfavourable judgments of the ends themselves. Nor does the fact that a particular course of action 
is the most efficient means to a favourably judged end mean that it should be performed; for one may 
also make a value-judgment about the means, that runs counter to the judgment of the end. See Russell 
Keat and John Urry, Social Theory as Science, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge k Kegan Paul, 1982 ), pp.196- 
9.
12! R. Keat and J. Urry, Social Theory as..., p . 197.
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study and causally explaining them. For Weber, all
knowledge of social reality is ideal-typical. One cannot 
criticize one ideal-type, say of capitalism, as less 
objectively "correct" than another. Relative to different 
values, one might wish to emphasize other features, such as 
capitalism’s class structure, which are not so central to 
Weber’s particular concerns. As a social being, a social 
scientist has his values, interests, and partisan concerns 
like anyone else. In fact, they guide him in the
formulation of the problems he chooses to investigate. In 
this sense, the themes of his investigations are "value­
relevant,"130 as Weber had expressed it.
However, once the topic has been chosen, the social 
scientist is bound by the rules of procedure--which, by 
convention, have been accepted by his discipline--to gather 
and treat his data "objectively," that is, with no standard 
of relevance other than that built into his theoretical 
frame of reference. As a citizen of a community or society, 
he may well decide that he does not like the social 
conditions indicated by his data (or those of other social 
scientists), and he may wish to do something about these 
conditions. This is his privilege as a private citizen, but 
it is not his function as a social scientist. But Weber 
insisted that, once an object of a study has been selected 
and defined in relation to values, these have no further 
part in the investigation: neither they, nor any value-
130 On Weber’s doctrine of value-relevance, see ibid., pp.197-199.
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judgments, should affect the objectivity of causal 
explanations. Everything else that is studied gains its 
significance not from values, but either from the fact that 
it is a causal determinant of the object of investigation, 
or because it provides evidence of such causal relations. 
Weber’s position on these issues is explicitly and strongly 
expressed in the following passage:
This imputation of causes is made with the goal of 
being, in principle, "objectively" valid as empirical 
truth absolutely in the same sense as any proposition 
at all of empirical knowledge. Only the adequacy of 
the data decides the question, which is wholly factual, 
and not a matter of principle, as to whether the causal 
analysis attains this goal to the degree which 
explanations do in the field of natural events. It is 
not the determination of the historical "causes" for a 
given "object" to be explained which is "subjective" in 
a certain sense... rather is it the delimitation of the 
historical "object," of the "individual" itself, for in 
this the relevant values are decisive.131
It is worth noting at this point that in his actual 
"doing" of social science, Weber did not stick to his 
distinction between facts and values. Weber’s own practice, 
as contrasted with his methodological speculations, suggests 
that the gap between values and facts is crossed from the 
other direction as well. That is, not only are values 
heavily structured by facts, but facts are shaped by values. 
What then really went into Weber’s thinking? Weber clearly 
"experienced in his historical and personal situation the 
struggle for freedom. His own political involvement in the
H. Weber, The Hethodology of..., p . 159. Cited in Keat and U r r y , Social Theory as..., p . 199.
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Weimar Republic is itself a clear demonstration that he was 
not value-free in the sense in which latter day positivists 
have misinterpreted it."132 We can, thus,look at Weber from 
two sides: "First he wanted to defend the ’scientific’
character of social science by confining it to ’fact,’ and 
second, he wanted to defend the realm of ’human values’ as 
outside the realm of science, as free from the critique of 
science."133 Consequently, it can be said that Weber was as 
much interested in maintaining a realm of freedom (values) 
as in maintaining the sanctity of science (facts). Hence, 
the result of Weber’s work was ambiguous. Even though his 
scientific enterprise was becoming truly objective, however, 
it was so at the cost of his conceptual consistency. Weber 
"attempted to reach methodological objectivity in the sense 
of interpretational relevance," but lacked "clarity about 
the problem of theoretical relevance." As Voegelin
indicates, "thus far the work of Weber can be characterized 
as a successful attempt to disengage political science from 
the irrelevance of methodology and to restore it to 
theoretical order."134
However, the great defect with the Weberian method of 
analysis, as Voegelin points out later in T h e  N e w  S c i e n c e  o f  
P o l i t i c s , was that the criteria by which materials were
132 Theodore R. Hal loch, B e y o n d Reductionists: I d e o l o g y  an d the Science of P o l i t i c s (New York:
Irvington Publishers, 1 983 ), p. 246 .
133 Ibid., pp. 246-7 .
131 NSP, p . 21.
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accumulated for analysis as well as the reasons for an 
ethics of responsibility were themselves identified as 
’value-judgments’ and thereby outside the boundaries of 
scientific or rational analysis.135 According to Voegelin,
As the model case for his "ethics of intention" [Weber] 
used a not-too-well-defined Christian "other-worldly" 
morality; he never touched the problem whether the 
demonic values were not perhaps demonic precisely 
because they partook of his "ethics of intention" 
rather than of his "ethics of responsibility," because 
they had arrogated the quality of a divine command to a 
human velleity. A discussion of such questions would 
have been possible only on the level of a philosophical 
anthropology from which Weber shied away.136
But, the "objectivity" of Weber’s science is what could be 
"derived only from the authentic principles of order as they 
had been discovered and elaborated in the history of 
mankind."137 However, for Weber there existed no ultimate 
universal order which gives meaning to human life. In the 
absence of the deities, modern man can establish his own 
values which give dignity and meaning to the life of 
individual human beings. But since there is no ultimate 
universal order, there is no way to subject any values to a 
transcendental critique. Hence, for Weber all values are 
arguably equal. Consequently, Weber had "reduced the 
principle of a value-free science a d  a b s u r d u m ."1 38





In the Voegelinian sense, science, especially political 
science, is not the mere collection or typifying of so- 
called subjective value judgments, but "the elaboration of 
the problems of order deriving from a carefully nuanced 
analysis of the structure of human existence."139 But the 
positivism which dominated Weber’s conception of science 
denied "the existence of a science of order": by virtue of
the positivist criterion of method the object of such a 
science did not exist, and, therefore, the science itself 
was illegitimate and did not exist. With the assumptions 
underlying "objective tyranny,"140 moreover, positivism 
makes metaphysics taboo, by prohibiting the questioning of 
existence that transcends time and space, and so, is not 
completely amenable to the methods of sciences solely 
concerned with phenomena in time and space. As a
consequence, Weber could not admit "the existence of a 
science of order" and not render such a science. Even 
though he studied on sociology of religion, therefore, it 
"could not induce Weber to take the decisive step toward a 
science of order."141 Voegelin writes,
One can hardly engage in a serious study of medieval 
Christianity without discovering among its "values" the 
belief in a rational science of human and social order
135 Killian M. Thompson, "Voegelin and the Religious Scholar: An Introduction," in John Kirby and W. 
H. Thompson, eds., Voegelin and the Theologian: Ten Studies in Interpretation (New York: Edwin Hellen 
Press, 1983), pp.11-12.
140 Ronald E. Puhek, The Metaphysical Imperative: A Critique of the Modern Approach to Science 
(Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982), p.12.
141 MSP, p.19.
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and especially of natural law...In order to degrade the 
politics of Plato, Aristotle, or St. Thomas to the rank 
of "values" among others, a conscientious scholar 
would first have to show that their claim to be science 
was unfounded. And that attempt is self-defeating.142
Given the nature of positivism as a perversion of science in 
its subordination of the proper object of method, Weber took 
positivistic social science as far as they could go "on the 
road toward essence." But, for whatever reason, perhaps for 
an ultimately "impenetrable" one, he would never use the 
light of theory, gained from an understanding of the 
Classical-Christian science of man’s existence in society 
and history, to recognize that it was the nature of 
positivism that caused the problems he attempted to resolve 
as best he could. Weber’s "temporary resolutions pointed 
the way to a restoration of science p e r  s e  yet his own 
attempts at reform would remain arbitrary and a d  h o c  because 
he religiously obeyed the positivistic taboo on 
metaphysics. "i 4 3
When science is as thoroughly ruined as it was around 
1900, the mere recovery of theoretical craftsmanship is a 
considerable task, to say nothing of the amounts of 
materials that must be reworked in order to reconstruct the 
order of relevance in facts and problems. Weber’s period 
was the time when the "understanding of ontology as well as 
the craftsmanship of metaphysical speculation had to be
 Ibik7p’20~ .....
H! H.A.P. Diebel, "On Eagle's Kings...," p.99.
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regained, and especially philosophical anthropology as a 
science had to be re-established."144 However, he did not
attempt to answer the ontological question which culminates 
in "the understanding of man as the thing which is capable 
of transcendental experiences"; that is, he did not pursue 
philosophical anthropology. Indeed, Weber’s ideal types 
were theoretically not tenable because they have no 
ontological foundation. Weber’s types of power and
authority, e.g., are "grounded in nothing but a historical 
situation" created by the French Revolution and are 
inadequate for the interpretation of the manifold historical 
constellations with which Voegelin was concerned. Instead,
"he had made his decision for entering into rational 
conflict with values through the mere fact of his 
enterprise."145 In this sense, it can be said that, though 
Weber experienced reality, he was unable to account for 
it.146 As Voegelin announces, he "knew what he wanted but 
somehow could not break through it. He saw the promised 
land, but was not permitted to enter it."147
According to Voegelin, the "nucleus of Max Weber’s
philosophy of history" is the idea that the historical
relevance of our culture consists in its "rationalism,"
negatively determined by "disenchantment" and "daily life" 
______
1,s Ibid,, p.17.
1,5 B. Cooper, The Political Theory of  Eric Voegelin, p,22.
ESP, p. 22.
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and positively understood in terms of experimental science 
and responsibility.148 Weber was convinced that "history 
moved toward a type of rationalism which relegated religion 
and metaphysics into the realm of the ’irrational.’"149 In 
other words, Weber "conceived history as an increase of 
rationalism in the positivistic sense." From the position 
of a science of order, however, as Voegelin says, "the 
exclusion of the s c i e n t i a  p r i m a  from the realm of reason is 
not an increase but a decrease of rationalism. What Weber, 
in the wake of Comte, understood as modern rationalism would 
have to be reinterpreted as modern irrationalism."150
One of the most important aspects of Voegelin’s 
philosophy of history is his description of modern Western 
civilization as the expression of the "gnostic" symbolic 
form. Gnosticism--in this case, specifically modern
gnosticism--is a stream of thought which becomes 
progressively immanentized until it erupts in the 
totalitarian mass movements of our time. "Enormous and 
important differences exist between the various gnostic 
symbolisms that coexist in modernity, but they all have in 
common the fallacious attempt to transform the uncertainties 
and ambiguities of the experience of existence into the
1,8 E. Voegelin, "Ueber Max tfeber," D e u t s c h e  V i e r t e l j a h r e s s c h r i f t  fue r  L i t e r a t u r v i s s e n s c h a f t  und 
G e i s t e s g e s c h i c h t e , 3 (1925), p.178. Cited in Juergen Gebhardt, "Toward the Process of Universal 
Mankind: The Formation of Voegelin's Philosophy of History," in E. Sandoz, ed., Eric Voege l i n ' s 
Thought, p.71,
148 ESP, p.22.
15D Ibid., p . 23.
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certainties of one-dimensional intramundane experience. Out 
of their anxiety regarding the structure of existence, they 
create a ’second reality’ which gives more assurance to them 
than the apprehension of the ground of being by faith and 
analogical reasoning affords."151
Voegelin shows the gnostic implications of modern 
rationalism by indicating a relationship between the 
development of attempts at value-free inquiry and the rise 
of modern totalitarianism. He is convinced that it was more 
than historical coincidence that the apparent value-free 
characteristics of Weberian-type social science coincided in 
the 1920s and 1930s with the rise of German National 
Socialism. More details of this theme will be examined in 
next section and Chapter Four.
151 D, Gerraino, "Eric Voegelin’s Contribution to Contemporary Political Theory," R e v i e v  o f  Politics, 
26:3 (July 1964), p.397.
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3. R E L A T I O N S  TO O T H E R  C R I T I Q U E S
In the latter part of previous chapter, I have examined 
the presuppositions of positivistic epistemology underlying 
the intellectual premises of both scientism and Western 
liberalism.152 The positivistic rationalism, as formulated 
by Descartes, Locke and their successors, has fostered a 
mechanistic view of the world. In opposition to the
positivistic tradition there emerged scholars from various 
academic disciplines such as the philosophy of science, 
phenomenology and other fields. And the critiques of
positivistic political science by Voegelin run parallel to 
and are no doubt closely related to new developments within 
these various disciplines. It is the relationships between 
Voegelin’s criticism and some of the other criticisms that 
are the focus of investigation of this section. I have 
chosen to examine the works of four thinkers whose efforts I 
believe best exemplify recent currents contrary to scientism 
in many disciplines, and closely related to Voegelin’s 
critique. In order to clarify the relations between 
critiques by Voegelin and other leading figures, I refer to 
the attacks on the positivist position launched by such 
writers as Michael Polanyi (philosophy of science), Bernard 
Lonergan (theology), and Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau- 
Ponty (phenomenology). Although some of the works of these
152 Concerning the connection between positivistic episteaology and 1iberalisa, I will explain in 
Chapter Pour.
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writers are not as yet widely recognized among political 
scientists, there are, nonetheless, compelling reasons to 
consider their arguments seriously.
First, one of my reasons for choosing these various 
authors is to view the many ways the scientific tradition 
has been attacked. An obvious but nonetheless essential 
point must be made right away: no single, unified approach
has arisen in response to the failures of positivistic 
epistemology. I have selected these authors because there 
exist interesting and unique aspects to the research of 
each. On the other hand, the disparate analyses which are 
examined in this section do have a number of common 
elements. That is, there is a commonality in the variegated 
works.
A second reason for seriously considering their works 
is that their works provide an alternative to the 
rationalistic understanding of science which has come to 
dominate modern thought. This rationalistic interpretation 
has had the effect of challenging the very legitimacy of 
political philosophy itself. As a consequence, contemporary 
political philosophy lost much of its previous force and 
credibility. As James Wiser indicates, "as an attempt to 
reconstruct human and social order, political philosophy 
necessarily involves an act of creative imagination, and by 
its very nature the meaning of such an act is of the type 
that in part must be accepted rather than simply
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observed."153 This decision to accept certain arguments or 
to accredit certain experiences is necessarily a matter of 
personal judgment. Indeed classical political philosophy is 
based upon an acknowledgement of this fact.154 Yet in the 
climate of opinion emanating from the scientific revolution 
of the seventeenth century the personal involvement of the 
knower within the act of cognition came to be seen as the 
root of subjectivity. The objective character of modern 
science was associated with its impersonal quality and such 
a quality, in turn, was to be secured through a rigorous 
application of the "scientific method". Accordingly there 
developed a growing reluctance to accept the scientific 
claims of those traditions of inquiry where such an 
application was inappropriate, e.g., theology, ethics and 
political philosophy.
Therefore, the common arguments of the variegated
objections to the positivistic tradition seem to be that an
entirely new canon of knowing, transcending the old
dichotomy of empirical science and normative science and of
facts and values, has to be developed. They call the
categories of Descartes into question, though they have as
yet produced no new epistemological canon that has been
widely accepted as a substitute for the Cartesian dualiism
133 J. Wiser, "Knowledge and Order," The Polit i c a l  S c i e n c e  Reviewer, 1 ( 1977 ), p.91.
154 For exaaple, Aristotle states that "Scientific knowledge is judgaent about things that are 
universal and necessary, and the conclusions of deaonstration, and all scientific knowledge follow 
froa first principles (for scientific knowledge involves apprehension of a rational ground)."
Aristotle, R i c o a a c h e a n  Ethics, Bk.VI, Ch.5. 1140b. Also, see J. Wiser, "Political Theory, Personal 
Knowledge, and Public Truth," Journal of Politics, 36:3 (August 1974), pp.661-674.
171
of mind and matter that still dominates modern thinking. It 
is scarcely possible in one section to give due treatment to 
the variegated and complex theory o f ' knowledge of each 
thinker; but what follows is a brief rendering of some 
characteristics of their thought which suggests why it is to 
our purpose.
In opposition to the positivistic philosophy of 
science, there has emerged today a new breed of philosophers 
of science: among them are Thomas Kuhn, Michael Polanyi,
Norwood R. Hanson, Stephen Toulmin, and Paul Feyerabend. 
Despite their individual differences, they share something 
fundamental in that they are focusing on "doing science" as 
the basis of the philosophy of science, and concerned with 
transcending the Cartesian assumptions that underlie social 
and human sciences. While acknowledging the usefulness and 
originality of all the ways of the philosophers of science 
in criticizing scientism, I shall examine Michael Polanyi’s 
theory of knowledge.
His writings have been acclaimed, especially in the
philosophy of science, as a critical challenge to the
epistemological presuppositions of positivism and a creative
contribution to a redefinition of the nature of scientific
inquiry.155 Although in many ways Voegelin and Polanyi are
155 For exaaple, T.A. Spragens, Jr. uses Polanyi's philosophy as a springboard in the hopes of 
creating a post-behavioral science of politics in his work, The Dileaaa of Conteaporary Political 
Theory: Toward a P o s t - B e h a v i o r a l  S c i e n c e  o f  P o l i t i c s (New York: Dunellen, 1973),
very different thinkers, Polanyi’s critique resembles 
Voegelin’s at least in three aspects: First, Polanyi’s work
provides an alternative to the positive rationalistic 
understanding of science. Second, in developing his
understanding of the actual operations of science, Polanyi 
proceeds to an analysis of human consciousness. "This 
analysis, in turn, leads him to posit the principles of a 
specific ontology within which his view of human nature can 
be appropriately located."156 Finally, in his conception of 
human consciousness, "this particular understanding of the 
order of reality quite naturally implies a reconsideration 
of the principles of political order."157
As articulated in his major work P e r s o n a l  K n o w l e d g e : 
T o w a r d s  a  P o s t - C r i t i c a l  P h i l o s o p h y ,  Polanyi, a physical 
chemist who turned to cognitional questions for the purpose 
of establishing the foundations of science in a free 
society, challenges particularly the objective criterion of 
verifiability that has been the hallmark of positivism. He 
contends that positivistic tradition has fostered a 
mechanistic world view based on Galilean and Newtonian 
cosmologies, and a critical ideal of scientific knowledge 
assuming that scientific theory cannot go beyond the 
empirical and observational. Such a view assumes that 
knowledge is not complete until it becomes explicitly 
formulated, critically established and objectively verified.
J. Wiser, "Know l e d g e  and Orde r , "  p p . 91-92.
Ibid,
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It also nurtured the effort to eliminate all personal and 
human appraisals from science. Like Voegelin, Polanyi 
observes that the positivistic position has thus led to a 
fundamental falsification of the nature of scientific 
inquiry and that this falsification is responsible for the 
intellectual crisis of the twentieth century.
Before getting into an examination of Polanyi’s 
epistemological breakthrough, let us make a brief summary of 
what he sees to be the "nihilist" and totalitarian 
implications of the scientific rationalism.158 This
procedure is appropriate because his chief concern is "not 
with a proper understanding of scientific technique p e r  s e  
but rather with the larger cultural and intellectual impact 
of the critical interpretation of science upon 
modernity."159 In Polanyi’s analysis, modern thought in a 
wider sense was animated by a passion for "emancipation of 
the human mind from a mythological and magical 
interpretation of the universe"160--i.e ., liberation from 
religious fanaticism and traditional spiritual authority. 
With this characterization of modern thought, although he 
does not mention it explicitly, he seems to follow 
Voegelin’s equation of the Western liberal tradition with 
the positivistic tradition. His argument presumes the two 
are based on the same philosophical premises--that is, anti- 
158 See H. Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), pp.3-21.
158 J. Wiser, "Knowledge and Order," p.107.
188 H. P o l a n y i  and H. Prosch, Meaning, p p . 5-6.
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authoritarianism and philosophical skepticism.161 Western 
liberalism, for example, as is based on scientific 
rationalism and formulated by Descartes and Locke, was a 
protest for demanding freedom from authority and freedom of 
thought as the best means of approximation to truth.
The doctrine of free thought, which is presuming anti­
authoritarianism and philosophical doubt, reached its 
extreme position in the European continent in the eighteenth 
century by the philosophy of Enlightenment. As a skeptical 
reaction against the dogmatic forms of speculative 
philosophy, the liberalistic position seems to represent "a 
healthy return to common sense and experience." Ironically, 
however, the philosophical premises of liberalism and thus 
the positivistic tradition, although animated by a passion 
for liberation from religious dogmatism and authority, have 
actually contributed to the destruction of the meaning of 
intellectual freedom. As is often the case, anti-
authoritarianism and skepticism soon generate their own form 
of orthodoxy. And in this particular instance, the
orthodoxy of liberal and scientific rationalism became a 
cultural and intellectual force of unique authority. Indeed 
in Polanyi’s analysis, modern science— or more accurately, 
the rationalistic interpretation of modern science— is "the 
most important single element contributing to the 
intellectual crisis of the age."162 The philosophical
161 Terry Hoy, "Hichael Polanyi: The Moral Iaperatives of a Free Society/ Thought, 58:231 (Decenber 
1983), pp.393-405.
182 J. Wiser, " K n o w l e d g e  and O r d e r /  pp. 93-94 .
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presuppositions underlying liberalism and the Enlightenment 
denied the possibility of transcendent or universal 
standards of morality.
Liberal rationalism thus replaced traditional "moral 
ideals by philosophically less vulnerable objectives."163 
The process of replacement is "not a mere pseudo­
substitution but a ’real’ substitution of human appetites 
and human passions for reason and the ideals of man."164 
Polanyi describes the process of replacement as a process of 
"moral inversion." He writes, "The morally inverted person 
has not merely performed a philosophic substitution of 
material purposes for moral aims; he is acting with the 
whole force of his homeless moral passions within a purely 
materialistic framework of purposes."165 However, owing to 
the failures to discover universal standards of human 
behavior, Enlightenment rationalism gave birth to various 
substitutes. They were: the romantic cult of unrestrained
nationalism, the Hegelian enthronement of reason immanent in 
history, and the Marxist view of history as the product of 
class conflict arising from the mode of production.166 
According to Polanyi, therefore, the revolutions in the 
twentieth century that have resulted in the emergence of 
totalitarianism were the realization of the false
113 H. Polanyi and H. Prosch, Mean i n g , p.14.
1,4 Ibid.
185 Ibid., p.18.
188 Ibid., p p . 12-14.
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expectations raised by Enlightenment rationalism. This is 
where "the inconsistency of a liberalism based on 
philosophical doubt becomes apparent: freedom of thought is
destroyed by the extension of doubt to the field of 
traditional ideals, which includes the basis for freedom of 
thought."167 Thus, he suggests that:
We need a theory of knowledge which shows up the 
fallacy of positivistic skepticism and supports the 
possibility of a knowledge of entities governed by 
higher principles. Positivistic skepticism is one of 
a number of fallacies that have had their origin in 
modern science. In the days when it controlled all 
knowledge, religious dogma was a source of many errors, 
Now that the scientific outlook exercises predominant 
control over all knowledge science has become the 
greatest single source of popular fallacies.168
An appreciation of Polanyi’s epistemology also requires 
a brief mention of the Kantian theory of knowledge as 
backgrounds. The central achievement of Kant stems from a 
radical bifurcation of the universe between a scientific 
world of empirical laws and effects ( p h e n o m e n a )— the only 
possible object of knawledge--and a world as it "really" is 
(n o u m e n a )— what is not an object of intuition, or that which 
has no logical possibility of ever being known and is 
accessible only through the moral will. As creatures of 
desire, our actions belong to the world of empirical cause 
and effect and are completely determined. But Kant believed 
that there is a moral or "transcendental self," which is
1ST Ibid,, p.10. 
168 Ibid., p.24.
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free and able to transcend the phenomenal world and bring us 
into contact with the real or noumenal world in which man 
becomes conscious of moral obligation and the conflict 
between what "is" and what "ought to be." It is in the 
consciousness of moral obligation that we experience our 
freedom as a recognition that the moral law is not something 
imposed from without, but from within. Moral behavior is 
action in conformity to the idea of law, in doing what 
reason prescribes as our duty as opposed to personal 
advantage or self-interest.
It is not the intent here to provide a full discussion 
of Kant’s epistemological and ethical theories. Suffice it 
to say that he represents "one of the more influential 
efforts in Western thought to establish a basis for moral 
universals in terms that would seek to overcome the 
inadequacies of Hume’s criticism. 1,16 9 However, although 
Kant criticizes the excesses of Humean empiricism, there is 
nonetheless an empirical and objectivist strain in his 
thought. The view that knowledge is possible only of 
phenomena given in sense experience is still too strongly 
influenced by empiricism.170 Moreover, it is widely
recognized that his theory perpetuates a central deficiency 
of Enlightenment rationalism: a radical dualism of mind and
body that descends from Descartes through Hume.
165 T. Hoy, "Michael Polanyi," p.395.
176 In this sense, a critic like Haberuas claias that Kant assuaes a noraative concept of science, 
with physics taken as the aodel of legitiaate "scientific knowledge." See Juergen Haberaas, Knowledge 
and Huaan Merest (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), trans. by Jeremy L. Shapiro, pp.13-15.
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This springs from Kant’s central contention that moral 
universals are the product of what is given to the practical 
reason of an autonomous will in opposition to deterministic 
laws of cause and effect that govern the world of nature as 
understood by the theoretical reason of scientific inquiry. 
The fundamental inadequacy of Kantian perspective, as 
Marjorie Green points out, is the Cartesian image of a 
thinking mind over a dead nature, making impossible the 
understanding of man as historical, rooted in the world of 
living organisms.171 "The conclusions of Kant were
inevitable so long as the Newtonian concept of the nature of 
scientific inquiry was unquestioned. Contemporary
developments in the philosophy of science, however, have 
challenged the Newtonian model. It is here that the 
writings of Polanyi are of significance as a corrective to 
the inadequacies of Kantian dualism."172
In rejecting the rationalistic ideal of strict 
objectivism, Polanyi develops a new conception of science 
which comprises a concept of personal knowing. He suggests 
a distinction between science--science as the search for 
truth concerning the nature of reality--and the 
rationalistic interpretation of science. This distinction 
reminds us of Voegelin’s understanding of science as the 
search for truth and of positivism as the perversion of 
science. Polanyi is concerned about the rationalistic
1.1 Marjorie Green, The K n o w e r  a n d  the Kno w n (New York: Basic Books, 1966), p.152.
1.2 T. Hoy, "Michael Polanyi," p.395.
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interpretation of science which regards the ideal of science 
as detached and impersonal knowledge. The rationalistic 
ideal of strict objectivism tends to misrepresent the nature 
of scientific method by exaggerating the precision and 
exactitude of its operations. The effect of the "critical 
ideal of knowledge"173 is to reduce scientific procedure to 
a set of clearly specifiable and impersonal observations and 
calculations which can be objectively criticized step by 
step. But it also eliminates from science the element of 
originality which "conflicts sharply with the ideal of a 
completely formalized intelligence."174
On the contrary, for science as defined to be the 
search for truth concerning the nature of reality, 
uncertainty and vagueness is a vital and necessary part of 
it.175 Hence far from representing a system of exact rules, 
procedures and inferences, Polanyi argues, really operative 
method in science more closely resembles a "loose system of 
intuitions" based on a tradition which is tacitly accepted 
and "transmitted from one generation to the other only 
through the medium of personal collaboration."176 Thus, by
173 Polanyi designates the belief systea of aodern rationalistic science as a "critical philosophy". 
"The aeaning of critical philosophy is aost apparent in the ideals it sets forth--in particular the 
ideal of scientific detachaent as a Beans of producing iapersonal and therefore universal knowledge." 
See J. Wiser, "Knowledge and Order," p.94.
174 H. Polanyi, Personal K n o w l e d g e :  T o w a r d s  a P o s t - C r i t i c a l  P h i l o s o p h y (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1958), p.301.
175 Uncertainty is an inherent characteristic of truth and reality which is an object of "science." 
See, Chapter Three, "1. Uncertainty and Knowledge,"
174 H. Polanyi, The Log i c  o f  L i b e r t y (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp.52, 57.
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countering the objectivistic theories of science that have 
disregarded man’s power of knowing, and by calling forth an 
enormous array of examples of personal acceptance and 
judgment in the very doing of science, Polanyi, like 
Voegelin, attempts to emancipate the conception of science 
from the scourge of positivism.
In the rationalistic interpretation of science, the 
opposite of science was traditionally regarded as opinion. 
However, Polanyi argues that, as any interpretation must, 
the rationalistic interpretation includes a belief system. 
And "it is the particulars of this specific belief system 
that Polanyi finds to be destructive."177 For him such an 
ideal of exact science is mischievous because it is 
unattainable. There can be no wholly explicit and wholly 
impersonal, so-called objective knowledge. Scientific
method, in his view, cannot be described as the application 
or verification of explicit rules and procedures, or an 
objective criterion of verification and testability. It is 
his central contention that scientific inquiry embodies a 
dimension of personal knowledge that transcends the 
distinction between objective and subjective, normative 
versus descriptive (or fact and value), and reason versus 
faith, and encompasses a tacit or subsidiary awareness 
analogous to a skill or connoisseurship.178
1T? J. Wiser, "Knowledge and Order," p.94.
1J* See Thonas Langford and Williaa Poteat, eds., I n t e l l e c t  an d  Hope: E s s a y s  in the Thought of H ich a e l  
Pol a n y i (Durhaa, NC: Duke University Press, 1968).
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Basically, in this way, he develops a new conception of 
science which acknowledges "the active and legitimate 
participation of the knower within the act of cognition 
itself."179 As I have already brought up briefly in the 
first section of this chapter, Polanyi’s theory of personal 
knowledge is complementary to an understanding of Voegelin’s 
theory of consciousness, which I will turn to in the next 
chapter. According to Polanyi, participation of the knower 
is an indispensable coefficient of all knowledge. 
Ultimately, all knowledge is utterly personal, and insight 
is an utterly personal achievement. The human mind is not 
an impersonal machine engaged in the manufacture of truth. 
And in Polanyi’s scheme "involvement (or commitment) rather 
than critical detachment" becomes the ideal scientific 
attitude. His epistemology seeks to transcend by showing 
how all knowing, including scientific knowing, is rooted in 
a structure of commitment.
This leads to another area of Polanyi’s epistemology: 
his understanding of the role of belief in human 
knowledge.180 His epistemology "reflects an Augustinian 
approach to the faith-reason relationship in emphasizing the 
primacy of belief over understanding."181 According to him, 
the order of knowing is not that we understand and then
1,9 Ibid., p.95.
191 In accounting Polanyi1s understanding of the role of belief in hunan knowledge, I indebted to 
Joseph Kroger, "Polanyi and Lonergan on Scientific Method," P h i l o s o p h y  Tod&y, 21:1 (Spring 1977),
pp.2-20.
1,1 J o s e p h  Kroger, "Polanyi and L o n e r g a n . . , , "  p . 8.
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believe but rather that we believe in order that we may
understand. All explicit acts of reasoning--intelligent 
understanding and rational judgment--are grounded in a tacit 
and, therefore, fiduciary framework. "This is the way of 
acquiring knowledge... f i d e s  q u a e r e n s  i n t e l l e c t u m ,  to believe 
in order to know."182 Since all knowledge is what someone 
believes to be true, "to believe" and "to know" are simply 
two ways of describing the same cognitional activity; the 
former emphasizing the personal character of knowledge, the 
latter its universal intent. Such is the equivalence of
belief and knowledge in Polanyi’s cognitional theory. 
Ultimately Polanyi’s theory demands that we deny the 
validity of an absolute distinction between truth and belief 
or in stronger terms, between science and faith. "For all 
truth is but the external pole of belief, and to destroy all 
belief would be to deny all truth."183 He contends that
science is a system of beliefs which must be upheld by
commitment, for "science or scholarship can never be more 
than affirmation of the things we believe in."184
Yet, it should be emphasized here that personal 
involvement assumes a form of involvement which does not 
imply subjectivity. In other words, grounding knowledge in 
personal commitment does not necessarily mean subjectivism.
182 H. Polanyi, Science, Fai t h  an d  S o c i e t y (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), p.15.
183 H. Polanyi, P e r s o n a l  Knowledge, p,286,
184 H. Polanyi, The Log i c  of  Liberty, p.31.
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Although Polanyi emphasizes the personal commitment in 
scientific inquiry, therefore, his concept of the "personal" 
is not a defense of a radical subjectivity; for he clearly 
distinguishes between the "personal" in us that actually 
enters into commitments and the "subjective" states in which 
we merely endure feelings.185 The concept of the personal 
thus transcends the distinction between subjective and 
objective.186 It is important to realize that the category 
of the personal is neither subjective nor objective, rather 
it transcends the distinction between objective and 
subjective. By having denied a rigid distinction between 
reason and faith, Polanyi is accused of replacing science 
with mysticism.187 Yet, according to him, personal
knowledge can and does claim a universal validity. The 
knower*s claim to make contact with reality is a claim also 
to universality.
By regarding all knowledge as personal, that is, as 
neither entirely objective nor entirely subjective in the 
traditional usage of these terms, Polanyi maintains that the 
validation of scientific truth is therefore achieved by an 
admixture of both factual and valuational judgments. 
Polanyi writes:
For one thing, there are no mere facts in science.
185 H. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, pp.299-301.
188 Ibid., p.300.
18J Iare Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Prograaaes," in Iare 
Lakatos and Alan Husgrave(eds.), C r i t i c i s e  a n d  the G r o w t h  o f  K n o w l e d g e (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1970), p.163. See J. NiBer, "Knowledge and Order," p.100.
184
A scientific fact is one that has been accepted as 
such by scientific opinion, both on the grounds of 
the evidence in favour of it and because it appears 
sufficiently plausible in view of the current 
scientific conception of the nature of things.
Besides, science is not a mere collection of facts, 
but a system of facts based on their scientific 
interpretation. It is this system that is endorsed 
by a scientific authority. And within this system 
this authority endorses a particular distribution of 
interest intrinsic to the system; a distribution of 
interest established by the delicate value-judgments 
exercised by scientific opinion in sifting and 
rewarding current contributions to science. Science 
i s  w h a t  i t  i s , in virtue of the way in which scientific 
authority constantly eliminates, or else recognizes at 
various levels of merit, contributions offered to 
science. In accepting the authority of science, we 
accept the totality of all these value-judgments.188
Polanyi designates the foundation of human knowledge as 
the "tacit dimension." The tacit dimension constitutes the 
foundation or presupposition of all personal knowledge and 
it is the pervasive structure of all intelligent activity. 
Man has certain tacit powers which he shares in common with 
the animals. Our tacit powers organize our experience in 
order to gain intellectual control over it. What Polanyi 
calls "explicit knowledge" is actually tacit knowing that 
has become articulated, but yet we must recall his 
conviction that no knowledge can be wholly explicit. Our 
unarticulated and unformulated knowledge remains tacit. 
Hence we encounter Polanyi’s famous saying: "we can know
more than we can tell."189 What his theory of tacit knowing
181 H. Polanyi, Knotting a n d  Being, pp.65-66,
1!S H. Polanyi, The Tacit Distension (Garden City, NY: Double Day k Co., 1966 ), p.4.
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amounts to is the rejection of the delusory demand for 
wholly explicit and wholly impersonal knowledge.
Let us clarify this by considering the character of 
comprehension. It is the act of understanding, for Polanyi, 
which most clearly manifests the structures of tacit knowing 
since tacit knowing is the basic operator in the integration 
of particular parts into a coherent whole.
We may say that when we comprehend a particular set of 
items as part of a whole, the focus of our attention 
is shifted from the hitherto uncomprehended particulars 
to the understanding of their joint meaning. This 
shift of attention does not make us lose sight of the 
particulars, since one can see a whole only by seeing 
its parts but it changes altogether the manner in 
which we are aware of the particulars. We become aware 
of them now in terms of the whole on which we have 
fixed our attention. I shall call this a subsidiary 
awareness of the particulars by a contrast to a focal 
awareness which fixes attention on the particulars in 
themselves, and not as parts of a whole.190
Consequently, within any act of comprehension, Polanyi 
argues, there is both a focal awareness and a subsidiary 
awareness. The object of focal awareness is that of which 
we may have explicit knowledge. However, we achieve this 
knowledge only by virtue of the clues provided by things of 
which we have subsidiary or tacit awareness. Operative in 
the structure of tacit knowing is an inherent "from-to" 
relation so that we attend "from" a first term of this tacit 
relation "to" a second term. This basic polarity is 
explained in terms borrowed from anatomy. The first term is
1J) H. Polanyi, The S t u d y  of  Han (Chicago: U n i v e r s i t y  of Chic a g o  Press, 1965), p p . 29-30.
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the "proximal term," and the second is the "distal term." 
We attend from the subsidiary to the focal, from the 
proximal to the distal, from clues to an object, or from 
component parts to a comprehensive whole. In each case, we 
integrate the former in the latter. The fact that knowledge 
has a tacit component means, among other things, that we 
know more than we can say. That is, we have knowledge of 
the proximal term of which we are not able to speak. 
Consequently, "given the logic of the subsidiary-focal 
structure, there can be no formally defined set of strict 
criteria by which to guide the act of cognition."191 For 
example, methodological rules, as such, must be explicit; 
yet knowledge contains a tacit dimension. Thus personal 
skill rather than method reemerges as the vital element in 
man’s effort to establish truth.
Closely connected with the notion of the tacit is what
Polanyi calls "indwelling." By this term he is drawing our
attention to the way in which man dwells in the subsidiary 
components of awareness. That is, he uses the term to 
describe the process by which man incorporates subsidiary 
terms as an extension of his own cognitive powers. 
Preeminently this means that we are embodied and that our 
experience always carries with it these roots. Ultimately 
the body functions as the instrument of all knowing and 
acting so that we have a subsidiary awareness of it in all 
that we do. As Polanyi notes, "our own body is the only
1,1 J. Kiser, " K n o w l e d g e  and Orde r , "  p . 98.
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thing in the world which we normally never experience as an 
object, but experience always in terms of the world to which 
we are attending from our body."192 To dwell in something 
is to treat it subsidiarily, in the same way that we treat 
our bodies. An alternative expression for indwelling is 
"interiorization." Thus the integration of particulars by 
"indwelling" is a form of interiorization and appropriation. 
We understand by dwelling in things, not by looking at them. 
When we truly accept moral principles or scientific 
theories, for instance, we interiorize them. They function 
as proximal terms in our processes of understanding--we 
attend to other things from them. These n o e t i c  frameworks 
form part of our conceptual dwelling.
B..a.r...n..a.r...d L..Q...n..s..r..g..a..o.
In the West, as we have witnessed in the preceding 
chapters, the premodern worldview based upon the Christian 
theology was fragmented after the Renaissance through the 
modern mind’s preoccupation with the mastery of method in 
empirical and objective analysis. The metaphysical and 
theological world-views thus have been thrown into crisis by 
an inability to assimilate critically the import of modern 
scientific methods. The resulting triumphs of modern 
science over theology led to a pervasive secularism.193
i"9'3 H. Polanyii The Tacit Diaension, p.16.
153 With regard to the triuaph of perversive secularisa, see Chapter Four of this dissertation which 
assesses Voegelin’s account of gnosticisa and aodernity.
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Consequently, as in other fields of human knowing, in 
contemporary political science the rationalistic ideal of 
knowledge of the scientistic tradition has been widely 
embraced. The positivist political science whose goal is to 
augment the empiricist-oriented, objective theory of 
knowledge through use of the scientific method regards the 
metaphysical or transcendental experience, e.g., religious 
belief, as unreliable because it pertains to value 
assertions, moral statements or the nonempirical claims of 
fact that cannot be validated through direct rationalistic 
empirical observation.
Dialectically, however, contemporary liberal and 
positivistic cultures are now experiencing crisis, the roots 
of which can often be traced to such secularism. For a 
theologian, therefore, it might be hoped that the foundation 
for a resurrected theology, one that is not based on the 
doctrine of value freedom, could be developed from a similar 
deeper mastery of method operative both in science and 
religion. Then, a renewed theology could offer many valid 
insights into the deficiencies of any secularist exclusion 
of the metaphysical questions and value judgment. It is to 
this context that Bernard Lonergan speaks. As a Catholic 
theologian who sought a foundation for method in theology, 
Lonergan argues that a contemporary theology is not possible 
without some retrieval of the subjectivity operative not 
only in religion but also in science. He thus comes out of 
the religious context of Christianity and out of the
1 8 9
scientific and secular consciousness of the modern world. 
And he discovers in himself and makes available a recovery 
of the subjectivity operative both in religious and our 
scientific consciousness.
It is obvious that there is a fundamental congruence 
between the work of Voegelin and of Lonergan.194 However 
divergent their views may be on fundamental issues (such as 
their understanding of doctrine, for example), they share a 
common endeavor. They both share the basic approach for 
understanding human existence: God, man, history and society 
are not objects to be known from the "outside" , they can 
only be known by participating in what constitutes their 
order; human order is achieved in the experiences of self­
transcendence toward the order of divine being. For 
Voegelin this means recovering the constitutive experiences 
and symbols of human self-understanding that have emerged in 
history. Thus he approaches the foundational reality by 
studying the representative symbolizations of experiences of 
transcendent order as they emerge historically. For
Lonergan this is achieved by fulfilling the transcendental 
precepts of authentic human existence. He addresses the 
basic reality by articulating a method that can be 
implemented in all concrete inquiries into human meaning.
114 On the congruence between the work of Voegelin and Lonergan, Eugene Webb and Michael P. Morrissey 
present coaprebensive accounts. See, E. Webb, P h i l o s o p h e r s  o f  C o n s c i o u s n e s s :  Polanyi, Lonergan, 
Voegelin, Ricoeur, Girard, K i e r k e g a a r d (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988), pp.93-121; 
H.P. Morrissey, "Consciousness and the Search for Transcendent Order: Eric Voegelin’s Challenge to 
Theology," (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1988), pp.370-398.
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They both recognize the affinities in one another’s 
thought.195 There is a fundamental affinity between
Voegelin’s analysis of the structure and dynamics of 
consciousness and Lonergan’s. Indeed, "no contemporary 
thinker has been more concerned with consciousness than 
these two giants."196 Their theories of consciousness are 
basically compatible and complementary. Both Voegelin and 
Lonergan, with varying degrees of intensity and exactness, 
have been breaking away from the intellectual horizon 
reigning ever since the late Middle Ages, the hallmark of 
which has been the relativistic rationalist theory of truth. 
They both depart from the current ethos of relativism by 
taking their stand on the classical viewpoint which affirms 
the unity and universality of truth. Both Voegelin and 
Lonergan draw their basic insights from classical Greek 
philosophy, especially Plato.
Lonergan insists that contemporary philosophical 
culture retraces the journey in search of foundations along
195 Each aan read the other’s work but only Lonergan discussed Voegelin’s thought in print in two of 
his later essays: "Theology and Praxis," and "A Post-Hegelian Philosophy of Religion.” See B.
Lonergan, A Third C o llection, ed. by Frederick E. Crowe, pp.188-96, 219-221. Here Lonergan 
appreciates Voegelin’s essay "The Gospel and Culture." The only place where Voegelin aentioned 
Lonergan in print was when he borrowed Lonergan’s technical tern "scotosis" in his essay "What is 
Political Reality" to refer to the psycho-spiritual disease of blocking out reality. See Voegelin, 
Anaanesis (Geraan), p.201. In a brief correspondence initiated by Voegelin in Hoveaber 1967, Voegelin 
and Lonergan expressed an appreciation for the other’s work. Their exchange of letters was 
accoapanied by an exchange of recently published articles (for exaaple, Lonergan's "The 
Dehellenization of Dogaa" and Voegelin’s "Iaaortality"). On this occasion Voegelin reaarked to 
Lonergan: "though froa very different positions, we are concerned with the saae problea" (undated).
And Lonergan replied: "I agree that our differences are coapatible with a fundaaental agreeaent on 
direction" (11/15/67). These letters are included in the Correspondence File of Eric Voegelin's 
Collected Papers, Box 20, Hoover Institution Library Archives, Stanford University. See H.P.
Morrissey, "Consciousness and the Search for Transcendent Order," p.370n,
196 H.P. Morrissey, "Consciousness and the Search for Transcendent Order," pp.12-13.
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the path from medieval essentialism to Descartes’ thinking 
substance, to Kant’s transcendental ego, to Hegel’s subject, 
to Kierkegaard’s "this" subject: from object as object, to
subject as object, to the subject as subject.197 The 
venture of cultural reconstruction— to use Voegelin’s term, 
the "restoration" or "retheoretization"-- must take the road 
of, in his unique phrase, "self-appropriation. 1,19 8 By this 
Lonergan means that epistemology, metaphysics, and all other 
branches of philosophy, including the philosophy of 
religion, must rest on an existential underpinning; they 
must be founded on an explication of the conscious 
activities of the self as knower.199 Through a studied 
application of the Socratic injunction "know thyself," 
issuing in what Lonergan styles "cognitional theory," we 
can, he claims, fashion a basic philosophical semantics.
Truth, objectivity, and reality now assume meaning in 
terms of the norms ingredient in the very process of inquiry 
with its directional tendency. The knower, then, rather 
than being a self-contained c o g i t o  "in here" confronting a 
world "out there," is a self-transcending subject dwelling 
in the luminous openness through its recurrent cognitive 
structure of experiencing, understanding and judging. 
Fundamental differences in metaphysics, ethics, and
Bernard Lonergan, M e t h o d  in T h e o l o g y (New York: Herder & Herder, 1972), p.316.
188 B. Lonergan, Insight: An  E s s a y  in Hun a n  U n d e r s t a n d i n g (New York: Harper t Row, 1957), p.xviii- 
xxiii, xxvii.
188 Ibid., p p . x v i i i - x i x ,  319-339, 396-401, 602-604, 636-638.
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epistemology can usually be reduced, explicitly or 
implicitly, to differences in cognitional theory, and those 
differences can be resolved, and only be resolved, by an 
appeal to the data of consciousness.200 Such is Lonergan’s 
tack. His focus on self-appropriation and the systematic 
expansion of the positions of cognitional theory into all 
domains of philosophy stands as his most original 
achievement and perhaps as an enduring legacy to the history 
of philosophy.
The Kantian turn to the subject set the problematic for
modern philosophy as a shift from metaphysics to cognitional
theory. However, even Kant’s modest claims for critical
cognitional theory have been "overthrown by the dominant
currents of logical positivism, linguistic analysis, and
Sartrean existentialism, each in its own right, among other
imperatives, attempting to salvage some residue of
philosophy from the ravages of historical consciousness."201
As Wilhelm Dilthey clearly saw, that is, the objectivism of
Kantian idealism was no match for the expanding success of
the natural sciences, along with the positivism and
empiricism that claimed to be their rightful philosophical
exponents.202 Dilthey, as is illustrated by Matthew Lamb,
Ibid” P~P~xi!7 ̂ ix7 38?:388,602-604 , 623-630, 677-686.
2,11 T.J. HcPartland, "Historicity and Philosophy: The Existential Dinension," in Tinothy P. Fallon,
S.J. 4 Philip Boo Riley, eds., R e l i g i o n  a nd Culture: Essa y s  in H o n o r  o f  B e r n a r d Lonergan, S.J.
(Albany, MY: SUNY Press, 1987), p.107.
2,2 See, Matthew Lanb, "W. Dilthey*s Critique of Historical Reason and B. Lonergan’s Heta- 
aethodology," in P. HcShane (ed.), Langu a g e ,  Truth an d  H e a n i n g (Notre Dane, IN: University of Notre 
Dane Press, 1972), pp.115-166; H. Lanb, "The Exigencies of Heaning and Hetascience: A Prolegomenon to 
the God-Question," in Thomas A. Dunne and Jean-Hare Laporte, eds., T r i n i f i c a t i o n  o f  the Horld: A
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perceived how Kantianism, French positivism, and British 
empiricism were all too exclusively dependent upon 
mathematics and the natural sciences in articulating their 
respective cognitional theories. Nevertheless, Dilthey’s 
own attempt to provide a cognitional theoretical grounding 
of cultural sciences, of G e i s t e s w i s s e s c h a f t e n ,  by separating 
those sciences from the operations of the natural sciences 
was doomed to failure.203
On the other hand, Lonergan "typifies the contemporary 
problematic in his move from cognitional theory to 
methodology."2 0 4 For him this move could not be content 
with excluding certain fields of conscious human performance 
from others. He defines the contemporary problematic with 
reference to a "critical inclusivism."205 Mindful of the 
Hegelian critique of Kantian cognitional theory,206 
Lonergan’s cognitional theory has not been elaborated in 
"isolation from the actual performance of the sciences."207 
In this sense, Lonergan’s use of the terms, "insights, 
understanding, is both more precise and has a broader range
Festschrift in Honour of Frederick E. Crove in Celebration of His 60th Birthday (Regis College Press, 
1978), pp,15-45; and, H. Laab, History, Method and Theology: A Dialectical Conparison of Hilheln 
Dilthey’s Critique of Historical Reason and Bernard Lonergan's Meta-Methodology (Missoula, Hontana: 
Scholars Press, 1978).
203 On the failure of Dilthey’s atteapt, see M, Laab, History, Method and Theology, pp.236-241, 338-
343 .
284 H. Laab, "The Exigencies of Heaning," p.16.
285 Ibid.
285 See David Tracy, The Achieve/sent of Bernard Lonergan (New York: 1970 ), pp.91ff.
282 H. Laab, "The E x i g e n c i e s  of H e a n i n g , "  p . 16,
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than the connotation and denotation of V e r s t e h e n .  Insight 
occurs in all human knowledge, in mathematics, natural 
science, common sense, philosophy, human science, history, 
theology."208 Therefore, in his monumental work, I n s i g h t :  A  
S t u d y  o f  H u m a n  U n d e r s t a n d i n g , Lonergan begins his treatment 
of human cognition with an extended analysis of knowing in 
mathematics and the natural sciences. He chooses these 
disciplines because of the obvious clarity and success of 
their methods. 2 0 9 He also realizes that the analysis of 
cognition will not have credibility nor generality unless it 
is developed in terms of the sciences, the scientific 
methods.
In his analysis of the human person, the subject, 
Lonergan uncovers the conscious operations of knowing.210 
He equates three levels of consciousness-experiencing, 
understanding, and judging--in the structured process of 
knowing operations with scientific methods of gathering 
evidence or data, forming hypothesis, and verifying.211 
What modern science has writ large in its methods is indeed 
simply the pattern of cognition within the human subject who
m  B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp.212ff.
209 B. Lonergan, Insight, pp.xxi-xxii.
210 Besides knowing, he also discovers conscious operations of choosing or deciding. According to 
his, in our choosing, there are both the level of ethics and the uItisate horizon of religious 
existence.
211 Indeed in his answer to the question "What do we do when we know?" he presents a theoretical 
analysis of knowing: huaan knowing is a self-structuring process of experiencing the data of sense and 
of consciousness; of attenpting to understand and gain insight into the data and to foraulate those 
insights; and of verifying or falsifying the correctness of our understanding on the basis of 
evidence. B. Lonergan, Insight, pp.3-25.
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does science. Lonergan’s emphasis remains very much upon 
the distinctively objective character of the scientific 
outlook. It seems that the idea of an impartial and 
objective scientific viewpoint underlies a number of 
important distinctions in Lonergan’s cognitional theory. 
Moreover, he states that "all objectivity rests upon the 
unrestricted, detached, disinterested desire to know."212 
Therefore, one could get the impression that his cognitional 
theory implies a contrast between the objectivity of 
scientific knowledge and the subjectivity of all non- 
scientific knowledge. In short, Lonergan regards scientific 
knowing as typical of cognitional activity. That the study 
of the human understanding is the way to determine the 
fundamental nature of the reality revealed to that 
understanding is of course the starting-point of the 
classical British empiricists Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. In 
this sense, it can be said that Lonergan has not rejected 
but rather sought to appropriate the modern rationalistic 
ideal of scientific knowledge, and that he identifies 
knowledge with the content of explicit formulation and 
reflective criticism. His cognitional theory reflects the 
positivistic and rationalistic ideal of explicit, objective 
scientific knowledge.213
212 Ibid., p.383.
213 In Lonergan we can find what seeas to be a sharply conflicting view of the scientific enterprise.
As he characterises it, scientific inquiry is doninated by the spirit of detachaent. "It Units 
itself to questions that can be settled through an appeal to observation and experiaent. It draws its 
theoretical aodels fron aatheaatics. It aias at an enpirical knowledge in which value judgnents have 
no constitutive role" (Lonergan, H e t h o d  in Theology, p.218). The ideal of detached intellectual
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With regard to the understanding of the ideals and
methods of science, here we can discern that there is a
disagreement between Voegelin's thought and Lonergan’s. 
Whereas Voegelin rejects positivistic tradition because it 
is an existentially disordered orientation of the soul in 
that it attempts to reduce all reality to thingness--God, 
man, world and society become objects to be perceived by a 
skeptical observer— Lonergan criticizes it as an 
epistemological fallacy because it views knowing as
something like looking. Moreover, Voegelin has a high
regard for classical science, whose tenets he believes have
been lost in the mathematicized and verifiable empiricism of 
modern science; in contrast, Lonergan gives to modern
science very high marks, believing that on most all accounts 
it has superseded classical science.
However, it should be noted that Lonergan’s methodical 
stress does not fall under the critique of a "methodological 
solipsism," because the metaphysical consequences of the 
method as pursued by Lonergan are not, to say the least of
it, the same as those arrived at by the empiricists.
Through an examination of Lonergan’s foundational position 
of objectivity immanent within his cognitional theory we can
inquiry, in short, sets scientific knowledge apart froa other foras of huaan cognition, suggesting 
that in soae sense it is both aore objective and iapersonal. Here we find the iaage of the scientist 
as a disinterested observer who relinquishes all personal concerns and allows "the detached and 
disinterested exigencies of inquiring intelligence....to enter and assuae control" (Lonergan, Insight, 
p.73). According to Lonergan, aoreover, one approxiaates the scientific ideal to the extent that his 
presuppositions, aethods and categories of thought are critically exaained and specified. In his 
view, "aatheaaticians, scientists and philosophers all operate on presuppositions that they can 
explicitly acknowledge" (Lonergan, Ne t  ho d  in Theology, p. 223 ), and therefore, these cognitive 
disciplines can be "critically" grounded.
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fathom the true intention of his "methodical exigence." His 
articulation of method does not stop at "methodolatry"; 
"methodical exigence" raises questions which call forth 
another exigence, the "transcendental exigence." Indeed, 
"Lonergan’s method is aimed at overcoming once and for all 
empiricist and idealist misunderstandings of the subject as 
confined within private mental acts."214 He maintains that, 
as the cognitional pattern of the human person, method is 
not limited only to scientific knowing, it is common to 
human knowing in all fields. It is the "transcendental 
method" or "meta-method" which is shared by all the 
particular methods of the human and natural sciences, 
including theology. That is, Lonergan’s treatment of the 
exigencies of method is dynamically oriented to the 
transcendental exigence. As the notion of being is
dependent on the notion of the subject, so the notion of 
objectivity is dependent on both previous notions. We have 
to be careful in treating his conception of objectivity, for 
his notion of objectivity looks antithetical to the 
conventional notion. For him objectivity is the fruit of 
authentic subjectivity.215
Then, what is the authenticity of subject? Each 
person, or subject, has his own body, own abilities, own 
psycho-social development, own opportunities, own personal 
history of good fortune and bad, risk and decision, success
2H Karl-Otto Apel, Die T r a n s f o r a a t i o n  de r  Philosophie, II, pp.311 ff.
215 B. Lonergan, Hethod in Theology, p . 265 and passia.
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and failure. Because each person has his own life to lead, 
what authentic living might mean for any person can be 
determined only by that individual himself. But because 
every individual is at least a subject, and because the 
dynamism of our conscious subjectivity heads toward 
authentic subjectivity, we are led to ask if perhaps there 
might be some directives or imperatives, so to speak, built 
into our very being as subjects. And Lonergan believes that 
there are, indeed, such imperatives.216 In order to speak 
any further of the authenticity of subject, we need refer to 
the existential consciousness.
According to Lonergan, the human person is more than 
experiential, intellectual, and reasonable, for the striving 
or eros momentum of our conscious life does not reach its 
summit in the attainment of truth. Living is far broader 
than mere knowing. Human existence is not simply an 
adventure of the mind, because our conscious living is also 
a "doing", an exercise of freedom, a self-commitment and 
creation. And so beyond the levels of experience,
understanding, and reflection, our conscious subjectivity 
moves us to a higher realm where we deliberate about our 
goals and projects, evaluate them, make decisions, do this 
or that, work out the direction and meaning of our lives.
This level of activity, as Lonergan sees it, constitutes the
2It Paul Schuchnan, "Bernard Lonergan and the Question of Horal Value," P h i l o s o p h y  Today, 25:3 (Pall 
1981|, p.255.
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human subject in his fullness, the human person, so to 
speak, in the full strength of his actualization.
It is, in fact, the highest level or manifestation of 
human subjectivity, the subject as existential, and it is on 
this level of the person, of the existential subject, that 
the question of moral value finally appears. The subject, 
therefore, in his concrete living is at once experiential, 
intellectual, reasonable, and existential. The restlessness 
of our conscious being moves us forward to higher and more 
human modes of actualization. And as we mount from level to 
level, the lower activities are not overcome and left behind 
but are preserved, raised up, and given a new significance 
as the basis for further operations of a subject that is 
aware of himself in a fuller mode of life. This movement in 
our conscious activity is a thrust toward self-transcendence 
in our being, and each successive level of our conscious 
operations manifests a higher, more complete, and more 
fulfilling mode of self-transcendent existence.217
Self-transcendence, therefore, is visible on different 
levels. As experiential we are carried beyond ourselves by 
the flow of perceptions, desires, memories, and 
anticipations. As intelligent we can transcend the infant’s 
world of immediacy and move into the larger world mediated 
by the constructs of meaning in all its different 
modalities. As reasonable we are enabled to transcend mere
217 B. Lonergan, "Religious Knowledge," Lonergan Workshop, 1 (1978), pp.311-314; Paul Schuchnan, 
"Bernard Lonergan...," Lonergan Workshop, pp.252-261.
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meaning to true meaning which mediates a world as it really 
is. And as existential we can move beyond cognitive self- 
transcendence, to an objective living characterized by self- 
direction, self-mastery, self-domination, and self- 
sacrifice. This dynamism toward self-transcendence
constitutes the essential inner reality of human living. 
But the thrust itself is one thing; its actual realization 
is another. The achievement of self-transcendence is what 
is meant by authenticity.218 Lonergan says, "a man is his 
true self, inasmuch as he is self-transcending."219 The 
dynamic structure of consciousness--that conscious subject 
is at once, experiential, intellectual, reasonable, and 
existential--suggests that corresponding to each of these 
levels or dimensions of consciousness, there is to be found 
a particular exigency for the authentic, a particular 
manifestation or articulation of the radical eros of 
consciousness toward self-transcendence.
For the subject as experiential authenticity means: Be
"attentive." For the subject as intellectual authenticity 
means: Be "intelligent." For the subject as reasonable
authenticity means: Be "reflective." Finally, for the
subject as existential authenticity means: Be "responsible." 
These transcendental precepts are the imperatives built into 
the dynamic structure of the human subject, and the 
fulfillment of these precepts constitutes, in part at least,
216 B. Lone r g a n ,  Hethod in Theology, p . 104,
2IS Ibid., p . 357.
201
the meaning of human authenticity, of self-transcendence, of 
objective existence, of a genuinely human life. Self­
transcendence is radically and fully the fundamental driving 
impulse of man’s being, and the fulfillment of its abiding 
imperatives is the creative side of an authentically human 
existence. Objectivity, then, as self-transcendence, has 
its source in authentic subjectivity, and this includes the 
objectivity of our responsible evaluation and decision. As 
intelligent consciousness is the transcendental notion of 
the intelligible, as rational consciousness is the 
transcendental notion of the true and the real, so 
existential consciousness is the transcendental notion of 
value.220
M e t h o d  i n  T h e o l o g y  explicitly acknowledges this more 
radical existential foundation. In it the basic position on 
the subject, in which the basic positions on being and 
objectivity are rooted, is expanded to include not only the 
position on knowing, but also the position on existential 
consciousness, on moral and religious conversion. The 
operations of existential consciousness initiate and 
sustain, but also follow upon and sublate, those of 
cognitional consciousness. "The existential intention of 
value needs and so sublates the knowledge of reality that 
has been attained by the exercise of intelligence and
22# H. Lanb designates experiential, intelligent and reflective transcendence as "cognitive self­
transcendence"; existential transcendence, "aoral self-transcendence," See H. Lanb, "The Exigencies 
of Heaning," p.35.
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rationality."221 Because of this sublation, existential
consciousness is a fuller and richer condition than knowing
consciousness.
Concomitant with this development is the explicit 
acknowledgement that theology is no longer founded in
cognitional analysis alone, but in an intentionality
analysis that objectifies moral and religious consciousness 
as well. And such an objectification is referred to, not as 
the basis or foundation of theology, but as theological 
foundations.222 The new notion of existential consciousness 
means that the specialty of foundations includes an 
objectification of moral and religious conversion as well as 
an intellectual self-mediation. Cognitional analysis
"stressing methodological exigence" becomes only one 
component in theology’s foundational functional specialty. 
A marvellous shift has occurred: Lonergan moves from
speaking of the cognitional foundations of theology to 
discussing the theological foundations of, among other 
things, interdisciplinary collaboration; and, in this way 
his methodical exigence transforms to transcendental 
exigence. The development in Lonergan’s thought is quite 
momentous. And, transcendence is, for Lonergan, not some 
"absolute knowledge," "transcendental ego,” or "a priori 
innate forms." It is struggle and search; it is as concrete
221 Robert H. Doran, P s y c h i c Conversion a n d  T h e o l o g i c a l  F o u n d a t i o n s :  Tovard a R e o r i e n t a t i o n  of the 
Huban S c i e n c e s (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1981), p.62.
222 B. Lonergan, H e t h o d  in Theology, p.365.
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as the vast efforts of human beings slowly and painfully to 
discover, and resolutely to overcome the setbacks endured 
throughout history.223
In clarifying the relations among cognitional theory, 
methodology and method in Lonergan’s thought, an account of 
Lonergan’s thought on the nature of philosophy which is 
presented by Thomas McPartland is worth noting.224 
According to Lonergan, philosophy has an existential aspect 
and a systematic aspect; both are intrinsically related to 
each other as subjective and objective poles of the horizon 
of philosophy. Lonergan, more than any other contemporary 
philosopher, emphasizes both the existential and the 
systematic character of philosophy; to ignore either would 
be to distort philosophy, heading for either subjectivism or 
objectivism.225 This dual characterization of philosophy by 
Lonergan presents a sharp contrast of Lonergan to Voegelin 
who stresses solely the existential dimension of 
philosophical inquiry. By keeping in this full perspective 
in his philosophy both the subjective pole of self- 
appropriation and the objective pole of cognitional theory, 
Lonergan strives to avoid the twin dangers of either 
subjectivism, irrationalism, and romanticism, on the one
223 H. Lanb, "The Exigencies of Heaning," p.35. Also see Lonergan, H e t h o d  in Theology, pp.27-55;
Lanb, H istory, H e t h o d  a n d  Theology, pp.475-481,
224 In articulating Lonergan's thought on the nature of philosophy, I an indebted to Thomas J. 
HcPartland, "Historicity and Philosophy: The Existential Dinension," Tinothy P. Fallon, S.J. and 
Philip Boo Riley, eds., R e l i g i o n  and Culture, pp.107-122.
225 T.J. HcPartland, "Historicity and Philosophy," p.111.
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hand, or objectivism, essentialism, and conceptualism, on 
the other hand. For Lonergan the existential aspect is the 
experience of the philosopher as a lover of the wisdom, an 
incarnation of the desire to know with its structure of 
experiencing, understanding, and judging.
But because philosophy is a search for complete 
intelligibility, the systematic imperative emerges. The
systems, expositions, treatises, arise ever anew to do
*
homage to the desire to know. The subjective pole therefore 
specifies the objective pole. Lonergan’s philosophical 
perspective includes more than the systematic positions 
derived from cognitional theory. Yet Lonergan, "for all the 
wealth of his existential analysis, tends to accord the 
systematic dimension of philosophy more treatment."226 And 
"when he makes his most penetrating statements about
existential issues, he addresses them more to the topic of 
human living in general, and of religious and cultural 
communities in particular, than to the topic of philosophy 
per se."227 Lonergan thinks that the philosopher does not 
look at an objective pole of essences, of systems, of being; 
the philosopher is immediately related to being in the 
philosopher’s questioning unrest.
However, we must not confuse the existential aspect—  
the philosopher as subject, the concrete philosopher as 




objectifications of that activity in the objective pole.228 
In assessing Lonergan’s emphasis on cognitional theory, we 
must distinguish within the objective pole itself a 
subjective dimension and an objective dimension. In the 
former case (subject as object) we have cognitional theory, 
an explanatory account of the process and structure of 
knowing present in consciousness. In the latter case 
(object as object) we have metaphysics and allied fields, 
fundamental positions about the structure of reality, the 
ultimate ground of being, and the relationship among the 
various sectors of being investigated by the several 
intellectual disciplines.
Now, for Lonergan, "metaphysics must be critically 
grounded in cognitional theory; metaphysical positions on 
reality must be consonant with basic positions on knowing, 
truth, and objectivity derived from cognitional theory; 
erroneous metaphysical statements are those, explicitly or 
implicitly, tied to a faulty cognitional theory, usually 
some variation of the rationalistic theory of truth. 
Correct metaphysical statements are those, explicitly 
implicitly, joined to a cognitional theory in which the 
process and structure of questioning is given full play."229 
The sense and meaning of reality, the metaphysical status of 




and norms of inquiry.230 Hence within the objective aspect 
metaphysics is conditioned by cognitional theory.
But "the objective pole itself is conditioned by the 
subjective pole. Another way of putting this is to say that 
metaphysics is conditioned by methodology and methodology by 
method."231 Lonergan has proclaimed that one of the most 
profound transformation in modern philosophy is the 
transition from logic to method.232 We may judge what 
Lonergan is saying in two senses here. First, metaphysics, 
rather than simply founding itself upon the logical ordering 
of propositions, must assume the exigency of method. In 
this sense, metaphysics is one in which its conclusions 
would be verified by an appeal to cognitional theory and the 
conclusions of cognitional theory, in turn, would be 
verified by an appeal to cognitional fact. Secondly, 
cognitional theory is nothing but methodology, where 
methodology is a systematic reflection upon method, an 
objectification of method. Cognitional theory, then, is a 
reflection on the basic method of questioning, not on any 
given science or academic discipline or field of inquiry as 
such, but on the basic, or transcendental, structure of 
cognitional operations. This structure with its immanent 
norms embraces not only purely intellectual endeavors but
130 B. Lonergan, Colle c t i o n :  P a p e r s  by B e r n a r d  Lonergan, ed. by Frederick E. Crowe (Montreal: Pain 
Publishers, 1967), pp.227-231.
231 T.J. HcPartland, "Historicity and Philosophy," p.112.
232 B. Lonergan, H e t h o d  in Theology, pp.94, 305.
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also practical reason, the self-correcting process of moral 
learning, the subtle path of spiritual inquiry, and the 
creative project of the aesthetic imagination. Lonergan 
defines method as "a normative pattern of recurrent and 
related operations yielding cumulative and progressive 
results."233
Now if method is restricted in meaning to the mere 
following of rules or to the interpretation accorded it by 
positivists and neo-Kantians, then, of course, Lonergan 
would join those, such as Gadamer, who attack the modern 
preoccupation with "method" as technique. However, for him 
method is taken in its etymological sense as "way" 
( i n e t h o d o s )  and is seen as referring to the numerous ways of 
apprehending and communicating meaning. Therefore, the 
proper existential contours of method can be illustrated. 
In short, his treatment of methodical exigence thus shifts 
method from its classical Cartesian concern with axioms and 
rules of procedure into an appropriation of the inner 
dynamics of human performance in all domains mentioned by 
Lonergan such as mathematics, empirical science, common 
sense, human science, history, philosophy, and theology.234 
Hence he provides a telling critique of the dichotomy 
between subject and object in Cartesianism, Lockean 
empiricism, Kantianism, and Husserlian phenomenology.235
233 Ibid. , p . 4.
234 See ibid. , pp. xi, xii, 3ff.
235 S ee H. La n b ,  H i s t o r y , H e t h o d  an d  Theology,, p p .55-109, 3 4 4 - 4 4 4 .
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The diagnosis of the various forms of disorder that mar 
the human community and the study of what constitutes true 
forms of order is the object of Lonergan’s method, as it is 
Voegelin’s primary task. In the diagnosis of the
intellectual, moral and spiritual diseases that plague 
modern man— an analysis which cuts to the core of personal, 
social and historical disorder--the work of Lonergan, as 
that of Voegelin does, can be considered a therapeutic 
exercise for healing the torn and fragmented fabric of 
contemporary life. However, compared to Voegelin’s theory 
of consciousness, Lonergan does not seem to develop the 
basic insight into man’s participation in the order of being 
as far as Voegelin does. Lonergan’s analysis of intentional 
consciousness and the method that stems from it does not 
penetrate to the level of order itself as it has emerged in 
history.236 In Voegelin, existential order is primary and 
the knowledge that ensues from right order is a by-product, 
not an end itself. But Lonergan’s primary emphasis is on 
the process of knowing and thus he tends to relegate 
existential order to a secondary result of that knowing.
238 K. Morri s s e y ,  " C o n s c i o u s n e s s  and the Sea r c h  for T r a n s c e n d e n t  Orde r , "  p p . 373-374.
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In its beginning, phenomenology, which is a new 
paradigm in man’s understanding of himself as both knower 
and actor in the world, emerged as a philosophical movement 
concerned primarily with epistemological and methodological 
questions and appeared to have no interest in political 
inquiry, prescription, or transformation.237 In the late 
1960s and early 1970s, however, phenomenology began to exert 
its influence on American political science. It was 
reflected and echoed in redefining the responsibility of the 
political science profession itself in the name of the 
"Credo of Relevance," and, therefore, coincided with the 
"post-behavioral revolution." Indeed, the term "post- 
behavioral revolution" refers to the debut of phenomenology 
on the stage of American political science.
The term "post-behavioral" may be chronologically 
accurate since it came after political behavioralism. 
However, it is nonetheless "conceptually misleading, because 
phenomenology is a radical challenge to the theory of 
politics that is meant to uproot the existing sedimentations 
of scientific practices. Therefore, the conceptual
challenges of phenomenology must be understood correctly as 
discontinuous rather than continuous with the scientific 
tradition of political behavioralism."238 That is to say,
237 S c o t t  Warren, The E a e r g e n c e  of D i a l e c t i c a l  Theory: P h i l o s o p h y  a nd P o l i t i c a l  I n q u i r y (Chicago; 
University of  Chicago Press, 1984), p.90.
238 H.Y. Jung, "Phenoaenology as a Critique of Politics," H u a a n  Studies, 5 (1982), p.162.
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phenomenology is a response to the crisis of political
understanding due largely to the failure of scientism to
take into account the experiential vectors of subjectivity 
in political inquiry.
It is Edmund Husserl with whom phenomenology emerges 
when he introduced in his T h e  C r i s i s  o f  E u r o p e a n  S c i e n c e s  
a n d  T r a n s c e n d e n t a l  P h e n o m e n o l o g y  a new avenue of approach to 
the theme of the crisis of European thought since Galileo
and the revolutionary notion of life-world (L e b e n s w e l t ).
Husserl’s thought is immediately relevant to Voegelin’s 
anti-positivistic stance. To rescue philosophy and humanity 
from the quicksand of naturalistic objectivism and 
positivism, Husserl criticizes them: "positivism, in a
manner of speaking, decapitates philosophy" and "merely 
fact-minded sciences make merely fact-minded people."239 In 
his criticism of positivism, Husserl asks: "Can the world,
and human existence in it, truthfully have a meaning if the 
sciences recognize as true only what is objectively 
established in this fashion, and if history has nothing more 
to teach us than that all the shapes of the spiritual world, 
and the conditions of life, ideals, norms upon which man 
relies, form and dissolve themselves like fleeting waves, 
that it always was and ever will be so, that again and again
239 E. Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenoaenology: An Introduction to 
Phenonenological Philosophy, trans. by David Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 
pp.6-9. Hereafter all references to this work are aade to Carr’s translation and cited as Crisis.
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reason must turn into nonsense, and well-being into 
misery?"2 4 0
The most important consequence of positivism "in its 
designating as metaphysical any theorizing that does not 
meet its requirements of adequate knowledge, and in its 
treatment of meaning as an epiphenomenon" is that it cuts 
the social sciences in general and political science in 
particular adrift from philosophy.241 This segregation, as 
Merleau-Ponty points out, has very serious consequences, for 
in refusing philosophy and social science any meeting-point, 
and hence any cross-fertilization of ideas and concepts, 
they become mutually incomprehensible, placing culture "in a 
situation of permanent crisis."242 As Leslie Spurling 
states, it is "not so much that artists and scientists no 
longer talk to each other. It is rather that they can no 
longer understand each other and, even more importantly, no 
longer understand themselves, since their knowledge is cut 
off from a philosophical understanding of the relation 
between knowing and being. Positivism cuts knowledge off 
from its roots in pre-reflective experience, in common-sense 
knowledge, and in the life and commitments of the 
theorist."243 Hence the primary task of a phenomenological
’̂ibitrr̂L ........
2.1 L a u r i e  S p u r l i n g ,  P h e n o m e n o l o g y  a nd the Social World: The P h i l o s o p h y  o f  N e r l e a u - P o n t y  a n d  Its 
R e l a t i o n  to the Social S c i e n c e s ( L o n d o n :  R o u t l e d g e  a nd K e g a n  Pa u l ,  1977 ), p . 84.
2.2 H. M e r l e a u - P o n t y, Signs, p . 98.
243 L. S purling, Phenomenology and the Social World, p . 85.
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philosophy which aims to challenge positivism is "to remind 
philosophy and social science of their common ground in the 
intentionality of consciousness."244 Phenomenological
philosophy "is not a particular body of knowledge; it is the
vigilance which does not let us forget the source of all 
knowledge." For phenomenologists, it is phenomenology that 
reveals the essence of philosophy.245 Indeed, it may be 
said that for them phenomenological thought is
indistinguishable from philosophical thought.
According to Husserl, the defense of philosophy is
essentially the defense of man and humanity since it is in 
itself a human cultural accomplishment. And the crisis of 
philosophy is also an aspect of the crisis of human
existence, or, to say, man and humanity--particularly,
"European humanity that has been uprooted from the life- 
world by the calculative thinking of positive objectivism 
where the human is defined both ontologically and
methodologically more and more in terms of the natural or 
physical."246 In this sense, Husserl spoke of "the
philosopher as the functionary or civil servant of 
humanity." For him, "as philosophy is the ’nursemaid* of 
humanity, the sense of history depends on the sense of
philosophy."247 Thus the task of Husserl’s phenomenology in
2“ ibidr, p.85. "
2,s John Hurungi, "Herleau-Ponty’s Perspective on Politics," Han and Hot Id, 14:2 (1981), pp.141-142. 
m  H.Y. Jung, The C r i s i s  o f  P o l i t i c a l  Unders t a n d i n g , p.18.
2 < ’ Ibid., p . 4.
213
his C r i s i s  was twofold: "to show the rootedness of science
in the life-world and by so doing to rediscover the t e l o s  of 
science and philosophy for human existence."248 Insofar as 
mathematical and scientific construction is a product of the 
human mind and a socio-cultural object, the function of 
phenomenology is to clarify the conditions in which 
scientism takes for granted the life-world as the 
preconceptual infrastructure of all meaning: that is,
scientism is indeed the "garb of ideas" (I d e e n k l e i d )  . 
Scientism, according to Husserl, is fallacious because it is 
foremost a conceptual garb whereby what once was or was 
intended to be true in the mathematical formalization of 
nature as a "method" has gradually been taken or mistaken 
for reality itself: "What in truth is a method and the
result of that method comes to be taken for reality"--that 
is, the conceptual sedimentation of mathematics has 
concealed the reality of the life-world to the extent that 
the former has replaced the latter. Husserl further writes:
mathematics and mathematical science, as a garb of 
ideas, or the garb of symbols of the symbolic 
mathematical theories, encompasses everything which, 
for scientists and the educated generally, represents 
the life-world, dresses it up as "subjectively actual 
and true" nature. It is through the garb of ideas that 
we take for true being what is actually a method--a 
method which is designed for the purpose of 
progressively improving, i n  i n f i n i t u m , through 
"scientific" predictions, those rough predictions which 
are the only ones originally possible within the sphere 
of what is actually experienced and experienceable in 
the life-world.249
_______
245 E. H u s s e r l ,  Crisis..., p p . 51-52.
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In this sense, scientism in the political science today is 
the blind transference of this methodolatry to the study of 
political reality: "political reality has turned into a 
mistress of scientific methodology. As an a r c h a e o l o g y , 
phenomenology is capable of disclosing or undressing the 
cloak of scientism in which, unself-conscious of its origin, 
methodology replaces ontology or the truth of reality."250 
However, scientism is mistaken because, as Alfred Schutz 
puts it succinctly,
The concept of Nature... with which the natural sciences 
have to deal is, as Husserl has shown, an idealizing 
abstraction from the Lebenswelt, an abstraction which, 
on principle and of course legitimately, excludes 
persons with their personal life and all objects of 
culture which originate as such in practical human 
activity. Exactly this layer of the Lebenswelt, 
however, from which the natural sciences have to 
abstract, is the social reality which the social 
sciences have to investigate.251
In short, phenomenology--unlike political behavioralism as a 
form of scientism--attempts to develop the methodology of 
political science on the basis of its ontological insight 
that the world of politics, unlike the world of physical 
objects, is constructed as the world of meaning whose 
subject is political man as actor on the social scene.
2511 H.Y. Jung, "Phenoaenology as a Critique...," p.172.
251 k. S c h u t z , C o l l e c t e d  Papers, vol.l: The P r o b l e a  of Social Reality, p. 58.
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In this sense, Husserl took as his task the development
of a new philosophy which would facilitate the rigorous
study of whatever is worthy of investigation. He proposed
the phenomenological method as a way of considering features
of the world according to their manner of appearance (as
phenomena) for an inquiring consciousness. Intentionality
was presented as a directedness toward the world in order to
identify particular items as objects of study. The
phenomenological reductions were articulated as devices for
understanding whatever was under investigation: first,
without determination as to the investigator’s assumptions
about, or the existence of, the object of inquiry (the
transcendental reduction or e p o c h e ); and, second, with an
identification of the meaning or pure essence of the object
of inquiry (the eidetic reduction). In this way
transcendental phenomenology could return to the things
themselves, to things in the world. The object under
investigation would be transformed methodologically into an
object within the subjectivity of consciousness. Thus, as a
form of transcendental philosophy,252 Husserl’s development
of phenomenology is a response to the objectivistic,
uncritical self-understanding of science, which takes the
natural appearance of the world as given and final.253
2 5 2 Husserl's phenoaeno1ogy draws inspiration froa the Kantian roots of all transcendental philosophy. 
Phenomenology parts company from Kantian philosophy, however, by removing the restrictions Kant placed 
on investigating the foundations of transcendental subjectivity as such. In light of the goal set by 
Husserl, Kant’s transcendental philosophy is considered to be "far from accomplishing a truly radical 
grounding of philosophy, the totality of all sciences." See, E. Husserl, Crisis,.., p,99.
253 I b i d . , p . 68.
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Transcendental philosophy itself, however, attempts to 
penetrate to the foundations of consciousness and the 
objects of consciousness and inquires "back into the 
ultimate source of all the formations of knowledge"; it 
involves "the knower’s reflecting upon himself and his 
knowing life," in a self-critical, self-reflective manner.
Voegelin called Husserl’s C r i s i s  "the most important 
epistemological achievement of our times." However, he was 
deeply disappointed by it "as much as by any other work by 
Husserl": in his opinion, like all epistemology it was
merely a "preface to Philosophy but not in itself a basic 
philosophical undertaking."254 The problem with Husserl 
ultimately, as Voegelin wrote to Schutz, was that despite 
his claims he was not really a radical thinker at all in the
sense of developing clarity regarding the roots of his
thinking:255 "his radicalism, which he constantly 
emphasized, is not a radicalism of philosophical existence, 
but only radicalism in the following out of a special
problem" within the framework of questioning set up 
historically by such thinkers as Descartes and Kant.256 
With his conception of history, Voegelin argues further: 
"Husserl reached neither the ’objectivity of the
philosophical cognition of the World’ nor the ’fundamental
254 Voegelin’s letter to Schutz, Septeraber 1 7 , 1943 . Cited in H. Wagner, Alfred Schutz, p.191, and H.
Wagner, "Agreeuent in Discord...," p.76.
2 5 5 E. Webb, Eric Voegelin, p.34,
25t E. Voege l i n ,  Anamnesis (Geraan) p . 25.
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subjectivity of the Ego.’ Instead, his historical teleology 
is ’a case of Averoistic speculation,’ the assumption of a 
world soul of which the individual soul is a particle. As a 
mere ’philosopher of Progress,’ Husserl flew in the face of 
Kant, who had expressed his astonishment about the idea that 
earlier generations of mankind should merely be steps toward 
an ultimate objective. In his teleological announcement 
there was a ’messianic element’ that could transform 
phenomenologists into an ’ultimate sect.’"257 Voegelin 
regards Husserl’s phenomenology as a theory that conceived 
consciousness as "a stream of perceptions and carefully 
analyzed its temporal structure and its relation to the 
external world on this foundation."
Schutz, who had an "advantage over Voegelin when 
speaking of Husserl’s true intentions"258 since he had known 
Husserl closely, countered this argument by pointing to what 
he considered essential achievements of Husserl: the
discovery of the prepredicative sphere of immediate 
experience, the unearthing of the problem of 
intersubjectivity, the reduction of logic and the sciences 
to the grounds of the life-world, the analysis of inner-time 
consciousness and the constitution of space.259 All of 
these achievements concern fundamental philosophical 
problems; if they fall under the category of epistemology, 
Voegelin’s letter to Schutz, September 17, 1943. Cited in H. Wagner, Alfred Schutz, p.192.
258 H. Wagner, "Agreenent in Discord...," p.76.
259 Ibid., p.76; and Alfred Schutz, p.191.
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the epistemology is well worth the efforts of a 
philosopher.260 Yet Schutz did not defend Husserl’s 
transcendental phenomenology,261 with which he had 
difficulties from the outset.
The critical exigence in Husserl’s phenomenology 
concentrated on the epistemological question of why what the 
sciences do is knowledge. In this Husserl was primarily 
dependent upon the natural sciences and mathematics, with 
their logics, for paradigms to analyze phenomenologically. 
Yet his failure to clear up the ambiguities of the prior 
cognitional question of theory-praxis led to an 
irreconcilable conflict between his analysis of intentional 
constitution and his reliance on intuition in determining 
the epistemological criteria of verification. As a result, 
phenomenology was unable adequately to correlate the 
concrete L e b e n s w e l t  of common sense and the concept of 
world-constitution derived from intentionality.
Husserl’s modification of the Hegelian account of 
phenomenology as "the science of the experience of 
consciousness" was again reinterpreted by other succeeding 
phenomenologists, such as Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul 
Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.262 These leading
figures’ existentialization of the Husserlian position 
opened up new possibilities which seemed to be precluded 
2811 Schutz's letter to Voegelin, November 11, 1943, H. Wagner, Alfred Schutz, p.191.
261 H. Wagner, Alfred Schutz, p.191.
282 Hugh J. Silverman, "Phenomenology," Social Research, 47:4 (Winter 1980), pp.705-706.
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from Husserl’s account. They were convinced that the 
transcendental perspective would create a distance from 
human experience rather than an orientation toward it. They 
were skeptical of the Cartesian dualism which Husserl 
espoused and which resulted in a radical separation between 
the empirical and the transcendental, between the objective 
and the subjective, between the world and the consciousness 
of it. They were concerned with our being-in-the-world as 
the experience of an existing self (which Heidegger called 
D a s e i n , which Sartre translated as ’human reality,’ and 
which Merleau-Ponty characterized in terms of embodiment). 
They were committed to the experience of other people as a 
special type of encounter (for Heidegger as a case of Being- 
with, for Sartre according to concrete relations with 
others, and for Merleau-Ponty in terms of intercorporeity). 
They understood the experience of time as a temporality 
interwoven with the conditions of being rather than as an 
internal web of expectations and memories as in the 
Husserlian account.
Despite their many points of agreement in response to 
Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty each held very 
different views as to the character of existential 
phenomenology. With some justification it is often said 
that there are as many phenomenologies as there are 
phenomenologists.263 It is scarcely possible here to give 
due treatment to the complex history and nature of 
H.Y. Jung, The Crisis of Politics] Understanding, p.4.
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phenomenology. But special attention is devoted to Merleau- 
Ponty who has contributed most abundantly and creatively to 
the emergence of an existential phenomenology which is both 
dialectical and relevant to political inquiry.
There emerged the "second school" of phenomenology, 
"existential phenomenology," which attempted "to synthesize 
the philosophical insights of Soren Kierkegaard, i.e., 
existentialism and those of Husserl, i.e., phenomenology. 
For existential phenomenologists, phenomenology is a 
descriptive and interpretive enterprise which explores the 
different regions of human existence, the meaning of man’s 
placement in the world. "Existential phenomenology," Paul 
Ricoeur concisely states, "makes the transition between 
transcendental phenomenology, born of the reduction of 
everything to its appearing to me, and ontology, which 
restores the question of the sense of being for all that is 
said to ’exist.’"264
Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the inextricable, necessary
attachment of consciousness to the world, a development
fraught with dialectical relations. Scott Warren designates
his phenomenology as "the first and most coherent expression
of a dialectical existential phenomenology."265 Unlike
Heidegger and Sartre, Merleau-Ponty focuses the
phenomenological project on an understanding of the
2H Paul Ricouer, Husserl: in A n a l y s i s  of  His P h e nomenology, trans. by Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. 
Babree (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1967), p.212.
2t5 In reconstructing Her1eau-Ponty’s phenoaenology, I aa indebted to S. Warren, The E m e r g e n c e  of 
D i a l e c t i c a l..., pp.102-115.
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L e b e n s w e l t , the intersubjective life-world. And unlike 
Sartre’s focus on the phenomenology of pure, individual- 
personal consciousness, Merleau-Ponty directs phenomenology 
to the phenomena of perception as they are securely anchored 
in the subject as lived-body. He develops a phenomenology 
of our radical attachment to and presence in the world. His 
phenomenology develops as a mode of uncovering the inherent 
involvement of human existence in the world, particularly as 
it is grounded most fundamentally in our perception of the 
world.
Merleau-Ponty, in his phenomenology of perception, 
stressed the vitality of human experience and particularly 
our embodied existence as lived.266 Therefore, although 
phenomenology is still, as it was with Husserl, a search for 
essences, but with two differences.267 First, essence is 
found and replaced in existence. Second, therefore,
phenomenology is not concerned with pure essences, since a 
complete reduction is impossible. Thus the phenomenological 
reduction does not lead us to pure essences any more. 
Rather it leads us to being-in-the-world which is grounded 
in a corporeal subject. The radical reduction leads neither 
to transcendental subjectivity nor to the pure nothingness 
of consciousness, but to the consciousness of our 
indestructible relation to the world. We are "full" of 
being, and we are "through and through compounded of 
26"* H.J. Silverman, "Phenoaenology," p.707.
2n S. Warren, The Baergence of Dialectical., p. 103.
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relationships with the world," so that we are a subject 
which is embedded in the world or, in a sense, which is the 
world. The world is not something apart from us which we 
"posit" or which we possess; it is something we "live 
through."
Merleau-Ponty*s phenomenological attempt to discover 
our most original way of being in the world leads him to the 
primacy of perception. "For if phenomenology is to go ’to 
the things themselves,’ it must return to the prereflective 
L e b e n s w e l t , which is to say, to primordial perception. It 
is neither consciousness nor Being which is primary; it is 
the world-and-our-relation-to-it-in-perception."268 The
world revealed in perception is the "cradle of meanings, the 
direction of all directions, and ground of all thinking" 
beyond which we cannot push.269 For him, our primordial 
perception of the world presupposes meaning or pre-existent 
logos in the world.270 Meaning is the ambiguous but 
fundamental Logos, already present in our original relation 
to the world."271 The "primacy of perception" means "that 
the experience of perception is our presence at the moment
258 Ibid.
289 H. Merleau-Ponty, P h e n o a e n o l o g y  o f  Perception, trans. by Colin Saith (London: Routledge I Kegan 
Paul, 1962), p.430.
278 Ibid., pp.xvi, xx.
271 See Pierre Thevenax, Vhat is P h e n o a e n o l o g y ?  an d  O t h e r  Essays, ed. by Jaaes H. Edie and trans. by 
J.H. Edie, C. Courtney, and P. Brockelnan (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1962), p.88.
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when things, truths, values are constituted for us; that 
perception is a nascent logos."272
Phenomenology aims to describe the meaning-structure of 
human action from the standpoint of man as actor (that is, 
as attaching meaning to his action) rather than spectator. 
As an intentional analysis of meaningful action, 
phenomenology is not a psychology of introspection. For 
intentionality is neither entirely internal nor entirely 
external. By focusing on the essential structure of 
meaningful action, phenomenology attempts to avoid 
altogether a "psychologism" that reduces meaning (or 
everything) simply to psychological components. Only when 
the meaning of action is regarded as the simultaneous 
process of the internalization of the external and the 
externalization of the internal does one come to grips with 
the idea that man "is" his action. From a phenomenological 
point of view of thought and action, the idea of rigor in 
political behavioralism is exclusively a methodological 
principle, but it ignores another level of rigor that 
clarifies the nature of the knowing subject--the scientist 
as a knower. Science is a human activity which is founded 
upon the human life-world; there is no science without 
scientists and thus the scientist cannot ignore his 
rootedness in the life-world.
272 H. Herleau-Ponty, "The Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical Consequences," in Fisher, The 
E s s e n t i a l  W r i t i n g s  of  He r l e a u - P o n t y , p.61.
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To some commentators, phenomenology’s contribution to 
political science is understood as a paradigmatic challenge 
and a radical alternative or counter proposal not only to 
political behavioral ism but also to the traditionalism 
propounded especially by Leo Strauss and Voegelin. From the 
perspective of phenomenology as a critique of politics, this 
kind of critical remark on both political behavioralism and 
traditionalism--especially Strauss’ conception of politics-- 
parallel Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological critique of 
"empiricism" on the one hand and " intellectualism" on the 
other for their failure to take into account the role of 
philosophy as an active participation in the creation of 
meaning or the construction of reality; that is, both are 
incapable of explaining adequately, albeit in different 
ways, the d i a t a c t i c s  of the noetic act and the noematic 
object.2 7 3
For Merleau-Ponty, not only positivism (empiricism) but 
also traditionalism (intellectualism) maintain a faulty and 
alienated duality of subject and object. The former entails 
an abstraction from lived existence, while the latter 
entails an abstraction within the whole of reality and is 
thus reductionist in character. In this sense, "the 
competition between traditional philosophy’s reliance upon 
detached and abstracted subjectivity, and positivism’s 
reliance upon a reductionist objectivity, is an illusory
273 H.Y. Jung, " P h e n o a e n o l o g y  as a C r i t i q u e . . . , "  p . 166.
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rivalry."274 In its most general formulation, Merleau-Ponty 
states it as follows:
There can be no rivalry between scientific knowledge 
and the metaphysical knowing which continually 
confronts the former with its task. A science without 
philosophy would literally not know what it was talking 
about. A philosophy without methodical exploration of 
phenomena would end up with nothing but formal truths, 
which is to say, errors.275
Responding from this philosophical perspective of Merleau- 
Ponty* s existential phenomenology, a form of which is 
Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology, Scott Warren 
claims that the traditionalist critique of positivism such 
as that of Voegelin is inadequate because of "its negative 
value to the positive assumptions contained within it." 
Warren continues to claim: "The epistemological emphasis on
the authority of reason implies a depreciation of the 
cognitive importance of unreason as well as the prerational, 
prereflective dimension of human and political life. This 
assumption can often culminate in a form of ’rationalism,’ 
even if not to the extreme of the narrow, formalistic 
rationalism of the Enlightenment. The ontological emphasis 
on an absolute, or at least objectively structured, reality 
existing independently of human knowledge implies a 
depreciation of the importance of a creative epistemological
2.4 S, Barren, The E n e r g e n c e  of  D i a l e c t i c a l..., p.114.
2.5 H. Herleau-Ponty, Sen s e  an d  Non-s e n s e , p.97.
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and practical subjectivity in shaping the knowledge and 
structure of reality itself."276
However, with regard to phenomenology, there emerge 
questions which should be paramount in serious work in 
political inquiry: "what are the principles of justice and
the public good that should direct and inform the study of 
politics?" and "what are the grounds by which policies and 
principles can be justified?" As Eugene Miller claims, the 
phenomenologists--in particular, Merleau-Ponty--are both 
epistemologically and ethically relativistic, and therefore 
without any firm grounds for sound political judgment.277 
Furthermore, in contrast to Voegelin’s thought which is 
concerned with the search of the order of being through the 
restoration of philosophical inquiry based on philosophy of 
history, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is concerned more 
with the dynamics of history than the order of being, with 
envisioning new possibilities of political life than 
conformity to transcendent life of philosophic theory. In 
other words, despite what appear to be significant 
affinities between Voegelin and Merleau-Ponty in that for 
both of them the ontology of man is the basis of 
epistemology, they are in fundamental disagreement in
their ontological concern. What is radical and rigorous in 
phenomenological thinking in relation to political inquiry
2.6 S. Warren, The Emerg e n c e of D i a l e c t i c a l . , pp.3-4.
2.7 Eugene Hiller, "Positivism, Historicisu, and Political Inquiry," daerican Polit i c a l  Science 
Review, 67:3 (September 1972), pp.796-817.
is twofold: (1) the recovery of ontology as the basis of
epistemology and (2) the self-examination of thinking 
consciousness itself as the human project.278 Like
Voegelin, phenomenologists in general and Merleau-Ponty in 
particular dwell on the nature or essence of man which 
defines the aim of their political thought. However, their 
ontological concern is flawed. While there is an implicit 
theological concern and it is of the character of that type 
of ontology whose beginning point is the self in interaction 
with the world, Merleau-Ponty*s conception of ontology is 
flawed because it is in conflict with the onto-theological 
character of theorizing. To sketch the contrast let’s turn 
to the onto-theological implications of Voegelin’s 
philosophy.
To Voegelin, political behavior must be understood not 
in relation to a constructed theory but in the context of 
the order of the world and its ground: "the prerequisite of
analysis is...the perception of the order of being unto its 
origin in transcendent being, in particular, the loving 
openness of the soul to its transcendent ground of
order."279 That is the Voegelinian philosophical science of 
politics intends to keep political science in touch with the 
deeper and profounder aspects of human experience, Thus
Voegelin refers to certain "border experiences"--the
Christian meaning of faith, the Jewish experience of
2,"i* H.Y. Jung, The Crisis of Political Understanding, p.166.
2JS SPG, p.21.
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revelation, Plato’s myth of the Last Judgment, and Islamic 
prayer exercises--"in which man’s knowledge of transcendent 
being, and thereby of the origin and meaning of mundane 
being is constituted."280 In these experiences, nothing 
certain and tangible is given. There is no precise 
political principle, no clear social vision and no ideology 
that is provided. But there is an intimation of the source 
and ground of the world; there is an awareness of final 
judgment; there is a hint of the mystery of the whole; there 
is an experience of the existence of God as the source and 
sustainer of one’s being. From the standpoint of Voegelin’s 
philosophy, God is not an ’option’ that may be simply 
supposed or not supposed at will, bracketed or unbracketed 
as deemed useful. God is the transcendent-divine ground of 
being to which the human psyche can attune itself, the end 
and judge of the political order. And openness to the 
reality of God is essential to any adequate study of 
politics.281 Another way to formulate the same perspective 
is this: ethics and politics belong together as "sciences of 
the order in which human nature reaches its maximal 
actualization,"282 and thus any science of politics that is, 
in principle, divorced from philosophical anthropology and 
onto-theology is deficient.
 fbid77p.iIo7  ..........
281 Douglas Sturm, "Politics and Divinity: Three Approaches in American Political Science," T h o u g h t,
52:207 (December 1977), p.353.
2 8 2 NSP, p . 12.
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The phenomenological approach to the experience of 
divinity rests on a new understanding of the character of 
human experience. In the phenomenological approach, God’s 
presence is discovered in one’s interaction with the world. 
’’The new beginning for theological method... is the 
ingressive relationship of the self and the world to each 
other."283 Within the context of this understanding of 
experience, phenomenologists argue that the encounter with 
the reality to which supreme devotion is directed, named God 
within Judeo-Christian tradition, is direct but not separate 
from one’s relation to the world. The encounter with God is
a dimension of one’s experience in and with the world.
Regarding to this notion of encounter with God, John Smith 
argues:
There is no experience of God that is not at the same 
time experience of something else. That is to say, the
presence of God is always mediated by signs or comes
through a medium, even though the presence itself is 
genuine and the experience direct...The indication or 
sign of the divine presence is supplied by or found 
implicit in the inherited religious tradition.284
Within the type of Merleau-Ponty’s ontology, self, world and 
God are co-present and co-known.285 God is directly present 
in and through one’s experience of the world. In other
283 Clark M. tfillianson, "Tillich’s 'Two Types of Philosophy of Religion: A Reconsideration," Journal 
of Religion, 52:3 (July 1972), p.219.
288 John E. Snith, E x p e r i e n c e  an d  God, p.150.
285 John C. Robertson, "Tillich's 'Two Types' and the Transcendental Method," J o u r n a l  of  Religion,
55:4 (April 1975 ), pp.216-217.
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words, while phenomenology’s informing experiential 
structure is strikingly congruent with the structure of the 
religious dimension of experience, it has not been and is 
not explicitly onto-theological. The phenomenologists seem 
to insist that politics and political science are both not 
only ways of doing but also ways of being. They are ways of 
interacting with the L e b e n s w e l t , and are responsible for the 
forms and the consequences of that interaction. In short, 
while, for Voegelin, God and the divine reality is the 
transcendent source of the order of being and the ultimate 
standard for the order of politics, for Merleau-Ponty, 
apprehensions of divine and political realities are in 
principle both part and parcel of one’s 1ived-experience of 
the world. Thus, for Merleau-Ponty, God, instead of being 
the transcendent source of the order of being, may become 
the immanent and temporal.
As I have already mentioned, Voegelin’s work is an 
attempt to provide an answer to the positivistic world view 
of man, politics and history by means of the restoration of 
the traditional political philosophy of the West. In the 
following two chapters the substance of Eric Voegelin’s 
thought as it has evolved over the years will be presented.
Any study of Voegelin’s work must begin with his views on
the meaning of political reality and of the peculiar
technical vocabulary that was engendered during the course 
of forming the concepts of the classical political
231
philosophy and of the concepts that he has developed in his 
work. The philosophical core of Voegelin’s thought is 
represented in the three terms, reality, experience, and 
symbolism. Thus, the primary focus will be on his 
developing of theory of political reality (Chapter Three) 
and theory of modernity and gnosticism as a civilizational 
critique (Chapter Four). First of all, toward the end of 
the chapter Three, i.e., to recount Voegelin’s speculation 
of political reality, the "theory of consciousness" (as a 
philosophical anthropology), "theory of representation" (as 
a philosophy of society), and "theory of history," which are 
altogether comprising an investigation of reality, will be 
examined.
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CHAPTER IX X
ERIC VOEGELIN AND 
POLITICAL, REAL I T Y
In the preceding chapters we have endeavored to 
illuminate that "scientific" constructs have been the basis 
of our knowledge of mundane reality, i.e., space-time 
reality, and that scientism, though it had become a dominant 
commitment among many inquirers, does not provide an 
appropriate or productive approach to political knowledge. 
The primary concern of this chapter is to explore one 
general but ultimate question, namely, what is political 
reality. Generally speaking, the aim of the political 
science is to organize in a disciplined way the knowledge of 
the political reality as a whole. In a situation where 
controversy over how best to approach the study of political 
reality still permeates the discipline of political inquiry, 
it is required to investigate what political reality is. 
With the investigation an answer to the question, "what is 
the proper approach to study political reality?" will, then, 
be obviously provided: i.e., the philosophical science of
politics is a proper and desirable approach to the study of 
political reality.
Before getting into a review of Voegelin’s philosophy 
of political reality, we first examine in more detail why
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the positivist or scientistic inquiry is improper as a 
search for truth concerning the nature of reality. That is, 
I intend to challenge the positivistic view at its 
foundations, by showing that to claim to have knowledge of 
the spatio-temporal reality is a crude empiricism and naive 
realism and the uncertainty is a vital nature of reality. 
Then, I will try to review what seems to me the core of 
Voegelin’s philosophy, i.e., his theory of political 
reality. To do so, I will illustrate his theory of 
consciousness, theory of representation, and theory of 
history, respectively. They are resonant with the classical 
topics of political inquiry: the questions of human nature,
political order and history.
1. REALITY: U N C E R T A I N T Y  AND KNOW LE DG E
P„Q..sJAi..Yi...a.t..i.s.......U.n.d..e.r..sXAn..d..i..rii.g.
We speak of "knowledge" and "reality." Most of us 
suppose we know roughly what reality is. Moreover, we act 
as if we know how we know reality. But our difficulty today 
in addressing them is that the epistemology has come to mean 
almost exclusively the methodology of the natural sciences 
and, more recently and belatedly, the positivistic social 
sciences, to the exclusion of any possibility of knowing 
extra-mundane reality. We are not living in a traditional
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world built on certain "metaphysical"1 assumptions. We live 
in an age of scientistic analysis and modern rationalistic 
reason. The modern culture leads us to believe in a 
physical space-time reality that is explored and 
increasingly discovered to us in physical sciences.
The physical is the mask of reality revealed by our 
sensual experiences. Sensation possesses two fundamental 
forms: (1) the mask of reality perceived as objects visible
to our ordinary outer senses and (2) the mask of reality 
perceived as subjects and visible primarily to our emotional 
senses. And this sensual experiences become conscious 
through a double process:2 (1) nerve stimulation in the 
inner organs such as the stomach and heart or in outer 
organs such as the eye, ear, and skin and (2) immediate and 
spontaneous processing of these stimulations by the mind, 
which places chaotic stimuli within pre-defined categories 
such as fear, anger, blue, red, hot, and cold. In this 
sense, it is obvious that the physical is always and 
inevitably a construct of the human mind.
Moreover, as a result of the Kantian dualism’s legacy, 
in essence, the contemporary understanding of knowledge and 
reality rests on what has been called the myth of objective 
consciousness. The myth of objective consciousness assumes
1 T h e  t e r a  " a e t a p h y s i c a l "  is u s e d  h e r e  b o t h  in its t r a d i t i o n a l  s e n s e — to a e a n  t h e  B c i e n c e  o f  r e a l i t y  
a s  s u c h  a n d ,  a o r e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  in i ts l i t e r a l  s e n B e — as th e  s t u d y  of w h a t  is b e y o n d  p h y s i c s ,  i.e., 
b e y o n d  t h e  p h y s i c a l .
2 S e e  R o n a l d  B. P u h e k ,  The ffetaphysical Iaperative: A Critique of the H o d e rn Approach to Science 
( W a s h i n g t o n ,  D.C.: U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s  of A a e r i c a ,  1982), p p . 3-4.
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that the only "facts" in the world— the only things that are 
real--are those things that are apart from us and that those 
objective facts become truths. According to this myth, 
things have a reality if we can perceive them objectively. 
Viewed from this myth, thus, it is implied that we can add 
and subtract reality. For most of the modern unreflective 
empiricists, this is the paradigm of reality against which 
all other claims to objectivity have to be measured. In 
other words, scientism presupposes the thesis that there is 
only mundane, spatio-temporal reality and that this reality 
is sufficiently understandable in terms of modern scientific 
methods.
We also believe in the existence of other persons with 
whom we join in groups and societies and who create a kind 
of man-made reality of social rules, roles, norms, and 
institutions. These are also space-time entities, available 
for study as are the objects of natural sciences. They form 
a humanly created reality like other social or political 
phenomena. For example, political reality conceived by 
positivism is, in David Levy’s terms, a reality of factual 
variables whose correlations, when formulated in political 
scientific laws, are conceived as causal determinants of all 
that happens in society.3 Thus political positivism 
systematically ignores, or at least underestimates, "the 
extent to which political reality is a realm of more or less 
rational individuals freely choosing lines of action in
3 David Levy, Realise (Manchester: Carcanet New Press, 1981), p.18.
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accord with personal systems of relevance and subjective 
estimates of the options available."4 Consequently, many 
political behavioralists, in a variety of ways, reduce a 
totality of political reality to one of its parts.
What we know conventionally the word reality, 
therefore, tends to be in its parochially narrower sense.
It is not to much to say that modern man is rootless and 
empty, because he has lost his sense of relationship to 
reality in its fullness. Because of the influence of 
solipsistic epistemological narrowness of rationalism, 
modern man tends to reduce the totality or multi-dimensional 
character of reality to one aspect of it. Without the 
search for the ground and nature of transcendental and 
metaphysical reality, knowledge in modern age, as we 
witnessed in preceding chapters, becomes merely positivistic 
accumulations of data. The political positivists at times 
engage in painstaking labor on trivial matters while 
ignoring political reality which is obvious.5
In Germino’s words, "reality in politics, we have 
heard, is concerned with ’who gets what, when, and how,’ 
with the struggle to attain prestige, power, and wealth, and
4 I b i d . ,  p . 19.
5 C h r i s t i a n  B a y  h a s  d e s c r i b e d  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  w e l l  in h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  " p o l i t i c s "  a n d  " p s e u d o -  
p o l i t i c s . "  B a y  d i s t i n g u i s h e s  " p o l i t i c a l "  w h i c h  i a p r o v e s  t he c o n d i t i o n s  o f  h u a a n  n e e d s  a n d  " p s e u d o -  
p o l i t i c a l "  w h i c h  r e s e a b l e s  t he p o l i t i c a l  b u t  is p r i a a r i l y  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  p e r s o n a l  n e u r o s i s  o r  i n t e r e s t  
g r o u p  a d v a n t a g e ,  t h e r e f o r e  t he c o u n t e r f e i t  of t r u e  p o l i t i c s .  "A g r o w i n g  a n d  n o w  i n d e e d  a p r e d o a i n a n t  
p r o p o r t i o n  of l e a d i n g  A a e r i c a n  p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n t i s t s ,  t he b e h a v i o r a l i s t B ,  h a v e  b e c o a e  d e t e r a i n e d  to 
a c h i e v e  s c i e n c e .  Y e t ,  in t he p r o c e s s ,  a a n y  o f  t h e n  r e a a i n  o p e n  to t h e  c h a r g e  o f  s t r e n u o u s l y  a v o i d i n g  
t h a t  d a n g e r o u s  s u b j e c t ,  p o l i t i c s . "  C. Bay, " P o l i t i c s  a n d  P s e u d o - P o l i t i c s :  A C r i t i c a l  E v a l u a t i o n  of 
S o a e  B e h a v i o r a l  L i t e r a t u r e , "  A a e r i c a n  Political Science fieview, 59:1 (Hay 1965 ) ,  p . 39.
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with the corruption that so often attend this struggle."6 
It is not easy to accept this particular reality as 
normative. "We think that both individually and as a nation 
we can do better than this, and part of our objective in
describing what is going on is to awaken people to the need
to do better. We become restless in the Cave, as we
experience the pull of a reality beyond its confines."7 
Crudely stated, this is the epistemological problem posed by 
the naturalist and scientistic paradigm. I contend that the 
primary source of intellectual mistakes and consequent life 
problems in our time is the tendency to take the physical as 
the most real and concrete while relegating the metaphysical 
to the speculative, unreal, and abstract. Positivistic 
inquirers assume that they are dealing with reality and
philosophical inquirers only are dealing with pure and empty 
speculation, not with reality.
However, the use of positivistic standards in political
studies is often at the cost of neglecting important
political existence and failing to ask deeper questions
about the truth-content of political reality. With regard
to the social or political phenomena, it should not be
neglected that there is a reality beyond and above the
mundane, i.e., an extra-spatio-temporal reality, that we can
know this reality, albeit imperfectly, and that it is not
* D. G e r a i n o ,  " E r i c  V o e g e l i n ’s P r a a e w o r k  fo r  P o l i t i c a l  E v a l u a t i o n  in H i s  R e c e n t l y  P u b l i s h e d  W o r k , "
Aaerican Political Science Review, 72 ( 1978), p . 110. R e p r i n t e d  in E. S a n d o s ,  e d ., Etic Voegelin's 
T h o u g h t  ( D u r h a a ,  NC: D u k e  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1982), p p . 115-133.
7 Ibid., p . 110.
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discovered by the modern scientific methods. The modern 
rationalistic culture does not have room for any taken-for- 
granted reality of this kind. If it is believed at all, it 
will either be an optional extra to the reality in which we 
all live, or it will have to be integrated with our other 
beliefs as a result of a much deeper critique of space-time 
reality and of natural scientific knowledge. It is worth 
noting that, since it fails to appreciate the truth-content 
of reality, the modern scientistic paradigm makes reality 
dependent on methodology; reality is intrinsically 
"verificationist" in that it assumes that what is in space­
time is all there is, because that is what we appear to have 
direct access to, and it is reinforced in everyday 
interactions and in the success of science.
Therefore, I contend that the "pseudo-scientific" laws 
of politics born up by political positivism are based on 
profound misunderstandings about the relationship between 
reality and knowledge. The result of the misunderstandings 
was narrowness stemming from what Herbert Marcuse was to 
call the "uni-dimensional" view of man and reality.® 
Furthermore, the positivistic tradition does "not only 
oversimplify, it falsifies reality."9 Being conscious of 
this modern epistemological pitfall, we may now proceed to 
an investigation that will provide us a glimpse of the 
nature of the modern natural sciences.
* S e e  H e r b e r t  M a r c u s e ,  One-diaensional (fan (B o s t o n : B e a c o n  P r e s s ,  1964).
5 Je a n  Blondel, The Discipline of Politics (London: B u t t e r w o r t h s , 1981), p . 135.
Admittedly, the rise of modern science had brought 
about an important revision in man’s conception of the world 
and his relation to it. This revision pierced to the basis 
of man’s search for reality. As we have mentioned, modern 
science is what survives experimentation and test; the 
results of experiments may feed back to change the 
scientific theory; and sometimes, as with Kuhn’s conception 
of paradigm change,10 to suggest revolutionary changes in 
natural cosmology.
During the past four centuries since the emergence of 
the modern science, however, we have learned that modern 
scientific theories do not provide final, true, and 
objective knowledge of the world and cosmos, even in its 
physical sense. We have seen in a preceding chapter that 
the Aristotelian and medieval worldview had been displaced 
by the new cosmologies of Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and 
Newton. But, note that this new cosmology has in turn been 
displaced by the modern physics of relativity and quantum 
mechanics. We can explain the motion of the planet Mercury 
better and better in terms of successive cosmologies that 
are radically different from one another: earth-centered
epicycles (Ptolemy), helio-centered epicycles (Copernicus), 
an ellipse with one focus at the sun (Kepler), a body moving
11 T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolution, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1970),
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according to the mechanical dynamics of gravity (Newton), or 
relativity theory (Einstein).
Human minds in general and the natural scientist’s mind 
in particular bend themselves to grasp reality. However, 
relativity theory and quantum physics bring a shock to 
physical science since it indicates that reality is not the 
object of investigation.11 Physics pretends to recover 
itself by adopting relativity theory as an image of
reality.12 Thus the dominant strands of contemporary 
physics converge in the conviction that the real is
relative--one planet is relative to another, time is
relative to speed, what is seen is relative to the seer. 
Therefore, physical science for which matter has been a 
primary reality is, in fact, no longer a "science of 
reality" but, at the deepest level, a "science of prediction 
and probable outcomes." Since the modern scientism started 
a disparate line of conception and investigation which, by 
various paths, has led to our modern parochial conceptions 
of reality, few modern scientists are very much disturbed by 
this ignorance of reality, and at best everyone is
interested only in reducing the range of probability.
11 See, W e r n e r  H e i s e n b e r g ,  Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science ( H e w  Yor k :  H a r p e r  
T o r c h b o o k s ,  1 9 5 8 ) ,  p p . 1 6 7 - 1 8 6 .
12 Indeed, viewed froa the perspective of reality in itB totality, not aerely is the physical leBS 
real than the aetaphysical but it is not real at all, because the physical is always and inevitably a 
construct of the huaan aind. Behind the physical stands the real: the physical is only a 
aanifestation of the relationship between the real and one or another of our senses. It is for this 
reason that physics Bust always be founded upon the principle of relativity. Everything in physics, 
or everything that is physical, appears relative to everything else since every physical thing is 
relative to us. R.B. Puhek, The Metaphysical laperative, pp.4-5.
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Nevertheless, genuine physical scientists are profoundly 
disturbed by the possibility that they are not studying and 
searching reality.13 However, their modern rationalistic, 
utilitarian brethren in the positivist social sciences, as 
well as the public generally, may be interested primarily in 
the fruits of physical sciences: yet even here it should be 
noted that a deep suspicion arises against modern science.
Indeed, it may seem paradoxical that while a confidence 
in the predictions men make on the basis of modern 
scientific theory goes on to increase, the understanding of 
mutability of modern scientific theory grows simultaneously. 
Werner Heisenberg and others set forth something quite new, 
and even astonishing from the viewpoint of the modern 
physical, or so-called objective science: the principle of 
indeterminacy or uncertainty principle emanated from the 
quantum theory. Just what the uncertainty or inaccuracy 
means cannot be stated with any degree of assurance. What 
should be stressed here is that the whole issue is a matter 
of speculation and controversy.14 As Einstein has
emphasized, the physical scientist only arrives at his
13 I b i d . ,  p . 6.
14 A c c o r d i n g  to W e r n e r  H e i s e n b e r g ,  t h e  p h y s i c i s t  iB f o r c e d  to c h o o s e  w h e t h e r  to d e t e r m i n e  t h e  l o c a t i o n  
o f  a n  e l e c t r o n  o r  to a s c e r t a i n  its s p e e d  w i t h  p r e c i s i o n ,  s i n c e  he c a n n o t  d o  both. P o s i t i o n  a nd  
v e l o c i t y  s e e s  to be so r e l a t e d  t h a t  no t wo p a r t i c l e s  c a n  o c c u p y  t h e  s a i e  s t a t e  o r  h a v e  t he s a a e  
c o n d i t i o n s  o f  p o t e n t i a l  e n e r g y ,  k i n e t i c  e n e r g y ,  a n d  d i r e c t i o n  o f  spin. A t  l e a s t  o n e  o f  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  
B u s t  be d i f f e r e n t .  F u r t h e r a o r e ,  e l e c t r o n s  a p p e a r  to j u a p  f r o s  o n e  o r b i t  to a n o t h e r  in a n  
u n p r e d i c t a b l e  B a n n e r .  P h y s i c i s t s  a r e  u n a b l e  to p r e d i c t  w h e r e  t h e s e  e l e c t r o n s  w i l l  g o  o r  h o w  long t h e y 
w i l l  t a k e  to r e a c h  t h e i r  n e w  p o s i t i o n .  T h e  v e r y  a c t  o f  o b s e r v a t i o n  s e e a s  to c h a n g e  w h a t  is u n d e r  
o b s e r v a t i o n ,  s i n c e  s o a e  s i g n a l  a u s t  be t r a n s a c t e d  f r o a  th e  p a r t i c l e  o r  s y s t e a  to t h e  o b s e r v e r .  See 
W. H e i s e n b e r g ,  Physics and Philosophy, p p . 1 4 7 - 2 0 6 .
2 4 2
theory by speculative means.15 Once again, physics and the 
physical sciences assume at least the reality of the 
physical world. But the only basis for such an assumption 
is beyond the physical world— i.e., meta-physical: the
speculation about and the judgment of reality, like that of 
truth, is fundamentally meta-physical. Evidences that can 
be used in the process of experimentation and verification 
may be considered physical, but the inferential process of 
assessment and judgment itself is inevitably meta-physical. 
Quantum mechanics, especially its Heisenberg principle of 
uncertainty, has been notable for the change it has brought 
in the natural scientist’s epistemological theory of the 
relation of the experimenter to the object of his scientific 
knowledge. Quantum physics has brought the concept of 
potentiality which was central to the Aristotelian worldview 
back into physical science.16 Thus to many people the 
foundations of modern science are undergoing radical change.
At this point, it is noteworthy that uncertainty and 
vagueness is a vital and necessary part of the nature of 
reality, as evinced even in the quantum physics. Certainty 
is indeed not available to man. Only God can be certain of 
things, man as participant in the drama of life can never 
know it fully or certainly. Such an observation may not 
help much, admittedly, but nevertheless it discloses what is 
true. Voegelin’s words, "fall from uncertain truth into
15 F.S.C. Northrop, "Introduction," in W. Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy, p.3.
15 Ibid., p . 6.
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certain untruth"17 illustrate the paradox of certainty and 
uncertainty. Germino offers a forceful presentation of the 
problem of certainty by stating that the modern totalitarian 
ideologies are a "fall from existence in the uncertain truth 
of faith to existence in the certain untruth of ideology."18 
Socrates, Plato, and Christianity, offer only an uncertain 
truth whereas Marxism and National Socialism, for example, 
offer certainty, mostly wrong, of course, but at least 
certainty.
Moreover, in this day people are in general enamored 
with the illusion of certainty. They like to impose upon an 
intractable and ambiguous reality a precise and predictable 
mental construct which may or may not reflect that reality 
but at least the construct is easier to deal with. Even 
though all men are believed to know something of the order 
of being, the order of being or reality as a whole is 
uncertain or unknowable to man in its essence. It is partly 
because man, the knower, is himself part, not the whole, of 
this order. In the spatio-temporal sense, the limitation of 
man’s knowledge is obvious; man cannot be everywhere in 
place and time. But the eternal God is not bound by such
limitations.
There is only one road for man out of this dilemma, the 
one chosen by Homer, Hesiod, Parmenides, Socrates, Plato and
17 E. Voegelin, Science, Politics and Snosticisa (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1968), p.100. Hereafter 
SPG.
18 D. Gernino, Political Science and Christian Faith (New York: Faculty Christian Fellowship, 1964 ),
p.10.
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Aristotle: to participate in the divine knowledge through
opening one’s human soul up to the divine. With the 
differentiation of knowledge into human and divine 
knowledge, the point of departure is the awareness of human 
existence as bound by the vastness of the uncharted
territory of the whole. Though the condition of man’s 
existence is his partnership in transcendent reality, he
never knows what the essential order of this reality may be.
What is brought into focus in the present case is the actual 
limitation of man’s ability to know, imposed on him by the 
physical conditions of his body in the world.
Nonetheless, although man is ignorant concerning the 
whole order of being and consequently the essence of his own 
existence, it never necessarily implies that he does not 
know of some parts of the whole. First, man is also aware 
that he possesses the faculty of n o u s  through which the 
mystery of reality as process becomes luminous to itself q u a  
mystery. Philosophy as the love of wisdom is a knowing and, 
at the same time not-knowing, and includes a knowledge of 
ignorance and c o g n i t i o  f i d e i ,  knowledge based on faith, in
the sense of H e b r e w s  11:1-3: "Through faith we understand
that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that 
things which are seen were not made of things which appear."
Faith is the existential virtue of the soul open to the 
nonmetric, invisible ground: it is the "evidence of things
not seen." Therefore, knowledge distinguishes the fields of 
reality and establishes structures of relationship which can
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ultimately culminate in the Socratic Irony: I know that I
don’t know. In other words, knowledge itself is a symbol 
arising out of the conscious distinction between what is 
merely taken for granted, what is more or less strongly 
believed, what is thought to be true, and what is not or 
cannot be seen.
There is indeed a "progression of knowledge concerning 
the order of the phenomenal world accompanied by significant 
changes in the symbolization of man’s partnership in the 
whole order of being."19 Political positivists dare to 
apply this principle to the theory of political knowledge.
For example, Karl W. Deutsch writes that "knowledge in the 
social sciences can be applied to social performance in the 
same sense as knowledge in the natural sciences has been."20 
However, political positivists neglect that the progression 
of knowledge concerning the phenomenal world does not change 
man’s essential ignorance; its effects may, on the contrary, 
further deepen it. For it is likely to lead man to believe 
that the expansion of knowledge concerning other parts of 
the whole constitutes an increase of knowledge concerning 
the whole and man’s existence as part of it. However, it is 
fallacious to apply to unseen extra-mundane reality the same
15 T h o u a s  H o i I w e c k , " T r u t h  a nd R e l a t i v i t y :  O n  the H i s t o r i c a l  E a e r g e n c e  of T r u t h , "  in P.J. O p i t z  and G. 
S e b b a ,  eds . ,  T he Philosophy of Order ( S t u t t g a r t :  E r n s t  K l e t t ,  1981), p . 125.
Karl H. D e u t s c h ,  " W h a t  Do H e  M e a n  b y  A d v a n c e s  in the S o c i a l  S c i e n c e s ? "  in K.H. D e u t s c h ,  A n d r e i  S. 
H a r k o v i t s  a n d  J o h n  P l att, ed s . ,  A d v a n c e s  in t he Social Sciences, 1900-1980: Ifhat, W h o , tfbere, How? 
( L a n h a a ,  HD: U n i v e r s i t y  Pr e s s  of A a e r i c a ,  1986), p . 10.
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tests of validity one applies in the investigation of the 
phenomenal world. As Thomas Hollweck says:
This illusion is created by a misunderstanding of the 
process of symbolization. The symbol renders the 
essentially unknowable order of being intelligible 
through interpreting the unknown in analogy with the 
known, or supposedly known. The expansion of knowledge 
about the phenomenal world frequently coincides with a 
weakening in man’s sensibility to his participation in 
the order of being. Or, as one can formulate it, 
intoxication with the known and knowable displaces the 
sense of the unknown and unknowable."21
For political positivists, uncertainty is "any lack of 
sure knowledge about the course of past, present, future, or 
hypothetical events." And most uncertainty is thought to be 
"removable through the acquisition of information, if a 
sufficient quantity of data is available."22 In this sense, 
it can be said that political positivists fallaciously 
attempt to transform the uncertainties and ambiguities of 
the experience of existence into the certainties of one­
dimensional mundane or intramundane experience.
Even the most heroic efforts to know cannot lead to 
more than partial knowledge at best. Quite often they 
result in the constructions of speculative systems 
purporting to explain the whole, generated by a profound 
fear that ignorance would be as much worse as physical 
death. "Out of their anxiety regarding the structure of 
existence, they create a ’second reality’ which gives more
21 T. H o l l w e c k ,  " T r u t h  a nd R e l a t i v i t y , "  p . 125.
22 S e e  A n t h o n y  D o w n s ,  A n  Econoaic Theory of Deaocracy  ( N e w  York: H a r p e r  t Row, 1957 ), p . 77,
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assurance to them than the apprehension of the ground of 
being by faith and analogical reasoning affords."23 For 
example, Marx, Durkheim, and Weber all discussed a social 
reality within spatio-temporal dimension. There is a sense 
in which the holder of any ideology would hold that the 
reality of the concepts underlies the ideology. Marx came 
to postulate social realities, such as the class struggle 
which emerge from the behavior of large groups of people and 
their institutions and which could not have been predicted 
from individual or small-group behavior alone. The next 
chapter will focus in detail on the gnostic creation of 
"second reality" rendered by the modern ideologies, 
including positivism.
R a j a J U L L y  a..s_  E j t p . £ x J l £ J U L e . .
Here we need to elucidate what reality is, especially 
what political reality stands for in its full sense, as 
articulated in Voegelin’s philosophical work. Genetically, 
the real is the actual, or the existing; the term refers to 
things or events belonging to the order of nature or 
existing in their own right, as opposed to the imaginary, 
the artificial, the fictitious. "Real" refers to what "is". 
Reality is the state or quality of being real or actually 
existent, in contrast to what is mere appearance or 
imagination. It stands for everything that does not exist
23 D. G e r n i n o ,  " E r i c  V o e g e l i n ’s C o n t r i b u t i o n  to C o n t e u p o r a r y  P o l i t i c a l  T h e o r y , "  fieview o f  Politics, 
2 6 : 3  ( J u l y  1964 ), p. 397 .
2 4 8
solely as an object of the human mind, or of our 
imagination; whether it be visible or invisible, material or 
spiritual, finite or infinite. Essentially, it is the 
reality into which men are born and that which they leave 
behind them when they die. But visible, material, finite 
substratum, though indispensable, is not enough.
In the R e p u b l i c , Plato attempts to explain, by analogy, 
his view of the structure of reality. He does this first by 
verbal description, then by the metaphor of a divided line, 
and finally with the Allegory of the Cave.24 There Plato is 
saying that what we call reality is in fact simply shadows 
on the wall of the cave and that the things we consider 
important like prestige, fame, power, and money are in fact 
meaningless illusions. He is suggesting that beyond all 
that conventional stuff is another world, perceivable to the 
opened soul, that is harmonious, ordered, and lasting.
There is a reality more real than the one we see and touch, 
and the soul, if it would be well-ordered, must attempt the 
long and difficult ascent up into that world. All specific 
questions concerning our existence as human beings are 
ultimately rooted in the matrix of reality.25 And the term 
reality indicates the totality of all that which is not 
there exclusively by human making; that which men find 
massively present in the world, including the cosmos itself.
It includes, not only myself, but all my surroundings, all 
14 Plato, Republic, 507A-517C.
25 E. Vo e g e l i n ,  "On Deb a t e  and E x i s t e n c e , "  Intercollegiate Review, 3:4-5 ( H a r c h - A p r i l  1967), p,143.
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human beings, the whole world, etc. Thus, it is evident 
that man who searches for the root of all reality, should 
not limit himself to the knowledge of only one or the other 
of its aspects. He will not be able to reach his purpose 
unless he comes into contact with reality in its totality.
Raising the basic philosophic problem of the nature of 
reality is, as Germino says, "to unlock a Pandora’s box of 
difficulties."26 For Voegelin, the most basic philosophical 
problem is the nature of reality.27 Unfortunately, however, 
this is precisely the problem which leading modern 
philosophers tend to neglect, or to assume to have been 
resolved in some common sense fashion, or to be meaningless 
and unverifiable.28 It has been largely ignored that if one 
attempts to abolish the problem of reality as Marx did, one 
also abolishes philosophy. A philosophy worthy of the name- 
-that is, one whose symbols are recognizably equivalent to 
other symbols which have noetically illumined the nature of 
reality--will acknowledge that reality is not a disorderly 
flux of events but is an intelligible process. In this 
sense, reality is the "source of somatic experience and its 
own source is the Platonic reality of which man has 
experience in the mode of certitude."29
D. G e r a i n o , " B r i e  V o e g e l i n ’s F r a n e w o r k . . . p . 110.
n  B. V o e g e l i n ,  Pros Enlightensent to Revolution, ed. by J o h n  H. H a l l o w e l l  (Dur h a a ,  N C : D u k e  
U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1975), p . 257. H e r e a f t e r  PETR.
21 K. K e u l a a n ,  " T h e  B a l a n c e  of C o n s c i o u s n e s s , "  (Ph.D. D i s s e r t a t i o n ,  St. M i c h a e l ' s  C o l l e g e ,  U n i v e r s i t y  
o f  T o r o n t o ,  1980 ) ,  p . 43.
2S B r i e  H a r o l d  W a i n r i g h t , " T h e  Z e t e a a  of E r i c  V o e g e l i n :  S y a b o l  a n d  E x p e r i e n c e  in P o l i t i c a l  R e a l i t y , "
(Ph.D. D i s s e r t a t i o n ,  U n i v e r s i t y  of S o u t h  A f r i c a ,  1978), p,24.
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The term reality is not an intangible concept, but 
rather it refers to the total order of meaningful experience 
both actual and possible. What is experienced is real, and, 
conversely, what is real is (at least in part) 
experienceable. For Voegelin, therefore, the philosopher 
who searches for the reality must experience it not by just 
one or several of his knowing faculties but by his whole 
being. He must open his whole self so that the experience 
involves all that he "is" and thus becomes an "existential 
experience." Consequently, in the existential experience 
man opens himself with his whole being in order to 
participate in reality in its comprehensive universality.
And Voegelin maintains that fundamentally existence is not 
lived blindly but is illuminated by consciousness. From 
this point of view, "reality, at its deepest level, is not a 
’thing’ or a ’fact,’ but an existential tension which is 
structured, through the poles of ’world’ and ’Beyond,’ as a 
pull toward the perfect fullness and luminosity of being 
that is symbolized in the language of myth by the realm of 
the divine. The substance of reality, in other words, at 
least as far as it can be known by man in epistemic 
experience, is nothing other than the love of God."30 
However, reality as experienced has a structure of multiple 
meanings. Before exploring the theory of consciousness,
51 E. Webb, Eric Voegelin (Seattle: U n i v e r s i t y  of W a s h i n t o n  Press, 1981), p . 126.
25 1
thus, let’s turn to look at Voegelin’s speculation on the 
multiple meanings of reality.
.
The term reality, as Voegelin acknowledges, has been 
used in more than one sense, and the several meanings seem 
to be at cross-purposes.31 "The multiple meanings of 
reality are not caused by loose usage of the term, but 
reflect the structure of reality itself."32 As modes 
expressing the structure of reality, Voegelin distinguishes 
the realities which are imagined and which are experienced-- 
more accurately, experienced in consciousness. He retains 
both levels of reality, but recognizes which of them is 
imaginative or speculative and which is experienced 
concretely in consciousness. Both the reality imagined and 
the reality experienced make up the reality.
However, the differentiating experiences are theophanic 
events (encounters with the divine) to which man can respond 
by questioning and searching. In other words, reality is 
dynamically alive, not with imagination, but with theophanic 
events that point toward an experience of ultimate 
transfiguration or immortalization, as St. Paul speaks of 
it. Through the progress of human consciousness reality 
becomes increasingly self-conscious and articulates its
3! E. V o e g e l i n ,  " T h e  E c l i p s e  of R e a l i t y , "  in E a u r i c e  K a t a n s o n ,  e d ., Phenoaenology  a n d  Social Reality:
Essays in Heaory of Alfred Schutz (The H a gue: H a r t i n u s  N i j h o f f ,  1970), p . 186,
32 Ibid.
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meaning. Or, as Voegelin paraphrases Plato, the soul and 
its movement are experienced as "the area of reality in 
which the cosmic process becomes luminous for its 
meaning."33 Though conciousness develops, or
differentiates, human beings continue to be subject to the 
biological rhythms of nature, and even those who have 
experienced the transfigurating movement of the soul are not 
immune to biological death. Socrates, and even Jesus Christ 
himself, suffered physical death. The structure of reality 
revealed itself, therefore, to be paradoxical. Human 
existence is simultaneously both mortal and immortal. This 
paradox, says Voegelin, is "the very structure of existence 
itself," and it must be respected if consciousness is not to 
lose its balance. Since the noetic theophanies reveal a 
movement of reality beyond itself, man, in interpreting his 
own experiences, must deal with "the paradox of a 
recognizably structured process that is recognizably moving 
beyond its structure."34 In the exegesis of reality this 
paradox can easily derail into misconstructions, because the 
force of the spiritual experiences is such that unbalancing 
is very likely.
In relation to this paradox of a structured process of 
reality, Voegelin presents a commentary in T h e  W o r l d  o f  t h e  
P o l i s  on Parmenides’ discussion of a l e t h e i a  (Truth) and d o x a
33 E. V o e g e l i n ,  O r d e r  a n d  History, v o l . 4, H ie E c u n e n i c  Age ( B a t o n  R o uge: L S U  Pres s ,  1 9 74), p . 187.
H e r e a f t e r ,  OH, IV.
34 Off, IV, p . 227.
(Delusion): "the Delusion is quite as true as the Truth, if 
by truth we mean an adequate and consistent articulation of 
an experience... Being and Delusion are not two different 
worlds; they are two aspects of one world that is given in 
two kinds of cognitive experiences of the same human 
being."35 Both are knowledge in the sense that they are 
ways of construing reality; the distinction is between 
levels or degrees of reality: "Truth is the philosophy of
the realissimum that we experience if we follow the way of 
immortalization in the soul; Delusion is the philosophy of 
the reality that we experience as men who live and die in a 
world that itself is distended in time with a beginning and 
an end. The characterization of this philosophy of reality 
as a Delusion derives its justification from the experience 
of a superior reality, of an immortal ground of the mortal 
world."36 In this sense, it is evident that there is not 
only mundane reality, the reality of finite objects in the 
world, but also eminent extra-mundane reality, the reality 
known in the experience of a movement of transcendence that 
reaches beyond the world.
Related to these dual modes of understanding of
reality, Voegelin distinguishes between two types of
scientific inquiry: the study of phenomena and the study of
substances (including man in society and history).37 Each
35 E. V o e g e l i n ,  Order a n d History, v o l . 2, The fforld o f  the Polis ( B a t o n  R o u g e :  L S U  P r e s s ,  1957 ),
p p . 1 6 -17. H e r e a f t e r  OH, II.
3t I b i d . ,  p . 216.
37 E. Voege l i n ,  "The O r i g i n s  of S c i e n t i s a , "  Social research, 15:4 (1948), p p .463.
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type is, though distinct, valid because each is a proper way 
to know the particular aspect of reality which is its 
specific concern. "Inasmuch as political science includes 
both a phenomenal and a substantive component, its renewal 
only requires a defense against the scientistic attempt to 
disallow the rational examination of substance. Limited to 
its own sphere, therefore, phenomenal science is entirely 
appropriate."38 But knowing reality only from an external 
perspective or from a science of phenomena, according to 
Voegelin, never penetrates to the essential substance, the 
ultimate experiential concreteness of the reality they 
attempt to explore.39
It is a mistake to insist that the arena of substance 
be studied through a science of phenomena. As Voegelin 
implies, the task of a science of substance can be achieved 
by the Greek tradition of philosophical speculation. As 
such the experiential and existential components of 
theoretical inquiry should be emphasized. As a science of 
substance, political theory necessarily begins with the 
concrete experience of a particular historical individual.
A consciousness is the concrete consciousness of a concrete, 
specific and individual human being. Even though Voegelin 
admits that "few men can realistically hope to achieve the
31 J.L. W i s e r ,  " E r i c  V o e g e l i n :  A S t u d y  in the R e n e w a l  of P o l i t i c a l  S c i e n c e , "  Polity, 18:2 ( W i n t e r  
1 9 8 5 ) ,  p . 307.
35 See, f o r  e x a n p l e ,  E. V o e g e l i n ,  Order and History, v o l . 3, Plato and Aristotle  ( B a t o n  R o u g e :  LSI) 
P r e s s ,  19 5 7 ,  h e r e a f t e r  OH, III, p . 73; a n d  FETR, p . 115,
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clarity and differentiation that characterize the 
philosopher’s noetic insight, he does, nonetheless, believe 
that it is the natural condition of all men to experience, 
even if compactly, the divine ground of being."40 The 
emphasis of p e r s o n a l  experience as the epistemological basis 
for substantive inquiry into reality is precisely the reason 
why Voegelin’s understanding of political theory fails to 
meet the critical standards of the phenomenal sciences. As 
traditionally interpreted, modern natural science (the 
science of phenomena) is characterized, in part, by its 
systematic attempt to replace personal knowledge with a 
universal and therefore abstract methodology of 
explanation.4 1
Thus, the substantial reality to which e p i s t e m e  can 
penetrate, and which the d o x a i  do not reach, is the
experience of "participation in being." The root of 
reality, which the philosopher comes to know epistemically, 
is nothing other than the tension of existence. To know
this with full theoretical clarity is both to experience it 
as the ground of being and to recognize its directional 
character and its transcendental goal. The substance of 
reality is the luminous tension of existence, and the
luminosity of this tension is what constitutes e p i s t e m e  or 
t h e o r i a .  In other words, existential reality is not known 
through an objectifying "look" which could subject it to
41 J.L. Wiser, "Eric Voegelin: A Study...," p, 306.
41 Ibid.
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cognitive mastery in the philodoxic mode, but only through 
the involvement of the whole person surrendering, 
entrusting, and committing himself to it in the philosophic 
mode. It appears that imagination, or delusion, "can cut 
loose from reality and produce the sets of images that we 
call Second Reality because they pretend to refer to reality 
though in fact they do not."42 Voegelin states:
A reality projected by imagination... is not the reality 
of common experience. Nevertheless, a man’s act of 
deforming himself is as real as the man who commits it, 
and his act of projecting a Second Reality is as real 
as the First Reality it intends to hide from view. The 
imaginator, his act of imagination, and the effects the 
act has on himself as well as on other people, thus, 
can claim to be real.43
The reality that is discovered in the differentiating 
experiences is not homogeneous, but has an etiological and a 
directional structure. Thus, there are two modes of being, 
that of the visible, finite and temporal things, and that of 
the non-visible, infinite ground. The ground is experienced 
as being more real than the visibly existing things. There 
is a tension of temporal being toward the ground that 
manifests itself as an attraction and a search. The ground 
and the finite things are two tensionally related poles 
within one comprehensive reality. This comprehensive
reality is experienced as engaged in a movement of 
"transcending itself in the direction of emergent truth."
42 E. V o e g e l i n ,  " T h e  E c l i p s e  of R e a l i t y , "  p . 187.
43 Ibid., p . 186.
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And man is a partner in this movement of reality toward 
consciousness.
However, it is an irony of history that a mode of 
existence which is actually highly imaginative or 
speculative--that of existence as known purely from without- 
-has become widely accepted as the standard of reality, 
while that mode of existence man actually experiences in 
consciousness is treated as unreal.44 The general conflict 
between the world of imagination and the real world comes 
from the discrepancy of contents between realities imagined 
and experienced, "through the act of projecting an imaginary 
reality, to the man who indulges in the act." To discern 
the discrepancy, Voegelin goes on to say:
First, on the level of contents, a reality projected by 
imagination may deform or omit certain areas of reality 
experienced; reality projected, we may say, obscures or 
eclipses First Reality. Ascending from contents to the 
act, then, one can discern a man’s intention to eclipse 
reality. This intention can become manifest in a large 
variety of forms, ranging from the straight lie 
concerning a fact to the subtler lie of arranging a 
context in such a manner that the omission of the fact 
will not be noticed; or from the construction of a 
system that, by its form, suggests its partial view as 
the whole of reality to its author’s refusal to discuss 
the premises of the system in terms of reality 
experienced. Beyond the act, finally, we reach the 
actor, that is the man who has committed the act of 
deforming his humanity to a self and now lets the 
shrunken self eclipse his own full reality. He will 
deny his humanity and insist he is nothing but his 
shrunken self; he will deny ever having experienced the 
reality of common experience; he will deny that anybody 
could have a fuller perception of reality than he 
allows his self; in brief, he will set the contracted 
self as a model for himself as well as for everybody 
else. Moreover, his insistence on conformity will be
44 E. Webb, Eric Voegelin, p . 143.
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aggressive--and in this aggressiveness there betrays 
itself the anxiety and alienation of the man who has 
lost contact with reality.45
As Voegelin indicates, "the conflict w i t h  reality turns 
out to be a disturbance w i t h i n  reality."46 By an act of 
imagination, he writes, man can shrink himself to a self 
that is "condemned to be free." To this shrunken and 
contracted self, God is dead, the past is dead, the present 
is the flight from the self’s nonessential facticity towards 
being what is not, the future is the field of possibles 
among which the self must choose its project of being beyond 
mere facticity, and freedom is the necessity of making a 
choice that will determine the self’s own being.47 The 
deformation of reality occurs when the balance of 
consciousness is lost. One of the fundamental concepts in 
Voegelin’s theory is that of "the deformed consciousness 
that creates deformed symbolisms about the nature of 
reality...A deformed consciousness is a consciousness that 
deliberately distorts its appreciation of reality in order 
to deny man’s ultimate ignorance of the nature of Being. 
Thus it creates symbols (like the gnostic and apocalyptic 
theories) that claim to provide complete and final knowledge
45 E. V o e g e l i n ,  "The E c l i p s e  of R e a l i t y , "  p . 186.
44 Ibid.
4T D. Levy, Realist, p p . 108-109.
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of it. Thus, the ultimate source of deformation seems to be 
the l i b i d o  d o m i n a n d i  o f  men."48
With regard to the reality existentially experienced 
the following section investigates Voegelin’s theory of 
consciousness, whereas Voegelin’s enunciation of modernity 
and gnosticism as an elaboration on the reality projected by 
imagination will be reviewed in the next chapter.
41 A n i b a l  A, B u e n o ,  " C o n s c i o u s n e s s ,  T i a e  a n d  T r a n s c e n d e n c e  in E r i c  V o e g e l i n ’s P h i l o s o p h y , "  in P.J. 
O p i t z  a n d  G. S e b b a ,  eds . ,  The Philosophy o f  O r d e r  ( S t u t t g a r t :  E r n s t  K l e t t , 1981), p . 107.
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2. T H E O R Y  OF C O N S C I O U S N E S S
As the theme of Voegelin’s philosophical enterprise-- 
human existence in society and history— discloses, "man, 
society and history" are fields of search which taken 
together constitute reality, especially political reality.49 
These three fields, "man," "society," and "history," refer 
to things that are not of the same order. It is important, 
therefore, to see in what manner Voegelin puts them 
together. In this and following sections of this chapter, 
thus, we shall see that Voegelin presents them as analogous 
and inter-connected dynamic structures or processes of 
reality, given life and meaning by an all-embracing process 
that transcends them as it encompasses them. No brief 
summary can do justice to his magnificent undertaking, 
elaborated over many years and set out in thousands of pages 
drawing on a great wealth of material. I will, however, try 
to review what seems to me the core of Voegelin’s 
philosophy, by illustrating the theory of consciousness, 
theory of representation, and theory of history, 
respectively. Bound together, they constitute the essence 
of Voegelin’s political philosophy and are inseparable parts 
of an investigation which is in itself part of man’s search 
for reality.
4S B. V o e g e l i n ,  d n a a n e s i s ;  Z u r  Theorie der Geschichte u n d  Politik ( H u e n c h e n :  R. P i p e r  k Co,, 1966), 
p. 144.
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Eric Voegelin began as a student of the history of 
political ideas. He had planned to write an introductory 
textbook on the history of political ideas using George H. 
Sabine’s A  H i s t o r y  o f  P o l i t i c a l  T h e o r y  as his model. But he 
reached an impasse which made him decide to abandon the 
project when he worked through the sources and wrote over 
several thousand pages.
First, he was struck by the fact that "the conventional 
histories began with the Greeks, as if there had been 
nothing before them."50 He found that the conventional 
principle of development from the Greeks through the Middle 
Ages, into the modern period broke down. The principle of 
selection of the historical materials was defective. It 
ignored the real development of spiritual and political 
freedoms through Judeo-Christianity, Augustine’s "sacred 
history." Also, it ignored ancient civilizations predating 
the Greeks that were accessible to contemporary scholars 
through the comparative study of civilizations, attempted by 
Oswald Spengler, Arnold Toynbee, and available through the 
Chicago Oriental Institute’s work on the Ancient Near East.
He also found that something was wrong with the concept 
of "ideas." He gradually realized that there was no such 
entity, except in a trivial sense. "Ideas are not entities 
in history; the real entities are societies, which express
51 G. Sebba, "Prelude and Variations on the These of Eric Voegelin," in E. Sandoz, ed., Eric 
Voegelin’s Thought (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1982 ), p.15.
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their existence in history through an enormously complex set 
of symbols."51 The "ideas" were not speculation about 
political society, or more or less arbitrary inventions of 
gifted thinkers, or rationalizations of emotional attitudes 
and vested interests. In his "Autobiographical Memoir" 
Voegelin writes: "the conception of a history of ideas was
an ideological deformation of reality. There were no ideas 
unless there were symbols of immediate experiences... No 
language symbol today can simply be accepted as a b o n a  f i d e  
symbol, because the corruption has proceeded so far that 
everything is suspect."52 Ideas are merely "a secondary 
conceptual development, beginning with the Stoics"; they 
transform experiences and their symbols into concepts that 
refer to a reality other than the true, experienced reality. 
"Hence, ideas are liable to deform the truth of the 
experiences and their symbolizations."53
Thus, Voegelin, who initiated his career as a teacher 
of jurisprudence at the University of Vienna, was led to 
philosophical speculation on account of an experience of the 
fragility of constitutional democracy in many European 
states after World War I. He perceived that institutions 
are founded on ideas, or symbols of self-interpretation
51 K i l l i a n  H a v a r d ,  " V o e g e l i n ’8 C h a n g i n g  C o n c e p t i o n  o f  H i s t o r y  a n d  C o n s c i o u s n e s s , "  in S t e p h e n  A.
H c K n i g h t ,  ed., Eric Voegelin's Search for Order in History ( B a t o n  R o u g e :  L SU P r e s s ,  1978), p . 15,
52 E. V o e g e l i n ,  " A u t o b i o g r a p h i c a l  R e n o i r , "  u n p u b l i s h e d  t r a n s c r i p t  of t a p e d  i n t e r v i e w s  w i t h  B. S a n d o z
in 1973 , p .64; h e r e a f t e r  c i t e d  as AH.
53 E. V o e g e l i n ,  AH, p . 75, c i t e d  in G. S e b b a ,  " P r e l u d e  a n d  V a r i a t i o n s . . . , "  p . 16.
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shared by a people, and that if such interpretations are 
shattered, the institutions will be as well.
With this realization, consequently, Voegelin began his 
"inquiry into the variety of symbolic manifestations through 
which historical societies express their existence, the way 
in which these differing symbolic forms are related to one 
another, and the problem of discerning the extent to which 
the experiences symbolized approach reality and thereby 
provide a basis for order."54 Thus, he began his life-long 
quest for the contours of political reality. This quest led 
him from analyzing the immediate context of the political 
struggle in concrete societies to searching the concepts 
that animated that struggle in an individual society, to the 
thought that grounded a particular civilization and, 
further, to the comprehensive structure of political symbols 
in the varied civilizations that have emerged in world 
history.
As his search expanded in scope and time, it also 
increased in depth; for the initiating and orienting 
concepts of civilization had to emerge from somewhere, and 
that "somewhere" was the depth of the consciousness of 
representative human beings. In this sense, it could be 
said that "the domain of ’empirical’ political reality 
expanded from constitutions to the concepts that undergird 
them and, further, from these ideas to the experiences of 
participation in political and social reality of which the
54 W. Havard, "Voegelin’8 Changing Conception...," p.15.
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ideas were expressions and finally to the comparative study 
of experiences of order and disorder in the psyche of 
representative human types, the philosophers, sages, and 
prophets who have illumined the contours of the drama of 
humanity."5 5
That is, Voegelin evaluates political ideas and regimes 
on the basis of an understanding of the human condition 
deriving from a comparative study of symbols concerning 
spiritual order and disorder which have appeared over time.
In fact, history may be characterized as a "trail of 
equivalent symbols in time and space," left by the process 
of moving presence of reality.56 Voegelin’s new insight 
into the connection between experience and reality had 
shifted the accent of his concern from symbols to the 
engendering experiences, i.e., toward the philosophy of 
consciousness and investigations into experiences of order 
and its symbolic expressions, into the institutions 
establish it--the political societies--and finally into the 
order of consciousness itself.
Indeed, the philosophy of consciousness is the core of 
Eric Voegelin's political theory. He became interested in 
the problems of consciousness in the 1920s, thus entering 
the philosophic domain of Edmund Husserl, Henri Bergson and 
William James. He writes, "[t]hat the poverty of political
55 K. E e u l a a n ,  "The B a l a n c e  of C o n s c i o u s n e s s , "  p p . 41-4 2 .
5t B. V o e g e l i n ,  " E q u i v a l e n c e s  of E x p e r i e n c e  a n d  S y a b o l l e a t i o n  in H i s t o r y , "  in B t e m a  e Storia, voll, 
valori p e r a a n e n t i  nel divenire storico ( F l o r e n c e :  V a l e c h i ,  1970), p . 233.
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science--through its immersion in neo-Kantian epistemology, 
value-related methodology, historicism, descriptive 
institutionalism and ideological historical speculations—  
could be overcome only with the help of a new philosophy of 
the consciousness was already clear to me during my 
twenties."57 However, struck by the political disorder 
caused by the totalitarian political movements in the 
twentieth century, he found that the contemporary accounts 
of the nature of consciousness was unsatisfactory. The 
political disorder caused by the totalitarian movements in 
this century could only, according to him, be understood 
through an analysis of specific forms of human 
consciousness. Voegelin writes:
I had arrived at a dead-end in my attempts to find a 
theory of man, society and history that would permit 
an adequate interpretation of the phenomena in my 
chosen field of studies. The analysis of the movements 
of Communism, Fascism, National Socialism, and racism, 
of constitutionalism, liberalism, and authoritarianism 
had made it clear beyond a doubt that at the center 
of a philosophy of politics had to be a theory of 
consciousness: but the academic institutions of the 
Western world, the various schools of philosophy, the 
rich manifold of methodologies, did not offer the 
intellectual instruments that would make the political 
events and movements intelligible.58
To quote Anibal Bueno’s summary: "[Voegelin] rejected
the materialistic and the idealistic theories, because the 
former could not explain the existence of consciousness, and
5T E. V o e g e l i n ,  d n a a n e s i s  ( G e r s a n ) ,  p . 7,
51 E. V o e g e l i n ,  Anaanesis  ( E n g l i s h ) ,  t r a n s .  I ed. b y  G. N i e n e y e r  ( H o t r e  Dane, IN: U n i v e r s i t y  of N o t r e  
Daie, 1 9 78), p . 3.
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the latter could not adequately account for the reality that 
transcends it."59 Voegelin also objected to "stream 
theories of consciousness"6o particularly Husserl’s, 
"because they were not actual descriptions of the phenomena 
of consciousness, but speculative constructions."61 The 
stream theories of consciousness "understood all knowledge 
of reality according to the model of knowledge of external 
objects, and neglected experiences of participation that are 
an important source of knowledge." And they "analyzed 
consciousness in general, as a type of entity whose nature 
could be determined by an abstract study of it."62 Since 
consciousness is a necessarily ambiguous term, an analysis 
of consciousness should be discrete, as Voegelin writes:
As far as consciousness is the site of participation, 
its reality partakes of both the divine and the human 
without being wholly the one or the other; as far as 
it is the sensorium of participation, it is definitely 
man’s own, located in his body in spatio-temporal 
existence. Consciousness, thus, is both the time 
pole of the tension (sensorium) and the whole tension 
including its pole of the timeless (site). Our 
participation in the divine remains bound to the 
perspective of man. If the distinction between the two 
meanings of consciousness be neglected, there arises 
the danger of derailing into the divinization of man 
or the humanization of God.63
55 A.A. Bueno, "Consciousness, Tiae and...," p.91.
** B u e n o  d e f i n e s  s t r e s s  t h e o r i e s  as t h a t  " c o n c e i v e d  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  as a B t r e a a  of p e r c e p t i o n s  an d
c a r e f u l l y  a n a l y z e d  its t e a p o r a l  s t r u c t u r e  a n d  its r e l a t i o n  to t h e  e x t e r n a l  w o r l d  o n  t h i s  f o u n d a t i o n . "
n Ibid., p .91.
,z Ibid., pp.91-92.
iJ B. V o e g e l i n ,  "I a a o r t a l i t y :  E x p e r i e n c e  and Syabo l , "  H arvard  T h e o l o g i c a l  Heviev, 60:3 (1967), p . 275.
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He also affirms:
The reality of consciousness is not unconscious, but 
through symbolic expressions in various degrees of 
illumination it relates to reality, either to its own 
reality of participation [in existence], or in the 
poles of the participation. The images themselves thus 
are reality, the reality of consciousness, but they are 
not the reality to which they relate themselves in 
knowledge. Consciousness is always consciousness of 
something.6 4
Opposing the stream theories of consciousness, therefore, 
Voegelin situates philosophy firmly within the historical 
world and within the concrete existence of the philosopher. 
He analyzes that a human consciousness is a concrete process 
in which awareness of reality is formed by concrete 
experiences. That is, reality is a process that becomes 
luminous to itself in the concrete consciousness of concrete 
human beings.
Voegelin believes that the "problems of human order in 
society and history arise from the order of the 
consciousness. The philosophy of consciousness is therefore 
the core of a philosophy of politics."65 In other words, 
"[t]he philosophy of order is the process in which we as men 
find the order of existence in the order of 
consciousness."66 Thus, the most important epistemological 
task of political inquiry is to elucidate the nature of
(< B. V o e g e l i n ,  d n a n n e s i s  (G e r m a n J , p. 307, B n g l i s h  v e r s i o n ,  p . 166.
* 5 I b i d . ,  ( G e r n a n ) ,  p . 7.
** Ibid., p . 11.
2 6 8
consciousness and its relationship to reality. For him, 
consciousness is a process that is aware of being a part of 
a comprehensive reality that constitutes it. That is, 
consciousness is the seat of human experience, the register 
of reality, "the specifically human mode of participation in 
reality." He states:
To be conscious of something is an experiential process 
polarized by the cognitive tension between the knower 
and the known. The several meanings of reality can be 
made intelligible by going through the successful acts 
of reflection on the process of consciousness: If, in a 
first act of reflection on the process, we turn toward 
the pole of the known, the object of cognition will be 
the something we acknowledge as real. If, in a second 
act, we turn toward the pole of the knower, the human 
carrier of cognition as well as his images and language 
symbols referring to the known, will move into the 
position of the something to be acknowledged as real. 
And if, in a third act, we turn toward the experiential 
process and the cognitive tension as a whole, the 
process will become the something we acknowledge as 
real. Following the acts of reflection, the meaning 
of reality moves from the known to the knower and 
ultimately to the process that is structured by the 
participation of, and by the cognitive tension between 
the knower and the known in the experience. The 
consciousness of reality becomes a process within 
reality.6 7
As he states the basic issue:
We have experience of our consciousness only qua 
consciousness, only as the process experienced from 
within, which is neither bodily nor material. The 
substantive unity of human existence, which must be 
accepted as [an] ontological hypothesis for the 
understanding of consciousness’ basis in body and 
matter, is objectively inexperienceable. That does 
not mean, however, that there is no such thing. At 
any rate, the hypothesis is indispensable for grasping 
the "ensemble" of consciousness and bodily process in
1,1 B. V o e g e l i n ,  "The E c l i p s e  of R e a l i t y , "  p . 187.
269
the total process of human existence. We cannot 
descriptively grasp "pure" consciousness as process; 
rather we can only interpretatively grasp a "human" 
consciousness as consciousness in the body and the 
world.68
Our fundamental pre-reflective experience is an 
awareness of participation in a larger territory of reality. 
But this experience is not a form of objective knowledge. 
There cannot be a separation between a knowing subject and a 
known object, because the subject is a part of the process 
of knowing itself. It is worth noting here that there is a 
different conception of experience between Voegelin’s theory 
of consciousness and that of modern rationalism. The scope 
they attribute respectively to the experience reflected upon 
is fundamentally different. In modern rationalists’
thought, the notion of experience is limited to sense data, 
and the operations by which the sense data are processed or 
rendered in mechanistic way.
On the contrary, Voegelin stresses the operations of 
consciousness and their experienced dynamism as themselves 
as important data for philosophical reflection. Thus, the 
scope of the experience is dramatically expanded beyond the 
limits of sensory perception and reflections on phenomenal 
regularities. As Sandoz writes, this implies "an
epistemological revolution worthy of the name" because it 
implies that " T r u t h  lies at the level of experience, not at 
the level of the propositions and symbolisms which 
•* E. Voegelin, Cannes is (English), p.31.
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articulate its content."69 This means that in the
Voegelinian philosophical science of politics the entire 
range and modes of human experience become resources from 
which the knowledge of reality and its order may be drawn by 
way of noetic inquiry.
Voegelin*s theory of consciousness is augmented by an
argument on experience and symbolization. For man expresses
his experiences of reality in language symbols, the study of
these symbolizations provides an avenue to the understanding
of reality. According to Voegelin, the experiential field
of reality is construed as made up of individual entities
which tend to be grouped into four categories: God and man,
world and society.70 The quaternarian structure of being
indicates the range of the experiential field within which
the inquiry to reality moves. Thus, even though the
different realms of being have their autonomy, our knowledge
of them is always affected by their relationship to the
other constituents of the quaternarian structure of being.
Accepting this, Voegelin attempts to trace the development
of man’s self-understanding of the structure of reality.
The quaternarian partners in reality and their
structured relationship were a "datum of human experience"
,J E. S a n d o z ,  " T h e  P h i l o s o p h i c a l  S c i e n c e  o f  P o l i t i c s  B e y o n d  B a h a v i o r a l i s a , "  G.J. G r a h & a ,  Jr. I G.W.
C a r e y ,  e d s ., The Post-Behavioral Bra ( D a v i d  M c K a y  Co., 1 9 72), p . 298.
T * B. V o e g e l i n ,  Order tad H i s t o r y , v o l . l ,  Israel and Revelation ( B a t o n  R o u g e :  L SU P r e s s , 1956 ), p. 1.
H e r e a f t e r  OH, I.
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insofar as man could know them "by virtue of his 
participation in the mystery of being," but not in the sense 
that he could grasp them as "an object of the external 
world," or view them from some location that would permit 
him to fathom the mystery of the whole.71 The quaternarian 
structure of being also supplies pertinent information about 
the meaning of experience and symbolization because reality 
is symbolized as a community of being articulated into the 
four-fold relationship by the symbols of God, man, world, 
and society.72 Given the existential situation, man was 
engaged in a "process of symbolization" that was "the 
attempt at making the essentially unknowable order of being 
intelligible as far as possible through the creation of 
symbols which interpret the unknown by analogy with the 
reality, or supposedly, known."73 Referring to God, man, 
world and society as the totality of things that the people 
of every age could see, Voegelin affirmed that "[t]he range 
of human experience is always present in the fullness of its 
dimensions."74 But, Voegelin states that man could not 
discern all the complex relationships in his experiential 
field at once.75 The activity of rendering experience
n  Ibid.
,2 E. S a n d o z ,  " T h e  F o u n d a t i o n s  of V o e g e l i n 's P o l i t i c a l  T h e o r y , "  The Political Science Reviewer, 1
(F a l l  1 9 7 1 ) ,  p . 41.
”  OH, I, p . 5.
u  I b id., p.l.
,s Ibid., p . 3.
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intelligible generally develops from compactness to 
differentiated modes: Voegelin contends that man’s
experience of reality moves from compact to more 
differentiated experiences, and thus what the sequence of 
symbolizations reveals is the development from compact to 
differentiated forms.76
From the matrix of experience a man gains partial
understanding of the order of being and the obligations of
existence. Yet human existence is paradoxical in the sense
that man is thrown into and out of existence without knowing
either the how or the why of it. Man’s most fundamental
experience is the anxiety-laden experience of the actor in a
drama who knows neither his part nor the play nor indeed
what exactly he himself is. "He is an actor playing a part
in the drama of being and, through the brute fact of his
existence, committed to play it without knowing what it
is."77 Voegelin holds that reality can only be known "from
the perspective of participation in it."78 "Participation
in being, however, is not a partial involvement of man; he
is engaged with the whole of his existence, for
participation is existence itself... Man’s partnership in
being is the essence of his existence, and this essence
depends on the whole, of which existence is a part."79
u  O n  c o n p a c t  a n d  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  s y a b o l i z a t i o n s ,  s ee t he '4. T h e o r y  of H i s t o r y "  s e c t i o n  in this 
C h a p t e r ,  p p . 3 1 2 - 3 2 5 .




However, since man is situated within the process rather 
than outside of it, he cannot discern its meaning as a 
whole. Moreover, this means that man can never know the 
whole, for being is not an external object that can be 
examined from the outside. The answer to the foundational 
questions of human existence remain opaque.
Knowledge of the whole, however, is precluded by the 
identity of the knower with the partner, and ignorance 
of the whole precludes essential knowledge of the part. 
This situation of ignorance with regard to the decisive 
core of existence is more than disconcerting: it is 
profoundly disturbing, for from the depth of this 
ultimate ignorance wells up the anxiety of existence.80
Therefore, man is ultimately ignorant of the nature of 
reality. But this ignorance— "man’s essential ignorance of 
himself and being, while a permanent attribute of existence, 
one given paradigmatic expression in the irony of Socratic 
ignorance"81--is not complete ignorance. For man can 
achieve "considerable knowledge about the order of being, 
and not the least part of that knowledge is the distinction 
between the knowable and the unknowable." Man’s knowledge 
about the order of being, however, "comes late in the long- 
drawn-out process of experience and symbolization."82 Yet 
it is not in the spirit of detached search for scientific 
truth that man seeks to render existence intelligible;
*' Ibid., p . 2.
11 E. S a n d o z ,  ' T h e  F o u n d a t i o n s  o f  V o e g e l i n ’s ...,* p . 44. 
11 Off, I, p p . 2-3.
274
rather it is out of the anxiety of a fall from being that he 
searches the texture of the experiential ground of 
consciousness to render existence itself meaningful.83
The concern of man about the meaning of his existence 
in the field of being does not remain pent up in the 
tortures of anxiety, but can vent itself in the 
creation of symbols purporting to render intelligible 
the relations and tensions between the distinguishable 
terms of the field.84
The anxiety of existence, the mystery of being, and the 
horror of a fall from existence into the nothingness of non­
existence, motivates the creation of symbols. Voegelin is 
concerned with man’s existence in a political order and with 
the manner in which man has symbolized or represented the 
brute fact of this existence and of his attempts to come to 
grips with the meaning of man’s existence on this earth,
i.e., in the cosmos. The question, "why should a cosmos 
exist at all, if man can do no better than live in it as if 
he were not of it, in order to make his escape from the 
prison through death?" is the critical question that brings 
the mystery of reality into full view.85 Voegelin states:
There is a cosmos in which man participates by his 
existence; man is endowed with cognitive consciousness 
of the reality in which he is a partner; consciousness 
differentiates in a process called history; and in the 
process of history man discovers reality to be engaged
15 E. S a n d o z ,  " E r i c  V o e g e l i n  a n d  t he N a t u r e  of P h i l o s o p h y , *  Modern Age, 13:2 ( S p r i n g  1 9 69), p p . 155- 
156.
84 Off, I, p p . 1-2.
85 OB, IV, p.19.
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in a movement toward the Beyond of its present 
structure.8 6
But the term "cosmos," as Webb indicates, could be easily 
misinterpreted. In Voegelin’s discussion it does not refer, 
as it frequently does in modern usage, to what is sometimes 
called the "astrophysical universe" which tends to be a 
purely physical, basically materializing conception based on 
the assumption that reality as a whole is made up of world- 
immanent spatio-temporal entities. "Voegelin’s own use of 
the term cosmos refers to its ancient use to designate a 
much larger conception of the wholeness of reality, 
including spiritual as well as physical dimensions."87
To be certain about this world, to be certain about his 
own role in maintaining the order of things, was a vital 
necessity and vital problem for man. Thus, Voegelin 
considers that man must continually seek the meaning of his 
existence in the divine ground of all being, which is a 
"spiritual absolute," ineffable in terms of discursive 
thought, but susceptible of being directly experienced and 
realized within the human soul. Man requires knowledge not 
only about how things are and how they work, but also about 
the unknown ground of being itself. Voegelin expressed his 
understanding in symbols created to render intelligible the 
relations and tensions between God and man, world and
“ Ibid.
,T B. Webb, Eric Voegelin, p . 135.
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society, within the limits of experience, and oriented by 
it. These symbols interpret the unknown in analogy to that 
which is known or believed to be known.
Voegelin writes that "man is able to engender symbols 
which express his experience of reality, of himself as the 
experiencing agent, and of his conscious experiencing as the 
action and passion of participating" in the reality. Again, 
he knows that the "symbols engendered (are) part of the 
reality they symbolize," but also realizes that the 
experience of reality cannot be whole or complete but has 
the character of a horizon.88 Thus, man can never hope 
finally to possess knowledge of the reality in which he 
participates through existence precisely because this 
reality is in the process of movement, and also because 
reality is all-embracing whereas, man’s participation 
therein can never be so. Summarizing his theory of 
symbolization in seven propositions in his essay, 
"Equivalence of Experience and Symbolization in History," 
Voegelin presents a useful approach to the understanding of 
reality.
1. Man participates in the process of reality. The 
implication of the fundamental proposition, then, 
can be expressed by the following propositions:
2. Man is conscious of reality as a process, of himself 
as being part of reality, and of his consciousness 
as a mode of participation in its process.
3. While consciously participating, man is able to 
engender symbols which express his experience of 
reality, of himself as the experiencing agent, and 
of his conscious experiencing as the action and
11 B. V o e g e l i n ,  " E q u i v a l e n c e  of E x p e r i e n c e  a n d . . . , "  p . 221.
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passion of participating.
4. Man knows the symbols engendered to be part of the 
reality they symbolize--the symbols consciousness, 
experience, and symbolization denote the area where 
the process of reality becomes luminous to itself.
To the positive statements we, finally, can add 
three corollaries of a cautionary nature:
5. Reality is not a given that could be observed from 
a vantage point outside itself but embraces the 
consciousness in which it becomes luminous.
6. The experience of reality cannot be total but has 
the character of a perspective.
7. The knowledge of reality conveyed by the symbols can 
never become a final possession of truth, for the 
luminous perspective that we call experience, as 
well as the symbols engendered by them, are part of 
reality in process.89
In B e tween Re.al...x..ty a.nd Ex .1. .st..e..n..t...x..a.l—
In his "Autobiographical Memoir," Voegelin says that in 
formulating the conception of experience in his theory of 
consciousness, he was stimulated by William James’ "radical 
empiricism" which he later discovered to be in line with 
Plato:
At the center of consciousness I found the experience 
of participation, meaning thereby the reality of being 
in contact with reality outside myself...Among the 
philosophers I found important confirmation from the 
radical empiricism of William James. James’s study on 
the question--"Does ’Consciousness’ Exist?"(1904)- 
-struck me at the time, and still strikes me, as one of 
the most important philosophical documents of the 
twentieth century. In developing his concept of the 
pure experience, William James has put his finger on 
the reality of the consciousness of participation, 
inasmuch as what he calls pure experience is the 
something that can be put into the context e i t h e r  of 
the subject’s stream of consciousness o r  of objects in 
the external world. This fundamental insight of 
William James identifies the something that lies 
between the subject and object of participation as the 
experience. Later I found that the same type of
"  Ibid.
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analysis had been conducted on a much vaster scale by 
Plato, resulting in his concept of the m e t a x y , the In- 
Between. The experience is neither in the subject nor 
in the world of objects but In-Between, and that means 
In-Between the poles of man and the reality he 
experiences... A good number of problems which plague 
the history of philosophy now become clear, as 
hypostases of the poles of a pure experience in the 
sense of William James, or of the m e t a x y  experiences of 
Plato. By hypostases I mean the fallacious assumption 
that the poles of the participatory experience are 
self-contained entities that form a mysterious contact 
on occasion of an experience.90
It was on the basis of these considerations that Voegelin 
said he developed his own conception of how consciousness 
can best be interpreted:
The term c o n s c i o u s n e s s ...could no longer mean to me a 
human consciousness which is conscious of a reality 
outside man’s consciousness, but had to mean the In- 
Between reality of the participatory pure experience 
which then analytically can be characterized through 
such terms as the poles of the experiential tension 
and the reality of the experiential tension in the 
m e t a x y .9 1
In Voegelin’s later writings the Platonic and Christian 
experiences become essential for understanding political 
reality. Along with the discovery of the soul, Voegelin 
contends that Plato differentiated the m e t a x y  or In-Between 
structure of reality. Voegelin’s symbolism for the
experience of human existence as participation in being is 
that of Plato’s m e t a x y .  Human existence was, according to 
Plato, not that of God nor that of animals, it fell
58 AH. Quoted in E. Sandoz, The V o e g e l i n i & n  R e v o l u t i o n (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1981), p.170,
*' Quoted in E. Sandoz, The V o e g e l i n i & n  R e volution, p.171.
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somewhere in-between. Thus, man’s soul is in tension toward 
the ground of being, which Voegelin describes as the:
...tension between life and death, immortality and 
mortality, perfection and imperfection, time and 
timelessness; between order and disorder, truth and 
untruth, sense and senselessness of existence; between 
a m o r  D e i  and a m o r  s u i ,  1 ’a m e  o u v e r t e  and l ’a m e  c l o s e ; 
between the virtues of openness toward the ground of 
being such as faith, love, and hope, and the vices of 
infolding closure such as hybris and revolt; between 
the moods of joy and despair; and between alienation in 
its double meaning of alienation from the world and 
alienation from God.92
In the Christian experience another structure was 
articulated into the field of reality. Voegelin calls this 
"eschatological consciousness" or the "transfiguration of 
reality." At any rate, man’s existence is not a fact, but a 
movement in the m e t a x y , a struggle between light and 
darkness, between open participation and closure against 
reality. Human consciousness both inclines and has power to 
transcend its particular spatio-temporal existence and the 
particular society, things, and times: it is "capable of
infinity" even though dependent on a particular human body. 
Thus, as Levy writes, "consciousness is a finite event in a 
transfinite process of reality."93 The limitation of 
knowledge by mystery flows from this for, as Voegelin 
writes, "[t]here is psyche deeper than consciousness, and
82 E. V o e g e l i n ,  " E q u i v a l e n c e s  o f  E x p e r i e n c e  a n d . . . , "  p . 220,
83 D. Lev y ,  fiealisi, p . 49.
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there is reality deeper than reality experienced, but there 
is no consciousness deeper than consciousness."94
Voegelin states that consciousness has a specific 
content. His theory of consciousness is situated firmly 
within the historical world and within the concrete 
existence of the philosopher. He analyzes that a human 
consciousness is a concrete process in which awareness of 
reality is formed by concrete experiences. That is, reality 
is a process that becomes luminous to itself in the concrete 
consciousness of concrete human beings, even though human 
consciousness is not the perfect luminosity of being that 
lies in the direction of a state beyond this world, the 
Platonic e p e k e i n a ,  the Beyond. Since a consciousness is a 
concrete individual process, any truth about the nature of 
consciousness in the abstract must first be true in the 
consciousness of a concrete individual.
Inasmuch as the consciousness of philosophizing is no 
"pure" consciousness but rather the consciousness of 
a human being, all philosophizing is an event in the 
philosopher’s life history--further an event in the 
history of the community with its symbolic language; 
further in the history of mankind, and further in the 
history of the cosmos...the systematic reflection on 
consciousness is a late event in the biography of the 
philosopher. The philosopher always lives in the 
context of his own history, the history of a human 
existence in the community and in the world.95
,4 E. V o e g e l i n ,  " E q u i v a l e n c e s  o f  E x p e r i e n c e s  a n d . . . , *  p . 228.
,s E. V o e g e l i n ,  A naanesis (G e r a a n ), p . 33.
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This conviction led him to undertake an anamnetic 
experiment in order to clarify the constitution of his own 
philosophizing consciousness. For Voegelin a n a m n e s i s , or 
memory, as it was for Plato, points toward the historical 
past, but also inward and downward--into the depths of the 
historical present.96 In this sense, according to Voegelin, 
history and philosophy mutually constitute one another.97 
That is, history is a philosophical inquiry, and philosophy 
is intrinsically historical in structure. In Webb’s words,
"[h]istorical inquiry...is an exploration not only of past 
events and their interrelations but also of the structure of 
human existence as a process of participation in being. 
This means that history as a study is in its essential 
character a philosophical discipline. Similarly, to
Voegelin philosophy itself is a process of reflection in 
which the structure of human existence and its historical 
character become conscious."98 Since Voegelin builds his 
theory on the foundation supplied by Plato, it is 
appropriate to look at Plato’s symbolism about anamnesis.
Plato expressed his own philosophy of consciousness in 
terms of the symbolism of recollection.99 Plato appears to 
have coined the word a n a m n e s i s  from m n e m o s y n e  (memory or
E. W e b b , Eric Voegelin, p . 17.
,f E. V o e g e l i n ,  A naanesis ( G e r s a n ) ,  p . 133.
*' E. We b b ,  Eric Voegelin, p . 17.
** O n  t h e  a c c o u n t  o f  a n a a n e s i s ,  I a s  i n d e b t e d  to Dr. S a n d o z .  See E. S a n d o z ,  ' T h e  F o u n d a t i o n s  of 
V o e g e l i n ’s ...,* p p . 38-39.
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remembrance; mythically, the Mother of the Muses); its 
meaning is remembering-again, recollection, or reminiscence. 
Anamnesis is one of the modes of consciousness. Plato’s 
symbolism of anamnesis provided an opportunity to solve the 
serious epistemological problem, i.e., how does one know the 
truth or reality.
What is remembered... is what has been forgotten; and 
the troublesome task of recollecting the forgotten must 
be assayed because it should not remain forgotten. 
Through recollection of the forgotten that which ought 
to be remembered is brought to the present of 
knowledge; and the tension to knowledge shows 
forgottenness to be the situation of not-knowing, the 
ignorance (a g n o i a ) of the soul in Plato’s sense. 
Knowledge and not-knowing are situations of existential 
order and disorder. What is forgotten can, however, 
only be remembered because it is a knowledge in the 
mode of forgottenness that through its presence in 
forgottenness stirs existential discontent in the man, 
and this discontent presses toward conscious knowledge. 
From the mode of forgottenness recollection retrieves 
what ought to be known into the present in the mode of 
knowledge. Recollection is, therefore, the activity of 
the consciousness through forgottenness; and this means 
that the latent knowledge of the unconsciousness is 
aroused through recollection and returned in an 
observable manner into specific presence in 
consciousness, there to be articulated. This 
articulation is, then, in turn, ’fixed’ through 
language by the assertion in consciousness of 
linguistic images of the content of the previously 
forgotten and inarticulate knowledge. Lastly, whether 
the recollection proceeds out of the resources of 
strictly autobiographical experiences or out of the 
meditation of the historiographic evinced experiences 
of men of distant generations, what is recollected that 
preeminently ought to be known and not remain forgotten 
is the source of man’s humanity and the order of 
society and history in participating attunement to the 
divine reality which is the Ground.100
1,1 B. Voege l i n ,  A n m e s i s  (Gernan), p . 11; B. S a n d o z , "The F o u n d a t i o n s  of V o e g e l i n ' s . . , p p . 69-70.
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Truth in Greek, a l e t h e i a , itself also connotes an self- 
disclosure of being, unhiddenness, uncovering, unconcealing, 
or unforgetting. Therefore, the opposite of a l e t h e i a  in the 
existential sense is not falsehood or inaccuracy, as in the 
case of an opinion, but eclipse, the darkening of reality 
through existential closure. The existence that becomes 
open in the uncovering of existential truth is conscious 
existence. Plato etymologically designates a l e t h e i a  as "an 
agglomeration of T h e i a  a l e  (divine wandering), implying the 
divine motion of existence" ( C r a t y l u s  421B; cf. 411A-413C). 
"The experience of dejavu or anamnesis not only is offered 
as evidence of the immortality of the soul and of 
metempsychosis by Plato; but it is also the sign of 
essential humanity itself and is equated with intuitive or 
noetic reason (nous): that mysterious divine something in
man, the highest rational faculty or capacity of intellect 
whereby the transcendental Ideas and undemonstrable First 
Principles of scientific knowledge are, through 
participation, grasped and known."101 Anamnesis is
identified with or at least closely allied to noetic reason, 
for "all inquiry and all learning is but recollection."102
In Aristotelian terms, the adequate analysis of human 
existence must take into account both the synthetic and the 
specific nature of man: Man participates in all realms of
being, from the inorganic to the divine but he is also 
m  E. Sandoz, "The Foundations of Voegelin's...," pp.39-40.
111 Plato, tfeno, 81E.
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distinguished from other living being as an a n i m a l  
r a t i o n a l e , as a being endowed with reason. Therefore, 
though a specifically human existence is ordered by means of 
the n o u s  or r a t i o ,  what is put in order is not consciousness 
alone, but the whole passionate and corporeal human 
existence in question. "There is no In-Between of existence 
as a self-contained object but only existence experienced as 
part of reality which extends beyond the In-Between."103
Human existence, it appears, is not opaque to itself, 
but illuminated by intellect (Aquinas) or n o u s  
(Aristotle). This intellect is as much part of 
human existence as it is the instrument of its 
interpretation. In the exegesis of existence intellect 
discovers itself in the structure of existence; 
ontologically speaking, human existence has noetic 
structure.10 4
The noetic interpretation of reality, central to 
Voegelin’s political theory, consists at the first level of 
man in just such an analysis of the structure of human 
existence under the guidance of the ordering n o u s .  The 
analysis is then existential in a double sense: it is an
exploration and at the same time a rational constitution of 
the structure of existence being explored.105 It is the 
only experience that is strictly one’s own, the only process
105 B. V o e g e l i n ,  ' T h e  G o s p e l  a nd C u l t u r e , "  in D o n a l d  G. H i l l e r  A D i k r a n  Y. H a d i d i a n ,  ed s . ,  Jesus and 
Kan's Hope, v o l . 2. ( P i t t s b u r g h :  P i t t s b u r g h  T h e o l o g i c a l  S e n i n a r y  P r e s s ,  1971), p . 76.
1.4 B, V o e g e l i n ,  "On D e b a t e  a nd E x i s t e n c e , "  p p . H 6 - 1 4 7 .
1.5 A t h a n a s i o s  H o u l a k i s ,  " P o l i t i c a l  R e a l i t y  a n d  H i s t o r y  in the W o r k  of E r i c  V o e g e l i n , "  in A. H o u l a k i s ,  
ed., The Proaise o f  H i s t o r y :  E s s a y s  in Political Philosophy (Ber l i n :  H a l t e r  de G r u y t e r ,  1986), p . 121.
of reality that one knows from inside.106 Noesis, the 
activity of n o u s ,  is a struggle to illuminate a movement of 
the soul in which one is passionately caught up:
The noetic exegesis lifts the logos [the intelligible 
structure] of participation into the light of 
consciousness by interpreting the noetic experience 
of participation. Noetic knowledge, therefore, is 
not abstract knowledge obtained by gathering cases 
of participation and examining them for general 
characteristics. Rather, it is concrete knowledge 
of participation in which a man’s desire for knowledge 
is experienced as a movement toward the ground that 
is being moved by the ground.107
From this point of view, n o u s , as a symbol, is virtually 
equivalent to philosophy as Voegelin considers ancient Greek 
thinkers to have understood it. Both symbols, philosophy 
and n o u s  were born of and represent the same experientially 
grounded process in which reflective consciousness emerges 
from the womb of mythic thought. As we have already seen, 
philosophy is the activity by which the consciousness, aware 
of its fundamental ignorance respecting the ground of Being, 
strives to illumine the human situation, experienced as 
tension between the demands of world-immanent existence and 
the possibility of attunement with the divine ground.108 
Voegelin writes:
For philosophy as a symbolic form is distinguished from 
myth and history by its reflective self-consciousness.
1,5 B. V o e g e l i n ,  A n a a n e s i s  ( G e r a a n ) ,  p . 44.
»•» I b id., p . 183.
1,1 D. Gera i n o ,  "Brie V o e g e l i n ’s A n a m n e s i s ," Southern Reviev, N . S ., 7:1 (Vin t e r  1971), p . 76.
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What philosophy is, need not be ascertained by talking 
a b o u t  philosophy discursively; it can, and must, be 
determined by entering i n t o  the speculative process in 
which the thinker explicates his experience of order. 
The philosophers’ conscious break with the form of the 
myth occurred about 500 B.C. The individual steps 
taken toward a differentiated experience of the psyche, 
during the two centuries after Hesiod, had the 
cumulative result of letting the self-conscious soul 
emerge as the tentative source of order in competition 
with the myth, as well as with the aristocratic culture 
of the archaic polis.109
For Voegelin, philosophy is not a body of ideas or 
opinions, "but a man's responsive pursuit of his questioning 
unrest to the divine source that has aroused it." This 
takes place as a process of experience and symbolization 
that together constitute the characteristic activity of n o u s  
and its mode of knowing, e p i s t e m e . What is supposed to be 
the characteristic activity of n o u s  is precisely the 
experience of tension toward the ground and the awareness of 
a possible participation by the human in the divine n o u s .  
The term ground in Greek, a i t i o n , means the ground of 
existence of man and of other things.110 The ground of
existence, especially in the Aristotelian philosophy, is the 
n o u s :  reason or spirit or intellect. In this sense, reason 
is the ground of existence for man, and especially the
1,3 OH, II, p . 170.
115 T h e  t e r n  aition, w h i c h  o c c u r s  in t h e  p h i l o s o p h y  o f  P l a t o  a nd A r i s t o t l e ,  h as t wo a o r e  a e a n i n g s .  
O n e  s e n s e  is t h a t  w h i c h  in p h y s i c s  we c a l l  " c a u s e " ;  and, t h e  s e c o n d  is s o a e t h i n g  d i f f e r e n t  f r o a  "the 
c a u s e "  b u t  c a n  be t r a n s l a t e d  into L a t i n  as th e  d o c t r i n e  o f  f o u r  c a u s a e :  t he c a u s a  aaterialis, the 
c a u s a  f o r a a l i s ,  t h e  causa efficie ns, a n d  th e  c a u s a  final i s .  S ee E. V o e g e l i n ,  Conversation with Eric 
Voegelin, e d ., by E r i c  O ’C o n n o r ,  S.J. ( H o n t r e a l :  T h o a a s  H o r e  I n s t i t u t e ,  1980), p p . 3-4.
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ground for everything rational in his action.111 The ground 
of existence which is divine is an experienced reality of a 
transcendent nature towards which one lives in a tension. 
Thus, the experience of the tension towards transcendent 
being is the experiential basis for all analysis in such 
matters. For the expression of this tension, a vocabulary 
has been developed:
Already Heraclitus knew three variants or nuances of 
the tension: love, hope and faith. Where love towards 
a Divine Being is experienced, where hope for 
fulfillment in relation to such a Being is experienced 
as the point of orientation in life--where these 
experiences are present, there is the openness of the 
soul in existence which is an orienting center in the 
life of man. The vocabulary of love, hope and faith 
has remained in St. Paul: the L e t t e r  t o  R o m a n s , for 
example, has those three names for the tension 
experienced. They are summarized in that openness of 
the soul which St. Augustine has called a m o r  d e i  (the 
love of God) or which Bergson in his L e s  D e u x  S o u r c e s  
d e  l a  m o r a l e  e t  d e  l a  r e l i g i o n  has called the openness 
of the soul towards transcendence— which means openness 
towards the ground of existence, because we all 
experience our own existence as not existing out of 
itself but as coming from somewhere even if we don’t 
know from where.112
However, such a tension means a participation in the 
Divine Being because we are engaged in tension toward it by 
the psyche. The term psyche is ontologically "the sensorium 
of transcendence," an organ of man by which he experiences
111 It s h o u l d  be n o t e d  t h a t  t he n e a n i n g  of the r a t i o n a l i t y  of a c t i o n  in A r i s t o t e l i a n  e t h i c s  a nd
p o l i t i c s  d i f f e r s  f r o a  t h a t  of n o d e r n  s e c u l a r i s e d  c i v i l i z a t i o n .  T h e  g r o u n d  f or the r a t i o n a l i t y  of 
a c t i o n  in A r i s t o t e l i a n  p h i l o s o p h y  is t h e  t r a n s c e n d e n t  d i v i n e  g r o u n d .  H o w e v e r ,  in o u r  r a t h e r  
s e c u l a r i z e d  c i v i l i z a t i o n - - a n  " e n l i g h t e n e d "  c i v i l i z a t i o n  s i n c e  t he e i g h t e e n t h  c e n t u r y - - w e  B e a n  
p r i a a r i l y  b y  " r a t i o n a l i t y  of a c t i o n , "  r a t i o n a l i t y  in c o o r d i n a t i n g  B e a n s  to a n  end. Se e  ibid., p . 4.
112 Ibid., p p . 8-9.
or in which he experiences the various tensions. And the 
human psyche refers to the entire process of participation 
in reality, its symbolization, and the tension that moves 
and guides the process. And insofar as it is engaged in 
such experiences, the psyche can be called the "noetic" 
self, "noetic" being derived from n o u s .  N o u s , however, is 
not a part of the psyche; rather it is psyche raised to 
self-reflective clarity.
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3. T H E O R Y  OF R E P R E S E N T A T I O N
ihil—ffn-i—X—S- y... .
For Voegelin, as we have already witnessed, political 
science, or rather rigorously, political philosophy is a 
discipline that deals architectonically with the whole of 
human existence in political community and covers all 
aspects that deal with man’s essential humanity. Man, as a 
communal existence, must structure political institutions 
that will regulate the formal, public relations between 
individuals and groups.
Men belong together as fellow participants in a society 
which is both finite and simultaneously transfinite being. 
Society is finite in the sense that it rises and falls; but 
it is transfinite in that it, as a participatory whole, 
transcends the individual member’s existence. "Societies do 
not merely encompass other members but they also antedate 
and/or outlast individual men."113 Participation in a 
society has been and can be symbolically expressed. Men 
give symbolic expression to the recognition of their 
communal existence in a political order. That is, the human 
beings who inhabit the political order continually create 
and maintain the symbols of meanings as both the mode and 
the condition of their self-realization. The symbolism 
forms the time-bound parameters of society and also 
conditions the relations between the individual members of
113 A. Houlakis, "Political Reality and History...," p.125.
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the group and the relations of the individual with the
illuminated whole of the existing political reality. 
Therefore, the symbols and institutions must represent both
the reality of human existence and the order in which this
existence is encompassed and, at the same time, must form a 
mediating structure between the two poles of existence--man 
and God.
Voegelin uses a conception, "representation" refering 
to the way in which a society represents itself symbolically 
in order to establish its existence in history. For him, 
the nature of representation is the "form by which a
political society gains existence for action in history."114 
To represent itself as ready for action in the political 
sphere, a society creates political institutions and symbols 
which reflect the society’s attempt to create an order that 
will give meaning to the fact of its existence as a concrete 
political entity. The political order itself is the 
expression of the political existence of the society and the 
symbols and institutions are those that express and 
represent the political order. The symbols and institutions 
are intended as a more or less adequate representation of 
the society’s self-interpretation and enable it to act in 
the political sphere.
In short, behind the political institutions of every 
society there are certain conceptions which those 
institutions are supposed to represent. And they are truly
111 HSP, p.I.
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representative only so long as they realize those 
conceptions. Every society seeks by self-interpretation to 
discover the meaning of its existence and tries, moreover, 
to relate this meaning to ultimate reality. Thus society is 
like a little world--a cosmion--that deliberately sets out 
to illuminate itself with meaning from within itself. To 
put it in Voegelin’s words, "[s]ociety was a cosmion of 
meaning, illuminated from within by its own self- 
interpretation."115 Voegelin writes:
All the early empires, Near Eastern as well as Far 
Eastern, understood themselves as representatives of 
a transcendent order, of the order of the cosmos; and 
some even understood this order as a "truth." Whether 
one turns to the earliest Chinese sources in the S h u  
K i n g  or to the inscriptions of Egypt, Babylonia, 
Assyria, or Persia, one uniformly finds the order of 
the empire interpreted as a representation of cosmic 
order in the medium of human society. The empire is a 
cosmic analogue, a little world reflecting the order of 
the great, comprehensive world. Rulership becomes the 
task of securing the order of society in harmony with 
cosmic order.116
Voegelin’s examination of the primary experience of 
human political existence--the perceived analogy between the 
ordered hierarchy of the cosmos and the hierarchy of the 
mediating political structure of the mesocosm--is centered 
around the understanding of the meaning of order as it has 
appeared in the various political societies of the past. In 
explaining Voegelin’s theory of society, Moulakis writes
11S Ibid., p . 52.
115 Ibid., p . 54.
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that "societies are seen to express, however imperfectly, a 
sense of transfinite order, and...it is precisely the 
institutional and symbolic expression of this experience of 
order which holds societies together. We see concrete 
finite societies existing or having existed in time as 
mythically constituted entities."117 Voegelin designates 
each historical differentiation in the modes of the search 
for meaning, as was expressed in the various forms of the 
political societies of the past, a "leap in being." Each of 
the historical leaps was accompanied by an analogous 
political order, so that the cosmological myth of antiquity 
forms the religio-political model for the mesocosm, which is 
the mediating political structure between gods and men.
In the undifferentiated compact world of antiquity 
(i.e., Egypt and Mesopotamia), religious institutions were 
also political institutions, and mythic rites had a 
political or social dimension. Pharaoh is the man who 
symbolizes the organic juncture between the gods of the 
cosmic order and the political realm, and, in his person he 
represents the order of the political reality. This compact 
experience is now lost in general in the mists of time and 
probably consisted of the genesis of political communities.
The first leap was the revelation to Israel of the 
transcendent God by Himself, whose order was also revealed 
through His revelation of Himself as separate from His 
creation and His delineation of Himself as the true t e l o s
117 A. Koulakis, "Political Reality and History...," p.125.
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for man. The Israelite order of revelation has the 
concomitant Kingdom of God as its political expression. And 
when the apocalyptic attempt is made to realize this kingdom 
on earth, the Israelite order compounds with the cosmic myth 
to form the Kingdom of Israel. The second leap was the 
Hellenic discovery of the order of wisdom which is 
symbolized in philosophy. The order of wisdom, expressed 
through philosophy, makes the individual who has attained 
knowledge of the ultimate reality that is the A g a t h o n  (the 
idea of Good) into the analogue of the polis through the 
anthropological principle that the polis is the man writ 
large.118
These symbolic forms of history--in various stages of
compactness and differentiation of the symbolic political
constructs--gave meaning to the fact of the existence of the
society in reality and made for each individual member of
that society a complete explanation of his existence within
the boundaries or limits of that society’s representation of
itself. However, when one says that a society creates
symbols to express its experience of order and therewith
constitutes itself as a society, it does not mean that
society is to be taken as a subject with a consciousness and
a capacity to interpret it with the help of symbols.
Voegelin’s position with regard to this point is that
experiences of order and their symbolic expression are "not
111 T he h i s t o r i c a l  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s  in t h e  a o d e s  of t he s e a r c h  fo r  a e a n i n g  in the s y a b o l i c  f o r a s  of 
h i s t o r y ,  d e s i g n a t e d  b y  V o e g e l i n  " t h e  l e a p s  in b e i n g , "  w i l l  be r e v i e w e d  a o r e  in d e t a i l  in t he next  
s e c t i o n ,  t i t l e d  " T h e o r y  o f  H i s t o r y . "
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the products of societies or cultures, but rather 
constitutive of these societies and cultures."119 According 
to Voegelin, as mentioned earlier, there can be no 
experience of any consciousness other than that of concrete 
human beings. "Constructions such as a ’collective
consciousness’ of a society, of humanity etc. are but 
hypostatic figments of the mind."120 The reality of the 
political order originally was engendered by the attempt to 
understand human existence and to express this understanding 
institutionally.
On the contrary, however, when the term reality is 
qualified by an adjective, such as political, this usually 
seems to be a reality of man’s own making and of which he 
also has or derives experience. At some time in the distant 
past of antiquity, man facing the cosmos in its compact, 
unselfconscious, or undifferentiated mode saw the mystery of 
the whole with awed consciousness and bent his will to 
create an analogous institutional structure to that which 
was not of his making. But the mesocosm was, and was not, 
of man’s making; it was of man’s making, insofar as the 
unselfconscious and undifferentiated consciousness followed 
what was seen to be a natural pattern already existing in 
the order of the cosmos; but it was not of man’s making, in 
that the mesocosm was patterned after a model devised by the 
unknown source of the ordered cosmos for man to imitate 
A. Houlakis, "Political Reality and History...," p.125.
>*' Ibid.
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( m i m e s i s ) . Thus, political reality in the form of mesocosm 
that represents the organic juncture between man and gods 
was a natural outgrowth of the cosmic myth. And men were 
born into the political order that represents a historical 
present.
This illumination is an essential part of man’s 
political existence within an order, and it is the single 
fact with which any political inquiry must begin. Thus, a 
theory of politics must start with an understanding of the 
rich body of self-interpretation of a society and proceed 
from there by means of a critical evaluation and 
clarification of the symbolism that explains the society to 
itself and to others before it can create an understanding 
of the symbols of political order.
Voegelin’s theory of representation in terms of 
symbolic forms can be divided into three categories: 
elemental representation, existential representation, and 
articulation.121 Representation in the elemental sense 
includes such major processes as the choice of a chief 
executive; the election of the members of a legislature by 
popular vote; the choice of a chief executive; the relations 
between the executive and legislative branches of government
121 I n  s u a a a r i s i n g  V o e g e l i n ’s t h e o r y  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  e s p e c i a l l y  r e g a r d i n g  to r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  in 
e l e a e n t a l  a n d  e x i s t e n t i a l  s e n s e s  a n d  a r t i c u l a t i o n ,  I as i n d e b t e d  to H a n s  A u f r i c h t ,  " A  H e s t a t e a e n t  of 
P o l i t i c a l  T h e o r y :  A N o t e  on V o e g e l i n ’s T he N e w  S c i e n c e  of P o l i t i c s , "  S.A. H c K n i g h t ,  e d ., Eric 
V o e g e l i n ’s Search for Order in History, p p . 4 7 -50.
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and the relation of both to the judiciary; the frequency of 
elections; the role of parties in the election process; and 
the process of legislation itself, etc. The observance of 
these electoral processes and political activities do not
y».
"automatically provide the desired substance" of the
symbolic form,122 no matter what the nature of the
representatives and of the represented, and of the
principles by which both are guided in their decisions. It 
is because these processes cover only the external 
realization of one special type of articulation and 
representation. In order to be truly representative it is 
not sufficient for any government to be representative in 
the elemental sense, or in the constitutional sense; it must 
also be "representative in the existential sense of 
realizing the idea of the institution"12 3 in terms of the 
state’s own interpretation of the meaning of its concrete 
existence as one state among many.
The principle perhaps can be clarified at a practical 
level by noting that there is a question, for example, as to 
whether the government of the Soviet Union is representative 
in the elemental sense. There seems to be little doubt that 
the Soviet government possesses the outward form of 
representative institutions as a state. But there is some 
doubt as to whether its constitution and elections are 
genuine when compared to, say, the American or the British
in nsp~~̂rf.
> »  Ibid., p . 51.
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constitutions and elections. Furthermore, there arises a 
question of whether the Soviet government is meaningful in 
that it truly represents the Russian people. But, while 
there "may be radical disagreement on whether the Soviet 
government represents the people, there can be no doubt 
whatsoever that the Soviet government represents the Soviet 
society as a political society in form for action in 
history. 2 4
Viewed from the Voegelin’s perspective, "existential 
representation and not elemental representation is the real 
test of the viability of representative institutions."125 
Failure to distinguish between the two forms of 
representation in the practice of states may lead, and 
actually has led, to a misunderstanding about the form and 
meaning of order and to domestic and international disorder. 
Such disorder is likely to occur when a state makes a policy 
decisions that spread "representative institutions in the 
elemental sense to areas where the existential conditions 
for their functioning"126 are absent. "In political theory 
and practice the question of ’who represents whom’ 
frequently arises. Voegelin illustrates the increase in the 
number of persons who are eligible to be representatives
i n t e r  a l i a  by reference to English political history."127_____
125 H. A u f r i c h t ,  "A R e s t a t e n e n t  of P o l i t i c a l  T h e o r y , "  p . 47.
125 HSP, p.51.
122 H. Aufri c h t ,  "A R e s t a t e n e n t  of P o l i t i c a l  T h e o r y , "  p . 47.
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In the first instance, the king was the only symbol of the 
existential order of the realm; in his person he was the 
realm and often was called "England." Later, there was an 
extension in the actual number of individuals who were 
called upon to represent the order of the realm in that the 
King-in-Council came to personify the realm of England. 
And, finally, it was the King-in-Parliament that now 
represents the realm as an entity ready for action in the 
political sphere. That is, a society can exist only when it 
has some form of tangible representative to act for it and 
in its name.
Voegelin’s articulation of the notion of existential 
representation shows that the symbolism of the 
representation of the people must be articulated by 
determining the number of persons who shall act as 
representatives and the people who constitute the
representable units. "[I]n the course of history, the range
of people who are being represented has in many countries
been widened until virtually all members of a political 
entity have become politically articulate."128 Voegelin 
designates the emergence of new representative and 
representable units of society as "articulation." A society 
articulates itself in a twofold sense: it determines the
person or persons who will act for it as representatives, 
and it determines the persons who constitute the
representable units. Articulation thus is prerequisite of
121 Ibid., p.48.
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or prior to representation and is a momentary end-point of a 
historical process through which the members of a society 
structure that society for action.129 The limit of
articulation is the clarified symbolism of existence in 
political reality, and, more important, of the individual 
consciousness of both symbolism and articulation. Voegelin 
notes that to be
conscious of something is an experiential process 
polarized by the cognitive tension between the knower 
and the known. The several meanings of reality can be 
made intelligible by going through the successive acts 
of reflection on the process of consciousness. If, 
in a first act of reflection on the process, we turn 
toward the pole of the known, the object of cognition 
will be something we acknowledge as real. If, in a 
second act, we turn toward the pole of the knower, the 
human carrier of cognition as well as his images and 
language symbols refering to the known, will move into 
the position of the something acknowledged to be real. 
And if, in a third act, we turn toward the experiential 
process and the cognitive tension as a whole, the 
process will become something we acknowledge to be 
real. Following the acts of reflection, the meaning 
of reality moves from the known to the knower and 
ultimately to the process that is structured by the 
participation of, and by the cognitive tension between 
the knower and the known in the experience.130
In knowing both symbolism and its expression within the 
political order that he inhabits the knower partakes of the 
existence of his society as a unit that requires 
representation, and the extension of representation to each 
unit is the end-point of articulation. The whole that is 
known as representation presents the final form of truth for
123 Ibid.
131 E. V o e g e l i n ,  "The E c l i p s e  of R e a l i t y , "  p . 187.
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a particular society, where the existential representation 
of the society is also the representative of truth.131
Another critical criterion of representation is, 
according to Voegelin, transcendental representation, or, 
more accurately, representation of a transcendental truth.
Voegelin points out that any society understands itself
representing a transcendental truth, and that the concept of 
representation in the existential sense is to be 
supplemented by the principle of representation of truth. 
Thus, the existential representative of a society is at the 
same time "its active leader in the representation of
truth."132 Wherever there is government by consent, i.e., 
if elemental representation by consent is present, it is 
assumed that the active citizens participate in the 
representation of an existence in truth. While the
articulation of society determines "who represents whom,"
the issues relating to the representation of truth center on 
the question of "who represents what"--i.e., who represents 
the true meaning of man in society. What is relevant here 
is, therefore, the question of what is truth. Here we need 
to look at the Voegelin’s consideration of the Platonic and 
Aristotelian insights of representation and truth.
131 USP, p.75. 
133 Ibid.
In relation to the theme of representation, Voegelin 
views that a political society rests on two principles that 
have been formulated by Plato: (1) the "anthropological
principle," which means that every society reflects the type 
of men of whom it is composed;133 and (2) the "theological 
principle," which implies that "God is the Measure"134 
rather than that "Man is the Measure." In elucidating the 
symbolism of society and representation the anthropological 
principle and the theological principle are mutually 
supplementary symbols; they bound together constitute 
standards, originally set forth by Plato and Aristotle.
The Platonic and Aristotelian insights are concerned 
mainly with the anthropocentric shift in emphasis that was 
inaugurated by Socrates. This shift was from the study of 
nature to the study of man as the center of his own 
existence, and the Platonic discovery of the political order 
of any community as the analogue of the order within the 
soul of the man who had attuned himself to the order of 
transcendent reality, and, as such was the measure and the 
standard of the political community and its societal order.
Plato’s anthropological principle is that order in the 
cosmos, the polis and the souls of individual men is 
interdependent and organically whole: "The order of man and
153 P l a t o ,  Republic, 36 8 C - D .
134 P l a t o ,  Lavs, 716C.
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society is part of the embracing cosmic order."135 
Therefore, society is man written large, and "The soul is a 
one-man polis and man is the ’statesman* who watches oyer 
its constitution."136 Plato’s insight is that the polis is 
the individual writ large and that, in its existential 
order, a political society reflects that order in terms of 
the psyche of the highest type of human being. Although 
existentially the state is more powerful and can deport or 
kill the individual, on a different level, the individual 
can prevail over the state. For example, Solzhenitsyn, 
through his person and his work, more adequately embodies 
some truths of human existence than does the contemporary 
Soviet state. He is a representative of human existence in 
the Soviet society.
For Plato, p o l i t e i a  refers not only to an institutional 
pattern, such as a particular regime, but also to the good 
order, or constitution, within the souls of the leading 
philosophers. The division and distinction that Plato makes 
between the various civic virtues of a political order is 
reflected also in the virtues of the societal elements that 
make up a society.137 Each element must possess
135 Off, I, p.5f 
13t Ibid., p.92.
133 Here we need to consider Plato’s theory of huaan nature. His theory of huaan nature starts with 
an analysis of justice and injustice. Plato holds that every aan is coaposed of two different 
ingredients: body and soul. Justice and injustice are in the soul just as health and disease are in 
the body. Health is defined as the establishaent of an order by nature aaong the parts of the body; 
disease as a disturbance of the natural order of rule and subordination aaong the parts. Justice is 
thus the establishaent of an order by nature in the soul in such a aanner that each part of the 
various parts of the soul fulfills its own function and does not interfere with the function of the 
other parts. The huaan soul can be divided into three parts: what Plato called the "rational
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predominantly the particular virtue that is characteristic 
of the element, as soldiers must possess, above all other 
virtues, the virtue of courage so that they may defend the 
political order against its enemies.
In relation to the theological principle, Plato flatly
contended that the proper study of mankind is God. No man
is ever perfectly just; only God is. Likewise, no man is
ever the transcendental Truth itself; only God is. Thus,
man cannot be the measure (m e t r e t i k e ) of all things as
Protagoras asserted. But, as says Voegelin, "[t]he truth of
man and the truth of God are inseparably one. Man will be
in truth of his existence when he has opened his psyche to
the truth of God."138 Since man’s experience of reality
occurs mainly in relation to man’s self-understanding of
God, man’s awareness of participation in a wider and greater
reality generates insights and their symbolic expressions
that constitute his order of existence. The movement of
man’s self-awareness occurs as an aspect of the movement of
man’s God-awareness. Thus, in discovering his lack of
knowledge man actually come closer to God, the divine
e l e m e n t ," t h e  " s p i r i t e d  e l e m e n t ,* a n d  t he " a p p e t i t i v e  e l e a e n t . "  T h e  r a t i o n a l  e l e a e n t  is t h a t  p a r t  of 
a a a n ’s s o u l  w h i c h  e n a b l e s  h i m  to r e a s o n ,  to d e l i b e r a t e  a n d  so f o rth. T h e  s p i r i t e d  e l e a e n t  is w h a t  
B a k e s  a B a n  c o u r a g e o u s  o r  c o w a r d l y ,  a n d  t he a p p e t i t i v e  e l e a e n t  c o n s i s t s  of h i s  d e s i r e s  a n d  p a s s i o n s ,  
s u c h  as t h e  d e s i r e  f or food, d r i n k ,  s e x  a n d  so on. In t e r a s  of t h i s  h i e r a r c h i c a l  t h r e e - f o l d  d i v i s i o n  
of t h e  sou l ,  P l a t o  a r g u e d  t h a t  it is j u s t  w h e n  o r  if t he t h r e e  p a r t s  of t he soul f u n c t i o n  
h a r a o n i o u s l y .  J u s t i c e  is t h a t  d i s p o s i t i o n  o f  t he w e l l - o r d e r e d  soul b y  n a t u r e  o f  w h i c h  e a c h  p a r t  
f u l f i l l s  its p r o p e r  f u n c t i o n .  J u s t i c e  is t h e r e f o r e  a s t a t e  o r  c o n d i t i o n  in w h i c h  a ll p a r t s  of a who l e  
a r e  r i g h t l y  r e l a t e d  to e a c h  o t h e r  a nd w o r k i n g  h a r a o n i o u s l y  t o g e t h e r  to a c h i e v e  t h e  c o a a o n  end. E a c h  
p a r t  is d o i n g  its o w n  b u s i n e s s - - n o t  t h e  " ay o w n  t h i n g "  of c u r r e n t  p a r l a n c e ,  b u t  w h a t  e a c h  is s u p p o s e d  
to be d o i n g  a c c o r d i n g  to n a t u r e .  T h a t  is, e a c h  is d o i n g  w h a t  it w a s  a a d e  to do, o r  w h a t  it n e e d s  to 
d o  if t h e  w h o l e  is to be B a ved. See, P l a t o ,  Republic, B o o k  IV, 4 2 7 - 4 4 4 .
131 HSP, p.69.
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reality. In ascending from the realm of shadows to the 
realm of ideas and ultimately to the vision of the a g a t h o n  
itself, man actually achieves the transcendental 
constitution of the soul. As an object of becoming, human 
beings become to discern and realize what is good and what 
is evil. Therefore, even though man himself cannot be the 
measure of anything, man who has experienced and realized 
the ultimate reality of the beyond can be the measure of 
society, of political order. The Platonic anthropological 
principle and theological principle bound together imply 
that man "can be the measure of society because God is the 
measure of his soul."139 In other words, because the Beyond 
of all mundane existence is the source and standard of order 
within the soul of man, the man who has experienced and 
realized the ultimate reality of the Beyond is the measure 
of political order and human existence. The truth of God 
will become manifest in history to the extent that man’s 
psyche is capable of grasping the truth of the divine, 
eternal world rather than that of the phenomenal world.
The philosopher who has the experience of the ultimate 
reality of the a g a t h o n  is the measure of all political 
institutions because, within the complex of his experience 
of the a g a t h o n , he has formed "his character into habitual 
actualization of the dianoetic and ethical virtues" and thus 
is capable of the "imaginative re-enactment of the
lss Ibid., p . 70.
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experience of which theory is an explication."140 To this 
type of man, Plato transferred the authority of the 
political order of polis because the philosopher has 
attained the serenity of spiritual order within his soul and 
thus is able to pronounce on existential matters with the 
authority of knowledge of what is good both for the 
individual and for his society, thus covering both the 
private and the public orders of the individual and his 
political order. Voegelin remarks that, surprising as this 
transfer of authority may seem to many, "Plato’s claim has 
proved historically quite sound. The order represented by 
Callicles has gone down in ignominy: the order represented
by Plato has survived Athens and is still one of the most 
important ingredients in the order of the soul of those men 
who have not renounced the tradition of Western 
civilization."141 Plato’s cardinal conviction underscores 
his perception of the greatness and achievement of Socrates: 
"The order of the soul as revealed through Socrates has, 
indeed, become the new order of relations between God and 
man."x 4 2
Aristotle’s anthropology is very close to that of 
Plato. For Aristotle the true nature of man in order is to 
achieve the highest good or happiness, e u d a i m o n i a .  The good 
of man is the function of his soul in accordance with its
144 Ibid,, p.67.




own excellence. Happiness can be found in various ways of 
life. There are several excellences of man including 
ethical excellence and dianoetic excellence. But true 
happiness can only be achieved by the life of reason, 
contemplation, b i o s  t h e o r e t i k o s ,  which is risen through the 
dianoetic excellences. A good society, in the Aristotelian 
sense, is a society in which the e u d a i m o n i a  of man can be 
realized. Thus the existence of a good society depends on 
the group of men who are predominant in the society. The 
predominant group of men is the "norm and measure" in 
Aristotle’s sense.
Aristotle identified the s p o u d a i o s  as the best man and 
connects individual and society to the b i o s  t h e o r e t i k o s  as 
the best life and as the e u d a i m o n i a  for both individual and 
society. The society that corresponds to this man is called 
the s p o u d a i a  p o l i s  (literally, the mature polis), which is 
that political community that achieves the highest societal 
good, the p o l i s  e u d a i m o n .  Although the society as a whole 
is a reflection of the s p o u d a i o s , the inhabitants are not 
all capable of reaching the heights that the s p o u d a i o s  can 
attain. It is noteworthy that the mature man is the 
"representative" of everyman, and the masses have the right 
to demand of him that he present to them his answers to the 
unfathomable mystery of human existence and the relation 
between the being of man and the Being of transcendence. In 
this sense, philosophy is "not a solitary but a social 
enterprise. Its results concern everyman; it is undertaken
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by the sapiens representatively for everyman. More
specifically the represented have the right to receive 
answers not only to their own questions but also to hear 
answers to brilliant and well propagated errors which 
threaten to disintegrate the order of existence in everyman 
personally. "i 4 3
For Plato and Aristotle, the notion n o u s  of man is 
cognate with the divine N o u s  by way of the l o g o s  (law, 
reasoning power). And man must seek the divine N o u s  through 
the z e t e m a  (philosophical inquiry) in order that he may 
experience in his soul the inner balance that will allow him 
to live in accordance with reason and virtue. Furthermore, 
it is the task of the political order so to structure its 
institutions that it will encourage the attainment of the 
life of reason. Society must actively support the z e t e m a  
that seeks the divine N o u s  that is substantial to the world 
of things and lives and minds, that finds in the soul 
something similar to divine reality, that searches for the 
ethic that places man’s t e l o s  in the knowledge of the ground 
of all being. For the seekers who attain to such knowledge
are those that can determine what is the right order for a
society, for they are both measure and standard for the
classification of the empirical varieties of social 
institutions as well as the private morality of the
inhabitants of the society. In essence, the seekers are the 
representatives of their society in that they are the best 
143 E. Voegelin, "On Debate and Existence," p.144.
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that their society can produce and the structure of this 
society must reflect the order that it has itself produced 
in the psyches of its best men.
The anthropological and theological principles can be 
summarized as follows: (1) the character of a given
political order is the reflection of the psyche of its
ruling elite; (2) the best society will reflect the pattern 
of right order of the psyche of the best man in its
institutional order; (3) the best man is the person who has 
attained knowledge of the truth of the divine reality that 
is the measure of man, and applied the measure to himself, 
and, through himself, to the political order. The
anthropology of Plato and Aristotle becomes a political 
science because it is inquiring into order and disorder in 
society through a study of the state of the individual soul 
which expresses itself in the corresponding state of
society. A polis is in order when it is ruled by men with 
well-ordered souls; it is in disorder when the souls of the 
rulers are disordered. In this sense, not only the good 
polis is man writ large, but every polis writes large the 
type of man that is socially dominant in it. Plato’s good 
polis is the philosopher written large, while corrupt 
society is "the greatest of all sophists." It is in this 
light that we must view the conflict between the true 
philosophers, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, and their 
opponents the Sophists.
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For Plato and Aristotle, the true philosopher is the 
law-giver of society; the sophist is the false prophet who 
corrupts the souls of its citizens and on a parochially 
empirical level destroys the just order of society. The 
philosopher is the man who attempts to establish right order 
in his soul through resistance to the diseased soul of the 
society; the man who can evoke a paradigm of right social 
order in the image of his well-ordered soul, in opposition 
to the disorder of society which reflects the disorder of 
the sophist’s soul. The disorder of society is a disease in 
the souls of its members. And the disorder of the human 
souls is a disease of society. Ultimately, the spirit of 
man (the personal soul) and the nature of society (the body 
politic) are identical. Evidently society depends on 
individuals and vice versa: that is, good societies produce
good men, good men good societies. And, as Voegelin writes,
Society can destroy a man’s soul because the disorder 
of society is a disease in the psyche of its members. 
The troubles which the philosopher experiences in his 
own soul are the troubles in the psyche of the 
surrounding society which press on him. And the 
diagnosis of health and disease in the soul is, 
therefore, at the same time a diagnosis of order and 
disorder in society... Justice is sometimes spoken of 
as the virtue of a single man, sometimes of a polis.144
Indeed, Plato "plays back and forth, in the R e p u b l i c ,  
between the order in the polis and the order of the soul, 
illuminating the one by the other."145 Since justice is the 
i" OH, IIlTT̂ O.
145 Ibid., p . 88.
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right relationship of each person with his nature or rather 
the right correspondence of human action with natural order, 
man ought not to live as the civil society orders but as 
nature orders--in Biblical teaching, God orders. That is, 
justice is natural, and societies ought to conform it. But 
in any given civilization the conventional— or, historically 
existing--societies say that justice is conventional or made 
by society. Perhaps the conventional societies seem to 
defend this view with good reason, for Platonic justice, as 
many modern inquirers and the public in general believe, 
appears to exist nowhere in the world.
However, this unreflective presumption is due to the 
misunderstanding of the purpose of the classical political 
philosophy. One of the purposes of Platonic political 
philosophy is to account for deviations in human conduct by 
pointing out the source of injustice. But it also points 
out the way to remedy it-— if not in entire societies, then 
at least in one’s own society, the soul. In order to 
discover what is good for the society, one must look into 
the individual lives of those who compose it. This means 
that the domination of individuals by society, which is 
ordinarily encountered in the world, is a serious distortion 
of right order. Therefore, the interest of political 
phil osophy in saving societies is subordinate to the 
interest in saving individual souls. But what if all or 
most of the individuals in a society were or became
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philosophers? This could never happen because the multitude 
is not philosophical. Only a few or only one man can be 
really philosophical, according to Plato. And this is 
beneficial to society because if many were philosophers 
social order may even break down. The best arrangement or 
the best society is, thus, Aristocracy,146 government by the 
best, in which the many follow the lead of the few 
philosophers. In this respect, Plato’s philosophy is not a 
philosophy but the symbolic act of salvation for the 
philosopher himself and others. It is the ascent toward the 
salvation for everyman and the society.
In this sense, Plato appears to be a religious figure,
theologically-inclined, concerned about gods and invisible
beings. This certainly complicates Plato for modern
scholars nurtured on positivistic empiricism. However, once
again, what Plato founded was political philosophy and not
religion or a system of worship. The discipline with which
we associate him was a "rule of reason"--reason in the
comprehensive sense, i.e., n o u s , or r a t i o .  As we have seen
Platonic political philosophy points beyond this phenomenal
life to eternity. It is because Platonic political
philosophy ultimately concerned with realities not
experienced in phenomenal or positivistic sense but
experienced in eternal, transcendental, metaphysical or
philosophical sense. In some sense, death is therefore more
Mt The word, "Aristocracy" is coined by Plato hiaself. Though there were states of this kind in 
existence which he instances, they called themselves aristocracies; Plato, however, wishes to keep the 
word Aristocracy for the best polis where the rulers are really the best.
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significant for Platonic philosophy than life. But it is 
not biological death. Death is not an biological end but is 
the true beginning, or rebirth, to a life beyond which is 
more real than our physical and phenomenal existence.
The estrangement between conventional societies and 
philosophers reflects the problem of cosmic dualism, or the 
inevitable tension between time and eternity, between good 
and evil, a m o r  D e i  and a m o r  S u i , between orientations to 
this mundane world and the extra-mundane world, and the 
transcendent-immanent tension of being as an In-Between 
reality. For Plato, however, the Idea or the Form is his 
reality. The good polis is thus not an ideal state; rather, 
in his sense, the historically existing societies that 
alienate themselves from philosophy are the corruption of 
reality.
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4. T H E O R Y  OF H I S T O R Y
HJLai.QXX—
In Voegelin*s view, the aim of history is not 
antiquarian, nor yet pragmatic. As he says, history is not 
a "chronological encyclopedia," but the "unfolding of a 
pattern of meaning in time."147 His examination of the 
historical and social order of existence in community should 
be seen "not as an attempt to explore curiosities of a dead 
past, but as an inquiry into the structure of the order in 
which we live presently."148 Voegelin writes:
For the ray of light that penetrates from a historical 
present into its past does not produce a "meaning of 
history" that could be stored away as a piece of 
information once for all, nor does it gather in a 
"legacy" or "heritage" on which the present could sit 
contentedly. It rather reveals a mankind striving for 
its order of existence within the world while attuning 
itself with the truth of being beyond the world, and 
gaining in the process not a substantially better order 
within the world but an increased understanding of the 
gulf that lies between immanent existence and the 
transcendent truth of being. Canaan is as far away 
today as it has always been in the past. Anybody who 
has ever sensed this increase of dramatic tension in 
the historical present will be cured of complacency, 
for the light that falls over the past deepens the 
darkness that surrounds the future. He will shudder 
before the abysmal mystery of history as the instrument 
of divine revelation for ultimate purposes that are 
unknown equally to the men of all ages.149
HJ E. Voegelin, "Political Theory and the Pattern of General History," Aaerican Political Science
Reviev, 38 (1944), p.748.
111 OH, I, p.xiv.
149 Ibid., p . 129.
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This unique conception of history crystallized by
Voegelin goes against the parochial conception of history
developed by the schools of historical thoughts— i.e.,
liberal, evolutionary, and positivistic schools--which
emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and have
dominated so thoroughly the discussion of historical
problems that many people seem unaware that another
venerable interpretation of history exists.150 As a result
of the modern pragmatic conception of history, there emerged
two kinds of history.151 One is the erroneous and misguided
closure of history into a system which can be observed from
the outside. It is a "historiography that limits itself to
the phenomenological description of mental realities of the
past and that results in the doxagraphic presentation of
doctrines isolated from the motivating experiences behind
them."152 To use Voegelin’s words, it is "historical
constructions reflecting a deformed existence." The other
is the rubbish heap of "mere information," the gathering of
"empirical materials." Voegelin calls it the "sausage view"
of history, for this view sees the "present," as a kind of
machinery grinds out an ever lengthening "past."153
158 See FETR, Chapter One; Russell Kirk, Enemies of the Permanent Things: Observations of Abnormity in 
Literature and Politics (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1969), pp.259-63; and, Larry Schmidt,
"Eric Voegelin’s Contribution to a Theology of History," in John Kirby and Killian H. Thompson, eds., 
Voegelin and the Theologian: Ten Studies in the Interpretation (Toronto: Edwin Hellen Press, 1983), 
pp.291-295.
151 A. Houlakis, "Political Reality and History...," p.131.
152 Ibid., p.130.
155 OH, IV, p . 332.
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What becomes evident from this parochial conceptions of 
history is that history is exposed to the danger of 
reification as other fields of experience. The
hypostatically reified historian is the mere recorder of a 
history structured by events. Such a conception rests, 
according to Voegelin, on a erroneous assumption that outer 
time constitutes an autonomous realm of Being. In fact, 
"time is but the dimension of duration of the astrophysical 
universe, a dimension which can therefore be measured by the 
patterns of movement of the universe. But the astrophysical 
universe is not identical with Being. It is itself a 
process within the entirety of Being ( t o  p a n )  even though 
its duration outdistances our transient human existence by 
very far indeed."154 "Things do not happen in the
astrophysical universe; the universe together with all 
things founded in it happens in God."155 Once again, 
therefore, history is not simply the activity of a subject 
studying objects "out there," susceptible to treatment by 
the natural scientific methods.
To seek to avoid the pitfalls of the truncated view of 
history, Voegelin conceives the history of order as "an 
insightful looking back over a course of events, that is 
made present to consciousness not as a non-committal 
collection of facts, but as a formative element of the order 
of consciousness itself. It is when, and only when, past
154 A. Houlakis, "Political Reality and History...,’ p.130.
155 OH, IV, p.334.
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events become present to consciousness in this manner, 
significantly affecting its structure, that they are raised 
to the rank of ’history’."156 In the first volume of his
m a g n u m  o p u s ,  O r d e r  a n d  H i s t o r y ,  which is entitled I s r a e l  a n d
R e v e l a t i o n ,  Voegelin declares, "[h]istory is the revelation 
of the way of God with man."157 He believes that history is 
the record of human existence under God, meaningful only so 
far as it reflects, explains and illustrates the order of 
the soul and of society which emanates from divine purpose.
History creates mankind as the community of men who, 
through the ages, approach the true order of being that
has its origin in God; but, at the same time, mankind
creates this history through its real approach to 
existence under God.158
For Voegelin "[h]istory has no knowable meaning ( e i d o s  or
essence)."159 Sustaining this view, Sandoz says, "although
meaning i n  history can be discerned in finite lines of
development, the meaning of history in its entirety remains
shrouded in mystery."160 Since "[m]an’s partnership in
being is the essence of his existence,"161 history should be
understood "from the perspective of participation, upon the
158 A. Houlakis, "Political Reality and History..,," p.129. See also, Anaanesis (Geraan), pp.318-19, 
English version, p.178.
15T Off, I, p.128.
888 Ibid.
158 Off, II, p.2.
188 E. Sandoz, The Voegelinian Revolution, p p . 111-112.
181 OR, I, p . 2.
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basis of man’s experiences as a partner in being, because 
this is man’s place in the structure of being; there is no 
alternative vantage point, no other role to play.”162 What 
Voegelin’s view of history means is, as Webb remarks, that 
"history in the proper sense of the word--history as lived 
by one who attends and responds to the calling implicit in 
the experienced tension of existence--is a process of 
gradually emerging existential truth, of development, that 
is, into conscious existence attuned both cognitively and 
ethically to the structure of reality."163 The historical 
consciousness of society is not a body of factual knowledge 
somehow disseminated among the members of that society, but 
a constituent of the society’s present as perceived to be 
meaningful in the light of man’s experience of participatory 
existence. Voegelin says:
Human existence in society has history because it has 
a dimension of spirit and freedom beyond mere animal 
existence, because social order is an attunement of 
man with the order of being, and because this order 
can be understood by man and realized in society with 
increasing approximations to its truth. Every society 
is organized for survival in the world and, at the same 
time, for partnership in the order of being that has 
its origin in world-transcendent divine Being; it has 
to cope with the problems of its pragmatic existence 
and, at the same time, it is concerned with the truth 
of its order. The struggle for the truth of order is 
the very substance of history.164
18Z E. Sandoz, The Voegelinian Revolution, p.124. E. Sandoz, "Voegelin’s Idea of Historical Form," 
Cross Currents, 12:1 (Winter 1962), p,48.
1,5 B. Webb, Eric Voegelin, p . 49.
184 Off, II, p . 2.
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In short, Voegelin*s formulation of the basic conception of
history is that it is "a process of increasingly
differentiated insight into the order of being in which man
participates by his existence."165 This means that "[w]hat
happens ’in’ history is the very process of differentiating
consciousness that constitutes history."166 For Voegelin,
therefore, "history is differentiated as a form of
existence," and the purpose of history is to reveal to man
and society the true nature of being. Therefore, to
Voegelin history is not the mere knowledge of things past,
but the symbolic articulation of man’s experience of
participation in the process of reality which is incarnated
as temporal process of the tension of existence in its
orientation toward the divine beyond of existence. In this
sense, history is identical with philosophy. As Webb says,
both "history and philosophy are processes that take place
in a field of tension between existential truth and
untruth."167 "[History] is the very tension," says
Voegelin, "in which the philosopher lives and moves...His
concern is, therefore, not with truth as a bit of
information that has escaped his contemporaries, but as a
pole in the tension of order and disorder, of reality and
loss of reality, he experiences as his own."168 
_ _ _ _ _ ...
»*• Ibid., p. 332 .
HT E. Webb, Eric Voegelin, p.50.
151 E. V o e g e l i n ,  " I a a o r t a l i t y : E x p e r i e n c e  and S y m b o l ," p . 250.
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As we have seen earlier, the historical dimension of 
the process of consciousness consists in the record of 
people who have expressed their experiences of reality in 
symbols. The symbols cannot be understood without
penetration to the depth of the particular experience of 
existence and the manner in which it was represented through 
the engendering of symbols, for each symbolization is an 
attempt to answer a question about existence. The search 
for the meaning of symbols, therefore, is the history of the 
search for emergent truths about man’s fundamental problems.
The quaternarian structure of being consisting of God, 
man, world and society indicates both the starting point of 
Voegelin’s philosophy of history and the range within which 
the inquiry moves. The study of these symbolizations 
provides an avenue to the understanding of history, for it 
is through these symbols that societies express their own 
understanding of the order of being. The historical 
sequence of these symbolizations is therefore the key to the 
history of order, from which "the order of history 
emerges."169 The history of order means the inquiry into 
symbolically expressed, socially constitutive experiences of 
order as they have manifested themselves concretely in the 
course of time. However, the order of history in Voegelin’s 
sense is not a structure of progress from primitive, 
backward times to a "higher" order of civilization. Rather, 
it shows "men of the same nature as ours wrestling with the 
ISS OH, I, p.l.
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same problems as ours" under conditions that differ and with 
"less differentiated instruments of symbolization."170
According to Voegelin, the search for order takes place 
within the framework of three general principles: (1) the
nature of man is constant; (2) the range of human experience 
is always present in the fullness of its dimensions; and,
(3) the structure of the range varies from compactness to 
differentiations.171 The Aristotelian symbolism of
"essence" or "nature" as being that without which a thing 
would not be what it is, defines human nature as constant.
For man is man, what makes him a man is "human nature."
This nature does not change, for, if so, man would not be 
man. What differs over time is not human nature but man’s 
understanding of the range of experience and his symbols in 
which he expresses the range. In short, what changes in 
history is not human nature but man’s consciousness of 
order. Voegelin contends that man’s experience of reality 
moves from compact to more differentiated experiences, and 
what the sequence of symbolizations reveals is the 
development from compact to differentiated forms. The 
development from compact to differentiated forms of 
consciousness is a fundamental discovery of Voegelin’s 
philosophy of history. Therefore, the study of the history 
of order is the study of the symbolization of an 
understanding that lifted mankind from an earlier compactrrip.Hi.
1T1 Off, I, p.60.
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order to a more fully differentiated one. Although these
differentiations occur mainly in relation to man’s self-
understanding of God, they may have profound implications 
for the entire quaternarian structure of being of which man 
is just a part.
Ih o.
The symbolic forms of political organization in any 
given civilizations reflect the particular manner in which a 
particular society experiences its own participation in 
being and the society arranges its institutions in 
accordance with the experience. Man participates in a
cosmos, i.e., in a reality by his existence and is "endowed
with cognitive consciousness of the reality in which he is a 
partner; consciousness differentiates in a process called 
history; and in the process of history man discovers reality 
to be engaged in a movement toward the Beyond of its present 
structure."172 However, as Voegelin holds, an increasing 
awareness of the inadequacy of "unseemly" symbolization 
causes men to seek a deeper and a wider understanding of the 
truth. This seeking consists in stages of movement in man’s 
understanding of the mystery of his own participation in 
being.
For Voegelin the word "leap in being" means the
experience giving rise to historical form. It also means
the various experiential stages that move mankind along the ______
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path of creating more adequate symbols of truth. Each leap
in being develops from an increasing awareness of the
emergence of meaning in which man’s participation in divine
being is experienced. This means that the leap in being is
the result of a spiritual outburst of understanding that is
reflected in the political communities of man. Therefore,
the "leap in being, the experience of divine being as world-
transcendent, is inseparable from the understanding of man
as human."173 The leap in being is also "the epochal event
that breaks the compactness of the early cosmological myth
and establishes the order of man in his immediacy under
God."174 However, the leap in being is not to be understood
as "a leap out of existence. The emphatic partnership with
God does not abolish partnership with the community of being
at large, which includes being in mundane existence."175
With the leap in being, the horizon of history opens and
enlarges; man and society enter into existence in historical
form, and man will come to know his nature in the new mode
of explicit, differentiated symbolization. Therefore, the
historical dimension of human nature is "an essential
component of man, [but] its presence rises to the level of
consciousness only through the leap in being."176 In short,
the leap in being is a historical experience and occurs in______
174 OH, II, p.l.
175 OH, I, p.11.
171 OH, II, p . 2.
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certain well-defined stages of movement. We will focus here 
on the fundamental differentiations in consciousness.177
The primeval form of symbolization of reality is the 
cosmological myth which is the "first symbolic form created 
by societies when they rise above the level of tribal 
organization."178 This cosmological form of experience is 
defined as "the symbolization of political order by means of 
cosmic analogies. The life of man and society is
experienced as ordered by the same forces of being which 
order the cosmos, and cosmic analogies both express this 
knowledge and integrate social into cosmic order."179 This 
level is the compact world in which gods and man, world and 
society form the single community of existence and man knows 
the divine ground of being through the fact of his 
participation. There is a singular correspondence between 
the government of the cosmos and the government of human 
society, between the structure of the universe by the gods 
and of the structure of human society by men, for "to 
establish a government is an essay in world creation. When 
man creates the cosmion of political order, he analogically 
repeals the divine creation of the cosmos."180 The major, 
primary experience of man is consubstantiality of being with
111 In reviewing Voegelin's articulation of the leap in being, I an indebted to E.H, Wainwright, "Eric 
Voegelin: an Inquiry into the Philosophy of Order,* Politikon, 5:1 (June 1978), pp.83-90.




the Being of divine order. Man translates this experience 
of the substantive oneness of being into the political 
mesocosm that reflects the oneness insofar as a concrete 
thing is able to reflect an intangible feeling.
The cosmos "of the primary experience is neither the 
external world of objects given to a subject of cognition, 
nor is it the world that has been created by a world- 
transcendent God. Rather, it is the whole, t o  p a n , of an 
earth below and a heaven above— of celestial bodies and 
their movements; of seasonal changes; of fertility rhythms 
in plant and animal life; of human life, birth and death; 
and above all, as Thales still knew, it is a cosmos full of 
gods."181 This last point must be emphasized: that the gods 
are intracosmic, for the facile categorizations of 
polytheism and monotheism miss the main point of a world 
that is permeated by divinity. Within such a world, the 
actual number of gods is relatively unimportant, the 
emphasis is on man’s consciousness of divine reality as 
something that is intracosmic; not transmundane, but a 
consciousness of divinity pervading the whole of being, and 
this concept includes man himself. And within this 
divinized world, the divine ground is immanent throughout. 
In all being there exists the chains of an epiphany of 
divinity, in all sight, in all thought, and in all deeds 
which is a beginning and an end in itself. Ancient man 
discovered within this epiphany a universal revelation upon
181 OH, IV, p.687
which he based his "political mesocosm."182 In a word, at 
the level of the "primary experience of the cosmos," divine 
reality is experienced as intracosmic; the order of the 
cosmos is reflected in the mundane order.
For instance, in Mesopotamia the empire in its spatial 
organization was regarded as the archetype of the order of 
the cosmos, on the principle of the correspondence between 
macrocosm and microcosm.183 Egyptian culture was also 
grounded in the consubstantiality of the divine order with 
the Pharaonic order.184 In the early Egyptian society the 
divine order of the cosmos was mediated by the Pharaoh who 
was the mythic son of the cosmic gods. Thus, the Pharaoh 
was the nexus between the cosmic order and the social order. 
Pharaonic order was a continuous renewal and reenactment of 
the cosmic order from eternity.185 Through Pharaoh, in whom 
the presence of god was manifest, the most humble subject 
participated in the "timeless serenity" of cosmic order. 
Voegelin holds that "We began our history of order not with 
Israel, but with the Mesopotamian and Egyptian empires, 
because in retrospect the struggle for order in the medium 
of cosmological symbols appeared to be the first phase in 
the search for the true order of being that was carried one
1.2 E. Wainwright, "The Zeteaa of Eric Voegelin.,,," p.46.
1.3 Off, I, pp.25ff.
114 Ibid., p.70.
185 Ibid., p . 78.
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step further by Israel."186 But the attunement of society 
with transcendent reality was never achieved in the Egyptian 
compact experience. The transcendence could become the 
ordering force of a religious or philosophical personality 
who, in turn, could become the center of a new type of 
community.
Since the "compact experience of cosmological order 
proved to be tenacious,"187 there occurred a number of 
"spiritual outbursts" which led to a break with the 
cosmological order and the perception of a truer way of 
life. Voegelin mentions four of these leaps in being. 
First came that of Israel, through Moses and the prophets; 
next that of Greece, through the great philosophers from 
Parmenides to Aristotle; then India, through the Buddha and 
Mahavaria; finally, China, through Confucious and Lao-tze. 
Voegelin shows that the two latter leaps have remained 
somewhat incomplete and focuses his attention on Israel and 
Greece, the analysis of which is itself a breakthrough in 
historical scholarship.188
The compact form of experience began to differentiate 
in the Israelite experience of revelation. "Through the
.
187 Ibid., p.lll.
188 The discovery of the universal humanity of man can be sometimes identified as the final leap in 
the Western civilisation. The leap into the concept of universal humanity is derived from the 
establishment of the ecumenic empires, which were only organisational forms that reached out for a 
spiritual substance that would fill them, and which they found in the universal religions. In 
relation to the establishment of the ecumenic empires, I will review rather in the next chapter which 
focuses mainly on the modernity and gnostic disorder.
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leap in being, that is, through the discovery of 
transcendent being as the source of order in man and 
society, Israel constituted itself the carrier of a new 
truth in history." The first leap in being is derived from 
the "differentiating experience of a world-transcendent 
divine being,"189 where the "interplay of experiences in the 
struggle of the spirit for its freedom from encasement in a 
particular social organization"190 leads to the 
establishment of a particular community (i.e., Israel) as a 
people under God. The constitution of a community under God 
who revealed Himself to man was the construction of the 
beginning of a "paradigmatic world-history," which took its 
materials from the "variegated contents of myth and 
history,"191 and moved man from a position of cosmic myth 
into historical consciousness.
This first leap culminated in Moses’ hierophany on Mt. 
Sinai of the burning bush and the "I am; that is who I am." 
These revelatory experiences are a clear break with the 
intracosmic experience of the divine. With this experience 
of transcendent God, the cosmological social order is also 
changed. Moses concludes his experiences with a covenant 
which breaks the Israelite’s ties to the cosmological 
Pharaonic order. For the Israelite the mediator between the 
Divine order and the social order is now the covenant
iTTo7~i7 p.it
»*• Ibid., p.183.
1,1 I b i d , , p . 185.
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(b e r i t h ). The leap in being at this level is associated
with two symbols: e x o d u s  and b e r i t h .  The e x o d u s  denotes the 
separation of the particular community from its bondage to 
the cosmological myth of Egypt, and the b e r i t h  opposes the 
authenticity of the experience of an intangible, unseen, 
spiritual divinity to the concrete compactness of a 
divinized world.
Traditionally, the b e r i t h  was associated with Abram who 
became Abraham, whose "spiritual sensitiveness" to the 
revelation of God created an "order of existence in
opposition to the world" and transformed "the symbol of 
civilizational bondage" to the compact and ordered cosmos of 
a divine oneness of being into the "symbol of divine 
liberation."192 This original b e r i t h  was fulfilled when 
Moses led the "Chosen People" out of bondage to the s h e o l
(realm of the dead) of Egypt into the desert where they 
could be moulded into a people that would be capable of 
experiencing a divinity external to man. The Israelite 
experience awakened the universalist potentialities193 of 
Yahweh’s revelation to Moses that lay dormant in the 
tradition. Thus Voegelin says, "[w]ithout Israel there
would be no history, only the eternal recurrence of
133 Ibid., p.195.
153 The existence of the coaaunity is freed (exodus) froa the constricting bonds of the cosnological 
ayth as it aoves into the experience of living in the historical fora and is no longer bound by the 
structuring cosaic ayths of the universe, but by God who created the universe. The people of Israel 
took this step into history as representatives of all Ben, even though "the universalist iaplications 
of the experience were never successfully explicated within Israelite history." Ibid., p.164,
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societies in cosmological form."194 To the Israelite 
people, the existence or non-existence of the kingdom was 
irrelevant to "life in righteousness before the Lord." 
Their mission was to recall Israel to the covenant mode of 
existence which was transparent for the order of 
transcendent reality.
The other important differentiation in man’s 
experience, or the second leap occurs in ancient Greece 
among the mystic philosophers to culminate in Plato’s 
differentiation. While the cosmological order understands 
men as living in a natural and social cosmos that is "full 
of gods," the "spiritual outburst" consists in a human 
experience of participation in a transcendent divinity 
beyond both the natural and social tangible existence. The 
experience has the character of a discovery, not only of the 
transcendent god but also of that in man which can respond 
to and participate in, the divine.195 The discovery results 
in a depreciation of the cosmological symbols of order and 
the perception and practice of a "new life," which appears 
as a leap in being, rising above what went before. In the 
Greek differentiation, however, the symbolic form of 
existence in truth is not revelation which is the 
paradigmatic history of Israelite consciousness, but 
philosophy which finds its optimal expression in the
185 G. Nieaeyer, "Eric Voegelin’s Philosophy and the Drana of Mankind," Modern dge, 20:1 (Winter 
1976), p.29.
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dialectic of the Platonic dialogue. The discovery of 
philosophy as a symbolic form is not as radical a break with 
the experience of the primary symbol of the cosmological 
myth as is Israelite revelation, for in Israel God is in 
search of man, while in Hellas man is in search of God. The 
motivating centers of leap in being can be circumscribed 
through comparisons between the Hellenic and the Israelite 
experiences, as developed by Voegelin:
The Hellenic consciousness of history is motivated by 
the experience of a crisis; the society itself, as well 
as the course of its order, is constituted in 
retrospect from its end. The Israelite consciousness 
of history is motivated by the experience of a divine 
revelation; the society is constituted through the 
response to revelation, and from this beginning it 
projects its existence into the open horizon of time. 
The Hellenic consciousness arrives, through the 
understanding of disorder, at the understanding of true 
order— that is the process for which Aeschylus has 
found the formula of wisdom through suffering; the 
Israelite consciousness begins, through the Message and 
Decalogue from Sinai, with the knowledge of true order. 
The Mosaic and prophetic leap in being creates the 
society in which it occurs in historical form for the 
future; the philosophic leap in being discovers the 
historical form, and with it the past, of the society 
in which it occurs. Such contrapuntal formulations 
will bring into focus the essential difference between 
the historical forms that are developed respectively by 
Revelation and Philosophy. The word, the d a b a r ,  
immediately and fully reveals the spiritual order of 
existence, as well as its origin in transcendent-divine 
being, but leaves it to the prophet to discover the 
immutability and recalcitrance of the world-immanent 
structure of being; the philosopher’s love of wisdom 
slowly dissolves the compactness of cosmic order until 
it has become the order of world-immanent being beyond 
which is sensed, though never revealed, the unseen 
transcendent measure.196
»*• Off, II, p.52.
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The Greek experience of differentiation moves into the 
noetic mode of thinking and of the attunement of individual 
person to divine being. The attunement is derived from the 
insight that man must and can be measured by the highest 
order of existence within him through his participation in 
the divine reality, as elucidated in the Platonic 
anthropology, even though the standard for the highest order 
within man comes from the divine N o u s  external to man. In 
the openness toward the transcendent divinity the reality 
becomes intelligible. The noetic mode of consciousness 
refers to the man’s reflective, self-conscious experience of 
existential order that is attuned to the divine N o u s .  The 
noetic mode thus is a rational inquiry--not in the modern 
pragmatic sense— into the truth of being and into man’s 
experience of' existential tension in which the unseen God is 
the measure of what man can and must be.
Voegelin contends that the Allegory of the Cave in the 
R e p u b l i c  is mythopoetic197 articulation of theophany. Thus, 
the philosopher’s turning (p e r i a g o g e ) of the soul toward the 
illumination of the A g a t h o n  and away from the shadows of 
opinion articulates Plato’s discovery of the soul. At this 
point, the illustration of the Platonic vision of A g a t h o n  
becomes topical. What is the Idea of the A g a t h o n ? To this 
question Voegelin replies:
1ST "Mythopoesis" aeans deliberate poetic nyth-aaking, that Plato engaged in to represent the 
absolutely transcendent and nan's destiny in it. He invented such fables as "The Hyth of Er" as 
"saving tales." See OH, IV, pp.223, 225, 36. Voegelin renarked that Paul's story of Jesus was also a 
product of aythopoesis, and he referred to the gospel news of "divine Incarnation, Death and 
Resurrection" as a "saving tale." See Ibid., pp.248-251.
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Concerning the content of the Agathon nothing can be 
said at all. That is the fundamental insight of 
Platonic ethics. The transcendence ( e p e k e i n a )  of the 
Agathon makes immanent propositions concerning its 
content impossible. The vision of the Agathon does not 
render a material rule of conduct, but forms the soul 
through an experience of transcendence.198
What Voegelin means is that statement about the Agathon 
cannot exhaust its content. And in any case the vision of 
the Agathon, the experience of transcendence, or leap in 
being, does not yield "a truth that one cannot sit on or 
possess like a thing once and for all."199 It is the "flash 
of eternity into time."2 0 0 The vision of the Good "forms 
the soul through an experience of transcendence."201 
Ultimately the Good is something one experiences rather than 
something one knows. Thus, paraphrasing Plato, Voegelin is 
concerned not to lead us to knowledge of the Good but to 
experience the Good.
The third and final leap was the discovery of the 
universal humanity of man, the universalist differentiation 
in the consciousness of Jesus Christ. The leap into the 
concept of universal humanity is derived from the 
establishment of the ecumenic empires, which were only 
organizational forms that reached out for a spiritual
Hr0i;ii7;7p7mff':
195 E. Sandoz, "Voegelin1s Idea of Historical Fora," p.43.
199 Off, III, p.363.
191 Ibid., p . 112.
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substance that would fill them, and which they found in the 
universal religions. With the epiphany of Christ, the 
Church became the mediator of Divine order into the social
order, and the political realm became de-divinized.
Voegelin’s analysis of this universalist differentiation 
begins with "the struggle between three competing truths for 
representation in the Roman Empire, where the Roman state 
cult represented the dying truth of ’the cosmos filled with 
gods,’ Greek philosophy the truth of world-transcendent
being, and Christianity the revolutionary truth of
Redemption and of the ultimate salvation of man’s soul as 
his supreme goal in this life."202
Chritianity confirms the Greek understanding of man 
whose soul is opened toward transcendental reality and 
enlarges upon the experience with which the Greek philosophy 
was concerned. But whereas the Greeks emphasized man’s 
ascent to God, Christianity emphasizes God’s descent to man, 
and if it is by reason that man approaches God it is by 
grace (revelation) that God approaches man. With coming of 
Christ, the critical authority over the older truth of 
society which the soul had gained through its opening and 
its orientation toward the unknown measure was now confirmed 
through the revelation of the measure itself. However, 
man’s spiritual destiny in the Christian sense cannot be 
represented on earth by the power organization of a
2,2 G. Sebba, "Prelude and Variations of the Theme of Brie Voegelin," E. Sandoz, ed., Eric Voegelin’s 
Thought (Durban, NC: Duke University Press, 1982), p.21.
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political society; it can be represented only by the church. 
As a consequence, the sphere of political power is in turn 
radically de-divinized; it has become temporal. The double 
representation of man in society through church and empire 
lasted through the Middle Ages. As we will encounter in the 
next chapter, the specifically modern problems of 
representation are connected with the re-divinization of 
society.203
5. E P I S T E M E  P O L I T I K E
Noetic experience and science, or the "noese" as 
Voegelin terms it, is the symbolic form of true philosophy. 
Political science in the Voegelinian sense is a "noetic 
interpretation" of political reality, that is noetic 
interpretation of man, society, and history claiming a 
critical knowledge of order v i s  a  v i s  the non-noetic 
conception of order prevailing in the conventional society 
itself. "The term noese, noetic experience, noetic
interpretation, and the like derive from the technical 
vocabulary of Classical philosophy, specifically from the 
word n o u s  which means, variously, reason, thought, and 
mind."2 0 4
2,4 E. Sandoz, "Eric Voegelin and the Nature of Philosophy," Kodern Age, 13:2 (Spring 1969), p.159.
The classical understanding of the tera, reason (nous) is far sore coaplex than the truncated "reason" 
of the Enlightenaent. And the classical position oust be fully understood, as Voegelin uses the tera 
in that sense. Nous can be identified as follows: "(1) the consciousness of existing froa a Ground,
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When Voegelin defines political science as the noetic, 
interpretation of political reality, the concrete meaning of 
the expression may be suggested by saying that noese is an 
interpretation of political reality substantially like that 
given by Plato and Aristotle. He explicitly adopts what he 
understands to be the Aristotelian conception of political 
science ( e p i s t e m e  p o l i t i k e )  . Thus, when he speaks of 
political science he means a discipline which is firmly 
grounded on political philosophy or the philosophy of order, 
and which is being distinctive from the "hard" or phenomenal 
sciences dealing with the "external world." He rejects the 
claim of positivists to represent the "scientific" approach 
to politics.
Noetic interpretation precludes the understanding of 
political science in terms of a phenomenal science which 
operates with axioms, strives to be systematic, and models
an awareness filled with content and not eapty. Reason is thereby the instrument for handling world- 
iaaanent reality. Rebellion against reason since the eighteenth century creates a void in this 
dimension that aust then be filled by substitutes; (2) the transcendence of huaan existence, thereby 
establishing the poles of consciousness: iaaanent-transcendent; (3) the creative Ground of existence 
which attracts aan to itself; (4) the sensoriua whereby aan understands himself to exist froa a 
Ground; (5) the articulation of this understanding through universal ideas; (6) the perseverance 
through a lifetime of one’s concern about one’s relation to the ground, generative of existential 
virtue: phronesis (wisdoa, prudence), philia (friendship), and athanatizein (the immortalization of 
huaan existence); (7) the effort to order existence by the insight gained through understanding of the 
self to be existentially linked to the Ground and attuned to it: the aajor intellectual operation of 
so translating consequences of this insight as to fora daily habits in accordance with it; (8) the 
persuasive effort to induce conscious participation of the self, and other aen's conscious 
participation, in transcendent reason (Plato's peithoj. The problem of communicating and propagating 
the truth of being; (9) the constituent of aan through his participation in (the reason of) the 
Ground; or, the constituent force in aan qua human through participation in the divine Nous which his
specific essence; (10) the constituent of society as the hoaonoia or "like-aindedness" of everyman in 
a community formed through recognition of the reason common to all men. Nietzsche perceived that if 
that is surrendered then there is no reason to love anybody, one consequence of which is the loss of
the sense and force of obligation in society and, hence, of its cohesiveness." E. Sandoz, ""The
Philosophical Science of Politics Beyond Bahavioralisa," pp.301-302,
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itself through methodological rigor on the natural and 
mathematizing sciences of the external world.205 "Because 
political science is unable to view its subject matter as an 
object ’outside’ the self but must rather recognize the 
investigator himself as a participant in the existential 
drama he sets out to illumine, there allegedly can never be 
any definitive ’principles’ or ’axioms’ for such a 
science."206 To Voegelin, as to Plato and Aristotle, 
therefore, political science ( e p i s t e m e  p o l i t i k e )  and 
political philosophy are essentially one and the same, 
because political science was conceived in Greek philosophy 
to be noetic, self-critical interpretation of man and 
society.
Like Plato’s, Voegelin’s political philosophy emerges 
from deep personal experience with the disorder of our 
times; he has come to see the disorder of the twentieth 
century as a reflection of the disorientation of our 
consciousness. "In an effort to understand why our
consciousness is disoriented, where we went wrong, so to 
speak, he has been led not only to reject the false 
consciousness of modern ideologies that distort reality by 
arbitrarily limiting the perspective with which we can 
encounter reality, but also to search Western history from 
its very beginning for that point of reference that defines
2.5 E. Voegelin, Anaanesis (Geraan), pp.283ff, 318; NSP, pp.3ff.
2.5 D. Geraino, "Eric Voegelin's Anaanesis," p.75.
3 3 7
our humanity."2 0 7 For Voegelin, one of the purposes of 
political science, or more rigorously speaking, philosophy 
is to account for deviations in human conduct by pointing 
out the source of disorder and injustice in political 
societies. But it also points out the way to remedy 
disorder and injustice--if not in entire societies, then at 
least in one’s own society, the soul.
At this point, Plato’s "anthropological principle" 
holds the enduring significance for political philosophy. 
Since the state is nothing but the man "written in larger 
letters," in Platonic political science, the same analysis 
which has been done for human nature can be applied to it. 
That is, Plato’s anthropology becomes a political science 
which is inquiring into order and disorder in society, 
because the state of the individual soul expresses itself in 
the corresponding state of society. In this sense, Voegelin 
is said to be not concerned only with reconstructing 
"Platonic philosophy" or "doctrine," but "rather with the 
way in which Plato sought to resist the disorder of his own 
society. The recollection of Plato’s endeavor may prove to 
be therapeutic on our own time."208
Voegelin’s great achievement is to have restored the 
"scientific"--not natural or positivist scientific but 
epistemic--character of political science, the science of
282 John H. Hall o w e l l, "Existence in Tension: Han in Search of His Huaanity," Stephen A. HcKnight, 
e d., Eri c V o e g e l i n ' s  Search for O r d e r  in History, p, 103.
281 J.H. H a l l o w e l l , " E x i s t e n c e  in T e n s i o n , "  p,102.
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order turning on speculations about transcendent reality. 
He perceived that a reconstruction of political order was 
made possible in the restoration of theory to the study of 
society. For Voegelin, the recovery of the classical 
political philosophy is a form of "therapeutic analysis."209 
It is a matter of "retheoretization" and "restoration" that 
will supposedly have practical consequences. That is, he 
affirms that e p i s t e m e  p o l i t i k e ,  a disciplined exploration of 
human existence in the light of the whole of being, cast 
into forms of public truth, can become political order. On 
the basis of this restored concept of the science of 
political order, Voegelin broke through the parochial 
narrowness of contemporary political studies. Political 
science, which is, to employ Max Scheler’s distinction, in 
the realm of "sciences of the person" rather than that of 
"sciences of phenomena," is the attempt to achieve a noetic, 
as distinct from a nonnoetic, interpretation of political 
reality. And its methods must, therefore, be appropriate to 
the investigation of the multidimensional participation in 





The purpose of this chapter is to review Voegelin’s 
account of modernity and gnosticism as a civilizational 
critique. One of the most important aspects of Voegelin’s 
political philosophy is his description of a major aspect of 
modern Western civilization as the expression of the gnostic 
symbolic form. He notes that gnosticism is a persistent 
factor in its manifold manifestations within the history of 
Western civilization. But it has continued as a destructive 
force in the civilization. The gnostic modern movement has 
had a pervasive but, at the same time, perverse impact on 
intellectual and political life in the West. In this 
chapter Voegelin’s articulation regarding the historical 
development of the gnostic modern disorder will be reviewed. 
Also a sketch of his critique of gnostic implications 
especially in the form of the Enlightenment will follow.
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1. MODERNITY: GNOSTIC DISORDER
Voegelin’s interest in the study of politics stemmed 
from a response to his deep personal experience1 with the 
disorder of the twentieth century characterized by 
totalitarianism based on Soviet Marxism and German Nazism. 
The crisis is both political and intellectual in character, 
but an essential element of his diagnosis of the crisis is 
the notion that it is most fundamentally a crisis of human 
soul or a spiritual disorder. Disorder of the soul is 
failure to grasp the truth of order and to become attuned to 
it. He thus sees the disorder of our time as a reflection 
of the disorientation of our consciousness. According to 
Voegelin, therefore, as expressions of civilizational crisis 
the modern political and intellectual mass movements could 
only be understood through an analysis of specific forms of 
human consciousness. Voegelin, then, sees the primary task 
of political philosophy as one of developing a theory of 
human consciousness that could account for the character of 
our modern age. Inevitably, he is very critical of the 
modern age or modernity. He sees the tradition of political 
theory from Plato onward as the decline, or "derailment," of 
the tradition itself.
1 It is interesting but no wonder that in a confused, disrupted tine Plato devoted his life to a 
search for order. In fact, aost of the aajor philosophers of Ban and society, e.g., St. Augustine, 
Hachiavelli, Hobbes, lived at a tiae of social and political disorder as an old order collapsed and 
passed. Hegel very poetically described this phenonenon by suggesting that "the owl of Hinerva 
spreads its wings only with the falling of dusk." H e g e l ’s P h i l o s o p h y  of  Right, trans. by T.H. Knox 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 13.
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From a viewpoint somewhat similar to that of Voegelin, 
Berman also analyzes the current crisis of the Western legal 
tradition. According to Berman, in failing to recognize the 
historical roots of the Western tradition, we are in a 
crisis of losing the tradition itself. We are threatened 
with the few surviving elements of the tradition and the 
disappearance of yet others. He thinks that Western 
civilization has been degraded into "ideological and 
technological barbarism." For Berman the principal reason 
for this crisis is that the Western society is losing some 
basic characteristics with which the Western legal tradition 
is founded. He suggests that members of the legal
profession, as well as the vast majority of citizens, the 
people as a whole are losing their consciousness of the 
beliefs in which the Western legal tradition is rooted. 
Those beliefs and postulates, including "the structural 
integrity of law, its ongoingness, its religious roots, its 
transcendent qualities" are disappearing.2
Through an effort to understand why our consciousness 
is disoriented, Voegelin tries to regain a truth of 
political order that has been lost through the process of 
modernization. In so doing, that is, in understanding 
"where we went wrong, so to speak," as John Hallowell 
writes, "[Voegelin] has been led not only to reject the 
false consciousness of modern ideologies that distort 
reality by arbitrarily limiting the perspective with which
2 H. Berman, Lan and Revolution (Cambridge, HA: Harvard University Press, 1983), p.39.
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we can encounter reality, but also to search Western history 
from its very beginning for that point of reference that 
defines our humanity."3 For Voegelin, the recovery of the 
past is a form of "therapeutic analysis." It is not "an 
attempt to explore curiosities of a dead past, but an 
inquiry into the structure of order in which we live 
presently."4
A cardinal feature of Voegelin’s philosophy of history 
is that "the essence of modernity [is] the growth of 
Gnosticism,"5 even if gnosticism is not the whole of 
modernity.6 Modernity has been aptly defined as the rise of 
variety of gnostic movements and their doctrines to social 
dominance, resulting in profound disorder of spirit, mind, 
and eventually society. Therefore, in his view, gnosticism 
furnishes the key to the nature of modernity. He has guided 
us to an understanding of what is the character of our time, 
through his clear distinction between gnostic disorder and 
order, ideology and philosophy. As mentioned above,
Voegelin has come to see the disorder of our time as a 
reflection of the gnostic disorientation of our 
consciousness. He regards gnosticism as an expression of
3 J.H. Hallowell, "Existence in Tension," in S.A. HcKnight, ed., Eric Voegelin's Search for Order in 
History, p.103.
4 E. Voegelin, Order and History, vol.l, Israel and Revelation, hereafter OH, I, p.xiv.
5 B. Voegelin, The Hen Science of Politics, p.126. Hereafter NSP,
4 E. Sandoz, The Voegelinian Revolution, p.110. Voegelin notes: "it uust never be forgotten that 
Western Society is not all nodern but that nodernity is a growth within it, in opposition to the 
Classic and Christian tradition." HSP, pp.176, 187-188.
3 4 3
l i b i d o  d o m i n a n d i  of men which stems from a deformed 
consciousness that distorts its appreciation of reality and 
creates a "second reality." Reality, because it is not 
comprehended in its fullness, is likely to be misunderstood 
and misconstrued. However, what is worse is that man can 
reject participation in and understanding of reality.
The history of symbolization, which is the history of 
ongoing search for appropriate understanding of reality, can 
also be the history deformations of understanding and of 
human refusals to understand, refusals that are made in the 
mode of symbolization.7 For man is not forced to recognize 
his participation in the drama of existence. Even if he can 
open his soul and participate in the existential tension, he 
can also reject and suppress his fundamental awareness of 
reality; he can eliminate from his conception of the order 
of being the one element that disturbs him: unknowable
divine being in the Hellenic sense or unseen God in the 
Judeo-Christian sense. If he does, he will cease to look 
upon himself as a participant in existence. Instead, he 
considers himself the master, or the potential master in his 
own world. Consequently, for the search of the truth of 
being he will ignore the search for the why or the t e l o s  of 
the human existence and substitute and limit it to the study 
for human knowledge of the how.8
Ml?, I, p.10.
• The less concern about the why, or, the lack of the teleological worldview iB the typical feature of 
natural-scientific aethodology.
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The concept of gnosticism is very important in 
Voegelin’s political philosophy as he uses it in the 
analysis of modern intellectual, spiritual, and political 
disorder. However, Voegelin’s concept of gnosticism was 
called into question even by some of his admirers.9 
Originally, the term "gnosticism" is a designation 
traditionally applied to one of the many Christian heresies 
that flourished during the period between A.D. 30 and 300. 
But it has now been established that gnosticism was a wide­
spread religious movement whose origins are unknown and 
which appeared slightly before or contemporaneously with 
Christianity.10
In the formative period of Christian doctrine, however, 
the "second reality" that the ancient gnostics endeavored to 
set up was the perversion of the Christian symbolism. 
Gnosticism substituted a dream of a perfect mundane society 
for the c i v i t a s  D e i , the City of God. In the Christian 
symbolism the realms of existence were divided into the 
eternal, transcendental realm of God and the finite, mundane 
realm of man; salvation for man lay in the beyond of this 
physical world. Against this, the gnostic vision was one in 
which salvation was possible here on this earth and the 
world was the primeval chaos that was to be transformed into
* See E. Webb, Eric Voegelin (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981), pp.l98ff; and J.L.
Wiser, "Proa Cultural Analysis to Philosophical Anthropology: An Examination of Voegelin’s Concept of 
Gnosticism," R e v i e v  o f  Politics, 42:1 (January 1980), pp.92-94. .
15 On the controversy regarding Voegelin's use of the term gnosticism, see E. Webb, Eric Voegelin, 
pp.199-200.
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an enduring, stable, and perfect order. But, as he explains 
in S c i e n c e , P o l i t i c s  a n d  G n o s t i c i s m ,  the idea of gnosticism 
that Voegelin had chosen for analytical convenience is not 
an hermetic Christian heresy. Even though his use of the 
concept is based on the term in the ancient world, he uses 
the concept in a much more comprehensive and broader sense 
than that of the ancient gnosticism both in conception and 
in coverage.11
Voegelin identifies the six characteristic features of 
gnostic movements by which we can recognize the nature of 
the gnostic attitude:12 (1) the gnostic is dissatisfied with 
his situation; (2) the belief that the drawbacks of the 
situation can be attributed to the fact that the world is 
intrinsically poorly organized; (3) the gnostic believes 
that salvation from the evil of the world is possible; (4) 
the gnostic believes that the order of being will have to be 
changed in an historical process, that a good world must 
evolve historically from this wretched one; (5) the gnostic 
believes that a change in the order of being lies in the 
realm of human action, that this salvational act is possible 
through man’s own effort; and, (6) the gnostic makes 
knowledge--gnosis--of the method of altering being his 
central concern, because it is his task to seek out the 
prescription for a structural change in the given order of 
being to what people can be satisfied with as a perfect one.
11 E. Vo e g e l i n ,  Science, Politics a nd Gnosticisn, h e r e a f t e r  SPG, p p . 86-88.
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Thus, the gnostic constructs a formula for self and world 
salvation.
The meaning of the term gnosticism in the Voegelinian 
sense implies the intellectual and political movement that 
attempt to escape from the inherent uncertainties and 
limitations of the c o n d i t i o  h u m a n a ; to allay man’s 
existential anxiety by creating a "second reality" as an 
adequate representation of the truth of human existence. 
Voegelin classifies gnostic modes as the main modes of what 
he believes to be representation in untruth. He contends 
that the symbols of Christianity and Platonic political 
philosophy have been sufficiently evocative of the 
experiences of reality to have touched the consciousness of 
a large segment of mankind. They had formed the basis for 
the civilizational order of the West, which has persisted 
for two millennia. But what is to be noted is that during 
this period the symbolization had been acted upon by a 
persistent doctrinal inversion and, once the meaning of the 
original symbols had been eroded, the inversions evoked mass 
movements that constantly threatened, and eventually broke 
through the whole structure of Western society.
In this sense, gnostic thought was generally contained 
until the erosion of the meaning behind the Christian 
symbols permitted gnostic symbols of reality to take over 
the representational function among the nations of the 
Western world. The gnostic modern age has emerged as 
"victorious in its effort to replace the anthropological
347
(Greek) and soteriological (Judeo-Christian) traditions of 
the past. Historically this effort has been conditioned by 
the inability of Christianity to serve adequately as the 
Western form of civil theology."13 The historical evolution 
of gnosticism and its denial of the understanding of the 
differentiated orders of existence attained in Greek 
philosophy and Christian theology has constituted a
"theoretical retrogression,"14 which has been manifest in 
all major political and intellectual movements since 
medieval times.
The Roman emperors attempted, with the aid of
Christianity, to organize secular power in such a way that 
it could represent the spiritual destiny of man. But these 
attempts failed. Instead, the idea of double representation 
of society by church and empire came to be adopted, and the 
gnostic understanding of divinized society persists 
throughout the Middle Ages. What made Christianity a 
revolutionary movement was its "radical de-divinization of 
the world."15 "The spiritual destiny of man could no longer 
be represented on earth by the power sphere of political 
society at all (as it had been in the philosophers’
paradigmatic polis) but could only be represented by the 
Church. Life in the world became temporal, the sphere of 
power de-divinized, and the dual representation of empire
15 J.L. Wiser, "Froa Cultural Analysis...," p.96.
14 KSP, p.79.
15 Ibid., pp.100, 143ff.
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and Church as formulated in Gelasius' doctrine of Two Swords 
endured to the end of the Middle Ages."16 Thus spiritual 
power and temporal power split apart.17 Secular power was 
becoming "de-divinized." Political society is no longer the 
representative of the eternal, ultimate truth which affects 
the very source of legitimacy, order, and authority of the 
now wholly temporal state.
It should be noted that the "specifically modern 
problems of representation are connected with the re- 
divinization" of secular political society.18 Though
symbolized in an entirely different manner from the ancient 
mode, gnosticism can be seen in modern times, for example, 
in Marxism where the Communist order is supposed to be in 
harmony with the truth in history. The relation between the 
ancient gnostic religion and the modern mass movements is 
sufficiently close to make the concept a useful tool for 
understanding the mass movements in terms of the gnostic 
symbolism. Of particular importance is the religious aspect 
of the mass movement.
These gnostic experiences, in the amplitude of their 
variety, are the core of the redivinization of society, 
for the men who fall into these experiences divinize 
themselves by substituting more massive modes of 
participation in divinity for faith in the Christian
IS E. Sandoz, The V o e g e l i n i a n  Revol u t i o n , p.106; cf. RSP, pp.100, 159,
17 For the general purpose of this dissertation, it is worth noting that "the de-divinization of the
world...fostered by the eaphatic separation of ecclesiastical and secular polities...coincided with
the rise of [nodern] science." See E. Sandoz, "Book Review: taw a n d  R e volution, By Harold Beraan," 
Louisiana taw Review, 45 (1985), p.1119.
11 NSP, p p . 106, 151,
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s e n s e .19
Both modern mass movement and the generic meaning of 
gnosticism share an antithetical attitude to the idea of a 
divine ground for existence, and center their attention on 
the conception of the "acosmic self,"20 Two crucial aspects 
of gnosticism are worth emphasizing here: "(1) Man the
creature is not responsible for the evil in which he finds 
himself. He has a right to blame it on someone or something 
else. The assumption that ’In Adam’s fall/ We sinned all’ 
is to the Gnostic pure nonsense. And (2) Man’s salvation 
depends upon his own efforts. He must rely not upon faith 
but on gnosis, the secret knowledge that makes it possible 
for him to evade the snares and entanglements of the demon 
and to reunite his soul with the divinity from which he has 
come."21 These two traits of gnosticism continue to 
characterize gnosticism even in its present-day secularized 
form, i.e., modern gnosticism.
The ancient gnostics held that the world has been
created by the work of a demon, a god of evil--a cruel
demiurge. The corollary was that what the evil god had made
was also evil. The world is regretfully imperfect with its
mutability, wickedness, and violence. Man was unfortunate_____
28 For the tem "acosnic self," see H. Jonas, "Gnosticism and Modern Nihilism," Social Research, 19 
(1952), p.442.
21 Cleanth Brooks, "Walker Percy and Modern Gnosticism," in Harold Blooa, ed., Walker Percy: Hodern 
Critical Vievs (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1986), p.56.
3 5 0
to be placed in this flawed world not by his own error but 
by an evil god. "His task is to extricate himself from this 
evil world, partially at least by throwing off the bonds of 
his own evil flesh."22 Man has the potentiality to be 
perfect if he does not confound himself with this imperfect 
world. He could overcome the evil of the world by means of 
esoteric knowledge of the gnostic way.
— .O-.f— t h e . —
The word "gnosis" in Greek literally means knowledge 
and it reflects the main objective of the gnostic movement, 
which was to determine the scope of knowledge of divine 
things as opposed to certitude. Gnosticism’s main claim was 
that the gap that traditionally existed between the human 
and the divine realms of being could be bridged by means of 
the possession of the special brand of knowledge. The 
esoteric knowledge would make man his own savior and thus 
obviate the need for any external agent such as the divine 
revelation. And to the gnostic, Voegelin notes, "[t]he 
instrument of salvation is gnosis itself--knowledge." 
Knowledge (not e p i s t e m e , but g n o s i s ) of the method of 
altering being is the central concern of the gnostic.23 The 
" g n o s i s  of the gnostic is a g n o i a , ignorance of the truth. 
But it is not innocent ignorance: he w i l l s  the untruth,
22 C. Brooks, "Walker Percy and Hodern Gnosticisa," p.56.
23 SPG, p.87
although he k n o w s  the truth."24 As a consequence,
"knowledge of the ultimate ground of being through the faith 
experience (in the Christian horizon, the c o g n i t i o  f i d e i )  is 
supplanted by the gnosis which, as a body of secret 
knowledge, is itself sufficient to salvation..."25 In
short, in Voegelin’s view, gnosticism is a doctrinal 
attitude that offers the privileged knowledge that will
liberate man from the prison of uncertainty in existence.
The modern gnostics are indeed aware of the poles of
inner tension between God and man in which man has found his
order of existence. For instance, Marx admitted that the
question of God was urged on man by "everything palpable in 
life," yet Marx proceeded to forbid this question to 
"socialists."26 The addict of l i b i d o  d o m i n a n d i ,  viz. the 
ideologist, perceived, as did philosopher, the dimensions of 
the Beyond, the Transcendence. However, what is to be 
emphasized here is that "[t]hey did not discard this
dimension, but they perverted it by drawing the
transcendence into the historical immanence, thereby
endowing something human with the character of divinity"27-- 
i.e., re-divinization. Similarly, they were aware of the
24 G. Sebba, "History, Modernity and Gnosticism," in P.J. Opitz & G. Sebba, eds., The P h i l o s o p h y  of 
Order, p.241.
25 B. Sandoz, "The Science and Deaonology of Politics," I n t e r c o l l e g i a t e Review 5:2 (Winter 1968-69), 
p.119.
26 E. Wainwright, "The Zeteaa of Eric Voegelin," (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of South Africa,
1978), p.48.
27 G. Hieneyer, "Greatness in Political Science: Eric Voegelin (1901-1985)," H o d e r n Age, 29:2 (1985), 
pp.108ff.
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eschatological element at the center of the Christian view 
of order, but they played false with the eschaton by 
misplacing it in history. This is the "immanentization of 
the eschaton."28
Modern gnosticism is distinguished by its immanentism. 
Bruce Douglas delineates the modern gnosticism’s 
immanentistic character by contrasting it with the ancient 
mode: "Original gnostic religion solved the problem of
spiritual and intellectual insecurity by recourse to a surer 
knowledge of Sod, designed to liberate men from the in­
betweenness of existence through flight from the world. 
Modern gnosticism solves the problem through recourse to a 
surer knowledge of human existence, designed to liberate men 
from the conditions of existence by changing the world. 
Whereas the former ’solves’ the problem created by the 
contraction of consciousness through a resymbolization of 
society and cosmos as evil, the latter ’solves’ the problem 
by attempts at resymbolization of society that deny 
transcendence."2 9
As Voegelin notes, the modern mass movements are 
expressed in symbolisms based on two principal sources: the
Christian eschatological conception of perfection and the 
trinitarian symbol of sacred history speculated by the 
thirteenth century Joachim of Flora. Christian eschatology
28 PSP, p.29.
28 Bruce Douglas, "The Gospel and Political Order: Eric Voegelin on the Political Role of 
Christinaity," J o u r n a l  of  Politics, 38:1 ( 1976 ), p.11.
embraces: (1) the teleological element--"movement toward the
goal of perfection"--which is described by the notion of 
s a n c t i f i c a t i o ,  the sanctification of life, or in English 
Puritanism, the pilgrim’s progress, and (2) the axiological 
component--the goal itself--which is understood as the v i s i o  
b e a t i f i c a ,  salvation, ultimate perfection, or supernatural 
fulfillment through grace after death in an eternal 
beyond.30 In gnostic perfection within the historical 
world, the teleological and axiological components can be 
immanentized either separately or together.
The resultant immanentization of them in the various
gnostic doctrines thus yields three types of variants of
gnosis or ideology. Progressivism is the first type of
derivation in which the teleological component is
immanentized. Eighteenth century ideas of progress, for
example, Kant’s or Condorcet’s belong to this teleological
variants of gnosis. According to the Kantian idea of
progress, "humanity is moving in an unending approach toward
the goal of a perfect, rational existence in a cosmopolitan
society."31 Utopianism is the second type of derivation in
which the axiological component is immanentized. In U t o p i a
Thomas More assumes "the form of an ideal image" which
expresses conditions for a perfect social order. The third
type of derivation in which the two components are
immanentized together is Activist Mysticism or Revolutionary 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
51 Ibid,, p.90.
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Activism. There exist both the conception of the end goal 
and knowledge of the methods by which the end goal is to be 
brought about. Comtean and Marxian thought are the examples 
of activist mysticism in which the whole Christian symbolism 
is immanentized to provide a program for the revolutionary 
transfiguration of man and the world.32
In Comte, a final state of industrial society under 
the temporal rule of the managers and the spiritual rule of 
positivist intellectuals are the formulation of the state of 
perfection; in Marx, a final state of classless realm of 
freedom. "In both cases, there is clarity about the way to 
perfection: for Comte, through the transformation of man
into his highest form, positivist man; for Marx, through the 
revolution of the proletariat and the transformation of man 
into the communist superman."33 What is common in these 
variants of gnosticism is that they implant "gnostic dream 
assumptions" which make the root cause of the imbalanced 
political situation the modern world faces today.
Joachim’s trinitarian speculation yields specific 
symbols employed by modern gnosticism.34 The Joachitic 
speculation on the trinitarian symbol is the most important 
but commonly perverted symbol in that it creates three 
phases of history according to three ages of man. In the 
three ages of man, the Father was the dominant symbol of the
32 E. Sandoz, "The Science and Deaonology...p.118.
33 SPG, p . 92.
34 E. Sandoz, "The Science and Demonology...," p.118.
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first realm, the Son ruled the second, and the Holy Spirit 
was massively present in the third. History is considered 
to be stages of intelligible fulfillment climaxing in a 
perfect existence. The underlying notion of making immanent 
of the holy number three is that of the perfectibility of 
man. When to the perfectibility of man is added the notion 
of a legitimate end to striving for the perfectibility, the 
eschatological expectation is one where man closes down his 
own history. That is, the eschatological element of the end 
of history is present. Examples of these symbolization 
range from the trichotomy of ancient, medieval, and modern 
history to the Marxian sequence of the Realm of Necessity, 
the transitional period of Proletarian Revolution and 
Dictatorship, and the Realm of Freedom (Mature Communism) 
and to the Comtean Law of the Three Phases--Theological, 
Metaphysical, and Positivist. Invariably, the three stages 
are phases of progress, though the content of progress 
differs from thinker to thinker.
Joachim and those inspired by him looked for the coming 
of a Third Kingdom of the Spirit in which all Christians 
would be inspired by the Holy Spirit to the extent that 
institutional authorities, either secular or ecclesiastical, 
would no longer be required. Thus, this kind of speculation 
has served as historical background for such diverse later 
developments as Renaissance Humanism and the Enlightenment, 
Hegel’s theory of the Absolute Epoch, Comte’s theory of a 
new age of Positive Science, Marx’s theory of a transformed
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humanity in a Communist society. And the twentieth century 
saw Hitler’s dream of a New Order and D r i t t e  R e i c h ,  that was 
to last a thousand years. Another aspect of the trinitarian 
symbolism is found in the underlying notion in Russian 
thought that Russia is the "Third Rome," and, as such, it is 
the heir to the world empire.35 The Russians have never 
lost their belief that they are destined to rule the world, 
and the Marxian ideology is a twentieth-century mode of 
expression of their brand of Third-Realm eschatology. There 
was an eschatological element in that the Third Age was the 
end of history.36 In Voegelin’s view, the "immanentist 
eschatology" is a feature which varieties of modern gnostic 
movements have in common. That is, the attempt to create a 
new world is common to all.
The term "philosophy of history" is commonly taken to 
mean— from a philodoxic point of view— as an immanentist 
speculation on the structure of history. The immanentist 
speculation claims to be able to define the dynamics of 
history and thereby to predict the pattern in which it will 
inevitably unfold and disclose its final meaning. Hegel and 
Marx are probably the most prominent exemplars of this 
approach, and Voegelin has commented on their thought at 
length.37 Hegel, "the intellectual father of both Nietzsche 
______
!S Ibid., p.112.
!T See E. Voegelin, "On Hegel: A Study in Sorcery," in J.T. Fraser, F.C. Haber, & G.H. Hueller, eds.,
The S t u d y  of  Tine (New York: Springer Verlag, 1972), pp.418-51; SPG; E. Webb, Eric Voegelin, p.237.
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and Marx,"38 is the deepest modern gnostic thinker who has 
promulgated a deformed conception of reality by libidinally 
ignoring certain elements of humanity. In Hegel a totally 
new consciousness has arisen: with its rise, history too has 
come to an end. He assumes that the revelation of God in 
history is fully comprehensible. But because the revelation 
is incomplete, he considers it man’s duty to complete the 
incomplete revelation by raising the Logos--reason--to 
complete clarity in consciousness. "This elevation to 
consciousness is in fact possible through the mind of the 
philosopher--concretely, through the mind of Hegel: in the
medium of the Hegelian dialectic the revelation of God in 
history reaches its fulfillment."39
The Hegelian assumption of a philosophy of history is 
that the mystery of revelation and of the course of history 
can be solved and made fully transparent through the 
dialectical unfolding of the Logos. Thus Hegel excludes 
from reality the mystery of a history that wends its way 
into the future without knowing its end. As we have already 
seen in a sketch of Voegelin’s philosophy of history, 
"history as a whole is essentially not an object of 
cognition; the meaning of the whole is not discernible." On 
the contrary, Hegel constructs a history of man that is 
fully comprehensible. Voegelin writes:
31 G. Sebba, "Order and Disorders of the Soul: Eric Voegelin’s Philosophy of History," S o u t h e r n
Review, Hew Series, 3:2 (April 1967 ), p.305.
33 SPG, p p . 1 0 5 f f .
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Nevertheless, the diremption of Hegel’s existence into 
the true self of the philosopher and the false self of 
the Messianic sorcerer imposes itself on the work, so 
that its philosophical excellence become subordinate to 
the anti-philosophical Z i e l ,  to the goal of enabling 
philosophy at last "to give up its name of a love of 
knowledge and to become real knowledge ( w i r k l i c h e s  
W i s s e n )"... The Z i e l  of the P h e n o m e n o l o g y  is the 
creation of the man-god.40
In this respect, Voegelin declares that "we must conclude 
that in 1807 Hegel has become God."41 And, after the death 
of Hegel philosophy "is virtually dead."42
At the root of the Marxian idea we find another main 
representative of "the spiritual disease of the Gnostic 
revolt."43 Marx as a "speculative gnostic" has convinced 
himself that he has penetrated the secret of history and 
therefore knows the way in which it must go. He advocates 
activist redemption of man and society and adopts 
Feuerbach’s view that God is but a projection of man’s 
beliefs about what is most valuable in man. Since God
exists only in man’s imagination, man can, in turn, imagine 
himself as God. Thus there is hope that man may attain his 
ultimate objective, namely, to secure in this world an 
economically satisfactory stateless society of autonomous 
beings. The perfect society of the classless state will be
44 B. Voegelin, "On Hegel: A Study in Sorcery," pp.425-426.
41 Ibid., p.430.
42 G. Sebba, "Prelude and Variations of the These of Eric Voegelin," E. Sandoz, Eric Voegelin's 
Thought, p.47.
43 E. Voegelin, Froa Enlightenaent to Revolution, hereafter FETE, p.298.
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achieved through the revolution of the proletariat and the 
transformation of man into the Communist Superman. But, 
according to Voegelin, Marx, like all gnostic thinkers, 
misrepresents the nature of man and for his own purposes 
deforms the nature of realities. As Voegelin indicates, 
"some imaginative constructions of history, designed to 
shield the contracted self, as for instance those of Comte, 
or Hegel, or Marx, even have grown into social forces of 
such strength that their conflicts with reality form a 
substantial part of global politics in our time. The man 
with a contracted self is as much of a power in society and 
history as an ordinary man, and sometimes a stronger one. 
The conflict w i t h  reality turns out to be a disturbance 
w i t h i n  reality."44
This deification of man emanates from the modern 
depreciation of studies concerned with the nature of man, 
and the shift of the focus from human nature to the nature 
as the physical environment. Voegelin believes that the 
loss of interest in the nature of man "turned to hatred when 
the nature of man proved to be resistant to the changes 
dreamed up by intellectuals who want to add the lordship of 
society and history to the mastery of nature."45 He 
contends that there is a "nature of man, a definite 
structure of existence that puts limits on perfectibility"
44 E. Voegelin, "The Eclipse of Reality," in Maurice Natanson, ed., P h e n o a e n o l o g y and Social Real i t y 
(The Hague: Kartinus Nijhoff, 1970), p.186.
45 E. Voegelin, "On Classical Studies," H o d e r n  Age, 17:1 (Winter 1973 ), p.2.
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but the gnostic belief is that the "nature of man can be 
changed, either through historical evolution or 
revolutionary action." And this will lead to the "perfect 
realm of freedom," which is the self-realization of an 
entelechy that gnostics give to history.46 But the self- 
realization of history means the end of the whole process of 
history, an end to man’s striving for anything above 
himself, and an end to any human endeavor.
Ideology and Onost.xcxsm
In a word, gnosticism is a rebellious will to change 
reality. "There resulted the phenomenon of the ’second 
reality’ where the spider web of thought replaces a common 
sense perception of reality."47 Voegelin has repeatedly 
shown up this "will to untruth." In the modern gnostic 
mind, the life of reason, or the b i o s  t h e o r e t i k o s  is not 
merely pushed into the background; they are definitely 
eliminated. For the gnostics "[m]an will be free when he 
has achieved perfect knowledge of the external world and 
with perfect knowledge the problem of purpose, which causes 
indecision, will have disappeared."48
Whether the addiction assumes the forms of 
libertarianism and asceticism preferred in antiquity, 
or the modern form of constructing systems which 
contain the ultimate truth and must be imposed
4! E. Voegelin, "On Classical Studies," p.3.
4T G. N ie n e y e r ,  " G r e a t n e s s  in P o l i t i c a l  Scie n c e , "  p . 109.
♦' FETR, p . 268.
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on recalcitrant reality by means of violence, 
concentration camps, and mass murder, the addict is 
dispensed from the responsibilities of existence in 
the cosmos. Since Gnosticism surrounds the l i b i d o  
d o m i n a n d i  in man with a halo of spiritualism or 
idealism, and can always nourish its righteousness by 
pointing to the evil in the world, no historical end to 
the attraction is predictable once magic pneumatism has 
entered history as a mode of existence.49
Gnosticism in Voegelin’s sense is a stream of thought which 
becomes progressively immanentized until it leads to the 
eruption of the totalitarian mass movements of our time. 
The components of gnosticism are diverse. Voegelin writes:
By gnostic movements we mean such movements as 
progressivism, positivism, Marxism, psychoanalysis, 
communism, fascism, and national socialism. We are 
not dealing, therefore, in all of these cases with 
political mass movements. Some of them would more 
accurately be characterized as intellectual movements—  
for example, positivism, neo-positivism, and the 
variants of psychoanalysis. This draws attention to 
the fact that mass movements do not represent an 
autonomous phenomenon and that the difference between 
masses and intellectual elites is perhaps not so great 
as is conventionally assumed, if indeed it exists at 
all.50
Though enormous and important differences exist between 
the various modern gnostic symbolisms, what is common for 
them is that the components of gnosticism, when congealed, 
produce intense ideologies. For Voegelin, basically all of 
modern thought is gnostic and ideological. The modern 
gnostic ideologies especially post-Kantian thought such as
4S E. Voegelin, O r d e r and History, vol.4, The Ecuaenic Age, hereafter OH, IV, p.28. 
54 SPG, p.83.
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Hegel, Darwin, Marx, Comte, logical positivism, pragmatism 
and behavioral ism consider themselves as adequate 
substitutes for the Christian symbols for perfection and 
salvation. Invariably, gnosticism is ardently apocalyptic 
or secularist. "Gnosticism and ideology (the ’isms’) are 
thus equated: modern gnosis embraces the intellectual and
mass movements which dominate life and thought in the 
present."51 Voegelin does not provide a definition of 
ideology. But he has picked out the formulation of one 
element in it--the misplacement of the ground within an 
immanent hierarchy of being. He enumerates the elements of 
ideology:
In the first place, all ideology comes out of the 
classic and Christian background (beginning with 
Enlightenment)--so one element always is the survival 
of apocalypse, the idea that this present imperfect 
world is to be followed by a more perfect phase. A 
second element is gnostic, that is, knowledge of the 
recipe for bringing about the more perfect realm.
(That is gnostic: the recipe) Third, immanentization, 
as distinguished from older apocalypses. In old 
apocalypse, the new realm--the fifth monarchy--is 
brought about by the intervention of God, or by a 
messenger of God, by an angel. In modern immanentist 
ideologies, it is always brought about by human 
action.5 2
Ideology is "the term which Voegelin uses most frequently to 
describe fundamental distortions of political reality 
leading to the derailment of political thought and the loss 
of order in human existence. Ideology is rigid, dogmatic
51 E, Sandoz, "The Science and Denonology.. . p.118.
51 E. V o e g e l i n ,  Conversations vith Eric Voegelin, p p . 26-27.
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speculations which either omits altogether or hopelessly 
distorts a segment of existence. Ideology lacks the 
suppleness to conceive of man as existing in tension toward 
the ground and as capable of a fall from Being; rather 
ideology pretends to have a grip on Being and to possess 
certain knowledge (gnosis) respecting the ’nature’ of man, 
society, and history. Proponents of ideological thinking 
typically omit either the bodily, material side of human 
existence (as in utopian speculation) or the noetic and 
spiritual dimension (as in utilitarian, materialistic, and 
’social contract’ theories)."53
Clearly what Voegelin means by the term ideology is not 
quite the same as what political positivists refer to the 
term. This difference, I think, comes from the fact that 
Voegelin opposes ideology to science in the onto-epistemic 
sense, or philosophical understanding of man and society. 
The positivists also contrasts ideology to science.54
53 D. Gernino, "Eric Voegelin*s Anamnesis," pp.83-84.
54 The use of the terra ideology by political positivists is diverse and soraetiraes obscure. Many of 
then are influenced by the Destutt de Tracy's and Marxian concepts which give the wide currency that 
it now enjoys. Ideology is a beneficial science of ideas as developed in the works of French 
rationalist de Tracy. The science of ideas (ideo-logy) would demystify society just as natural 
science had de-aystified nature. For de Tracy, the application of reason (instrumental rationality) 
to society would eliainate society of the irrational prejudices that had been so noxious in the past. 
According to the Marxian conception, ideology is connected with idealism which is unfavorably 
contrasted with material ism: any correct view of the world has to be, in soae sense, a materialist 
view. Ideology is relegated to the superstructure and becomes associated with the ideas, as in the 
work of Durkheira or Althusser. In the work of Althusser, for exaraple, it is Marxism itself and 
possibly psychoanalysis. As Seliger defines, ideology is every action-oriented set of beliefs 
organised into a coherent system. Angus Campbell et al, in their study of voting, elaborate a concept
of ideology by suggesting alternative terras, such as "belief systems" or "attitude structure." See L.
Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy (London: New Left Books, 1971); E. Durkheim, Elementary Forms of the 
Religious Life, 2nd ed., (London: Allen Unwin, 1976 ); H. Seliger, The Marxist Conception of Ideology 
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1977); A. Campbell et al., The American Foter (New York: Wiley, 1960); David
McLellan, Ideology (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).
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However, the difference between the two lies in their 
conceptions of what constitutes the science that oppose 
ideology. What becomes obvious from these conceptions is 
that the intrinsic dynamics of ideology, in the measure that 
it is a willful distortion of reality, requires "more-than- 
quantifiable insight into the effect of ideology. It 
requires treatment of the truth and untruth of the 
ideology."55 For Voegelin who accepts philosophy and 
revelation as sources of truth about man and the world, the 
transformation of political philosophy into ideology is the 
core of the modern crisis. Ideology is the gnostic delusion 
which leads, in Voegelin’s words, "with increasing
theoretical illiteracy to the form of various social 
idealisms, such as the abolition of war, of unequal 
distribution of property, of fear and want.
And, finally, immanentization may extend to the 
complete Christian symbol. The result will then be the
active mysticism of a state of perfection, to be achieved 
through a revolutionary transfiguration of the nature of
man, as, for instance, in Marxism."56 In disavowing 
ideology, Voegelin assails the disorders of our time. He
holds that the remedy against the disorder of modernity is 
thus philosophical inquiry.
ideology is existence in rebellion against God and man.
It is the violation of the First and Tenth
55 Theodore Halloch, Beyond Reductionists, p.211,
5t E. V oe g e l i n ,  q u o t e d  in R. Kirk, Eneaies of the Peraan e n t  Things, p . 255.
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Commandments, if we want to use the language of the 
Israelite order; it is the nosos, the disease of the 
spirit, if we want to use the language of Aeschylus and 
Plato. Philosophy is the love of being through love of 
divine Being as the source of its order. The logos of 
being is the object proper of philosophical inquiry, 
and the search for truth concerning the order of being 
cannot be conducted without diagnosing the modes of 
existence in untruth. The truth of order has to be 
guided and regained in the perpetual struggle against 
the fall from it; and the movement toward truth starts 
from a man's awareness of his existence in untruth. The 
diagnostic and therapeutic functions are inseparable in 
philosophy as a form of existence. And ever since 
Plato, the philosophical inquiry has been one of the 
means of establishing islands of order in the disorder 
of the age.57
Voegelin considers that the self-centered, egophanic 
attempt to find salvation within a perfect world, coupled 
with the hatred for the essence of man and an end to human 
history, is hardly a reasonable--in the noetic sense— basis 
for a political philosophy. He contends that the
spiritually diseased concept of modern gnosticism must be 
replaced by the insights of the Platonic-Aristotelian views 
on the nature of political man in the fullness of his 
humanity and on what he calls the basic common-sense of much 
of Anglo-American political thought.58 Then, here we 
encounter the question, "If man can be the measure of 
political order through his tensional experience of the 
ultimate reality, and if man can be furnished with common- 
sensical insight, how can he act as a measure of society?" 
Or, simply, "how can he communicate to others; With the aid 
5T OH, I, p.xiv.
51 HSP, p.189.
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of doctrine, or without? Voegelin does not provide any 
explicit answers. However, his political philosophy implies 
that a person who experiences his participation in tensional 
existence necessarily needs doctrine to communicate to 
others, but that he does not and must not believe it to be 
the final and ultimate testimony of truth.
It is worth quoting Hallowell’s statement: "I think I
understand Voegelin’s desire to distinguish between 
existential faith and doctrinal belief: I realize that
doctrine divorced from the experience which gave rise to it 
becomes an empty abstraction and that many doctrinal 
disputes are much ado about nothing. But is every attempt 
to express faith in doctrinal form necessarily doommed to 
become doctrinaire? And how can existential faith be 
communicated to others without the aid of doctrine? The 
moment I say ’I believe’ and I have begun to enunciate a 
doctrine. Voegelin himself holds certain convictions which, 
if stated in a way, would appear to be doctrinaire. A 
person who espouses a doctrine does not necessarily believe 
it to be the final and ultimate statement of truth, nor need 
he hold to that doctrine in a doctrinaire fashion."59
The modern gnosticism has been responsible for the 
derailment of philosophy. In short, a crucial aspect of 
what Voegelin takes to be the "derailment" of the tradition 
is the fall of philosophy into the world of gnostic action. 
He emphasizes that "the history of philosophy is in largest
5S J.H. Hallowel1, 'Existence in Tension," p.126.
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part the history of its derailment."60 The moving force in 
that derailment was "gnostic activism,"61 and it attempts to 
emulate God, realize a millennium on earth, and achieve 
dominion over the world through the transformation of 
e p i s t e m e  into g n o s i s .  In its symbolic forms, the "gnostic 
revolt" is evident from the historical immanentization of 
Christian eschatology in the speculation of Joachim of 
Flora, who "created the aggregate of symbols which govern 
the self-interpretation of modern political society to this 
day,"62 through the Enlightenment to Marx. The activist or 
pragmatic manifestations of the Enlightenment and Marxism 
involve the French Revolution and the Soviet totalitarian 
polity.
81 E. Voegelin, O r d e r  a n d  History, vol.3, P la t o  a nd Arist o t l e , hereafter OH, III, p.277. 
11 FETR, p.298. 
t2 NSP, p.lll.
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2. A GN O S T I C  DERAILMENT: THE E N L I G H T E N M E N T
The political dimension of the crisis of our time is 
most ostensibly totalitarianism on both the right and the 
left. In modern political activities, gnosticism complies 
both manifestations of its left wing and its right: 
communism and liberalism. "If liberalism is understood as 
the immanent salvation of man and society, communism 
certainly is its most radical expression; it is an evolution 
that was already anticipated by John Stuart Mill’s faith in 
the ultimate advent of communism for mankind."63 The crisis 
of modernity is ultimately not simply a problem of politics 
in the practical world but a crisis of political philosophy. 
In many respects Voegelin is concerned with the subtle 
problems that he believes are immanent in modern society and 
liberal democracy, which, he claims, spring from the same 
intellectual roots.
The story of political thought from ancient times to 
the present was one of degeneration within modernity for 
which the liberalistic tradition was in part responsible. 
Through its failure to develop a philosophical ground that 
could justify itself in the face of totalitarian ideologies, 
liberalism helped to produce the crisis of our time that 
manifested itself in the totalitarian forces that gave rise 
to the world wars and now threatened the world in the form 
of communism. The crisis therefore represents the loss of
63 E. Voegelin, quoted in R. Kirk, Eneaies of the Peraanent Things, p. 255.
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both spiritual and political authority in the modern age. 
"In liberalism can be found all the symptoms of the crisis, 
such as the decline of the political realm and its 
subversion by social and private values, relativism and the 
weakness of political principle, and the historical regime 
that allowed Nazism to enter the world and that now may be 
too weak to defend against incursions from the East."64
Concerning the equation of liberalism with totalitarian
ideologies, Voegelin identifies the internal logic of the
liberalist tradition. Liberalism, as Voegelin notes, is a
"political movement in the context of the surrounding
Western revolutionary movement: its meaning alters with the
phases of the surrounding movement."65 Thus the feature of
liberalism changes as liberalism itself changes in the
process of history. However, by seizing the proper picture
of liberalism, we can best gain access to this constantly
changing field of meaning. Liberalism, especially in the
political aspect, is commonly understood as the belief in
"the redemptive value of a constitutional model constructed
in opposition to absolute monarchy and the police state.
The pillars of the construction are the demands for basic
human rights, the separation of powers and universal
suffrage."66 But this is not the inner logic of liberalism
64 J.G. Gunnell, Between Philosophy and Politics: The Alienation of Political Theory (Amherst, HA: 
University of Hassachusetts Press, 1986), p.100.
t5 E. Voegelin, "Liberalism and Its History," trans. by Mary and Keith Algozin, Review of Politics,
36:4 (October 1974), p.506.
Ibid., p . 515.
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but an expression of "the phenomenon of liberalism." In 
liberalism, while its philosophical underpinnings are in no 
way completely homogeneous, some fundamental ideas remain 
constant: (1) the primacy of man’s freedom; (2) the priority
of individual good over higher good; (3) the belief that man 
can substantively change the human condition; (4) a 
rejection of God and religion as ordering forces for the 
polity. Also in liberalism, states Voegelin, the problem of 
"permanent revolution" is involved. The nineteenth century 
liberal Charles Comte (not to be confused with Auguste 
Comte) developed the program of a liberalism that could 
carry on the task of permanent revolution. He believed 
that:
there were terrible social wrongs under the a n c i e n  
r e g i m e , and that the revolution occurred because 
necessary reforms were not implemented at the proper 
time. If not enough is done to satisfy the demands of 
social justice the result is revolution. If in the 
future we wish to avoid a repetition of the horrible 
events, then what the revolution achieved by unhappy 
means must be achieved at the proper time through the 
less unpleasant means of reform. The revolution must 
become permanent in the sense that a permanent, 
flexible politics of reform buys off revolutionary 
terror. Even though it changed its name, Charles 
Comte’s idea lived on in liberal politics...67
Voegelin notes:
Charles Comte’s idea that the goal of the revolution 
could be achieved through a constant process of reform 
without the unpleasant side effects belongs in the 
gnostic-utopian class. It is intimately related to the 
eighteenth-century progressivist idea, as held by Kant
ST Ibid., pp.508ff.
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and Condorcet, that a final state of rational humanity 
can be achieved in a process of infinite approximation. 
But this cannot be achieved, for man is not only 
rational but much else besides. Therefore it is no 
accident that the communist revolutionary took up again 
the liberal’s r e v o l u t i o n  p e r m a n e n t e .  For in liberalism 
also there is the irrational element of an 
eschatological final state, of a society which will 
produce through its rational methods, without violent 
disturbances, a condition of everlasting peace.68
The problems of liberalism and its intellectual 
handmaiden, i.e., social science in general and positivistic 
political inquiry in particular, not only spring from the 
same intellectual source as totalitarianism but may even 
anticipate the danger of degenerating into it. From the 
view of Voegelin’s modern gnosticism, it is obvious that the 
positivistic view of science is a part of modernity, 
gnosticism, and ideology. And, the premises of political 
positivism concerning the nature of scientific method, fact 
and value are dogmatic; that is, they are based on the 
belief that man’s being is not dependent upon transcendent 
Being but independent of it.
Voegelin’s stance on liberalism is endorsed by the 
works of Hallowell and Spragens. Hallowell addresses in 
M a i n  C u r r e n t s  i n  M o d e r n  P o l i t i c a l  T h o u g h t  a crisis in 
Western civilization caused by what he takes to be the 
decline of political theory and the perversion of 
liberalism. Hallowell has pursued the theme of the decline 
of liberalism, which he attributes to the rise of positivism
Ibid., p.510.
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which is, in turn, linked to the emergence of 
totalitarianism. For Hallowell, the solution is to
reconstruct the liberal political philosophy in terms of new 
philosophical and theological grounds. Spragens also argues 
in T h e  I r o n y  o f  L i b e r a l  R e a s o n  that the modern rationalistic 
thinker’s liberal thought has an epistemology that 
("ironically") justifies the Gulag Archipelago. Spragens 
understands modernity as the unfolding of a logic developed 
principally by Descartes and Locke and advanced by 
Condorcet, Hume, Kant, Comte, the Marxists, contemporary 
positivists and behavioralists, existentialists, and so on. 
But, as the title of his work connotes, the logic of the 
modern liberal tradition is ironic: the attempt to project
the human will over nature and to liberate man results in 
his debasement, through a subjugation to those forces that 
promise knowledge and liberation.
Liberalism based much of its original optimism on the 
conviction that autonomous critical reason would--after 
discrediting repressive superstitions and decadent 
Scholasticism--establish its humanitarian premises on 
luminous and secure foundations. Instead, the new 
reason proved to have a much greater appetite for 
critical debunking than the liberal reformers had 
anticipated. After discrediting beliefs the liberals 
disdained, it turned on beliefs they cherished. By 
rendering the whole notion of moral knowledge 
anomalous, by pushing moral claims beyond the pale of 
reason into the realm of pseudo-propositions, the 
empiricist conception of human understanding finally 
undermined the very humanitarian standards it was 
supposed to have secured for all time. Epistemological 
revolutions, like their political counterparts, 
sometimes devour their own children.69
t! T.A. Sprag e n s ,  The Irony of Liberal Reason (Chicago: U n i v e r s i t y  of C h i c a g o  Press, 1981], pp.212ff,
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In reverse of the classical understanding of human 
nature, the kernel of positivistic understanding is the 
belief that man’s being is confined to immanent horizons-- 
horizons within which man and nature are the sole existence. 
Within these immanent horizons, the sophistication of 
science--as defined by positivism’s reliance on natural- 
scientific method--allows modern man to increase his control 
over nature. This increase of man’s control over nature 
parallels the decrease of man’s dependence upon transcendent 
Being--and i p s o  f a c t o  man’s belief in transcendent Being. 
To comprehend the perverse impact of the gnostic modern 
disorder, especially one that emanated from liberalism, to 
the intellectual and political life in the West 
afterwards,70 it is necessary to review Voegelin’s critique 
of gnostic implications of the Enlightenment in his F r o m  
E n l i g h t e n m e n t  t o  R e v o l u t i o n .
As Voegelin indicates, the Enlightenment period is one 
of the major contributing forces to the spiritual crisis of 
Western civilization. The positivistic scientism is the 
contemporary outgrowth of the Enlightenment faith that 
heaven will be built on earth, by man himself, equipped with 
the tools of science, in its control over nature in 
technological production. The modern notion of science is 
thus an expression of the secularist notion of "self-
?c Liberalism is, as mentioned earlier in the first chapter, generally equated with the Enlightenment,
On the equation of liberalism and the Enlightenment, see Chapter One, especially pp.68-74.
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salvation." Behavioral ism is the dominant version of this 
notion of science in the American social sciences. 
According to Voegelin, one of the "symptoms" of the 
spiritual crisis of Western civilization, symbolized in the 
Enlightenment is "the reduction of man and his life to the 
level of material and utilitarian existence through the 
degeneration of the intellectual and spiritual substance of 
man."71 The structure of this crisis is "that of a gradual 
decomposition of civilizational values, consummated 
historically by repeated upheavals which destroy, or intend 
to destroy, the social bearers of the condemned values. 
Between the upheavals we find periods of stabilization at 
the respective levels of destruction."72 One of the 
peculiar consequences of the crisis is "the necessity of 
substituting for transcendental reality an intraworldly 
evocation which is supposed to fulfill the functions of 
transcendental reality for the immature type of man."73
Voegelin describes the Enlightenment as an apostatic 
revolt which formally abolished Christianity as "the 
authoritatively unifying spiritual substance of mankind" and 
which "revealed a movement of ideas which would shape 
decisively the political structure of the West."74 In his 
penetrating critique of the Age of Reason, Voegelin is not
u  Ibid., p.143.
” Ibid.
T4 Ibid., p . 3.
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blind to the weaknesses of Christianity which contributed to 
the rise of the Enlightenment world view. In the first 
place, Voegelin argues, Christianity should have come to 
grips with the new political and national forces of the late 
medieval period rather than subject them to the power of the 
Church institution. The resulting struggle ended with the 
relegation of the Church as spiritual institution to the 
private sphere, while the autonomous political institutions 
achieved the monopoly of public realm.
This privatization of the spirit left the field open 
for a re-spiritualization of the public sphere from 
other sources, in the forms of nationalism, 
humanitarianism, economism both liberal and socialist, 
biologism and psychologism. The growth of a plurality 
of counter spirits and counter churches to the 
traditional spiritual institutions is the most fateful 
consequences of the failure of the Church to find a 
compromise with the new pluralistic world of 
politics.7 5
In the second place, the Church did not adequately cope 
with the advancement of science. As a result we are 
confronted with "the spiritual devastation wrought by the 
wide-spread conviction that rational-scientific approach 
could be a substitute for the spiritual integration of 
personality."76 This creates the problem that the Church is 
losing its leadership, not only the leadership of the 
civilizational process itself, but the leadership of the 
spirit. Finally, there was the unresolved conflict between
T! Ibid., p p . 20-1.
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Christian symbolism and its rational, historical critique. 
The language of Christianity has become a "myth" as a 
"consequence of the penetration of our world by a 
rationalism which destroys the transcendental meanings of 
symbols taken from the world of the senses."77 These
symbols thus lose their revelatory character. The Church, 
until recently, showed admirable wisdom in resisting a 
modern rationalistic interpretation of its symbols, but it 
was helpless in dealing actively with the attack. 
"Obviously it is a task that would require a new Thomas
rather than a neo-Thomist.117 8
These evident failures of Christianity should challenge 
Christians to eliminate them, not to abolish Christianity 
itself. This was the intent of the Enlightenment.79
Voegelin speaks of the entire development of thought from 
the start of the modern era through Nietzsche, Marx, Freud, 
and Lenin, in terms of a process of inversion, of turning
matters upside down. Voegelin describes this process of 
inversion as modern gnosticism because of the rejection of 
the order of being or the creation order which it implies. 
Four philosophical or theoretical inversions in the process 
of the Enlightenment movement will be described: inversion
t m m T pIT.
78 Ibid., p.22.
75 For example, Voltaire, the versatile propagandist of the Enlightenment, was a deist and never gave 
up his belief in God: "All nature cries out to us that he exists." As a result of deistic principles, 
throughout his life Voltaire ruthlessly attacked superstition and ecclesiastical domination: he 
regarded revealed religion as the product of ignorance and deceit, as the work of clever priests 
making use of human stupidity and prejudice in order to rule over men.
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of history, inversion in human nature, inversion in 
authority, and inversion of the earth.80
Voegelin’s first illustration is taken from the area of 
historical reflection, where he compares Jacques Bossuet 
(1627-1704), the last Augustinian historian, with Francois- 
Marie Arouet de Voltaire (1694-1778), the first popular 
modern sophist. In Bossuet’s Christian view of history, the 
universality of history is constituted through the idea of 
creation and the descent of man from Adam as described in 
the "sacred history" of Israel. With Voltaire begins "the 
concerted attack on Christian symbols and the attempt at 
evoking an image of man in the cosmos under the guidance of 
intraworldly reason."81 By him the massive blow against the 
Augustinian construction, as represented by Bossuet, was 
delivered. And the attack was conducted primarily on the 
phenomenal level.82 With the moderns, the conception of the 
universality of history is secularized: i.e., the center of 
universality is shifted from the sacred to the profane, from 
the divine to the humane level. This shift implies the 
first revolutionary turning of tables: "the construction of
history will, in the future, not be subordinated to the
19 In articulating Voegelin’s assessaent of the Enlightennent, I an indebted to Bernard Zylstra, 
"Voegelin on Unbelief and Revolution," pp.1-15. Reprinted fron A Statesnan to Follow: Coaneiioration 
of Groen van Prinsterer (The Hague: Training Centers of the Anti-Revolutionary Party, the Christian 
Historical Union, and the Catholic Peoples Party, 1976], pp.191-200. As Zylstra shows, Voegelin sets 
out the French Revolution of 1789 as a practical instance of great inversion which historically 
eabodied the four philosophical and theoretical inversions.
91 PETR, p.23.
92 E. Voegelin, Order and History, vol.2, The Iforld of the Polis, p.15.
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spiritual drama of humanity, but... Christianity will be 
understood as an event in history."83
At least since the Enlightenment, "the Western 
world...has come increasingly under the sway of 
secularism,"84 which strips religion of its other­
worldliness, appropriates it for secular purposes, or seeks 
to eliminate it altogether. Whereas Christianity understood 
the meaning of history to be the awarding of salvation,
Voltaire saw it as a process by which humankind became
"better and happier" through the use of human reason. 
According to the Enlightenment, language, law, the state,
morality, and religion owe their origin to human reason; for 
example, language was invented by man to communicate his 
thoughts; the state was organized in order to insure his 
welfare. Since all these things are the work of reason, the 
ideal should be to make them more and more rational, to 
eliminate the irrational and accidental elements that have 
crept into them and corrupted them in the course of history.
With the mind of the Enlightenment and its unlimited 
confidence in the redemptive power of unassisted human 
reason, "an ethics of the Aristotelian type (with a scale of 
values oriented toward the b i o s  t h e o r e t i k o s ), or a spiritual 
morality of the Christian type (determined by the experience 
of the common ground in a transcendental reality), are
83 FETR, p.7.
84 Reinhold Niebuhr, Christianity and Power Politics (New York: Scribner, 1940), p.203.
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beyond... reach."85 There emerged the "idea of an autonomous
ethics, without religious and metaphysical foundation."86
Thus the secularization of history is accompanied by a new
conception of historical development which, in the words of
Voltaire, concerns "the extinction, the renaissance and the
progress of the human spirit ( 1 * e s p r i t  h u m a i n ),"87 These
words are reminiscent of the Biblical fall, redemption, and
final consummation. But the content of these terms is
immanent, mundane and intramundane rather than
transcendental and sacred. "The e s p r i t  h u m a i n  and its
changes have become the object of general history. The
transcendental pneuma of Christ is replaced by the
intramundane spirit of man, and the change of heart by the
change of opinion. The c o r p u s  m y s t i c u m  C h r i s t i  has given
way to the c o r p u s  m y s t i c u m  h u m a n i t a t i s . " 88 That is,
"[w]hereas God was the primary subject of history according
to Christianity, the object of Voltaire’s essay was the
human spirit."89
The notion of extinction, renaissance and progress of
the human spirit is a secular equivalent of the gnostic
conception of Joachim of Flora. As we have seen, in the




88 J. Wiser, Political Philosophj: A H istorp of the Search for Order, p . 213.
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of progress and the last stage is marked by spiritual 
communion without the burdens of institutions and 
organizations. In the secular versions the basic movement 
of intra-worldly "progress" descends from the deification of 
reason and intellect in Voltaire and Comte to the 
deification of the material, animal basis of existence in 
Marx. The modern welfare state is the provisional end point 
of this descent, this "progress." Voegelin speaks of a 
continuous change within the process of secularization "in 
accordance with the stream of human nature that commands the 
attention of the time and becomes the object of the process 
of deification."90
Voegelin develops the theme of the instability of 
intraworldly sacred histories as a characteristic trait of 
the new age. He is of the opinion that Bossuet, in his 
interpretation of the "heresies" of the Reformation, already 
pointed to the reasons for this instability. It is a 
consequence of the "initial revolutionary break": "once the
authority of the tradition is broken by the individual 
innovator, the style of individual innovation determines the 
further course of variations."91 As a consequence of the 
"initial break," Western man has in principle turned his 
back upon the past in order to realize progress in the 




age. The Left, writes Kolakowski, "is a movement of 
negation toward the existent world."92
But this ever recurring innovation-as-negation creates 
a real problem for the innovators, namely that of 
establishing a spiritual community between individual 
intellectuals. Bossuet points to this problem in the 
tension between the authority of the Church and the 
"individualism" of the reformers. The perfect truth
revealed by God has been replaced by the weak production of 
the human mind so that, with typically modern Christians 
like Newton, the knowledge of the external world, 
particularly in astronomy and physics, sets the standard for 
all our knowledge, including the knowledge of God. Thus the 
"existence of God" has become a "human persuasion" which has 
to be filled with a certain satisfying content to make it 
useful. The real problem with being a Christian in the 
modern age, therefore, is to avoid filling belief with a 
subjective, pleasing utilitarian content. At any rate, the 
dividing of Christianity in numerous factions, each pursuing 
a different utilitarian content of "faith," is paralleled by 
the divisions in the political and social realm. Voegelin 
points out that established communities are "continuously 
dissolved and broken by the competition of new foundations 
until the chaotic multiplicity of sects, schools, parties, 
factions, movements, groupings, associations, communes, is
,2 L. Kolakowski, Tov a r d  a M a r x i s t  H u a a n i s a :  E s s a y  on the Left Today (New York: Grove Press, 1968 ),
p.68.
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reached which characterized European social situation before 
the outbreak of violence in our time."93
The Enlightenment led to a second major inversion, 
namely inversion in our understanding of human nature, of 
the direction or goal of man’s existence on earth. Voegelin 
identifies the inversion of the understanding of human 
nature which was presupposed by the first inversion.
The rapid descent from reason, through technical and 
planning intellect, to the economic, psychological and 
biological levels of human nature, as the dominants in 
the image of man, is a strong contrast to the imposing 
stability of the Christian anthropology through 
eighteen centuries. Once the transcendental anchorage 
is surrendered, the descent from the rational to the 
animal nature, so it seems, is inevitable.94
From the ontological point of view, the danger in the 
Enlightenment conception of reason was materialism which 
explained all phenomena as the results of matter-in-motion. 
That is, materialism suggested the thought that man is a 
machine, and the soul is not a separate entity, but a 
function of the body. The Frenchman Julian Offray de La 
Mettrie (1709-1751) based his materialism on Descartes’ 
mechanical explanation of the animal organism: if the animal 
is a machine, why not man?95 The p h i l o s o p h e s  thought that 
all mental processes depended on the brain, a certain motion 
of the brain. The Classical and Christian tradition had
*~3 lm~ p7i5.
54 Ibid., p.13,
,5 P. Thilly, k Hi story of Philosophy, p p . 404-5.
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understood that human reason was the means by which humanity 
participated in a spiritual realm which was beyond the 
purely immanent, and that what made humanity human was its 
unique relationship with the divine. On the contrary, the 
materialist simply redefined the concept in such a way that 
reason now appeared to be based upon an organization of the 
material realm itself, and denied the existence of a 
spiritual reality and, thereby, brought mortals back 
entirely into the natural realm.
One of the most penetrating analyses of modernity’s 
reduction of man to the animal level of existence, notably 
in the line of development from Locke, Adam Smith, to Marx, 
can be found in Hannah Arendt.96 With regard to this 
connection, Guillaume Groen Van Prinsterer (1801-76), a 
Dutch historian and statesman, also detected a constant 
process of radicalization in the theory and practice of 
revolution: "The principle of this vaunted philosophy was
t h e  s o v e r e i g n t y  o f  r e a s o n ,  and the outcome was apostasy from
,s Hannah Arendt contrasts vita activa (the life of public action, or political action), homo fa her 
(work), and animal laborans (labor). In her anthropology, political activity or the vita activa 
actually constitutes or creates a human nature. Without this activity Ban is nerely a homo faber or 
animal laborans, he is not fully human. Arendt believes that the roots of the modern malaise lie in 
Cartesian doubt and Marxian politics.
With Cartesian doubt man lost faith in the certainty of immortality. Furthermore, according 
to her, this left man also in doubt about the immortality of the world. Thus the only thing left for 
man to immortalise is the human species itself. This left the telos of modern society reduced to the 
mere survival of a species, and thus depreciated modern man to animal laborans. Marx’s notion of 
socialised men and violent revolution is the most degenerate manifestation of modern reduction of man 
to the animal level of existence, For Harx, all of history is the struggle of the worker to achieve 
his goal of freedom. Thus, Arendt believes that Marx’s view of the struggle of the proletariat in 
history is nothing more than the reduction of all mankind to animal laborans. She points out that for 
the Greeks man was endowed with speech, and thus politics was conducted through discourse. Beginning 
with moderns like Marx, violence usurps the place of discourse in politics. Thus the modern age has 
been both the death of the vita activa and the death of man as a homo politicus. H. Arendt, The Human 
Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), part III.
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God and materialism. That such an outcome was inevitable 
once the principle had been accepted is demonstrable from 
the genealogy of ideas."97
According to the materialistic view, the phenomena of 
nature, be they physical or mental, are governed by law, and 
the mental and moral life of man is necessary product of 
nature. From this standpoint, Claude Adrien Helvetius, a 
typical representative of the Age of Reason, explained human 
morality. He began by defining the human being strictly in 
terms of physical sensibilities ( s e n s i b i l i t e  p h y s i q u e ). 
Given this, all people were understood to be simply the 
results of the impressions and experiences to which they had 
been exposed. Men and women are formed solely by their 
experience, and inasmuch as all experience is ultimately a 
matter of physical sensation, human nature is actually 
created through the administration of pleasure and pain. As 
a result, Helvetius’ materialism led logically to an 
"ethical utilitarianism."98 For him, pleasure is the only 
good. Humanity is a somewhat more simplified being: it has 
only one love--the love of pleasure. "Knowledge, power, and 
honor are not sought for themselves but only for the 
pleasures which they represent."99 Human beings are good 
when in the pursuit of their enlightened self-interest they
9? G. Groen Van Prinsterer, Unbelief and Revolution (Ansterdan: The Groen Van Prinsterer Fund, 1975), 
p.17.
99 J. Wiser, Political Philosophy, p . 240.
59 Ibid.
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actually contribute to the public utility. Thus the
greatest happiness of the greatest number became the
standard for social justice, and it could be achieved only 
by creating a stable balance among private interests. Once 
this balance was achieved, however, Helvetius believed that 
humankind would move necessarily towards its own immanent 
perfection and self-fulfillment. In this sense, for
Helvetius, "Enlightenment materialism necessarily implied a 
doctrine of historical progress."100
In a discussion of Helvetius’ thought, Voegelin shows 
that Helvetius is no longer capable of understanding the 
spiritual essence of human life before God since he accepts
passions, or s e n s i b i l i t e  p h y s i q u e  as the only moving forces
of human existence. Voegelin speaks here of "the inversion 
of the direction in which the r e a l i s s i m u m  of existence is to 
be sought." Instead of pursuing s u m m u m  b o n u m , a higher 
good, the protagonists of modernity were only interested in
avoiding a s u m m u m  m a l u m , a greatest evil which is, in the
final sense, violent death. In terms of this inversion, the 
internal order--perverted--of human nature becomes clear:
Whether it be the materialistic, the sensualistic, or 
the hedonistic variants--the strata of human nature 
are interpreted genetically as derivatives of a 
physical or biological substance at the bottom of 
existence. The internal structure of man is no longer 
ordered toward a transcendental aim but is to be 
explained by the operations of physical sensibility or 
of a pleasure-pain mechanism. This inversion of 
direction becomes from now on the symbol of the anti- 
Christian anthropology in politics--whether it assumes
1(111 Ibid., p.241.
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the form of economic materialism, or of biologism, or 
of psychologism.101
With the elimination of s u m m u m  b o n u m , the disorder of 
the passions and senses is looked upon as normal in the 
enlightened.- modern society. This has immense political 
consequences since the perversion of order is intimately
connected with the instrumentalizat ion of man. Man is no
longer an entity that has an existential center within 
itself; it has become a mechanism of pleasure, pain and 
passions which can be harnessed and instrumentalized by
another man. Here we are at the "key point of the anti-
Christian attack on the existence of man. Only when the
spiritual center of man, through which man is open to the 
transcendental realissimum, is destroyed can the disorderly 
aggregate of passions be used as an instrument by the 
legislator... This is the new basic thesis for collectivism 
in all its variants, down to the contemporary forms of 
totalitarianism."102 But in less extreme forms we are 
confronted with the same pernicious conception of human 
personality in the more common forms of managerial and 
organizational interference with the soul of man in 
political propaganda, commercial advertising, and education 
based on a behavioristic psychology of conditioned reflexes.
This process of general education for the purpose of 
forming the useful member of society, while neglecting
Ibid., p . 70,
3 8 7
or even deliberately destroying the life of the soul, 
is accepted as an institution of our modern society so 
fully that the awareness of the demonism of such 
interference with the life of the soul on a social mass 
scale, and of the inevitably following destruction of 
the spiritual substance of society, is practically 
dead.10 3
The third inversion is that in authority. In the
Biblical view of reality, creation is subject to the
authority of the Creator, God. Society finds its foundation 
in a divinely established order. The Enlightenment,
however, eliminated not only tradition but also revelation 
and a God-given order for creation as sources and standards
of authority in society. What has filled this vacuum? The
empirical process itself has to furnish the standards. But 
what moment in the empirical process can do this? Voegelin 
develops the theme of the "authoritative present":
This idea [of an authoritative present]...is needed for 
the adequate expression of intramundane religiousness 
in politics. A merely empirical present is a brute 
fact without superior authority in comparison with any 
past or future present. When the critical standards of 
civilizational values which stem from the b i o s  
t h e o r e t i k o s  and the life of the spirit are abandoned, 
when the empirical process itself has to furnish the 
standards, then a special doctrine is needed to bestow 
grace on the present and to heighten an otherwise 
irrelevant situation of fact into a standard by which 
the past and future can be measured.104
Jean Le Rond D ’Alembert (1717-1783), an Encyclopedist, 




derives the idea of justice from a situation of oppression,
"from the fundamental experience of revolt against
oppression and rejects a religious or metaphysical
foundation of morals."105 Thus the sentiment of revolt
overshadows the idea of order. Here, Voegelin seems to have
"located one of the roots of Marxism and neo-Marxism, also
in its present Christian varieties such as the German
political theology and the South American theology of
liberation which proceed from the concrete ’now’ which is
experienced as unjust and oppressive."106 What is most
significant for us to realize--and we can do this more fully
in the light of Voegelin’s analysis--is the fact that the
fundamental themes of the Enlightenment have become so
perversive in the twentieth century, both in the communist
world and in the capitalist countries, that we are no longer
able to distinguish them from radically different Biblical
themes. As a matter of fact, "in many instances we have
taken over the inversions of the Enlightenment and read them
back into the Scriptures. One instance of such e i s e g e s i s
(i n l e g k u n d e ) is the wide-spread habit of looking upon the
exodus-theme in the Bible as prior to the creation-theme
since the exodus of the people of Israel from Egypt is
viewed as a revolutionary response to a concrete situation
of oppression. The neglect in Christian circles of the
Biblical revelation of reality as creation, as the ordered _____
1 H  B, Z y l s t r a , " V o e g e l i n  on U n b e l i e f . . . , "  p . 7.
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home for man subject to the good law of the Creator, as the 
cosmos which God so loved that He sent only begotten Son, is 
one of the indirect results of Enlightenment influences on 
Christian thought and practices."107
If the given order "for" and "of" reality is rejected, 
then, by what standard can men respond to the experience of 
injustice and oppression in the "authoritative present"? 
Here again the notion of progress returns: modern science,
technology and industry will supply the material goods for 
the welfare of all so that empirically justice is done, so 
that the "needs" of all are fulfilled. In other words, 
material abundance supposedly will solve the problems of 
authority and order in society.
The final inversion is that of the earth. The utopian 
notion of material abundance entails a further inversion, 
namely one with reference to our understanding of the earth, 
man’s home. In the Christian view of the world, the earth 
is the Lord’s and the fullness thereof (Psalm 24). The 
earth is "the gift of God to man as the field of his 
sustenance and of his civilizational achievement." It is 
also "the symbol of the substance from which we come and to 
which we return bodily."108 In the Enlightenment, however, 
with the atrophy of Christianity and the growth of the 
intramundane ideas of man and mankind, the problem of the 




Turgot’s G e o g r a p h i e  p o l i t i q u e .  In Jacques Turgot (172 7— 
1781), the m a s s  t o t a l e  of mankind had become the substitute 
for the Christian idea of mankind. The tribe of mankind, 
the m a s s  t o t a l e  as the secular equivalent of the Body of
Christ, has the globe for its habitat, that is, as the 
object of increased technological exploitation by a mastery 
of its resources.109 In other words, for the modern mind 
the tie that binds men together is no longer the gift of
divine grace but the material fruits of the earth. The 
secular equivalent of unlimited grace is an infinity of
material resources, to be acquired by man’s conquest of the 
earth.
But what does material progress offer a substitute for
the order of society? Does it eliminate the problem of
authority? Of course, it cannot. And for this reason,
precisely in an age of industrial progress, spiritual
regeneration is the burning question.110 Voegelin shows how
this problem has already come to the fore before the French
Revolution, but that it was realized especially by St. Simon
and Auguste Comte, who attempted to find an alternative
source of order and authority in a new p o u v o i r  s p i r i t u e l  of
which the bearers would be a new elite, F u h r e r  of an
intraworldly political religion often of nationalistic
kind.111 Mention of an elite places us before the modern _____
11( Ibid., p.85,
111 Ibid., p p . 111-112 and 125,
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phenomenon of the masses. In Turgot, the m a s s  t o t a l e  of 
mankind had become the substitute for the Christian idea of 
mankind. But in Turgot the intellectuals were the sole 
barriers of progress. In Condorcet’s P r o g r e s  d e  1 ’E s p r i t  
H u m a i n  (1795), the masses have become the object of the 
elite’s dictatorial manipulation so that the entire human 
race can be the subject of progressive history--a prelude to 
Marx’s conception of the universality of the proletariat. 
The basis for this expansion of the bearers of progress lies 
in the perfectibility of human nature, which in effect means 
a change in man’s creaturely condition, the possibility of 
m an’s creating anew substance: "the creation of man by God,
which was eliminated as a superstition, now returns as the 
creation of the superman through Marquis de Condorcet (1743- 
1794). The intramundane hubris of self-salvation culminates 
logically... in the improvement on God through the creation 
of a man who does not need salvation."112
Marx, in my view, is the most radical proponent in the 
modern age of man’s self-creation and self-salvation. 
Voegelin identifies it as a swindling, and I therefore 
consider it utter folly on the part of intellectuals to look 
upon Marx as a kind of forerunner to the role which 
Christianity should play in the civilization of our time. 
In view of the current misunderstandings on this score it is 
best to do justice to Marx by quoting his own words on the 
matter of self-creation. In the E c o n o m i c  a n d  P h i l o s o p h i c a l
"MbirTpdiiT
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M a n u s c r i p t s ,  Marx wrote: "Since, however, for socialist man, 
t h e  w h o l e  o f  w h a t  i s  c a l l e d  w o r l d  h i s t o r y  is nothing but the 
creation of man by human labour, and the emergence of nature 
for man, he, therefore, has the evident and irrefutable 
proof of his s e l f - c r e a t i o n  of his own o r i g i n s . " 1 1 3 In this 
passage all of the revolutionary inversions of the 
Enlightenment are fused in one of the most radical counter­
statements of Christian revelation that the modern age has 
produced.
In Voegelin’s view, the fatal error of gnostic 
theorizing is in the turning away from the transcendent 
spiritual sustenance offered in the Hellenic and Biblical 
conceptions and placing confidence in the perversive notion 
that man has it within his earthly capacity to achieve self­
salvation and self-redemption. "The dream of achieving the 
perfect society through organizing men according to a 
blueprint instead of forming them in an educational process, 
is a serious affair," Voegelin contends, for "it is 
something like the blackmagic of politics. Most
appropriately, therefore, the dream of Atlantis rises in 
luciferic splendor."114 Also, "the fallacy of gnosis 
consists in the immanentization of transcendent truth."115 
Stated briefly: "Christ the Redeemer is replaced by the
113 Earl Harx: Early Vritings, trans. and ed. by T. B. Bottonore (New York: HcGraw-Hill, 1 963 ), p.166. 
111 OH, III, p.209.
115 PET’S, p.265.
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steam engine as the promise of the realm to come."116 "The 
climax of this is the magic dream of creating the Superman, 
the man-made Being that will succeed the sorry creature of 
God’s making."117
Even though there exist enormous and important 
differences between the various gnostic symbolisms that 
coexist in modernity, "they all have in common the 
fallacious attempt to transform the uncertainties and 
ambiguities of the experience of existence into the 
certainties of one-dimensional intramundane experience. Out 
of their anxiety regarding the structure of existence, they 
create a ’second reality’ which gives more assurance to them 
than the apprehension of the ground of being by faith and 
analogical reasoning affords."118 Voegelin’s diagnosis of 
the modern culture is that modern man has disordered notion 
of what he is and therefore a deformed conception of 
reality. It is Voegelin’s hope that man--especially
political philosopher-theorist-scientist--can restore the 
classical way of life through which he can resist the 
disorder of his own society.
lie ibid”   ...
117 Ibid.
118 D. Geraino, "Eric Voegelin's Contribution to Contenporary Political Theory," R e v i e v  of  Politics, 
26:3 (July 1964], p.397.
A
CHAPTER V 
SCOPE OF THE "NEW SCIENCE"
The aim of this chapter is to give some indication of 
Voegelin’s general position in contemporary political 
science by appreciating the scope of Voegelin’s "new science 
of politics." Every contemporary practitioner of political 
theory must eventually confront the thought of Eric 
Voegelin. One may be interested in developing a critique of 
positivism, in evaluating critically both the methods and 
the subject matter of political science, in probing the 
limits of instrumental rationality, in exploring the human 
nature and the reality of human existence in society and 
history, in comprehending the relations between knowledge 
and reality, in penetrating the sources of the disorder of 
society, or in establishing an ontological basis for 
political epistemology. If one is interested in any of 
these issues, then one will eventually delve into the 
studies launched by Voegelin over the past fifty years.
Voegelin’s philosophical science of politics has been 
hailed and criticized simultaneously. In this chapter, I 
will examine the assessments of Voegelin’s political 




1. N E G A T I V E / C R I T I C A L  DIME N S I O N S
Voegelin can exasperate the advocates of positivistic 
epistemology. Indeed, Voegelinian philosophical science of 
politics is obviously "very far from the concerns of the 
practicing political [positivists] today."1 The arguments 
advanced or implied by Voegelin may be disagreeable to 
modern rationalistic positivists who maintain that men have 
no souls transcending physical, organic existence, and that 
there exists no source from which transcendent knowledge can 
come; and who do not understand the language of 
philosophical and religious symbols. Many objections can be 
raised against Voegelin’s thesis: the adequacy of his
concept of immanentization; the consistency of denying the 
knowability of the whole meaning of history yet espousing 
principles of historical order; the tendency to blur 
objective and subjective categories; the inflation of the 
concept of gnosticism to polemical proportions.2 In fact, 
Voegelin is bound to clash with contemporary political 
positivists, and he is sometimes regarded as a sort of 
"intellectual anachronism who is trying to apply the 
outmoded internecine arguments of the Christian Middle Ages 
to a modern secular world in which they have no place."3
1 G. Sebba, "Order and Disorders of the Soul," S o u t h e r n Review, N.S., 3:2 (1967), p.264.
2 Lee Caueron HcDonald, "Voegelin and the Positivists: A New Science of Politics," Nidw e s t  Journal of
P o l i t i c a l  Science, 1:3-4 (November 1957), p.237.
5 V. Havard, "Notes on V o e g e l i n ' s  C o n t r i b u t i o n . . . , "  E. Sandoz, Eric Voegelin's Thought, p . 16.
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But, as Lee Cameron McDonald states with regard to the 
criticisms of Voegelin’s philosophy, "The strength of 
[Voegelin’s] position is not that he is invulnerable, but 
that he is invulnerable to those who refuse to meet him on 
his own ground."4
At any rate, the drawbacks to the Voegelinian 
philosophical science of politics are clearly discernible to 
us today. Few people are capable of mastering the multiple 
fields of discourse essential to such an enterprise; fewer 
yet are able to bring the resources of one field, bounded by 
its specialized vocabulary and instrumentalities, into the 
horizon of another fields. Certainly, Voegelin must be 
accorded high marks for his efforts, given the level of 
difficulty generated by the contemporary division of 
disciplines. He has penetrated a number of fields. His 
philosophical enterprise regards political science as "a 
truly integrated discipline, not one isolated from either 
history or economics, religion or philosophy."5 Specialists 
in each area may find much to criticize. But, it should be 
noted that the mode of philosophical science of politics 
Voegelin practices generates a scope of discipline 
unavailable to and untouchable by parochially insulated 
inquiries, i.e., insulated to the positivistic epistemology. 
It is worth quoting William Connolly’s statement regarding
4 L.C, McDonald, "Voegelin and the Positivists," p.231.
5 Klaus J. Hermann, "Book Review: Eric Voegelin, Anaunesis, Zur Theorie der Geschichte und Politik," 
C a n a d i a n  J o u r n a l  of  Polit i c a l  Science, 3:3 {Septeaber 1970), p. 193.
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the scope of discipline which he makes in a commentary on 
Habermas. In a philosophical, speculative theory, "claims 
articulated in one domain can be checked for their
consistency, or, more permissively, consonance, with 
assumptions accepted in others. Judgments reached with
confidence in one area can be brought to bear on issues 
posed in more problematic or mysterious areas of a theory. 
And, since every specialized theory necessarily draws upon 
uninvestigated assumptions in a variety of allied fields, 
one could argue that speculative theory, when it is done
well, provides more clarity and discipline than theory of 
the more restrained sort."6
Positivism which provides the intellectual foundation
of the modern world approaches the political reality from a 
confined epistemological direction. Scientific epistemology 
defines truth exclusively in terms of the empirico- 
positivistic demonstration of validity and therefore accepts 
nothing as self-evident. The truth or falsity of a 
proposition requires that meaningful but rigorous concepts 
possessing methodological significance be used in political 
studies. Concepts which do not possess those qualities are 
supposed to be meaningless insofar as their use in a study 
makes it impossible to prove or disprove the study 
"scientifically." Thus, concepts relating to values, like 
those relating to God, transcendence, the ground of being,
* Killian E. Connolly, P o l i t i c s  an d  A m b i g u i t y {Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), pp.52- 
53.
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are not to be included in the lexicon of the modern 
scientist, unless they can be reformulated in a more 
"operational" form. Therefore, an appeal to a truth that 
can be reached by m e t a l e p t i c  (participatory) experience of 
ultimate reality makes little sense if one is wedded to a 
positivistic epistemology. It is only one kind of
epistemology, and positivistic knowing is also only one sort 
of knowledge. Whoever limits what we know to only those 
things that can be proven positivistically may be 
foreshortening the realm of knowledge. What is required is 
to develop a proper understanding of human nature, a 
tolerance for uncertainty, an openness toward unseen being, 
the transcendental Beyond, and a recognition that the modern 
rationalistic way of looking at things is only one way.
In fact, Voegelin’s political philosophy reflects "vast 
erudition and a brilliant, critical mind at work."7 
However, Sandoz indicates that three factors have nurtured 
Voegelin*s relative lack of popularity. First, "much of 
Voegelin’s work has focused on antiquity" with which few 
practitioners of political inquiry today are familiar. 
Second, Voegelin ardently "moves at the frontier of 
knowledge" so that "full appreciation of his work requires 
the attentive response of an accomplished scholar." And, 
finally, Voegelin "has created a new language of 
philosophical discourse."8 For these reasons, Voegelin’s
7 J.H. Hallowe11, "Book Review: The Hew Science of Politics," L o u i s i a n a taw Review, 13:3 (Harch 1953), 
p.525.
8 E. Sandoz, The V o e g e l i n i a n  R e v o l u t i o n , pp.10-13.
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work must be "read many times with fresh insights." Since 
the reader of Voegelin stumbles over words like 
’retheoretization’ and strains to understand the distinction 
between the ’de-divinization of society’ and its *re- 
divinization,’" often the reader wishes Voegelin "could 
express himself in simpler language and with less pedantry."
But "once the author’s vocabulary is mastered the reader is 
rewarded for his efforts."9
To sketch the critical/negative dimensions of critiques 
against Voegelin’s philosophy, we need to examine at this 
time the appropriateness of the criticism, posed on the 
basis of the post-positivistic paradigm, of the traditional 
political theorists including Voegelin. In what has been 
characterized as the "post-positivist" era— or "post- 
behavioral ist" period in political science--an increasing 
number of methodological approaches to political science 
have been proposed as alternatives not only to the 
discredited positivist paradigm but to the traditionalists.
The list of the various denominations of post-positivist 
philosophy of social science includes phenomenology, a 
certain branch of philosophy of science, linguistic analysis 
(or what has come to be known as Wittgensteinian social 
science), critical theory of the Frankfurt school, 
structuralism, hermeneutics, ethnomethodology, as well as 
several offshoots of these approaches. These various sects
9 J.H. H a l l o w e l l ,  "Book Review: The N e w  S c i e n c e  of P o l i t i c s , "  p . 525.
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of the post-positivist philosophy of social science are 
represented as the "restructuring of social and political 
theory."10
First of all, let’s turn to a comparison and contrast 
of Voegelin’s thought to post-positivistic trend. There are 
remarkable similarities between Voegelin and most post­
positivists in their political conception and their 
conception of philosophy. For example, there are
similarities between Voegelin and Juergen Habermas, a 
principal representative of the tradition of "critical 
theory" established by Horkheimer and Adorno, in that they 
share a conception of the philosophic intent. Both Voegelin 
and Habermas reject positivism and modern liberalism; both 
see the restoration of the connection between theory and 
practice as the central task of philosophy today; both 
believe that the central questions are political and that 
the central political question is the common good; both 
agree that modern political thought has failed to regain the 
common good of the political society; both think political 
inquiry must evaluate on the basic of transcendental 
standards established through reason; both emphasizes self­
reflection .
Admittedly, the major difference between Voege]in and 
Habermas is that Habermas sees himself as a successor of 
Marx, whereas Voegelin fundamentally opposes to Marxism 
which he sees as the modern gnostic project in political
10 R. Bernstein, Restructuring cf Social and Political Theory, 1976,
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thought. Besides, Habermas rejects classical political 
insight Voegelin establishes as a standard against which the 
positivist conception may be judged and criticized. 
Rejecting classical insight, Habermas argues that the 
attempt to treat the political order as a symbolization of 
the cosmological order is itself a mystification which 
conceals the interest of classical philosophy.
Theory in the sense of the classical tradition only had 
an impact on life because it was thought to have 
discovered in the cosmic order an ideal world 
structure, including the prototype for the order of the 
human world. Only as cosmology was theoria capable of 
orienting action... Theory had educational and cultural 
implications not because it had frcad knowledge from 
interest. To the contrary, it did so because it 
derived pseudo-normative power from the concealment of 
its actual interest.11
On the basis of a post-positivistic stance, Scott 
Warren asserts that traditionalism including Voegelin’s 
philosophy has shortcomings, especially in that it lacks "a 
dialectical epistemological framework for a critical science 
of politics, which requires a focus on the unity of theory 
and practice."12 Indeed, political scientists who advocate 
post-positivism or post-behavioralism adopt a principle of 
dialectic as an alternative to behavioral ism and 
traditionalism. According to them, political inquiry should 
be engaged in a constant interplay between theory and 
practice, reflection and action, interpretation and
11 J. Habermas, K n o w l e d g e  an d  H u n a n  Interest, p.306.
12 S. Warren, The Emergence of D i a l e c t i c a l  Theory, p,178.
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engagement. Warren alleges that there are crucial
similarities between behavioral ism and the revived tradition 
of political theory.13 For him, what is held in common 
between the two is an objectivistic conception of reality, 
either in implicit or in explicit formulations. In
traditionalism, says Warren, this seems apparent in the 
assumption of a permanent and intelligible nature that can 
be known by reason. Such objectivism runs the risk of 
denying a concrete dialectic of subject and object where the 
human subject actually participates in creating reality 
itself through knowledge and praxis.14 He simplifies that 
the quest for objectivity is a quest for an objective 
standard of truth. According to Warren, Voegelin’s thought 
implies that truth presumes objectivity. Otherwise, the 
resolution of subject and object would be impossible, since 
there would be no objective order or truth with which to 
bring the knowing subject into accord. "With Eric Voegelin, 
it takes the form of an objectively ordered transcendent- 
divine ground of being to which the human psyche can ’attune 
itself. ’ "1 3
13 For exanple, "both orientations to political inquiry accept a nondialectical separation of the 
epistenological subject and object, although subject and object are defined differently for
each..,IB]oth orientations share an objectivistic view of a well-ordered (one night say pre-ordered) 
reality...[B]oth approaches to understanding political reality possess an abstract quality in their 
respective endeavors. Behavioralisa abstracts itself from the totality of hunan experience, while 
traditional political theory often abstracts itself fron the concrete, lived world in which we 




The critique of Voegelin’s political philosophy in
terms of the post-positivistic framework was, I believe, a 
somewhat negative undertaking in that it did not really
provide any solutions or alternatives to the problems it 
surfaced. Rather, the criticism appears to have missed the
specificity of Voegelin’s philosophical enterprise. The 
post-positivist criticisms on Voegelin overlook the fact 
that his emphasis on the onto-experiential conditions 
results in an understanding of political science that cannot 
be easily grasped by such conventional conceptual 
dichotomies as theory-practice and subject-object.
Voegelin’s political philosophy is not correctly 
described by categories which assume a theory-practice 
dichotomy.16 Nor can Voegelin’s conception of political
science be described in terms of the more modern subject- 
object dichotomy. Given his understanding of noetic
consciousness as man’s moving response to his being drawn by 
the divine ground of being, he argues that the human 
experience of reality is achieved through a process of 
"consubstantiation" or participation (Plato’s m e t a x i s , 
Aristotle’s m e t a l e p s i s , and Thomas’ p a r t i c i p a t i o ). The use 
of the subject-object dichotomy, on the other hand, suggests 
that reality is most clearly experienced through an act of 
confrontation in which a skeptical subject confronts and 
analyzes an indifferent object. Clearly Voegelin’s
J.L. Wiser, "Eric Voegelin: A Study in the Renewal of Political Science," Polity, 1 8:2 ( 1 985 ),
p.304.
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conception of theory cannot be explained in these terms. He 
has repeatedly argued that transcendence is neither a thing 
nor an object. Thus he differentiates between the
phenomenal sciences, which can be described in terms of the 
subject-object dichotomy, and the scientific quest for 
substance, which cannot.17 Obviously, those who do not 
accept Voegelin’s distinction, for example, positivists, 
empiricists, post-positivists, and the various advocates of 
scientism, have difficulty in acknowledging the epistemic 
character of Voegelin’s work.
Consequently, Voegelin’s call for a "new science of 
politics" not only challenges the way in which political 
science is practiced today but it also questions those 
metatheoretical categories by which the practice of 
political science is interpreted by others.18 For example, 
according to Voegelin, a theorist is able to do his work 
only because he does, in fact, practice a certain way of 
life, i.e., philosophical inquiry (z e t e m a ). By attuning 
himself to the transcendent order of reality, he is able to 
achieve that conscious participation in being which forms 
the basis of his knowledge. That knowledge, in turn, 
accounts for that existential harmony which is 
characteristic of the philosophical life. Therefore, to do 
theory is to achieve a specific form of existence-in-truth 
and philosophy is a way of practicing life. In this sense,
17 E. Voegelin, "The Origins of Scientism," Social Research, 15:4 (1948), p.463.
18 J.L. Wiser, "Eric Voegelin: A Study in...," p.10.
Voegelin’s conception of political science cannot be 
described in terms of theory-practice dichotomy.
Here, again, the emphasis is upon the necessity for 
preserving the unity of subject and object, of the soul and 
God, which is the very life of theophany. Aristotle, 
according to Voegelin’s exegesis, characterizes that unity 
by appropriating the term, m e t a l e p s i s , or mutual 
participation. "Thought ( n o u s )  thinks itself through
participation (m e t a l e p s i s ) in the object of thought 
( n o e t o n ); for it becomes the object of thought (n o e t o s ) 
through being touched and thought, so that thought ( n o u s )  
and that which is thought ( n o e t o n )  are the same."19 In
short, the human participates in the divine and the divine 
in the human N o u s .  Subject and object, soul and God, are 
logically distinguishable, but actually inseparable. 
" M e t a l e p s i s  is one of those reverberations of the soul’s 
depth in the conscious subject, and to treat it as
’scientifically’ descriptive of a relationship between a 
definable subject and object would be altogether to 
misrepresent Aristotle’s insight."20 By positivistically 
minded scholars m e t a l e p s i s  is likely to be treated as a
statement of literal fact rather than as a symbol to signify 
the mutual participation. Voegelin says: "A vision is not a 
dogma but an event in metaleptic reality which the
E. Voegelin, Order and History, vol.4, The E c u a e n i c  Age, hereafter OH, IV, p.190.
21 Harold L. Weatherby, "Kyth, Fact, and History: Voegelin on Christianity," H o d e r n  Age, 22:2 (Spring 
1978), p.147.
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philosopher can do no more than try to understand to the 
best of his ability. As the vision occurs in the Metaxy, it 
must not be split into ’object* and ’subject.’ There is no 
’object’ of the vision other than the vision as received; 
and there is no ’subject’ of the vision other than the 
response in a man’s soul to divine presence."21
Voegelin’s epistemology is subtle. It is not
idealistic, for it does not hold that thought is being, or 
that the mind is trapped inside itself and limited to 
awareness of its own constructs. Voegelin’s analysis 
emphasizes that our minds cannot get inside their objects. 
To use Kantian words, there is no intellectual penetration 
to the D i n g  a n  s i c h ; as yet, man has no experience of 
grasping the whatness of anything other than himself "from 
within," and he comprehends himself only incompletely. 
Therefore, he cannot define essences; he neither can say 
that a thing is this or that nor assert that this or that 
thing is. Voegelin’s analysis implicitly rejects the 
Thomistic thesis that reason abstracts essences, and it 
repeatedly denies that the symbols created by consciousness 
in the exegesis of experience represent external realities 
in themselves.22 This implies that there is no such thing 
as objective knowledge. According to Voegelin, once again, 
transcendence is neither a thing nor an object. The 
participation in the transcendental becomes luminous through
22 J.H. Rhodes, " V o e g e l i n  and C h r i s t i a n  Faith," Center Journal, 2 (Summer 1983), p . 65.
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a noetic exegesis of man’s existence, which belongs to the
realm of metaleptic reality. His concept of reality is,
therefore, neither the externality of things nor the
internality of thought or imagination. Reality is not an 
object to us, nor is it identifiable with the subject. It
is knowable to n o u s ,  or e p i s t e m e , yet only through the 
exegesis of the concrete experiences of concrete human
beings, existential experiences that are neither
idiosyncratic nor explainable in deterministic fashion.
To discern whether Voegelin’s political philosophy
implies that he is conducting the search for the objective
standard of truth as Warren charges, the traditional meaning
of philosophy and revelation should also be reexamined
asking again whether these sources offer any demonstrable
truths. We cannot deny that there are "authentic and
politically crucial truths that cannot be demonstrated by
what we call scientific method, and it is conceivable that
philosophy and revelation are alternative intellectual
avenues through which they are really known."23 However,
Warren oversimplifies that traditionalist political theory
presupposes objective conception of truth, because he fails
to recognize the significant discrepancies between
Voegelin’s and Strauss’ thought. For Strauss, "philosophy,
as quest for wisdom, is quest for universal knowledge, for
knowledge of the whole."24 But, as Rhodes expounds,
33 J.H. Rhodes, "Philosophy, Revelation, and Political Theory," J our n a l  o f  Politics, 49:4 (November 
1987), p.1037.
1{ L. Strauss, Ifhat Is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies (New York: Free Press, 1959), p . 11.
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Voegelin regards it as improper to formulate abstract 
definitions of philosophy, and to decree ontologies and 
methodologies on the basis of a personal preference for 
sense certainty.25 "The trouble with Strauss’s procedure 
was that it arbitrarily ignored man’s place in being, thus 
erring and presuming too much. Voegelin found in his early 
studies of consciousness that we have cognitive access to 
existence only through our experiences of participation in 
it."2 6
Warren, as other moderns, understands the somewhat 
elusive phrases such as "love of the divine sophon 
(wisdom)," "transcendence," and "the ground of being"--i.e ., 
ingredients of Voegelin’s definition of philosophy as 
symbolized by the Greek philosophers--as a claim that the 
inquirers acquire "objective knowledge of God." For Strauss 
thought that any proclamation about the transcendental was 
obliged "to allude somehow to objectivity."27 However, the 
very idea of apprehending objects is one of the 
misconceptions that Voegelin saw emanating from ignorance of 
the structure of consciousness. As Rhodes notes properly, 
"nobody could make headway with the problem of what the 
Greeks perceived without getting a clearer notion of what
25 J.H. Rhodes, " P hilosophy, R e v e l a t i o n ,  and. . . , "  p . 1045.
2t Ibid.
22 L. Strauss, "The Mutual Influence of Theology and Philosophy," I n d e p e n d e n t  J o u r n a l  of  Philosophy, 3 
(1979), p.114.
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occurs in experience."28 Voegelin’s initial investigations 
of this subject were influenced by Husserl and William 
James.2 9
The major point of Voegelin’s philosophical analysis 
distinct from Strauss’ is that Voegelin’s understanding of 
philosophy does not conceive of "objective knowledge" 
because philosophy does not experience God, divinity, 
transcendence, or ultimate reality as independent things or 
places that exist. For Voegelin, the symbols created by the 
Greek philosophers are "linguistic indices of the meditative 
movement"30 or "markers of processes experienced by man 
inwardly."31 Therefore, it is a fatal error to hypostatize, 
reify, or "thingify" these concepts. Voegelin has always
warned against hypostatizing or reifying the language 
of myth, religion and philosophy; he has exhorted his 
audiences not to mistake terms that communicate 
experiences for names of objective entities. For 
example, when Voegelin declared that a philosophy of 
history would concentrate on what happened in the 
psyche, or soul, the symbol psyche referred to the 
classical Greek experience of self as a site of 
illumination; it did not pertain to a thing attached to 
the body, divisible into so many parts, etc...A science 
of politics had to trace order to its origins, which 
lay where the ground of being touched man; this was why 
an e p i s t e m e  p o l i t i k e  had to be a philosophy of 
consciousness and history...History was identical with 
experiences of transcendence and participation... The 
transcendent God could be known only as a movement in 
man’s psyche because the process of the ground took
28 J.H. Rhodes, "Philosophy, Revelation, and...," p.1046.
28 In Chapter Two I have already aentioned the influence of Husserl. Concerning Williaa Janes’
influence on Voegelin’s thought, see E. Sandoz, The Voegelinian Revol u t i o n , pp.171-177.
88 E. Voegelin, A n a a n e s i s (English), p.175.
31 J.H. Rhodes, "Philo s o p h y ,  R e v e l a t i o n ,  and. . . , "  p. 1048 .
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place only in consciousness, not in the external world 
and, further, because the human mind had accordingly to 
its own experiences of the divine, and could not 
penetrate that reality in such a manner as to grasp it 
from within.32
It should be emphasized that people can know their 
participatory experiences of transcendent reality but not
that substance itself. In short, as Voegelin argues, the 
resistance to his views can typically be characterized as a 
sign of failure to grasp his experiential epistemology but, 
instead, to reify symbols originally intended to represent 
movements of divine reality in the m e t a x y . 33 Furthermore, 
the blunder committed by Warren comes from his selection of 
Straussian philosophy as the representative of
traditionalist political philosophy, or, more accurately, 
his inadvertent oversimplification of the Straussian
objectivistic conception of reality as representing the
traditionalist epistemology including that of Voegelin. 
Most commentators whose view is based on the post-positivism 
fail, as does Warren, to notice the discrepancies between 
Strauss and Voegelin by overlooking the precision of 
Voegelin’s political epistemology. As Warren confesses, it 
is certainly "an unforgivable oversimplification to claim 
that all the critics of behavioral ism who emerge from the 
revival of political theory... could take Strauss as their
32 J.H. Rhodes, "Voegelin and Christian Faith," pp.64-66.
33 Ibid., p.90.
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spokesman."34 It is my contention that Voegelin’s 
philosophical science of politics must not be identified 
simply as a resident in a traditionalist’s house represented 
by disparaged Straussian political philosophy.
It is worthwhile, at this time, comparing Voegelin and 
Gadamer. Just as Voegelin endeavored to cast about for an 
adequate theory of consciousness--as a response to the 
shortcomings of the various Neo-Kantianisms and of Husserl-- 
as also the most profound twentieth-century hermeneutic 
philosopher, "Hans-Georg Gadamer sought to free himself from 
the fetters of Cartesian, Kantian, and Husserlian 
’egology.’"35 Gadamer has also given, like Voegelin, a new 
life to the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle by striving to 
reveal the roots of classical philosophy. In the sense that 
Voegelin affirms two dimensions of the experience of truth 
that offer a contrast to the model provided by the modern 
scientific epistemology, his philosophy is equated with 
Gadamer’s .
The first is that truth is an experience, in which the 
knower is a constitutive element of the knowledge 
attained.36 In contrast to the scientific model of
objective knowledge which depicts the knower as a passive 
recipient of knowledge and removed from its object, both
34 S, Warren, The Emergence of Dialectical Theory, p.16.
35 Frederick Lawrence, "Voegelin and Theology as Hermeneutical and Political," J. Kirby t W.H.
Thompson, eds., Voegelin and the Theologian, p.316.
38 Susan Hekman, "From Epistemology to Ontology: Gadamer's Hermeneutics and Wittgensteinian Social 
Science," Hunan Studies, 6 (1983), p.208.
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Voegelin’s theory of consciousness and Gadamer’s analysis of 
the aesthetic experience reveal the knower as an active 
participant in the process. Second, both Voegelin’s and 
Gadamer’s analyses reveal that truth has an ontological 
dimension.37 The positivistic epistemology describes the 
act of knowing as strictly epistemological, that is, 
concerned solely with the constitution of the object of 
knowledge. But both Voegelin’s and Gadamer’s analyses 
reveal that knowledge involves the grasping of an object 
that is simultaneously revealing itself to the knower. That 
is, ontology precedes epistemology; the act of knowing 
entails that being is revealed.
Although there are some areas of agreement between 
Voegelin’s approach and the hermeneutic approach of Gadamer, 
however, there remains discrepancy. What is to be noted is 
that there is nothing in Gadamer like Voegelin’s treatment 
of the pneumatic differentiation of consciousness as 
complementary to the noetic differentiation.38 If we 
compare their respective treatments of Hegel overall, the 
major differences in tone and purport can hardly be 
overlooked. In a commentary on the comparison between 
Voegelin and Gadamer, Frederick Lawrence expresses this 
point very succinctly.
57 Ibid.
31 F. Lawrence, "Voegelin and Theology...," pp.327-328.
Concerning the contrast and complementarity of pneumatic and noetic modes of differentiation, see E. 
Sandoz, "Eric Voegelin and the Nature of Philosophy," M o d e m  Age, 13:2 (Spring 1969), pp.157-59.
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For Voegelin, Hegel is a prime example of pneumo­
pathology: Hegel not only as a promoter of ’second 
reality,’ but as a conscious sorcerer and magician as 
well. This does not mean that Gadamer for his part 
disregards Hegel’s failure in the direction of what 
Heidegger termed oblivion of being. But he is mainly 
out to make the best of Hegel, to show that even 
when he sells language out to logic and objectifying 
subjectivism, Hegel belies something of the 
significance of language in spite of himself...Voegelin 
conceives of [Hegel] as surveying the history of 
symbolization in order ’to diagnose the syndromes of 
untrue existence’ and ’to initiate, if possible, a 
healing process.’ The issue for him is the order or 
disorder within man and society. Gadamer thinks of 
[Hegel] more in terms of applying the truth of the 
tradition to the present.39
2. C O N S T R U C T I V E  D I M E N S I O N S
In the previous chapters we have seen that Voegelin’s 
political philosophy has much to offer the contemporary 
discipline of political study. It constitutes a landmark in 
political theory. By establishing a "new science of
politics," Voegelin’s political philosophy redefines the 
proper scope and method of contemporary political inquiry. 
The major concern of Voegelin is "restoration of political 
science" which means "a return to the consciousness of 
principles, not perhaps a return to the specific content of 
an earlier attempt."40 The "new science of politics" thus 
really means the restoration of the old great tradition of 
political science, as exemplified by Plato and Aristotle.
5S P. Lawrence, "Voegelin and Theology...," pp.327-328,
48 B. Voege l i n ,  The N e w  S c i e n c e  o f  Politics, h e r e a f t e r  fISP, p . 2.
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However, Voegelin is not concerned with reconstructing 
"Platonic philosophy" or "doctrine," but rather with the way 
in which Plato sought to resist the disorder of his own 
society and "his effort to restore the order of Hellenic 
civilization through love of wisdom,"41 because one "cannot 
restore political science today through Platonism, 
Augustinianism, or Hegelianism."42 He declares that
"political science cannot be restored to the dignity of a 
theoretical science in the strict sense by means of a 
literary renaissance of philosophical achievements of the 
past; the principles must be regained by a work of 
theoretization."4 3
Indeed, the "new science of politics" would be the 
first comprehensive, authentic, and committed effort since 
Aristotle and one that is free of "the ideological mortgages 
on the work of science"44 that have been the characteristic 
of positivistic tradition. The "new science" is, I believe, 
the most important and unique twentieth-century 
philosophical insights embodying an onto-theological 
orientation and capable of offering a "new," 
"revolutionary," and "restoring" understanding of the nature 
of political knowledge and reality.
41 E. Voegelin, O r d e r  a n d  History, vol.3, P l a t o  a n d  Arist o t l e , hereafter OH, III, p.5.
42 NSP, p.2.
43 Ibid.
44 E. Voegelin, O r d e r  a n d  History, vol.l, Israel and Hevelation, p.xii.
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Among the admirers of Voegelin’s philosophy, however, 
there is a controversy on the "revolutionary" character of 
his enterprise. Gerhart Niemeyer queries the title of 
Sandoz’s biographical introduction to Voegelin’s enterprise, 
T h e  V o e g e l i n i a n  R e v o l u t i o n .  Niemeyer asserts that Sandoz’s 
claims to "revolution" on behalf of Voegelin do not fit.45 
Here it is required to refer to the distinction between 
normal and revolutionary science which had been the linchpin 
of Kuhn’s theory of scientific change. Kuhn explains great 
revolutions in natural science, such as the Copernican, 
Newtonian, and Einsteinian revolutions. These revolutions 
occurred as the result of crises that arise when phenomena 
cannot be explained in terms of the basic postulates of the 
established science, hence are treated as anomalies, and new 
basic postulates are required. The new basic postulates 
that are devised to explain what were previously to be 
anomalous become the core of a new scientific "paradigm."46 
And, as a conceding response to his critics, Kuhn 
acknowledges in his essay "Reflections on My Critics," that 
all normal science would, to some unspecified degree, be 
revolutionary, because small-scale mini-revolutions occur 
frequently in the history of science.47 That is, Kuhn’s
45 G. Niemeyer, "Book Review: The Voegelinian Revolution," Review of Politics, 45:1 (January 1983], 
pp.134-35.
44 T. Kuhn, The S t r u c t u r e  o f  S c i e n t i f i c  Revolu t i o n s , 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1970).
47 T. Kuhn, "Reflections on Hy Critics," in Imre Lakatos and Alan Husgrave, eds., Criticism and the 
G r o w t h  o f  K n o w l e d g e (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp,249-50,
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account of scientific change has been transformed into a 
theory of permanent revolution.48 Viewed from the Kuhnian 
conception of scientific revolutions, however, Sandoz’s 
illustration of the revolutionary quality of Voegelin’s work 
is adequate and justifiable. Furthermore, with regard to 
Sandoz’s reference to the "Voegelinian Revolution," Ronald 
Puhek affirms that "Sandoz deliberately uses the word 
revolution in a special sense. Obviously, Voegelin has not- 
-at least not yet--produced a revolution in political 
science. Sandoz does not imply he has, but argues that 
Voegelin’s thought is itself a revolution."49 Sandoz 
writes:
For Voegelin is neither an eccentric nor merely a 
maverick. He is a genuinely revolutionary figure whose 
"new science of politics" cuts to the very roots of 
tendencies in the humane disciplines which have grown 
over a period of centuries. Any scientific revolution 
is difficult to effect, as the history of Einsteinian 
physics attests. The task is doubly difficult in the 
philosophical sciences which so immediately confront 
the passions of men and the weight of intellectual 
vested interests...[Voegelin] does not speak the 
language of a political science establishment dedicated 
to scientism and dogmatically committed to 
quantification of the subject matter of politics in the 
positivistic mode--and equally committed to the neglect 
of those sectors of political reality which do not lend 
themselves to treatment by this method.50
,J Terence Ball, "Is There Progress in Political Science?," in T. Ball, ed., fdioas of Inquiry: 
C r i t i q u e  a n d  R e n e w a l  in P o l i t i c a l  S c i e n c e (Albany,NY: SUNY Press, 198?}, p.19.
<9 R. Puhek, "Book Review: The Voegelinian Revolution," Aaerican Polit i c a l  S c i e n c e  Review, 74:4
(Deceaber 1982), p.970.
51 E. Sandoz, "The Science and D e a o n o l o g y  of Polit i c s , "  Intercollegiate Review, 5:2 (Winter 1968-
1969), p . 121.
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Moreover, we can discern twofold features of what is 
revolutionary in Voegelinian philosophical science of 
politics in relation to political inquiry. First, it is the 
recovery of ontology as the basis of epistemology. In 
political positivism as scientism and scientific 
epistemology, ontological issues are ignored or the ontology 
of man is defined in terms of the epistemological model of 
the physical sciences. It is ignorant of man as a self- 
reflective being capable of participating in the tensional 
existence. If the aim of political inquiry is to make a 
theoretical framework of the nature of political things as 
they are, scientific epistemology takes for granted the 
fundamental ontological difference between what is uniquely 
human and what is merely natural, organic, or artificial. 
However, political positivism inevitably results in a false 
immanentized eschatology of techniques for the same reason 
that it is ignorant of the primacy of ontology over 
epistemology. And, second, what is radical and
revolutionary in Voegelinian political philosophy is the 
self-examination of consciousness itself as human 
existential experience.
Voegelin draws up a comprehensive program for the "new 
science":
The understanding of ontology as well as the 
craftsmanship of metaphysical speculation had to be 
regained, and especially philosophical anthropology as 
a science had to be re-established. By the standards 
thus regained it was possible to define with precision 
the technical points of irrationality in the 
positivistic position. For this purpose the works of
4 1 8
the leading positivistic thinkers had to be analyzed 
with care in order to find their critical rejections 
of rational arguments; one had, for instance, to show 
the passages in the works of Comte and Marx where these 
thinkers recognized the validity of metaphysical 
questions but refused to consider them because such 
consideration would make their irrational opining 
impossible. When the study proceeded further to the 
motivations of irrationalism, positivistic thinking had 
to be determined as a variant of theologizing, again on 
the basis of the sources; and the underlying religious 
experiences had to be diagnosed. This diagnosis could 
be conducted successfully only if a general theory of 
religious phenomena was sufficiently elaborated to 
allow the subsumption of the concrete case under a 
type. The further generalization concerning the 
connection of degrees of rationality with religious 
experiences, and the comparison with Greek and 
Christian instances, required a renewed study of Greek 
philosophy that would bring out the connection between 
the unfolding of Greek metaphysics and the religious 
experiences of the philosophers who developed it; and a 
further study of medieval metaphysics had to establish 
the corresponding connection for the Christian case.
It had, moreover, to demonstrate the characteristic 
differences between Greek and Christian metaphysics 
which could be attributed to the religious differences. 
And when all these preparatory studies were made, when 
critical concepts for treatment of the problems were 
formed, and the propositions were supported by the 
sources, the final task had to be faced of searching 
for a theoretically intelligible order of history into 
which these variegated phenomena could be organized.51
This statement both describes what has been done and 
sketches what needs to be done. Voegelin’s articulation of 
the "new science" on behalf of classical political
philosophy is sufficient for exposing the theoretical
narrowness and inadequacies of positivistic dogma and
scientific epistemology in political study. Voegelin’s
experiential epistemology of transcendental truth proved 
that "there could be knowledge of right order, thus rescuing 
5”'Tsp7pp”25-6............ .
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politics from the dead-end of positivism."52 Voegelin’s 
philosophical enterprise finds that positivistic 
epistemology in political inquiry not only neglects but in 
fact defies the onto-theological grounds of political life.
Moreover, positivism is, in its effects and uses, as 
Voegelin notes, a modern form of gnosticism for it connotes 
"abolishing the constitution of being, with its origins in 
divine, transcendent being, and replacing it with world- 
immanent order of being, the perfection of which lies in the 
realm of human action."53 The destructive effect of modern 
positivistic tradition stems from the fact that positivism, 
itself an ideology, is grimly resolved to exclude from 
reality what nevertheless is part of reality, and to forbid 
to inquirers any search about questions which nevertheless 
are being asked. From positions of exalted academic 
prestige they control research and ban anything resembling 
Plato’s e p i s t e m e  p o l i t i l c e . In positivistic political
inquiry, the eclipse of onto-theological grounds of 
political life has meant not only the divorce of political 
life from ultimate, divine purpose but also, subsequently, 
the establishment of human power as the primary and, 
ultimately, the only purpose of politics. The point of 
Voegelin’s perspective is that political positivism, 
regardless of whether or not the practicing inquirers are
” J.K. Rhodes, "Voegelin and Christian Faith," C e n t e r  Journal, 2 (Sumner 1983), p.60.
S3 E. Voegelin, Science, Politics, a n d  Gnosticisn, trans. by Killian J. Fitzpatrick (Chicago: Henry 
Regnery Co., 1988), p.99. Hereafter SPG.
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aware of it, propagandizes its own theoretical assumption-- 
only the factual is real--and, therefore, promulgates the
view that only ..d.P..m.iJQ.a.ndi. is the proper subject of
intellectual analysis. In the name of science--in the 
modern rationalistic sense--the science of philosophical 
questioning is itself challenged as pseudo-science or non­
science, and the human experience of a transcendent Being is 
defined as superstition. It is an abominable irony!
For Voegelin the current dominance of positivism in 
political inquiry is a self-willed restriction in the scope 
of discourse. The consequence of the restriction is that 
the contemporary discipline of political inquiry cannot 
account for its own significance. On the other hand, it 
fails to train citizens to reflect upon the a g a t h o n ,  to 
develop values, and to act according to them. It assumes 
that values and purposes are merely subjective "givens" 
rather than difficult discoveries dependent upon the endless 
and arduous development of each person’s humanity gained 
through a process of existential tension. Once theory is 
destroyed, however, its reconstruction is extremely 
di f f icult.
By developing an onto-epistemic framework of a 
philosophical science of politics, Voegelin has really given 
us a new, deeper, and more accurate reading of Plato and 
Aristotle. The analysis of the thought of Plato and 
Aristotle reflects a brilliant, subtle mind and displays an 
erudition that few scholars can match. It is a remarkable
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intellectual achievement; but more importantly it is, along 
with his other enterprises, an adventure in philosophy not 
unlike the one undertaken by Plato himself. "Like Plato, 
Voegelin is intent upon helping us, if we want to be helped, 
to turn around toward the true source of order. He shows us 
how Plato and Aristotle responded to the disorder of their 
times by cultivating the reason that was solicited by the 
divine reason to acknowledge the good as the ground of all 
being. Voegelin does not claim, as Plato did not claim, to 
know the ultimate truth."54
Voegelin has rediscovered and restored the science of
politics on the basis of "critical, theoretical standards
for the interpretation of human existence," thereby enabling
us to make value distinctions regarding political order not
as a matter of sheer opinion but of strictly disciplined
theory.55 Voegelin’s great achievement is to have restored
the "scientific" character of political science, e p i s t e m e
p o l i t i k e , the science of order turning on speculations about
transcendent reality. Science in onto-epistemic sense
always rests on a foundation of existential experience.
Political science is no exception.56 The establishment of
e p i s t e m e  p o l i t i k e  implies a realization that being in the
world is contingent on the transcendent source of being
5< J.H. Hallowell, "Existence in Tension," in S.A. HcKnight, ed., Eric V o e g e l i n ' s  Sea r c h  for O r d e r  in 
History, p.121.
55 G. Niemeyer, "Greatness in Political Science: Eric Voegelin (1901-1985)," H o d e r n  Age, 29:2 (Spring
1985), p.108.
55 G. N iemeyer, "Eric V o e g e l i n ’s A c h i e v e m e n t , "  Hodern Age, 11 (1965), p . 135.
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which is the source of its order. For Plato and Aristotle, 
e p i s t e m e  p o l i t i k e , authentic political knowledge, was based 
on the dependence of earthly being on transcendent Being. 
In short, Voegelinian "new science" is a "science of man," 
science of the human being, more particularly, science of 
human consciousness. In the "new science," to "understand 
the various historical forms societies take, it is necessary 
to understand the experience of order they are based on." 
Thus, "the heart of the ’new science’ is the experiential 
rather than the experimental; it focuses on the experience 
of peoples past and on the experience of the political 
scientist present."57
Assailing the "disorders" of our time in his works, 
Voegelin holds that, as we have witnessed earlier, the 
remedy against the disorder of modernity is philosophical 
inquiry. He considers that most comprehensive knowledge of 
political reality is attained primarily through the 
philosophical investigation (z e t e m a ), in which the subject 
of the z e t e m a  is man the political living being in the 
fullness of his humanity.58 The objective of the z e t e m a  is 
the reality sought and known as a fragment of any aspect of 
the whole existent truth, and the purpose of the knowledge 
gained is to assist man to live in a well-ordered and happy 
community with his fellows.59
5T R.E. Puhek, "Book Review: The Voegleinian Revolution," American Po l i t i c a l  Scie n c e  R e v i e v, 74:1
(December 1982), p.970.
51 OR, III, pp.81-88.
55 Ibid., pp.320-21.
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In this respect, political philosophy in the classical 
sense is necessarily a detached criticism of every 
conventional regime, historically existing society. It 
explains oppression; it explains why rulers tend to become 
tyrants; it explains why society always tries to dominate 
individuals. For the healthy soul is the standard for the 
judgment of societies and the key to understanding them. 
And political philosophy must be necessarily evaluative. 
The politics of the soul is also a negative wisdom which 
advises us not to expect perfect conditions in any society, 
a temptation especially strong in today’s developing 
countries, because nothing can be permanent, or perfect in 
time. The great task of political philosophy is, thus, to 
correctly direct the course of personal salvation through 
this world of affairs and into the beyond. And the task of 
political philosophy in societal salvation or saving 
societies can be accomplished through personal salvation or 
saving individual souls. However, what has afflicted human 
beings for two millennia in political history is the fact 
that the gnostic deformation of eschatological consciousness 
accompanies the growth of this awareness from its beginning. 
The "parallel process" is still obscure in many respects, so 
obscure in fact that even its reality is doubted. Voegelin 
goes on to say that the "attempt to come to grips with the 
problems of personal and social order when it is disrupted 
by gnosticism...has not been very successful because the
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philosophical knowledge that would be required for the 
purpose has itself been destroyed by the prevailing 
intellectual climate. The struggle against the consequences 




The leitmotif of this dissertation is to criticize 
positivistic epistemology in political inquiry on behalf of 
the reconstruction of Eric Voegelin’s philosophical science 
of politics. In this dissertation I have attempted to 
explicate the development of Eric Voegelin’s philosophical 
science of politics and establish its significance for 
political inquiry. Since my primary intention is to 
elucidate Voegelin’s thought as best as I understand it and 
to draw out its implications to the nature of political 
knowledge and reality, my treatment of his work has been 
more expository than polemical.
I have emphasized that Voegelin’s political philosophy 
provides not only the foundation of political society, but 
also guidance and direction for the political inquiry. Eric 
Voegelin’s contribution to contemporary political theory is 
"to have made a philosophically profound and superbly
creative effort to restore the tradition of political theory 
as an experiential science of right order in our time."1 
Indeed, Voegelin’s philosophical science of politics is an 
"empirical" undertaking, not in the empirico-positivistic
1 D, Gernino, "Eric Voegelin’s Contribution to Contemporary Political Theory," R e v i e v  o f  Politics,
26:3 (July 1964), p.399.
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sense but in the sense that it is an investigation of 
experiences by which man seeks to become aware of the ground 
of being as such. This conception of experience, or 
empirical, is sharply distinct from that of positivistic 
scientism. Experience to Voegelin embraces man’s
participation in multiple dimensions of reality. It
includes confrontations and relations that extend far beyond 
the limits of sense perception. Reality, according to 
Voegelin, lies in the man’s experience of order, the 
experience which requires that the man’s soul be open to the 
divine, transcendent. The experience of order confirms the 
existence of order, or of what Voegelin frequently calls the 
divine ground of being. "It is Voegelin’s contention that 
order in history depends upon the recognition of the 
transcendental source of order; disorder is engendered by 
the "immanentization" of this source."2 It is essential to 
recognize that Voegelin conceives of political theory not as 
an ideology, utopia, or scientific methodology, but as an 
experiential science of right order in the soul and in 
society.
To quote Sandoz, ”[t]he experiential foundation of the 
science of politics, and the very source of scientific 
objectivity, is man’s prescientific participation in all of 
the realms of being from the somatic and simply sentient to 
moral, aesthetic and mystical levels of experience. This 
existential participation is the means whereby man attunes
Stanley  Rosen, ' O r d e r  and H i s t o r y , '  Reviev of  Metaph y s i c s ,  12:2 (De c e m b e r  1958 ), p . 25?.
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himself with reality and gains the primordial grip on the 
whole of being which is the foundation of all knowledge."3 
As Walker Percy, a Catholic novelist, recognizes, "there is 
a metascientific, metacultural reality, an order of being 
apart from the scientific and cultural symbols with which it 
is grasped and expressed."4 There is a prescientific or 
"common sense"5 knowledge of political reality that
constitutes the beginning and the basis of any more
sophisticated political knowledge. Reliance of political 
philosophy upon prescientific or "common sense" is "not 
uncritical, but it is not superficial. To attain knowledge 
about politics, one must attend closely to the actual 
experience of citizens and to the symbols with which they 
themselves interpret that experience."6
I have described Voegelinian philosophical science of 
politics as a new, revolutionary way of political inquiry. 
What is needed in the modern age which has no "theory of man 
as man" is a radically "new anthropology."7 Voegelinian 
philosophical science of politics, i.e., noetic science, 
"signals the abandonment of the sciences of the external
3 E. Sandoz, "The Philosophical Science of Politics Beyond Behav'ioralism," in G.J. Graham 4 G.W.
Carey, eds., The Post-Behavioral Era, p.298.
4 Walker Percy, The Message in the Bottle: Hov Queer Man Is, Hov Queer Language Is, and What One Has
to Do krith the Other (New York: Farrar, Straus 4 Giroux, 1975 ), p.242.
5 With regard to the appreciation of the concept "common sense," see E, Sandoz, The Voegelinian 
Revolution, pp.19, 29, 4 164.
4 Douglas Sturm, "Politics and Divinity," Thought, 52:207 (December 1977), p.348.
T Cecil L. Eubanks, "Walker Percy: Eschatology and the Politics of Grace," Jac Tharpe, ed., Walker 
Percy: Art and Ethics (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1980), p.122.
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world as the model of the science of man. It proffers 
science in a new mode."8 "The Voegelinian Revolution...is
more than a new science of politics. It is a comprehensive 
new science of man..."9 The centerpiece of Voegelin’s
political philosophy is his theory of consciousness.
Voegelin writes: "Consciousness is the luminous center
radiating the concrete order of human existence into society 
and history. A philosophy is empirical--in the pregnant
sense of an inquiry into the experiences which penetrate the 
whole area of reality that we express by the symbol ’man’ 
with their order. The work of this philosophy
requires... the constant exchange between studies on concrete 
cases of order and analyses of consciousness which make the 
human order in society and history intelligible. Since the 
analyses of consciousness presupposes the historical 
phenomena of order...a series of special studies... want to 
stress the close empirical correlation between the analysis 
of consciousness and the phenomena of order. As the 
consciousness is the center that radiates the concrete order 
of human existence into society and history, so the 
empiricism of social and historical phenomena of order 
reaches into the empiricism of consciousness and its 
experiences of participation."10
* E. Sandoz, The V o e g e l i n i a n  R evolution, p.199. 
s Ibid., p.188.
111 E. Voegelin, Anamnesis (German), pp.8-9. The Foreword to Anamnesis is translated and reprinted in
The B e g i n n i n g  a n d  the Beyond; Pape r s from the Gadamer a n d  Voegelin C o n f e r e n c e s Supplementary Issue of 
L o n e r g a n  W orkshop, vol.4, ed. by Fred Lawrence (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1 984 ), p.36.
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I also have attempted to illuminate his political 
philosophy by contrasting it to the modern rationalistic- 
positivistic epistemology. I have noted a failure on the 
part of most practitioners of political positivism to 
investigate political reality, a failure that I believe 
makes the contemporary study of politics obsolete and 
incomplete. What I have stressed in the Introduction and 
Chapter One is that the advocates of political positivism 
affirm the primacy of epistemology. The epistemological 
authority of modern rationalistic-positivistic tradition was 
modern science. The positivistic epistemology is based on 
the inherent position that ontology is unnecessary for 
growth in knowledge or understanding of political reality. 
Therefore, the practitioners of political positivism assume 
that progress in political science depends essentially on 
the articulation of a positivistic epistemological 
foundation for the enterprises. But the primacy of 
epistemology manifests itself in the "method fetishism,"11 
in the belief that the perfection of instruments of 
analysis, e.g., the rules of logic, test procedures, 
computer programs, will allow the practitioners to seek 
truth out of their encounters with the world. The absurd 
level of the positivistic epistemology is most dramatically 
expressed in the inability of modern scientists to place 
their discoveries in the context of human life.
11 Hila r y  Putnam, Reason, Truth, and H istory  (Cambridge: C a m b r i d g e  U n i v e r s i t y  Press, 1981), p . 188.
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On the contrary, the key conception underlying 
Voegelin’s philosophical science is the harmonizing of 
ontology with epistemology. In his reading of classical 
Greek thought, to which he has repeatedly referred as an 
example of "a truly relevant political science," political 
science is both a cognitive and an existential--that is, an 
epistemological and an ontological--achievement. The kind 
of knowledge required in order to judge correctly among 
opinions about the good is possible only if one achieves 
that form of existence in which the measure of reality 
becomes known through man’s self-conscious participation in 
its order. From this perspective, then, cognitive insight 
is an existential event and the "knowledge" gained by such 
an insight can be properly understood by another only if he 
is capable of systematically experiencing the event 
itself.12 Thus, according to Voegelin, a theorist-
philosopher-scientist is able to do his work only because he 
does, in fact, practice a certain way of life, i.e., z e t e m a .  
By attuning himself to the transcendent order of reality, he 
is able to achieve that conscious participation in being 
which forms the basis of his knowledge. That knowledge, in 
turn, accounts for that existential harmony which is 
characteristic of the philosophical life.
Philosophy, Voegelin emphatically and repeatedly 
insists, is "not a proof for the existence of God, for a
12 James Wiser, "Eric Voegelin: A Study in the Renewal of Political Science," Polity, 18:2 (Winter, 
1985), p.302.
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Prime Mover, for Spirit, or for Natural Right. Such a proof 
is not necessary, and when offered merely occasions counter­
claims. It is not necessary, because philosophy is, or 
originates in, the experience of order."13 Philosophy is 
clarified by the notion of the m e t a x y .  The content of 
philosophy is the soul’s tension toward the divine, a 
relationship which by its nature of flux and uncertainty can 
only be symbolized and never made fixed in propositions. 
Therefore, Voegelin contends that philosophy is a search for 
order; that the source of order is the divine ground; that 
man possesses the faculty for communicating with or 
participating in the divine.
To Voegelin, political "philosophy," political 
"science" and political "theory" are inseparably bound 
together. The object of the critical reflection induced by 
the activity of t h e o r i a  is e p i s t e m e  p o l i t i k e .  Therefore, 
without an ontologically grounded theory of politics, a 
fully developed political science is impossible. When 
political science is fully developed, it will contain a 
comprehensive inventory of all the relevant problems. Such 
an inventory can be organized under three headings: ethics,
politics proper, and history. Today, for the first time in 
centuries, the materials are available and the intellectual 
climate is suitable for great advances in the theoretical 
analysis of politics. These advances presuppose a recovery 
of the achievements of the Platonic-Aristotelian e p i s t e m e , 
i’ Patrick Coby, "Book Review: 4nannesis (English)/ The Thoaist, 44:3 (July 1980), p.461.
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nearly lost during the period since 1500, a period which has 
witnessed the triumph of fallacious gnostic symbolizations.
By probing to those experiences which lie at the center 
of our disorder, in the individual soul as well as society, 
Voegelin’s analysis of gnostic deformation of reality, human 
consciousness, and history "becomes both a model for future 
scholarship and a noetic evocation to join in the search for 
the true source of our order."14 Voegelin is a paradigmatic 
scholar, philosopher, and historian, one of the most 
profound explorers of political reality. "It is only fair 
to surmise that Voegelin’s name will acquire ever-greater 
luster in the years ahead."15
14 Michael Dillon, "Symbolization and the Search for Order," The Intercollegiate Review, 11:2 (Winter- 
Spring, 1976 ), pp. 105ff.
15 Robert Nisbet, "Eric Voegelin’s Vision: Book Review," lie Pub l i c  Interest, 71 (Spring 1983 ), p.112.
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